



**TARAS SHEVCHENKO NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF KYIV
FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY**

PHILOSOPHY:

THE EDUCATIONAL-METHODICAL MANUAL

TARAS SHEVCHENKO NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF KYIV
FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY

The Department of
Philosophy of Humanities

Philosophy:
THE EDUCATIONAL-
METHODICAL
MANUAL

For English-speaking students
*of Educational Program **Economics,***
*Educational Level **Bachelor***

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WORKING PROGRAM OF DISCIPLINE

1. The purpose of the discipline “Philosophy” is to develop the ability of scientific thinking by considering and grasping the conceptual and methodological heritage of fundamental trends of philosophy, as well as the ability to apply the acquired knowledge in analysis of contemporary realities of social being, in particular, of economic life.

2. Prerequisites for mastering or choosing a discipline:

1. *Know* the background categories and the basic concepts of fundamental philosophical trends that emerged, primarily, within the framework of European philosophy.
2. *Possess* the skills of conceptual thinking in terms of ability to deal with the definitions and formulate the complex worldview issues.

3. Annotation of the discipline

The course structure has two modules:

Content module 1. Introduction to philosophy, its subject matter and approaches.

Content module 2. Socio-cultural and economic backgrounds of fundamental philosophical problems.

Module 1. “Introduction to philosophy, its subject matter and approaches” is aimed at the study of the conceptual and methodological basis of philosophy, as well as its determining influence on development of humanities as such.

Module 2. “Socio-cultural and economic backgrounds of fundamental philosophical problems” covers the issues, which are closely related to comprehending the essence of social, cultural, political, and economic phenomena in the context of modern and postmodern eras.

4. The main objective of the discipline is to form the abilities of philosophical thought and philosophical understanding of the relationships between humanity and the world, including their social, economic, and cultural dimensions.

Competences:

- general competences (GC 2 – the ability to conserve of moral, cultural and scientific values and increase the

achievements of society based on an understanding of the history and patterns of development of the subject area, its place in the general system of knowledge about nature and society and in the development of society, technics and technology, to use various types and forms of motor activity for active recreation and leading a healthy lifestyle; GC 3 – the ability to think abstractly, to analyze and to synthesize;) GC 6 – ability to communicate in a foreign language;

- special competences (SC 14 – the ability to in-depth analyze issues and phenomena in one or more professional fields, taking into account economic risks and possible socio-economic consequences).

5. The results of the discipline are as follows:

<i>Results of the study</i> (1. know; 2. be able to; 3. communication*; 4. autonomy and responsibility*)		<i>Methods of studying</i>	<i>Methods of evaluation</i>	<i>Percent in total score</i>
Code	Result of the study			
1.1	contemporary meanings of fundamental philosophical notions and categories; particularities of development for basic philosophical approaches that have impacted on the methods of humanities.	<i>Lecture, practice, individual student's self-study</i>	<i>Oral examination, module test, individual student's self-study, exam</i>	40%
1.2.	the historical and sociocultural transformations and civilization risks for grasping of the place and significance of economic area in the existing system of social relation	<i>Lecture, practice, individual student's self-study</i>	<i>Oral examination, module test, individual student's self-study, exam</i>	20%
2.1.	to apply the philosophical concepts and ideas as tools for improving the acquired knowledge in economics.	<i>Lecture, practice, individual student's self-study</i>	<i>Oral examination, module test, individual student's self-study, exam</i>	10%

2.2.	to comprehend the socio-cultural and political transformations, caused by an essential transformation in the economic area.	<i>Lecture, practice, individual student's self-study</i>	<i>Oral examination, module test, individual student's self-study, exam</i>	10%
2.3.	to apply knowledge to solve practical problems	<i>Lecture, practice, individual student's self-study</i>	<i>Oral examination, individual student's self-study, exam</i>	20%

6. The correlation of learning outcomes of the discipline with the program learning outcomes

Results of study Program results of study	1.1	1.2	2.1	2.2.	2.3.
PRS12. To apply the acquired theoretical knowledge to solve practical problems and interpret the obtained results in a meaningful way.		+	+		+
PRS15. To demonstrate the basic skills of creative and critical thinking in research and professional communication.	+	+			
PRS23. To show skills of independent work, demonstrate critical, creative, self-critical thinking.	+		+	+	
PRS24. To demonstrate the ability to act socially and consciously on the basis of ethical principles, to appreciate and respect cultural diversity, individual differences of people.					+

7. The scheme of score forming:

7.1. The forms of evaluation (max. 60 points, min – 36 points): – semester evaluation:

- 1. Participation in seminars** (reports, additions, discussions of complex issues (RS 1.1, RS 1.2, RS 2.1, RS 2.2, RS 2.3) – max. 42 points / min. 28 points.
- 2. Test** – (RS 1.1, RS 1.2; RS 2.1, RS 2.2, RS 2.3) – max. 10 points / min. 4 points.
- 3. Individual student's work** (abstracts, essays (RS 2.1, RS 2.3, RS 2.4, RS 2.5, RS 3.2, RS 4.1, RS 4.2) – max. 8 points / min. 4 points.

– final evaluation in the form of the exam:

A student is not allowed to take the exam if he / she received less than 36 points during the semester. If the student's grade on the exam is lower than the minimum threshold level (24 points), the points for the exam are not added to the semester grade (considered equal to zero), and the final grade in the discipline is unsatisfactory.

There are 3 questions for the exam: 2 from them – theoretical questions and the last one – the practical.

*	Semester scores	Exam / pass/fail test	Total score
Minimum	36	24	60
Maximum	60	40	100

7.2. Evaluation

7.2.1. Seminars are held in accordance with the curriculum, for the academic group every week on the zoom online platform during distance/mixed learning.

7.2.2. Control works are carried out after the content parts of the discipline are worked out in accordance with the educational process. Test papers are written during extracurricular hours in compliance with the deadline and sent to the teacher's work email address for verification during distance/mixed learning.

7.2.2. Individual student's study (Self-student's work) is performed on a calendar basis and takes place in several stages: choosing the primary source for reading, approving the work, searching for additional materials and information, writing the text.

* In case of additional issues and difficult situations during the educational process, their solution is carried out with reference to the principles of the Regulations on the organization of the educational process at the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv.

7.3. The scale of correspondence

Excellent	90-100
Good	75-89
Satisfactory	60-74
Fail	0-59

STRUCTURE OF THE COURSE DISCIPLINE THEMATIC PLAN OF LECTURES

№	TOPIC	Hours		
		Lectures	Seminars	I/W
Module 1 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY, ITS SUBJECT MATTER AND APPROACHES				
1.	Philosophy in the context of its traditional approaches.	2	2	10
2.	The historical development of Western philosophy, and its main branches.	2	2	10
3.	The metaphysical core of ontology.	2	2	10
4.	The most relevant narratives in philosophical anthropology.	2	2	10
5.	Consciousness as a philosophical issue.	2	1	10
	Module 1 test	X	1	
Module 1 total		10	10	50
Module 2 SOCIO-CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUNDS OF FUNDAMENTAL PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS				
6.	The social issues of philosophical theory.	2	1	9
7.	Structuralism and the issue of social structure.	2	2	6
8.	Institutional power as the basis of social systems.	2	2	10
9.	Mass society in the context of modern theory of capitalism and related Globalization.	2	2	6
	Module 2 test	X	1	
Module 2 total		8	8	31
Total		18	18	81

Total hours: 120 hours:

Lectures: 18 hours;

Seminars: 18 hours;

Consulting: 3 hours;

Self-student's work: 81 hours.

COMPLEX OF LECTURES

TOPIC 1. Philosophy in Terms of its Traditional Approaches.

1.1. Philosophy and metaphysics. It is well known that the original meaning of the word “philosophy” is directly associated with Greek Antiquity. The term “philosophy” is borrowed from combining two Greek words: “*philio*”, which literally means “love” in terms of a simple attachment to something, and “*sophia*” with the meaning “wisdom”^[1].

The *subject matter of philosophy* is generally defined as the relationship between the world and human being in the context of comprehending their *essence*, including the *essence* of this relationship^[2], therefore the key concept of philosophical thinking is the *category* “*essence*”.

Category – is a concept, symbolizing the highest level of generalization and understanding the natural, sociocultural, and mental phenomena.

Essence – is a fundamental category of philosophical thinking that designates the immanent origins of things or phenomena, which are primary for them, and which are determined by the needed connections and fundamental principles of their existences.

Therefore, philosophy is mostly *a skill to work out of definitions*. It is this ability that is the distinctive principle for the entire philosophical thinking: for example, the above-mentioned definitions of *essence and category*.

To put it another way, philosophy is, primarily, thinking by means of the most abstract notions, that is, by means of the categories, as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) claimed. It is Hegel who quite reasonably considered philosophy as the highest type of scientific *worldview*, or the *Science of sciences*, aimed at comprehending the world in terms of its *entirety* and fundamental origins, *prime-causes* or *principles*, grounds.

Worldview is the effect of a meaningful experience of the world in its entirety on the part of personality or some group of individuals, understanding the place in it through the prism of acceptance, or vice versa – rejection of established answers to the most important existential questions.

Philosophy performs a number of functions, namely, *methodological, conceptual and humanistic ones*. The methodological function is to elaborate and substantiate those methods (approaches), which are used in humanities *per se*. The conceptual function provides the formation and development of the key scientific concepts and categories, and finally, the humanistic one *is brought about by humanism* as a fundamental principle in consideration of main worldview problems in the context of human *existence*.

The philosophical thinking was always aimed at comprehending the being in terms of its fundamental principles. This way of thinking got the title *metaphysics*.

Metaphysics is the philosophical theory about prime principles (origins) of being, or, a certain style of thinking, which is associated only with philosophy since it has the highest level of conceptualization and generalization; a way of thinking, which is grounded on reducing all that exists to some single principle.

Aristotle, for example, classified *metaphysics as the science of supersensible*. Another prominent philosopher, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, while describing metaphysics from a point of view of common sense, claimed that *philosophy is “the world turned upside down”*.

Thus, philosophy is, mostly, *ontology*.^[3] In other words, it is ontology that has been a fundamental branch of philosophical science for a long time, which is defined *as the science on the essence and the forms of being, including the human presence*.

Furthermore, in the history of Western philosophy, ontology traditionally was presented in the form of *natural-philosophical metaphysics*, that laid the foundations for all philosophical thinking, especially, in former periods. In regard to this fact, naturally, according to most philosophers, philosophy was, primarily, *metaphysics*.

Indeed, the *major metaphysical issue was related to the question about the very origins of the existent world, namely, the world of nature*, which was, as a rule, considered in terms of the primacy of “idea” or “matter”. These notions were regarded as the traditional categories of classical philosophy.

In the context of the above stated, the philosophical thinking tended to the idealistic or materialistic “ontology” or metaphysics in the past,

despite the fact that such generalization is obviously simplified. Take for example a famous system of *absolute idealism* that was elaborated by the above quoted Hegel. According to Hegel the matter is the result of “divine idea” activity, therefore it is the idea that is the prime cause of being.

The issue of the correlation between “matter” and “idea” has been the fundamental philosophical worldview issue for a long time, especially within the frameworks of natural-metaphysics, which manifested its main principle, namely, the highest level of generalization, consisting in reducing of “all that exists” to the general principle or “prime-cause”.

A vivid example of the above “reducing” process is the natural-philosophical concept of “*substance*”^[4]. But, in relation to what exactly contemporary metaphysics is, we have a variety of viewpoints that, apparently, is due to various stages of the historical development of philosophical thinking. It has relevance for the establishment of the so-called *existential* elucidation of metaphysics as the science of spiritual phenomena in the 20th century.

What does the concept of *existence* mean within the framework of contemporary philosophy?

Existence is the main category of existentialism and contemporary philosophy, which designates an inner world of personality in terms of certain spiritual needs, experience, and values, for example, the need for God, faith, protection, primarily, overcoming the fear of death, etc.

Meanwhile, if we ask a question, how exactly the *existence* is defined in existential philosophy, we will scarcely find a unanimously shared definition. In order to clarify this solely philosophical concept, one can refer to the outstanding words of modern German philosopher, namely of Karl Jaspers (1883–1969), who wrote: “what in the mythological way of expression is called *soul* and *God*, in the philosophical way of this is called *existence* and *transcendence*”^[5].

Having been a founder of German existentialism Martin Heidegger claimed (1889–1976): “what is termed “existence”, should, first of all, be experienced and consequently then thought of a place *the habitat of the truth of being*”, as an expression solely for human being, which the philosopher entitled “*Dasein*” in the sense of human presence.

It was Heidegger who offered the existential vision of metaphysics and insisted that the major metaphysical question should be related to the issue of “*nothing*” [put it in a German language “*das Nichts*”], rather than to the question of *being*: “Our question about *nothing* should lead us to metaphysics itself. The term “metaphysics” stems from the Greek μετὰ ἄτ φυσικά. This remarkable phrase was later interpreted to be the indication of a question that goes “beyond” μετὰ (trans) be-ing as such a going progression “after” be-ing as be-ing as a whole happens in the question about *nothing*. In this way it is shown to be a “metaphysical” question”^[6].

Nowadays in the postmodern period of philosophy we can observe the continuation of metaphysical way of thinking, since within the framework of certain *paradigms* such concepts as “producing”, “structure”, “libido”, “simulacrum”, etc. can be regarded as considerably metaphysical principles.

Paradigm – is borrowed from ancient word “paradeigma” that does mean a form of the scientific knowledge, a conditional model of formulating some problems and the ways of their resolving, that is, a set of relevant conceptual-methodological tools; a complex of scientific views, ideas and notions, which are regarded to be true at a certain period of scientific development.

Despite the loss of concern with nature, metaphysical thinking has remained the main feature of philosophy, which is determined by the strive for comprehending the fundamental causes of various phenomena, starting with the human unconscious and ending with the socio-cultural field.

So, there is a number of postmodern works, in particular, which are defined as metaphysical, primarily, due to a high degree of generalization [“absolutization”] inherent in them, regardless what exactly there is a new “absolute” – “*phenomenon*”, “*production*” or “*desire*”.

In this regard, many contemporary thinkers realize that even postmodern philosophy, in its core, is unavoidably metaphysics. Therefore, it is not a coincidence that both of the outstanding representatives of postmodern thinking, Michel Foucault (1926–1984) and the afore-mentioned Heidegger, insisted on the fact that philosophy and metaphysics are the same, since the question of prime principles of *being* in its various manifestations is still relevant.

1.2. The term “dialectic” and its historical types. At first glance, considering the very notion of philosophy, we have to admit that it has not essentially changed. Starting with classical schools and ending with contemporary directions, philosophical thinking differs by its tendency to a high degree of generalization. But, along with metaphysics there is another method in classical philosophy, regarded to be generally accepted too.

There is talking about the philosophical origin of *dialectic* (*διαλεκτική*). This term is borrowed from the ancient Greek language, where it was widely used, and its main purport was reduced to a specific *skill of reasoning*, based on dialogue of arguments and counterarguments, for example, in Socrates and Plato. In addition, the dialectical approach is widely used in humanities, in particular, when comprehending some socio-cultural, economic, or political phenomena.

It should be noted that as early as the ancient period of development of dialectical thinking, its fundamental principle was *the principle of contradiction* between opposite categories. The fundamental principle of dialectical thinking, namely *the principle of the unity of opposites* was formulated by Plato, who was known to be the first to declare that dialectical thinking operated with categories, contrasting them with each other. However, Platonic dialectics was confined only to proving the mutual *involvement* of opposite categories *in being*.

Take, for example, the famous dialogue “The Sophist”^[7], where Plato on behalf of Socrates asks his debaters, if we declare that “a lie” [“a false pretender”] and “a truth” are the same, similar to the ancient Greek philosopher Protagoras, then why do we consider one thesis as a true, but the other as a false?

In other words, in contrast to Protagoras, Plato puts forward a dialectical argument: *a lie* exists, that is, it is involved in being, just like truth. If we assert that only the truth does exist, then where does the very idea of *lie* come from? Therefore, if truth and lie are the same (as Protagoras claims), that is, there is no criterion on the subject of their difference, then why not declare that everything is *lie*? In fact, these categories mutually define each other: we know that this is false (*lie*) because we know what the truth is, and *vice versa*. The problem is to find out the criterion of truth, which is well-known to be the most complex issue of the entire philosophy.

But it is conventional that the most developed form of dialectical thinking is associated with the Hegelian heritage. Similar to previous dialectics, Hegelian dialectic is also based on a such principle as the principle of contradiction, symbolizing the tension between opposite categories – *thesis* and *antithesis*. However, this tension here has gained a minor alteration, namely, it may be resolved through a *synthesis*.

For example, the category “nothing” is the opposite to the category “being”. According to Hegel “*pure being is immediacy as such*”, “*taken on its own term without reference to anything else*”: “being is a simple logical act of “affirmation”, whereas “nothing” is a simple act of “negation”. In other words, being here corresponds to the verb “to be” and nothing more”.

That is why, in terms of its content, “being” does mean “nothing”, on the basis of that Hegel came to his well-known formula-conclusion: “*being and nothing are the same*”. It is the afore-mentioned Hegelian statement that would further become a starting point of valid criticism on the part of existentialist ontology.

Meanwhile, according to Hegel, there is a third concept that unites both of the above, – their *synthesis*. This is the category of “*becoming*”, which he defines as “*the passing of being into nothing*” and, *vice versa*, “*the passing of nothing into being*”. Therefore, *dialectic should be defined as such a mode of thinking, where the opposite categories become the starting point for reasoning*.

In addition to the above-pointed overcoming the tension through a synthesis, corresponding to *the principle of contradiction*, there are other principles of dialectical reasoning, namely, “*negation of negation*”, “*unity of logical and historical*” and *the principle of evolution*”.

Evolution – is the basic principle of dialectics, which designates the movement, which implies the quantitative-high-quality transformations of some objects or complex systems, aimed at achieving the high degree of superiority or perfection^[8].

Generalized interpretation of dialectics was suggested by a prominent philosopher of the 20th century, Karl Jaspers who clarified that formula “thesis-antithesis-synthesis” implied only to such opposition, which, in fact, referred to *transcendental thinking, that is the thinking, which does not depend on sensory experience*. In this case, it refers to the thinking by means of categories.

In view of the above, the entire philosophy is transcendental – this is “*the realm of shadows, the world of simple essentialities freed from all sensuous concreteness*” (Hegel). Moreover, the history of philosophy knows examples of so-called *negative dialectic*, which refers to such “opposites that are falling into unsolved contradiction”, for example, dialectics of Max Horkheimer and Søren Kierkegaard.

In addition, as far as the entire philosophy is concerned, we may talk about two *main points in understanding of what dialectic is*: from the point of view of some scientists, dialectics refers exclusively to the method of scientific thinking, which is based on the relevant principles; others identify it with the general theory of development in both nature and society.

Hegelian dialectic is predominantly idealistic due to the limitation of its laws exclusively to the field of “Reason”, that is, dialectical principles here apply only to the spiritual sphere of “pure thinking” and human civilization, which, according to the Classic are only different ways of actualizing the Absolute (Divine) Reason in history.

Besides, there is the so-called *materialistic dialectic*, which was elaborated by representatives of Marxists philosophy, and which was directly associated with the doctrine of the Universal Laws of development of both nature and society in full accordance with the principles, which were formulated in Hegelian philosophy.

However, both as a method of logical argumentation and as an ontological theory, dialectic is based on the recognition of a number of *irrefutable laws* for it, namely the *law of unity and struggle of opposites*, that is, the *principle of contradiction*, which is the *source of development*, the *law of mutual transition of quantitative changes to qualitative ones* and the *law of the negation of the negation*.

The *law of unity of opposites* points out three phases in the development of contradiction. The first phase is the state of their unity in interdependence (when one cannot exist without the other, which have been proved by Plato’s dialectics); the second corresponds to acute confrontation, opposition or irreconcilable tension, and the third phase is the resolution of this contradiction through their transition to a new basis or synthesis.

In general, there are three forms of contradiction: internal, external, and antagonistic. Internal contradictions arise within the framework of a common basis or source, outside of which the existence of the basis is impossible. External contradictions are the tension between opposite

foundations. *Antagonism* is a form of such external contradiction that enters into an irreconcilable conflict up to the complete destruction of each other, or mutual destruction. The concept of antagonism is used to characterize the social contradictions.

Thus, internal contradictions are those that are inherent in the objects or phenomena within the systems themselves. External ones are contradictions between systems in terms of local integrity that are relatively independent of each other (antagonism of cultures, civilizations, geopolitical contradictions, etc.). Both are the source of the development of systems and their possible destruction.

The *law of mutual transition of quantitative changes to qualitative ones*, or the *law of measure*, was described by both Hegel and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895), in particular in Engels’s work “Dialectics of Nature”, in which this law is considered as a universal principle of the existence and development of the natural world. The categories of quality and quantity reflect such forms of objective determinacy of things, which corresponds to their direct existence. *Quality expresses a purely external determinacy inherent in things, when one thing distinguishes from others, while quantity indicates a determinacy of a thing or things that are completely indifferent to their quality.*

However, the above opposite categories, namely *quantity* and *quality*, can form unity in the sense of internal contradiction (unity on a common basis), since things exist precisely by virtue of such unity or synthesis. Relative equilibrium, therefore, the synthesis between quality and quantity is expressed in the category of *measure*, which, therefore, *should be defined as a quantitatively limited quality.*

As soon as such unity is destroyed, that is, there are significant quantitative changes in things, they immediately begin to lose their qualitative determinacy: quantity passes into a new quality, including some social phenomena. So, within the same systems, good can become evil (*the road to hell is paved with good intentions*), and unlimited freedom in terms of complete arbitrariness can turn into slavery, etc.

The negation of the negation symbolizes the dialectical process of resolving contradiction in the sense of destruction (“negation”) of opposition by creating a new basis, which later causes the formation of another contradiction – in the following, the mutual negation of opposite categories or bases.

Another dialectical opposition is the tension between *content* and *form*. Elements and processes inherent in certain systems compose

their content. In contrast, the form symbolizes the way these systems are organized. The unity of content and form lies in the fact that certain elements of the system correspond to their own way of organizing.

Meanwhile, an equally important issue of dialectics is associated with the topic of the relationship between *freedom* and *necessity*. In the history of philosophical thought there are several views regarding the subject. Such an outstanding philosopher of modern times (XIV–XIX centuries) as Benedict Spinoza and his follower, the above-mentioned Hegel, for example, defined freedom dialectically, namely, “*freedom is the recognition of necessity*”.

It is this definition that is opposite to ordinary understanding of freedom, which is actually “false”, that is, “untrue”. Put it another way, the ordinary concept of freedom is equal to the concept of *arbitrariness*. The problem and, therefore, the category of freedom in its relation to necessity, is, mainly, related to the realm of social relations.

An alternative philosophy of freedom is a theory that overestimates the importance of human freedom, that is why, it is often defined as voluntarist or *voluntarism*, originated in the philosophy of life and existentialism (A. Schopenhauer, Fr. Nietzsche, J. P. Sartre). Voluntarism focuses on freedom as a specific way of human existence, where freedom is interpreted as a specific ability inherent in a person to act in accordance with their goals and interests, “projecting their own possibilities into the future” (Sartre).

Therefore, the dialectical antithesis to freedom in the existential sense is related to historical necessity, which, being the result of certain social activity, actually exists as a set of various kinds of social and cultural restrictions-practices. However, they constitute the objective ground for the historical choice of a person, which is directly associated with the phenomenon of freedom.

There is another concept that is related to the problem of the relationship between freedom and necessity, namely the category of *randomness*, which analysis led to the formation of *determinism* conception. *Determinism* proves that in fact there is no *randomness*, and everything that happens, does so with necessity, which does not lie on the surface of phenomena or processes.

Thus, determinism is understood as the doctrine of the general objective conditionality of the phenomena of Nature, Society and the human psyche, the existence of their latent causes, which can be revealed in the process of cognitive activity. Determinism is mainly an element of

a scientific worldview aimed at understanding natural phenomena. The socio-philosophical application of determinism, especially in relation to the formation of human individuals, is historical materialism and some post-structuralist approaches that defend the position of socio-cultural determinism.

When considering the issue of philosophical methods, it is noteworthy that, in this case, *we deal with the issue of substantiating the scientific nature of philosophy*. Furthermore, significant changes, which have taken place in contemporary philosophical methodology, confirm that Hegel was right concerning *the presence of a close connection between the subject matter of philosophy and its approach*. For example, classical metaphysics was aimed, primarily, at comprehending the physical nature. In regard to dialectic, its subject matter, in general, was associated with categories. But, from the early 20th century to nowadays, one can observe the development of many alternative philosophical approaches, which are directly determined by their own subject matter.

Put it in another way, an essential trait of the whole philosophy is the lack of agreement regarding the method in philosophy. The divergence of viewpoints on this matter is due to disparity in understanding the philosophical subject. For *phenomenology*, for example, the major issue of philosophy is the consciousness; from the point of view of *structuralism* such issue should be understood as latent structures of unconscious, which determine the ideas, values, views, etc. of certain individuals, the *existentialism* is engaged in the problems of human existence, and so on.

1.3. Philosophy in the context of historical types of worldviews. In view of the above one can conclude that philosophy is, primarily, a scientific type of worldview in terms of its conceptual and methodological contents. Furthermore, philosophy is always aimed at grasping the objective *truth in its classical definition, that such knowledge, which corresponds to reality*.

However, philosophy is not regarded to be a starting point of holistic and overall comprehension of the world. It is well-known that the first attempt to grasp the world in its entirety in terms of clarifying its possible “prime-causes” is associated with *mythology*.

As far as **mythology** is concerned, it is defined as *an essential component in the spiritual culture of peoples, as a kind of historical worldview, grounded on chaotic views on the world with dominating*

the perceptions, emotions, and fantasy. That is why, the main structural components of mythological thinking are the representations and images, based on sensuous experiences, based on so-called *collective co-creation and fantasy.*

It is also well-known that the word of *mythology* is borrowed from Greek language, namely, it is made from combining the word of “myth”, which literally means “a story”, “retelling” and poly-semantic word of “logos” with its meaning “concept”, “science”, etc. Mythology is often considered as an expression of poetic form of creativity since it operates by artistic narratives and images.

But according to Ernst Cassirer (1874–1945), for example, the mythic creativity differs from art, since the aesthetic creation of art is absolutely indifferent to the existence or non-existence of its “products” (“creations”). Meanwhile, the mythical consciousness, on the contrary, is predicated on belief in the reality of one’s own objects.

The myth has no sense beyond this belief. That is why, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775–1854), for instance, in his prominent “The Philosophy of Art” claimed that Greek gods “in the higher sense they were more real for the Greeks than every other reality”¹; “The complete dissociation of the Greek fantasy from the allegorical manifests itself with particular clarity in the fact that even personifications that might easily be taken to be allegorical beings, for example, Eris (strife, discord), are treated not at all as beings that are supposed to mean or signify something but rather as *real* beings that *are* simultaneously that which they signify”².

In addition to the above “realism”, mythology is associated with *anthropomorphism* in terms of extrapolating the *features* of the *human mental activity* to natural phenomena and processes.

If we compare myth and religion in its mature form, there are only a few essential features, which unite these worldviews. It is, primarily, the element of anthropomorphism, inherent in some world religious faiths, in particular, to Christianity (the institute of Angels), and fantasy.

Finally, both religion and mythology are based on intimate *faith* in the existence of the cults. But there are a number of characteristics in which myth is clearly distinguished from religion. Basically, the myth is grounded on aestheticism and polytheism, while the religious worldview

¹ The philosophy of art / Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling; edited and translated with an introduction by Douglas W Stott; foreword by David Simpson., 1989: 35.

² Ibid. 48.

is based on a highly developed system of moral imperatives and belief in *transcendent God*.

Put it another way, the essential feature of mythology is the moral indifference, the attitude is “beyond good and evil” (as Nietzsche wrote) that directly points to its *aestheticism*. Another German thinker, namely, the above Fr. Schelling, in particular, stated that the ancient gods themselves were neither moral nor immoral, but rather freed from this relationship and absolutely blessed. There were only a few things, by virtue of which the gods differed from people, namely, their unreal beauty and immortality.

In fact, it is well known that in ancient mythology, for instance, in Homer, the murder was not yet considered a crime and, also, we hardly can speak about the affective control at that time. The debauchery, for example, was not referred to the moral sphere at all. Similar to above, the truthfulness and honesty did not deserve the high praise, whereas the tricks and lies were quite desirable.

All of the noted above features do not pose any questions, since it is a convention, that it was aristocratic ethos, widespread in ancient period, that influenced all ancient culture the most, including the mythology. In its core, the Greek mythology reflected its social conditionality, the “value ideals” of dominant caste of aristocracy, expressed in such requirements as “physical strength”, “bodily beauty”, “clear mind”, “happiness”, “success” and “glory”, rather than morality in the sense of humaneness and kindness.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the content of the ancient concept of virtue, borrowed from the Greek word “*arête*”, was directly associated, first of all, with *nobility*, *physical strength* and wealth. But, along with that, starting with Greek Antiquity and ending with Western Absolutism, it was the imperative of *honor* that was the central moral quality of “true aristocrat” (noble) that implied the sense of dignity and complete contempt for life.

The aestheticism of mythological worldview was emphasized, for example, by Oswald Spengler, who is known widely to be a prominent representative of philosophical thought of the 20th century. Spengler focused precisely on the “bodily” character of the entire ancient worldview, starting with ancient mythology and ending with its mathematics and philosophy.

To make sure of it, according to Spengler, it is enough to refer to some mythical images in Homer in order to realize their absolute moral

neutrality. Athena Palladia is very beautiful, but she is so massive and heavy that the whole chariot Diomedes rattlers under her. Ares cries as loudly as only nine or ten people can yell together. Athena and Achilles themselves scream so much that a whole army runs away, etc. Thus, ethical virtues in the ancient myth hardly had any great importance, which they subsequently received due to the emergence of world religions, in particular, Christianity.

Contrary to mythology, religion is, primarily, the system of moral norms in the terms of significance of different *taboos*, constraints, ethics imperatives, etc. That is why, Ernst Cassirer, for example, defined *religion as a symbolic expression of high moral ideals*. Similar to mythological worldview, religion is founded on *faith*. But, in contrast to mythology, the religious worldview focuses on a person's moral and spiritual self-perfection in his relation to the "sacred".

In order to emphasize the essential particularities of religion, some thinkers level its moral component with existential function. It refers to that *religion expresses, primarily, so-called existential needs of humanity, for instance, human need in God, truth, life purport, kindness, liberty, etc. Religion, first of all, reflects the tragic experience of life, which is directly associated with the issue of death*. In other words, religion has both moral and existential meanings, that implies the human pursuit for spiritual ideals.

For instance, a religious philosopher Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768–1834) believed that the religious type of worldview, primarily, expressed a sense of absolute dependence on God, indicated by the very etymology of the word "religion", which Latin for "religare" in the meaning "bind or obligation".

A Danish existentialist Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855), by comparison stated, that religion was too, primarily, the strong passion, therefore it had an ambivalent nature in the sense of *dialectical synthesis* of desire for God and fear of Him. Kierkegaard was deeply convinced that religious consciousness could even be contrary to ethics ("the universal"). This thesis he was trying to prove by virtue of a biblical story about Abraham, who, *for the sake of faith*, once decided to murder his child.

Similar to Schleiermacher, Kierkegaard claimed that very markers of religious feelings were the sense of absolute *duty toward God and dread* of the Lord, that is to say, "Fear and Trembling" as Kierkegaard's

popular writing was titled. Meanwhile, Kierkegaard emphasized that Abraham, for example, had also “the highest and most sacred obligation” for Isaac. It is this contradiction that is the most dreadful existential paradox for a tragic hero who Abraham has eventually become.

What is the paradox? What exactly does Kierkegaard mean? Relying on his interpretation of the story about Abraham, one can conclude that he has in mind the “terrible” tension between “an absolute duty toward God” and “an absolute duty toward a child”. As is well-known, Abraham selected God, sacrificing his son. It is absolutely in correspondence with those notorious words from Biblical Luke 14:26: “If any man comes to me and hated not his own father and mother and wife and children and brethren and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple”.

That is why, the true faith, is always the presence of some *terror*, completed by another important category – category of *miracle*, which is the absurd in the sense of desire for the impossible. In this regard, it was Abraham who was a true believer, since he believed by virtue of the absurd that God could give him a new Isaac, could recall to life one who had been sacrificed.

But in this story Abraham, obviously, looks like a quite crazy man, and an ordinary philistine may declare in relation to him: “O vile man, who threw off society and virtue, what devil possessed you to want to murder your son?” In the human community he should be executed or sent to the lunatic asylum, since he commits a serious crime – the killing of his son. Nevertheless, it is this opposition between social ethics and religious feeling that demonstrates the impossibility of reducing the true faith to moral prohibitions. This perspective Kierkegaard calls the *negative dialectic*, which he contrasts with Hegel views.

According to Kierkegaard, the most significant contradiction is a tension between the real world, including the social world and spiritual one, that found its best expression in his words: “*unfortunately, things don't go on in the world as the parson preaches*”.

In comparison with the above-mentioned mythology and religion, philosophy is a form of historical worldview that combines both the irrational meanings of the religion and the components of scientific thinking, namely, methods and categories. At the same time, philosophy implies a high degree of conceptualization and freedom of thinking.

[1] The point is that Ancient Greeks distinguished four main types of love in the sense of simple attachment. In addition to the above *philio*, which symbolized attachment to certain activity or any subject, including native country or relatives, Greeks distinguished between *eros*, which meant the natural passion, *agathos* as a spiritual attachment, and *storge* as familial affection.

[2] But, for *phenomenology*, for example, which is the most widespread trend of the entire philosophy of the 20th century, the essence of relationship between world and human being, presumably, is expressed in the construction of various meanings; in *existentialism* this essence is related to *existence* in terms of experiencing the drama of being, while in *psychoanalysis* it is associated with striving for the pleasure of life, etc.

[3] It is well-known that the term *ontology* was introduced by a scientist of the 17th century Rudolf Goklinius. This term is created by combining of two Greek words: *ontos* (ὄν, on, ὄντος), which is translated as “being” or “that exists”) and *logos*, which is translated as “word”, “notion”, “science”, etc.

[4] “*Substance*” is the fundamental category of classical philosophy that symbolizes the universal essence (“origin”) of all that exists, primarily, *the actual existence (entities)*, or the key notion of metaphysics, which expresses the determining principle of “being”, that denotes the specifics of philosophical “reasoning”: “Substance is one of the definitions of essence – philosophical one” (G.W.F. Hegel).

[5] In modern philosophy, this category expresses everything that exists beyond human consciousness, including the existence of God. But the representatives of existentialism emphasize primarily on God.

[6]<https://www.google.com.ua/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwik-aizsMrXAhVDYJoKHym1CNcQFgglMAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwagner.>

[edu%2Fpsychology%2Ffiles%2F2013%2F01%2FHeidegger-What-Is-Metaphysics-Translation-GROTH.pdf&usg=AOvVaw0C2cPKx8OPbdvxEabju8F](https://www.google.com.ua/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwik-aizsMrXAhVDYJoKHym1CNcQFgglMAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwagner.edu%2Fpsychology%2Ffiles%2F2013%2F01%2FHeidegger-What-Is-Metaphysics-Translation-GROTH.pdf&usg=AOvVaw0C2cPKx8OPbdvxEabju8F)

[7] “Sophists” – a philosophical movement, the founder of which is regarded to be an ancient Greek philosopher Protagoras. Sophists put forward a thesis about the relative nature of knowledge as such. By virtue of constructing the incorrect syllogisms the Sophists argued that any thesis could be proved and equally refuted. An example of a sophism: a five is an odd number, but a five is a two and a three, so it is both even and odd at the same time.

[8] Along with the principle of *evolution*, in contemporary humanities a principle of *involution* is used, which is considered to be opposite of evolution in terms of possibility of simplification or *decline* on the part of certain systems.

TOPIC 2. The Historical Development of Western Philosophy and its Main Branches.

2.1. The main branches of philosophy. In general, philosophy is differentiated into such particular branches or parts as *ontology* (“*metaphysics*”), *epistemology*, *logic*, *ethics*, *aesthetics*, *philosophical anthropology*, *social philosophy*, *philosophy of culture*, etc. All these branches are determined by a number of various unresolved worldview issues, namely, by the problems of “being”, “truth”, “good and evil”, “human essence and freedom”, and so on.

Ontology (“*metaphysics*”) is a central part in the structure of philosophical science, aimed at conceptualizing and structuring the phenomenon of being an exact philosophical issue.

Epistemology is a philosophical science of foundations, essence and limits of cognitive activity. Its main issue has to do with the relationship between the Subject of cognitive activity and the Object of cognition, as well as the problems of content and criteria of objectivity (“truth”) of knowledge.

Logic is a philosophical science of correct reasonings, which studies the principles and criteria of valid inference. Logic itself is divided into formal or classical and non-classical (symbolic). Classical logic is composed of two main sections: the doctrine of elements of thinking, it refers to notion, judgment and inferences, and a doctrine of methods, namely methods of research and proof. Non-classical logic tends to maximize formalization and mathematization and operates with complex sign systems.

Ethics is a philosophical teaching of nature and the laws of morality. Its main categories are the notions of “good” and “evil”. From the very beginning, ethics tries to find out the principles of moral life of people, referring to authorities or real social practices, which are subject to doubt and critical comprehension.

Aesthetics is an area of philosophical knowledge, the content of which revolves around the question of the nature of “beauty”. Aesthetics studies the forms of manifestation of “beauty” both in nature and in art, as well as ways to its influence on the personality. Therefore, along with the theory of art this science is engaged in, the issues of aesthetic judgment and enjoyment are discussed.

Philosophical anthropology is a science of human being, aimed at comprehending the human essence or nature, and correlating itself with other humanities, namely, social anthropology, psychology, sociology, etc.

Social philosophy is a part of philosophical theory, involved in understanding the origin, evolution and the structure of society as a whole, and a separate social phenomenon. In contrast to other social sciences, social philosophy manifests the highest level of conceptualization and generalization.

Philosophy of culture is a branch of contemporary philosophy, focused on comprehension of culture as a universal phenomenon, as well as on construction and definition of its types and invariant structure. A fundamental question of philosophy of culture is related to the question of the difference of culture from other fields of human activity, in particular, the issue of the relationship between culture and *civilization*.

2.2. The historical review of Western philosophy. As a rule, the following periods in the history of the Western philosophical tradition are distinguished: a *classical* or *premodern* (from the 6th century BC to the middle of the 19 century); *non-classical philosophy* – the end of 19th century to the 20th; *post-non-classical philosophy*, starting with the middle of the 20th century till nowadays. Obviously, the above classification implies some generalization, based on defining the historical differences in grasping of a philosophical subject and main methodological strategies.

Meanwhile, there is an alternative classification, predicated on the principle of peculiarity of cultural epochs. Referring to this criterion, the historical development of philosophical European thought is divided into the periods as follows *ancient philosophy*, *philosophy of the Middle Ages*, *philosophy of the Renaissance*, *philosophy of the New Age* (early New Age, Enlightenment, German classical philosophy), *modern* and *postmodern philosophy*. Each of these stages of the historical development of philosophy has its own worldview problems.

The *Ancient period of Western philosophy* is marked by the formation of the structure of philosophical knowledge, preserved until the beginning of the nineteenth century. In general, it is distinguished by a high interest in comprehension of nature, which ancient Greek philosophers called the “cosmos”.

The philosophers of ancient Greece and Rome (from the 6th century BC to 2 centuries AD) made a significant contribution to the

development of ancient philosophy. Ancient Greek classical philosophy is divided into two periods: “pre-Socratic” or natural-philosophical period, related to the doctrines of such prominent thinkers as *Thales*, *Heraclitus*, *Pythagoras* and others, and the “Platonic” period, which is associated with ideas of *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Aristotle*.

The philosophy of Ancient Rome embraces the so-called Hellenistic period represented by the school of *Stoicism*¹ (Seneca, Marcus Aurelius), *Epicureanism*² (Epicurus), *Skepticism*³ (Pyrrho), and *Neoplatonism* (Plotinus). The common themes that bound together many philosophical doctrines across the whole Ancient classical philosophy are related to the questions *about being and its “prime principle”, the truth and its criteria; the purport of human being and human essence; the highest good and the best form of social order*, etc.

The *cosmos-centrism* of Greek philosophy in the Middle Ages, that is, its focus on comprehending nature is replaced by the theme of God in relation to the world and humanity. Such Theo-centrism is to be seen as a worldview principle that connects all philosophical issues with the *matter of God’s existence*. In other words, philosophy of the *European Middle Ages* is distinguished by its religiosity and references to dogmas of Christian creeds, namely, to doctrines of *creation, fall, redemption and resurrection*, as well as focusing on the ancient concept of man as a rational “*creature*”.

In total medieval philosophy revolves around many issues, namely, *the problem of substantiating the existence of God; the issue of grasping the essence of the Divine; the problem of theodicy in terms of justifying God for the existence of evil in the world; the questions of good and evil and the relationship between knowledge and faith*, etc.

In the medieval period of philosophy, there were two central directions – *patristics*⁴, founded the Church father St. Augustine the

¹ *Stoicism was a certain ethics doctrine in ancient philosophy, based on such moral demands as life in harmony with nature, asceticism, and impassivity.*

² *Epicureanism was an ethics conception that was opposite to stoicism, and according to which the highest value of life is related to pleasure and enjoyment.*

³ *Skepticism was a direction in ancient philosophy, which required doubting any statement or system of values, as well as the truth of any philosophical theory.*

⁴ *Patristics (from the Latin. pater – father) was the leading direction of medieval philosophy, focused on the interpretation of biblical texts, which were recognized as an unconditional source of truth.*

Blessed, also attributed to the so-called The Holy Inquisition, and *scholasticism*¹ (Thomas Aquinas).

Meanwhile, a turning point in the history of Western philosophy the era of the *Renaissance* (XIII – XV centuries), represented by such philosophies as Dante Alighieri, Marsilea Ficino, Lorenzo Valla, Giordano Bruno, and Martin Luther. *The fundamental principles of Renaissance philosophy are the principles of anthropocentrism* and associated *humanism*², as well as anti-scholasticism.

Theo-centrism of medieval philosophy is replaced by *anthropocentrism* in the sense that traditional philosophical questions are considered through the prism of human existence. Renaissance philosophy would *essentially revolutionize the* grasping of the human essence, defined as a combination of spiritual and physical “natures”, both have equal validity.

Philosophy of Modern times (XIV – XIX centuries) is marked by two fundamental philosophical questions, namely, the question of *substance*, and the search for an effective method of scientific cognition. During this period, a complete fusion of metaphysics and ontology took place, the classical types of ontological teachings were formed, and ideological bases were laid for further development of natural and general scientific methodology (Francis Bacon, René Descartes, Benedict Spinoza, Gottfried Leibniz and so on). The philosophy of Modern times returned to the natural-philosophical question, namely, to the question of the prime-causes of nature or “things”, also studied by the prominent representatives of *German classical philosophy*.

Representatives of *German classical philosophy*, in particular, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Josef Schelling, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Ludwig Feuerbach and others, made a significant contribution to the development of the categorical apparatus of the entire philosophical science. *German classical philosophy*, in fact, completed the development of classical ontology in the form of a system of “absolute

¹ Scholastics (*borrowed from the Latin – schole, a logical way of reasoning, hence the “school”, or scholastic – a scientist, well trained*) was the type of medieval philosophy, aimed at substantiation and systematization of theological thesis by virtue of logical arguments; the name for formal reasoning, detached from real life and practice.

² Humanism (from the Latin – humanities) was the ideological principle of the Renaissance and the central imperative of the entire European culture, which did not recognize any value that exceeded the value of human life and defended the thesis of harmonious development of man as a unique material and spiritual being.

idealism” (Hegel) and “materialist dialectics” (Marx), and made a clear methodological distinction between philosophical strategies and other sciences.

Non-classical or modern philosophy (XIX – until the middle of XX) is based on critique of all previous philosophy with its orientation to the knowledge of objective truth, focused on “irrationality” of both the human being and modern society in terms of dominating the affective and transgressive phenomena. Philosophy of this period is characterized by deep doubts about the truth of religious creeds and rationalism. It refers to such widespread trends of philosophy of the 20th century as “*philosophy of life*” (Nietzsche, Spengler), “*existentialism*” (Sartre, Jaspers) and “*psychoanalysis*” (Freud, Fromm).

With regard to the *subject matter* and *approaches* in philosophy, post-non-classical or postmodern philosophy has a completely different character. *Postmodernism* is the central philosophical paradigm, which is radically opposite to any philosophical tradition. There are many noteworthy philosophies related to this movement, for example, Felix Guattari, Jean Baudrillard, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze etc. Their philosophy is aimed at comprehending the essence of contemporary social formation and relevant culture, *acting from the standpoints* of historicism and the relativity of any ideas or theories.

Contrary to the classical discourse, the entire contemporary philosophy is inherent in the emphasized personalism. Furthermore, the whole field of philosophy in the 20th century testifies the emergence of specific interest in the problem of irrationality, connected with the problems of present-day society, rather than human being directly.

As some postmodernists correctly remark, contemporary philosophy doesn’t look like erudition, which is always based on some tradition and solely to the “school concepts”. Contemporary philosophy creates such concepts that are, first of all, correlated to the postmodern era, trying to grasp the new connotations (“meanings”) and values.

Nowadays, we can observe the essential transformations both within frameworks of structure of philosophy and its problem field. However, the elimination of the metaphysics problem of “prime-cause”, and therefore the classical issue of opposition between the “ideal” and “material”, does not mean that all problems of previous philosophy have lost their importance. Despite a diversity of modern philosophical

concepts, postmodern philosophical thinking shows a monolithic concern with anthropological and social questions.

In other words, the traditional issue of being has been replaced by the issue of sociocultural determinacy of humanity. One can take for example a *socio-genesis theory*, which is completely based on a concept of anthropological type and postmodern idea of “*designing the Subject*”.

A prominent thinker of the 20th century, Max Scheler quite reasonably emphasized that the entire contemporary philosophy had an anthropological bias, which was, mainly, reduced to “*failure of human existence*” (Jean Paul Sartre), “*drama of lack*” (psychoanalysis), or to devaluation of personality in postmodern era. Put it another way, if the essence of human being in classic philosophy was defined as the “homo-sapiens”, “Pure Reason”, or “Subject, which produced *the means for labor*”, then today it has become obvious that humanity is largely determined by relevant social transformations.

TOPIC 3. The Metaphysical Core of Ontology.

3.1. *The main stages of historical development of ontology.* The historical *evolution* of *ontology* as the fundamental part of philosophical theory is conditioned by the peculiarities of corresponding cultural period, as well as by the level of technical and spiritual evolution of a particular Civilization. And, *vice versa*, every sociocultural period is reflected in a certain categorical apparatus, which forms the basis of the philosophical theory itself.

Development of ontology in Western tradition involves three main stages, namely, classical, existential and postmodern. The problem of being is seen to be fundamental, especially, in the system of classical philosophy. In addition, the issue of being within the framework of *classical* ontology was studied from a perspective of the intrinsic prime cause of being. Therefore, almost the entire classical ontology was built upon considering the issue of the relationship between *essence* and its manifestation *in terms of finding the resemblance (“identity”) between them.*

But the later philosophy of being, exemplified by *existentialism*, does not focus on duality of being, therefore advancing beyond the above-mentioned problem, since the central concept of the suggested discourse, namely the category of existence, is directly associated with human “presence”, considered in terms of “being” in its relation to “nothing”, rather than in terms of “essence”.

Furthermore, the traditional philosophical categories of *essence* and *appearance as a methodological continuation of phenomenology in existentialism, have been subjected to a significant revision.* As a matter of fact, *phenomenology* is, briefly, regarded as a *way of reasoning that is grounded only on descriptive analysis of certain phenomena regardless of the clarification of their causes.* In other words, both in phenomenology and in existentialism accompanying it, the assumed opposition between *essence* and *appearance* is overcome by the concept of *phenomenon, which is exclusively: “interior essence”, existing in the form of a mental act or an emotional and spiritual experience – it refers only to the phenomena of consciousness.* In this case, it is related to an interior essence that is completely identical to its manifestation, therefore there is no problem of opposition or discrepancy.

Consciousness is the highest level of psychic development, which manifests itself in various forms of mental activity or inwardness, including the perception, fantasy, memory, different emotional feelings and passions, as well as the most significant abilities, inherent only in human being, namely, the structure of “Ego” as a center of personal self-identification (“I am I”), the ability for rational thinking and cognition.

Put it another way, as far as the human *consciousness* is concerned, any dualism between *essence* and *appearance* is impossible *per se*, since *phenomenon* is being talked about as something solely inner or inward^[1]. Therefore, very concept of phenomenon implies an absolute identity, i.e. a being, which is bereft of bifurcation or divergence.

Finally, there is the third alternative approach in the history of Western philosophy of being, the so-called meta-ontology of *simulacrum*, which uncovers the essence of such existence that is associated with the space of external appearances (“the seeming”).

Simulacrum is a fundamental concept of the entire postmodern philosophy, which is borrowed from the Latin word “simulate” that literally means “to pretend”, “depict”, “make image”, indicated to symbolic-perceptive (non-rational) way of manifestation or constructing the image of something, which essentially have nothing to do with it.

On the whole, *the simulacrum is the substitution of reality with the “signs of reality” (Baudrillard)*, that has gained its power over humanity and has spread widely due to development of digital technologies, which have created so-called “virtual reality” – a whole world of simulacra.

So, despite the difference of the above stages, a category of *being* is the fundamental category of philosophy, *the meaning of which varies depending on the historical or cultural context.*

3.2. The characteristics of classical ontology. As far as the classical period of ontology is concerned, *being* was, primarily, considered in its essential core, that is, in terms of its “*prime cause*”. But in addition, there was also presented a *rationalist ontology*, where *being* was seen as the most general (*transcendental*) notion, and as the category, expressing the highest synthesis.

In terms of the above approaches, *being* is viewed to be eternal, perfect, absolutely independent of subjective perception. That is why, the essential characteristic of *being* in classical ontology is related to “Absolute” (“prime-cause”), on which the notion of *substance* was formed. It was this *substance* that was identified as an *essence of everything that existed*.

Almost the entire philosophical tradition developed in the context of natural metaphysics, which elaborated such forms as *monism*, *dualism* and *pluralistic ontology*. The **monism** is defined as *a kind of classical ontology, based on the assurance in existence of universal (single) substance of being*.

The idea of the double nature of the essence, in other words, the ontological equality of the ideal and the material causes, lies in the basis of dualism. Pluralism is based on the assumption of the existence of a *variety* of individual substances, which are mainly understood as “spiritual entities”.

In the historical elaborating of the more complex ontologies, especially in German classical philosophy, the philosophers were inclined to choose monism. As far as the developed forms of monism are concerned, those were of two types, namely, idealistic and materialistic.

In regard to monism, it tended to absolutization of so-called “rational” or “spiritual” *prime cause* due to value negation of the ontological (substantial) significance of matter, its theoretical reduction to “nothing”^[2]. The traditional examples of idealistic monism are Hegel’s doctrine of Absolute Spirit, “World Will” of Arthur Schopenhauer, etc.

The representatives of materialism, on the contrary, believed that it was “matter” that should be defined as the fundamental basis of the whole world. Therefore, multiplicity and diversity of the things is reduced to the activity of material cause, the *evolution* of which contributes to emergence of the “thinking”, or so-called “ideal”^[3].

The origins of monism, as well as pluralistic ontology are seen in Ancient natural philosophy, which is considered the starting point in evolution of classical ontology itself.

It is conventional to assume that it was *Thales from the Greek city of Miletus in Lonia* (VII – VI centuries BC), who was the founder of Ancient philosophy and creator of the first philosophical school in ancient Greece (Milesian School of natural philosophy), since he was the first who *questioned* a mythological cosmology. *In other words, Thales*

was the first who formulated an absolutely metaphysical question “What exists?” in terms of its originating principle.

He was concerned with searching for the *prime cause* of being, that indicates the transition of ancient thinking to a qualitatively new level, namely, the level of high abstractions and generalization.

Thales supposed that such a *prime cause* was the “water”, to be regarded as the first metaphysical notion, but not to be seen as something that was fully identical to liquid. In other words, this “water” is the symbol of the universal substance in terms of *metaphysical essence*, within which the activity of the “world soul” is hidden. That is why, it is conventional that Thales was a *hylozoist* (from the Greek *gile – hylis*) in terms of the doctrine of *alive all things that exist*, that is, of total spiritualization.

Meanwhile, it is noteworthy that ancient natural philosophy did not yet distinguish between “ideal” and “material” as two incompatible forms of being. The idea of ontological opposition between the “ideal” and “material”, as two opposite forms of being with a different structure, emerged much later thanks to Plato.

The next representatives of Milesian School were Anaximander and Anaximenes. Anaximander believed that all-natural objects were composed of *apeiron*, rather than the particular element, such as water, for example. According to him, *apeiron* was the basis for all four elements, namely, “earth”, “fire”, “water” and “air”. Being the *quintessence* (the fifth essence) of all things, infinite and indefinite, *apeiron* was in constant motion.

Thus, Anaximander has come closer to the idea of a supersensitive principle of being. Anaximander also put forward the idea of eternal motion. This motion, presumably, caused the opposites hot and cold, which to be separated from one another as the world came into being. However, the world was not eternal and to be reduced (destroyed) back into *apeiron*, from which new worlds would arise. Anaximander held an evolutionary view on living things in the sense that in his view the first creatures originated from the liquid element by evaporation. As far as humanity is concerned, it originated from some other species of animal, such as fish.

In contrast to Anaximander, Anaximenes returned to sensual representation and assumed that all things originated from the “air”. Relying on his doctrine that all things were composed of air, Anaximenes suggested an interesting view on natural change. Air differs in essence in

accordance with its rarity or density. When it is thinned it becomes fire, while when it is condensed it becomes wind, then cloud, when still more condensed it becomes water, then earth, then stones. In other words, fire turns to air, air to wind, wind to cloud, cloud to water, water to earth and earth to stone. *Everything else comes from these.*

Nevertheless, the most contradictory philosopher in the “pre-Socratic” period was Heraclitus from Ephesus. Heraclitus, whom the Greeks called the “dark”, “weeping” philosopher, considered the *logos* to be the *prime principle* of “*all that exists*”. Greek etymology of *logos* is related to a lot of meanings, which can be reduced to, firstly, the meaning of “fire” in terms of a purely physical process; secondly, this term means some ideal principle, namely, “word”, “law”, “knowledge” or “notion”.

Heraclitus used paradoxes, antitheses and various rhetorical devices to construct expressions that had meanings beyond the obvious. That practice, along with the concept of *logos* (*word*) pointed to the fact that the essence of the world had structural complexity.

There is a viewpoint that the Heraclitus’s *logos*, *primarily*, *symbolized the universal law of constant change of “all that exists”, which does correspond to the category of “becoming”*. That is why, according to both Plato and Aristotle, Heraclitus held quite controversial views, namely, he believed that everything existed and did not exist at the same time, in relation the following aphorisms were attributed to him: “*Everything flows, everything changes*”, “*you could not step twice into the same river*”.

Ancient historian Lucian, for example, claimed there were some phrases, ascribed exactly to Heraclitus: “*Who are the gods? – They are immortal people, and who are the people? – They are mortal gods*”; “*Poor witnesses for men are their eyes and ears if they have barbarian souls*”.

Along with the first natural-philosophical schools, a Pythagorean School, founded by an ancient mathematician, evokes a particular interest. Pythagoreans believed that the essence of things should be found in their numerical designations. However, the number was considered as a certain “*eidōs*” in terms of its external form of manifestation, that is, as a qualitative category, rather than the quantitative characteristic, which had the magic meanings, in addition. Nevertheless, at the same time, Pythagoras talked about the number as the symbolic form of expressing the inner essence of things.

Thus, number is, primarily, the metaphysical principle of being, but at the same time, it should be defined as a symbolic essence of “thing”. In other words, according to representatives of this school, *all that exists* has certain magic purport, corresponding to a certain number.

For instance, in Pythagorean metaphysics of numbers, number *one* (in Greek: “*monad*”) signifies the Reason, and along with that, the metaphysical prime principle of arising the world of Nature: number *two* is the symbol of female and opinion: number *three* is the expression of masculinity, and simultaneously, a sign of harmony.

Pythagoreans believed that male nature had three important cognitive abilities, namely, sensuous perception related to opinion, emotions and reason. As far as women were concerned, there was a lack of reason – only able to have opinions and feelings instead. The number *four* symbolized justice or retribution. The number five was the sign of marriage, etc.

But, according to the Pythagoreans, it is the number four (“tetrad”) that is the perfect one, because this number is the limit, since together with all the previous numbers (one, two and three) it forms a “decade”.

They attributed to number *seven* a particular magic meaning, *since* it covered many interesting phenomena, for example, the week had seven days; seven music intervals; the milk teeth usually fall out aged seven, etc. Thus, Pythagoreans thought that the natural world was dominated by mathematical order and harmony.

Meanwhile, ancient philosophy had been formed by a *pluralistic type of ontology*, which was elaborated in general on the idealistic base^[4]. There is a speculation that Platonism significantly influenced the idealistic tradition in terms of completed paradigms in the history of philosophy.

The first tendency that influenced the evolution of *Platonism*, considered, was associated with the activities of the *Eleatic School*, considered to be the start of the idealistic development of philosophy. Its impact was so great, that the most outstanding philosopher-idealist G.W.F. Hegel analyzed the history of Western philosophy, starting exactly with this “school”. The prominent representatives of the Eleatic School, namely, Parmenides and Zeno, made a revolution in philosophy in terms of ascertaining and grounding an *identity between being and thinking*.

When referring to Plato’s famous dialogue entitled “The Sophist”, one can conclude that the founder of Western idealism knew well about

the main ideas of Parmenides. Affecting Plato, Parmenides was the first who reasonably demarcated between thinking and empirical reality, thereby between the “way of truth” and the “way of opinion”.

Furthermore, Parmenides reached the conclusion that the natural *moving (becoming)* world was not “truth”, since from the view of eternal an unmoved *being*, this natural empirical reality was *nothing* (“*nothingness*”). In other words, the natural world here has no ontological significance at all. The *true being or being in its proper sense belongs only to “thinking”*. The statement about the true being is associated with a suggestion that only thinking is the basic expression of all idealistic philosophy.

In addition, the representatives of the *Eleatic School* argued that any movement was an illusion, that is, the moving was only *appearance*, while, in fact, true being was unmoved. In order to prove that statement, another representative of the school, namely, Zeno, provided his famous logical paradoxes or aporias (in Greek). Zeno developed many paradoxes aimed at grounding the illusion of motion, but only a few have survived.

For example, a paradox known as “Achilles”: in the conditions of infinite divisibility of space and time, Zeno argued, the fastest runner Achilles will not catch up with the turtle, because when he reaches the starting point of the turtle’s movement, the turtle will already move away a certain distance. The “arrow” that actually flies, from the point of view of thinking, does not move, because if one divides the trajectory of its movement into many points then before passing to the next one, it must pass through the previous one and so on, until the very beginning of the movement – to a state of rest. There were other, equally fascinating, paradoxes.

Thus, thanks to *Zeno* for the first time in the history of philosophy a method of logical argumentations was used, which influenced the status of logic as a science of thinking. Having refused to fantasy, inherent in previous natural philosophy, the Eleatics confidently proved that the way of truth is thinking.

An Eleatic statement about the identity of thinking and being laid the basis to elaboration of the entire idealistic philosophy and ontology, primarily, in Plato philosophy. Plato was the first thinker who, in fact, discovered the categories, hence the human ability to generalized thinking, but he had not yet considered them as the products of human thinking.

In other words, if the Eleatics discovered thinking, then Plato developed the *possibility of thinking with no relation to sensory perceptions*, that is, to experience. He defined concepts and categories as ideal models, calling identifying them as “eternal *eidos*”, completely independent of real things, or metaphysical archetypes of real existent things.

Furthermore, Plato explained that the natural world arose as a result of a cosmogonic process. His description of this process was similar to that of the Pythagoreans. For example, Plato believed that the connection of the Divine monad (*eidos*) with matter generated real things. *So, the world came into being*. Plato argued that the more matter there was in things, the less perfect they were, because matter was “nothing”, rather than just a mere opposite of a metaphysical idea.

Aristotle, who in the IV century BC (b. 384 – d. 322) founded his own philosophical school (Lyceum), manifested the most noticeable pluralistic intention in ontology. He was a Greek philosopher who along with his teacher Plato, is regarded as the most influential ancient thinker.

Aristotle made a systematization of the main branches of philosophy, laying a solid foundation for the further development of the main philosophical disciplines, namely ethics, aesthetics, logic, political and social sciences. He also defined philosophy as metaphysics in terms of “the science of the causes of being”, truth “as knowledge corresponding to reality”, which are regarded to be classical.

Yet, in contrast to representatives of pre-Socratic thought, Aristotle did not consider the *essence* to be as universal prime-cause of being. He often defined it in the terms of unity of “form” (*eidos*) and “matter”, which together created the real thing. But, *unlike* Plato, Aristotle stated that matter was an essential component in the structure of essence. That is why his idealism is called “realistic”. In other words, for Aristotle an *essence* is the real thing – the “entity”. The entity can only be *qua*, a single or individual thing, for instance, “table”, “horse”, “flower” and so on: “*the essence of a thing is what it is said to be in respect of itself*”.

As Aristotle points out, definition of essence is the answer to the question “what it is”, that is to say, everything that exists is definable, so all *items* have essence – just as there is an essence of man, there is also an essence of white and an essence of music. However, such pluralistic

multiplicity of essences is secondary with regard to the phenomenon of primary essence.

The primary essence of an individual thing is the combination of the formal cause with the matter, and with one that is traditionally called the efficient cause, “the primary source of change or rest”. The fourth (final) type of cause is what Aristotle characterizes as “the end (telos), that for which this thing is done”.

Thus, Aristotle distinguished four different kinds of “cause” in being. In the history of philosophical thought, the pluralistic ontology was presented by Leibniz’s doctrine of “monad” as the tiniest particle of the universe. These particles are individual, and from Leibniz’s view, exist in a state of permanent movement and pursuit to self-perfection. Each of these particles is a whole “microcosm”, one can say, the information universe. Leibniz claimed, each “monad” lives its own life, “...is a living mirror, capable of internal activity, which reflects the universe exclusively from its point of view” (Leibnitz).

The typical example of dualistic ontology has to do with the theory of French philosopher rationalist Rene Descartes, who offered an idea of two separate substances in terms of *thinking* and *matter*, and thereby he contributed to further elaborating an alternative natural philosophy, in particular, *monistic pantheism of Benedict Spinoza*. *It was a doctrine, where in the existence of one God was asserted, which according to its founder, was the substantial basis of all that exists, that is, both visible and invisible, supersensible world.*

In other words, according to Spinoza, nature and God are the same in terms of the fact that God is real creativity, and all that exists does exist only due to God. The forms of His manifestations are attributes and **modes** (*borrowed from Latin modus –measure, way*) – *certain states of substance, which it has only under certain conditions, hence these states are limited and finite*. But Spinoza uses another metaphysical concept, namely, the concept of **accidence**, *which denotes the occasional and non-essential states of substance, that, presumably, aims to substantiate the existence of imperfect things.*

Meanwhile, in the development of more mature ontologies, especially in the age of German classical philosophy, thinkers increasingly were inclined toward *monism*. Along with *monistically*

pantheistic metaphysics in philosophy of being there were also distinguished idealistic and materialistic ones.

Idealistic monism is characterized by the absolutization of the ideal substance against the background of denying the ontological autonomy of matter, reducing it to “nothing”. Vivid examples of such an ontology are the teachings of G.W.F. Hegel on the Absolute Spirit, Arthur Schopenhauer’s “World Will”, etc. Materialistic monism, on the contrary, considers matter to be the fundamental basis of the world. Therefore, materialistic monism reduces the inexhaustibility of the diversity of the world to the activity of a material substance, which only at a later stage of development gives rise to *ideal* or thinking.

Marxist philosophy is considered as an example of the most matured form of materialistic monism. The methodological, hence metaphysical origins of ontological, in particular, of materialistic monism, have already been studied in ancient natural philosophy.

[1] It is noteworthy that in classical ontology the *phenomenon* often coincides with the notion of *appearance*, therefore it is defined as a *purely external determinacy of essence* in contrast to *very essence as a purely interior (inward) determinacy*.

[2] A good example of idealistic monism is the ontology that was proposed by Hegel, in relation to which he wrote: “*Reason is the certainty of consciousness that it is all reality*”; thus, does idealism express its Notion. Just as consciousness, that comes on the scene as Reason, possesses that certainty directly in itself, so too does idealism give direct expression to that certainty: “I am I, in the sense that the “I” which is an object for me is the sole object, is all reality and all that is present” (Hegel 1979, 140).

[3] “Ideal” is a philosophical category that symbolizes the immaterial or spiritual being; in a broader sense, it is a sensual, emotional and rational reflection of the world by a person, the semantic content of their mental activity.

[4] There is another perspective on the genesis of *pluralistic ontology*, where origins of such ontology are explained by the so-called materialism of Democritus, namely, by his theory of *atoms*. In particular, Democritus believed that *atoms* were an indivisible part of the existent universe, or that the world was composed of atoms that differed one from another by their weight, length, density and firmness. According to philosophers, the soul also consists of atoms. However, in contrast to natural components, atoms of the soul are fiery and very mobile.

3.3. Particularities of existential ontology. The theoretical origins of *existentialism* are usually seen in philosophical ideas of a Danish thinker Søren Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard is known to be the first to introduce the notion of “*existence*” into philosophical terminology in the sense of *so-called spiritual needs, namely, the human tendency to religious feelings, that refers to needs for God, kindness, searching for the purport of being, etc.*

Put it another way, the general existential issues involve a number of worldview *narratives*, related to the issue of existence or non-existence of God, the issue of human freedom, associated, primarily, with the problem of loneliness, love and hatred, the themes of morality and immorality, human life and death. But the central issue of existential philosophy is the issue of human death. Due to this reason, such discourse is often qualified as a depressive one.

Narrative is (borrowed from Latin narrare – speech act, verbal translation) the concept of postmodern philosophy, fixing the process of author’s self-actualization in the form of an arbitrary story, “text-message”, etc.

Kierkegaard, for example, believed that the core of “*existence*” lies in human inclination to despair and faith. In addition, he clearly distinguished between ethical and religious consciousness. Existentialism of Kierkegaard can be considered as an example of phenomenological analysis before the historical emergence of phenomenology in the form of a certain direction or strategy.

According to Kierkegaard, it is spiritual life that is the direct manifestation of “*existence*” in human being. The human tendency to despair is the prime step toward spiritual life, since in fact it symbolizes a strong denial of life values, based on the strive for pleasure. People who are content with a sensual [“*esthetic*”] way of life, according to Kierkegaard are similar to “*the frogs in the swamp of life*”^[1], whereas despair led to a loss of will to live, symbolizes both the desire for death and at the same time, an inability to fulfill this desire.

In terms of the Christian worldview, despair is the greatest sin, “*the Sickness unto Death, Despair is a Sickness in the Spirit*”. True faith consists in the ability to overcome this despair, which, in Kierkegaard’s view, is possible only due to faith in the Lord. Put it differently, *it is “only*

the knight of faith”, who was Biblical Abraham, managed to overcome his despair by virtue of his faith in the greatness of God.

But the most famous existential conceptualization of being is associated with the so-called “*existential analytic of Dasein*”, developed by German existentialists, namely, by *Martin Heidegger* (1889–1976). In his view, philosophy of existentialism is the continuation of metaphysical questioning about *being*, but this renewed metaphysics is closely related to solely human being, their “*standing in the lighting of Being*” – “*being-in-the-world*” which in Heidegger’s view is the “ek-sistence” in an existential sense: “What man is – or, as it is called in the traditional language of metaphysics, the “essence” of man – lies in his ek-sistence... Ek-sistence, thought in terms of *ecstasies*, does not coincide with *existential* in either form or content. In terms of content ek-sistence means *standing out into the truth of Being*...Man is rather “thrown” from Being itself into the truth of Being”^[2].

According to Heidegger, methodology of existentialism should be defined as *analytic of Da-sein* or “*phenomenology of presence*” that implies comprehending some essential structures of existence, which the philosopher entitles as “*existentials*”.

Existentials are defined as the structures that indicate the meanings of available markers of existence, for example, boredom, anxiety, fear, mood of dread, care, despair, loneliness, etc.

It is the above structures that testify to the total indeterminacy of human existence – “the indeterminacy of and about what we are” that manifests itself, first of all, in “profound boredom”. This profound existential boredom is the most widespread topic almost for the entire existentialism. Meanwhile, for Heidegger “profound boredom like a silent fog insinuating itself in the depths of existence, pulls things, others and oneself into it altogether with remarkable indifference”, when everything that exists is completely losing its purport and significance. This is the experience of total indifference of being, when we have “nothing to get a hold on”.

Another, no less “suspended” state, when there is nothing to get a hold on, is the “moving away of be-ing as a whole that closes in on us in dread pressures”: “more clearly, dread leaves us hanging because it brings on the slipping away of be-ing. So it is that we actual human beings slip away”.

That is why, the main subject of existential ontology is associated with the issue of *nothing* in terms of “death event”, that Heidegger emphasizes with regard to it: “*Only on the basis of the original manifestness of no-thing can the existence of human beings reach and get into be-ing... Existence means involvement in no-thing*”. So, “*existence belongs only to human beings*”.

According to Heidegger, we should distinguish clearly between “being” in the form of things (“that, does exist”) and being as human *existence*. How exactly *nothing in the sense of nothingness* is associated with *existence*? In his view “the Nothing is at the Heart of Metaphysics, since the “existence” does mean the direct involvement in *nothing* by virtue of human experience, or more precisely, the awareness of “death”: “Nothing is already beyond being as a whole”.

Philosophy diverges from other sciences precisely by this question, which occupies a special place, that is, by *the question of “nothingness”*. In regard to this divergence Heidegger noted that from the view of common sense “only *entity* is supposed to be studied, and besides that – nothing; only thing, and more than that – nothing; solely thing, and beyond that nothing. *How do things stand with this nothing?*”^[3]

It is philosophy that bravely asks such a question, which does seem to be absurd, but in relation to human existence it does not, which is intimately connected with awareness of death. In the context of this awareness the question about nothing is the most essential.

It is noteworthy that Heidegger regarded loneliness as “*a defective mode of existence*”, contrary to the account of Jean Paul Sartre, who, for example, turned this notion into the starting point of his existential reasoning. According to Sartre, it is loneliness that is closely associated with the phenomenon of human freedom, and therefore it is complementary to *the classical definition of freedom as the opportunity to make a choice*. A person is *doomed to be free* in the sense of being absolutely alone, which is reflected in his notorious phrase: “Hell is other people”.

As highlighted above, the classical conception of being implies there is both divergence and similarity between internal determinacy, that is, the *essence* of a thing and its external determinacy, that is its *appearance*. If due to the dialectic approach the tension between *essence* and *appearance* can be resolved in a synthesis, then phenomenology refers to the notion of *phenomenon*, which absolutely eliminates the stated above dualism.

Meanwhile, Sartre, for example, returns to absolutely ontological dualism in terms of tension between “the phenomenon of being”, which implies the existence of various things, and “the being of the phenomenon”, that is, individual consciousness, which according to him, is essentially “nothingness”. Put it another way, Sartre was convinced, if we consider consciousness in ontological sense, namely in terms of its being, that it, consciousness, is solely the realm of phenomena, and nothing beside: consciousness “exists” only because it reflects some “things”, but it is never the thing in the proper sense of this word.

Another key term of *Existentialism*, which plays a large role throughout the development of all contemporary philosophy, among other factors, is associated with the term *limit situation*.

Limit situation is the notion, introduced by Karl Jaspers with an aim to designate such limitations of human being, that cannot be avoided or overcome.

As mentioned above, existentialists, primarily, refer to the situation (existentials) of death, struggle, loneliness, suffering, etc., with regard to that *Jaspers* once noted: “We are always in situations. Situations change, opportunities arise. If they are lost, they never return. I myself can work to change the situation. But there are situations which remain essentially the same even if their momentary aspects change...: I must die, I must suffer, I must struggle, I am subject to chance, I involve myself in guilt. We call these fundamental situations of our existence *limit situations*. That is to say, they are situations which we cannot evade or change. Along with wonder and doubt, awareness of these ultimate situations is the most profound source of philosophy”^[4].

Almost all representatives of existentialism built their philosophy, specifically, their ontology on the basis of belief in the gap between reality and individual human existence, in particular, between bodily existence and the inner world of consciousness, referring to the words, attributed to the Buddha: “it is fine to contemplate the things, but it is terrible to be them”.

3.4. Postmodernist concept of simulacrum, and its ontological purport.

Referring to the postmodern stage of *ontology*, one can see that it is the category of *simulacrum* that is determinant, arising primarily, as a result of significant transformation of modern production, mediated by

convincing technological progress. This ontology should be considered as completely opposite to both the classical theory and the existentialist vision of being.

Presumably, the concept of *simulacrum* was introduced by a postmodern thinker Georges Bataille (1897–1962). But the notion gained its further development in the works by other authors, namely Gilles Deleuze and Jean Baudrillard.

For instance, according to Deleuze the *simulacrum* is closely linked to *desire* (*libido* energy), since it is desire that guarantees its functioning on the part of human subjectivity.

Libido is a fundamental concept of contemporary philosophy that designates the existence of specific energy of desire, aimed at obtaining pleasure or gratification.

Put it another way, the *simulacrum* is regarded in its correlation with the psychological phenomenon of *phantasm*.

Phantasm – the word is borrowed from Greek φάντασμα – ghost, image, imagination, that denotes the structure within the psychic unconscious, produced by desiring fantasy of the individual, who perceives it as a real existence.

In terms of Deleuze's view, *phantasm* is, first of all, a specific "fusion" of the desire and the image ("symbolic function"), that is, the possibility of the simulacrum's influence is mediated by strong mental activity, directed largely to a desire for gratification. It is *due to this reason that humans are largely predisposed to be deceived. In other words, humans not only tend to deceive, but they rather desire to be deceived themselves.*

According to Deleuze, humans always tend to produce *phantasms*, and it is the phantasm, in his view, that is a fundamental structure of the entire human culture, from religious faith to contemporary politicians' rhetoric, to be skillfully exploited as people's tendency to follow their desires.

It is not surprising that it is politicians or statesmen who are of the greatest interest in the context of the above concept, especially in ancient philosophy, for instance, in the age of Plato, who, as is well-known, influenced the whole classical philosophy the most. Simulacrum, as Deleuze claims, "incarnates the evil power of the false pretender".

More precisely it is a false pretender who depicts someone who is not. Simulacrum is related to the essence in terms of complete difference, rather than of similarity, as it has nothing to do with the former.

This is exactly the sham (theatrical) image, which, as philosopher underlines, “is built upon a disparity or difference” from the truth, this is “a model of the Other (Antichrist), from which there flows an internalized dissemblance and dissimilarity”^[5]. In its core, *simulacrum* symbolizes “abolition of the world essences and the world of appearances”, that is, abolition of the entire classical philosophy with its striving for the “truth” and “rightness”.

Plato was the first to declare the existence of such a pretender, who creates the illusion of similarity with regard to the essence, or the illusion of its manifestation. So, the main “person” of his famous Dialogues is the “sophist”, the most vivid example of a *simulacrum*, who pretends to be philosophy, but in fact, is not. He pretends to be wise, but actually his wisdom is false due to the creation of the illusion of truth, very often by constructing the wrong conclusions.

Deleuze states that Plato’s definition of the *simulacrum* as “a copy of a copy” (in its correlation with “original”) is not sufficient, since “we then miss essential, that is, *the difference in nature* between *simulacrum* and its copy, or the aspect by which they form two halves of the single division. *The copy is an image, endowed by resemblance, while the simulacrum is an image without resemblance*”.

He elucidates this “duality” with examples from the catechism, which, according to him, “has familiarized us with this notion. *God made man in his image and resemblance. Through sin, however, man lost the resemblance, while maintaining the image.* We have become simulacra. We have forsaken moral existence in order to enter into esthetic existence”^[6].

Following the Christian picture of the world, we can say that the simulacrum is “Antichrist which is opposite point to the Divine order”, therefore modernity can be characterized “by the death of God, destruction of the world, the dissolution of the identity, the disintegration of body”^[7].

Presumably, the simulacrum can be called as Hegel’s category of “*seeming*”, for example, which was defined as such a *manifestation of something that did not correspond to its essence absolutely*. The simulacrum is the “triumph of the false pretender” in the light of that

simple truth that we “no longer have an essence except as simulated, that is expressing the functioning of the simulacrum”^[8].

Similar to Deleuze, another outstanding postmodern author, Baudrillard states that simulacrum is “*the highest power of the false*”. In contrast to Deleuze, who tends to substantiate for libidinal *basis* of the simulacrum, emphasizing it is the phantasm that is the effect of functioning of the false pretenders, Baudrillard focuses on its symbolic “matter”.

An essential trait of the simulacrum, in Baudrillard’s view, is the absence of “reference”, that means its “separation” from any reality. Similar to any lie, the simulacrum is the opposite to reality. But its power lies in the fact that simulacrum reconstructs this reality in accordance with its will and desire. It is able to reconstruct reality as it wants.

In a work entitled “Simulacra and simulation” (1981) the postmodernist claims that “the modern world is constructed out of models or simulacra which have no *referent*”^[9] or ground in any “reality” except their own. But unlike Deleuze, in Baudrillard’s view the contemporary simulation is different from a simple fiction or lie in that it does not only present an absence as a presence, the imaginary as the real, but also undermines any contrast to the real, absorbing the real within itself. The existence of so-called “virtual reality” could be a good example.

It is “agony” of real referents that is the major event of the contemporary world that contributes to incredible simulation. The simulated reality, which has been created recently due to unbelievable simulation, does mean a complete loss of referents, their “symbolic death” exercised by certain technical devices, in particular, by emergence and development of advertising, cinema, social networks, etc.

Baudrillard often employs the term as a *hyperreality* of signs, referring to examples of TV newscast, which creates the news if only to be able to narrate it, or the soap opera whose daily events are both referent and reality for many viewers.

Almost unlimited power of *simulacrum* became possible due to unlimited power of virtual reality and consists in the production of visible images or phenomena, creating the illusion of something – some need or some quality. *Whereas, in fact, they are only pure appearance, “severed from” any reality, the obvious “substitution”, arising thanks to the power of widespread digital technologies and financial capital (fashion industry, brands, virtual money, etc.).*

Each simulacrum is, first of all, a *substitution of reality with the “signs of reality”*. Contextually, the simulacrum is “an artificial reality created by virtue of production activities, especially in the conditions of mass production of mass-consumption goods”.

Meanwhile, Baudrillard offers a certain classification of simulacra (*“The Orders of Simulacra”*), differentiating them into three main types, depending on a historical epoch of the development of Western civilization: “Simulacra of the first order play on the natural law of value; those of the second order play on the commodity law of value; and those of the third order play on the structural law of value”.

The emergence of this phenomenon he associates with the Renaissance. It was a time, as Baudrillard claims, *that was marked by “the demiurgic ambition to exorcize the natural substance of a thing in order to substitute a synthetic”*. Consequently, the Western world received the main production resource for the further evolution of technical civilization and its notorious “totalitarianism”, since the epoch is marked by the emergence of *counterfeit*, which, according to Baudrillard, found out “the dominant scheme” of the “classical” epoch, from the Renaissance to the industrial revolution: “It is in the Renaissance that the false is born along with the natural. From the fake shirt in front to the use of the fork as artificial prosthesis, to the stucco interiors and the great baroque theatrical machinery. The entire classical era belongs *par excellence* to the theatre. Theatre is the form which takes over social life...”^[10].

The second order of *simulacrum* promotes the artificial *hyperreality* of unlimited production of mass-consumption goods, their models or copies without referring to their real referents. The thing is the series production, that is the *industrial simulacrum*.

The industrial simulacrum leads to a complete devaluation between the real and the simulated to such an extent that reality itself loses its meaning. There is talking a debate on both the *replication* of mass-consumption goods and the replication of anything: from the very information to biological cells. The relation made between the identical objects “is no longer that of an original to its counterfeit – neither analogy nor reflection – but equivalence, indifference”.

However, it is the third simulacrum that draws a special interest, which is called the simulacrum in its proper sense. It designates a pure sign out or independently of any reference. If the simulacra of the first and the second orders are related to material production, or they are

governed by natural and market laws of value, then the third one has neither “thing ‘nor ‘substance”. It does only simulate the value. In other words, the third simulacrum is governed by the code of postindustrial capital, which destructs the values by virtue of their substitution with pure images.

The whole strategy of the modern social system is to create these “shaky” and “floating” signs. The third “type” of simulacrum indicates that its most significant characteristic is not artificiality, but the effect of false resemblance through the creation of an illusion and the substitution of truth for false, good for evil, value for fiction, etc.

Nowadays the simulacrum is just the visible symbol of something that has lost its original essence. Due to this fact the philosopher applies the concept of “delayed death” in relation to the most important spheres of public consciousness and institutions – church, state, parties, ideologies, etc., they are in a state of simulation, therefore – in “delayed death”.

Summarizing all the above stated, we can define the simulacrum as a depiction of something, which is based on falsification and substitutions, mediated by skillful pretending as an ability to create the appearance of resemblance and correspondence.

A number of representatives of postmodern philosophy insist that, firstly, the civilizations or “history are governed by the code”, and direct aim of philosophical examining is to clarify this code, and secondly, the people of contemporary informational civilization overuse of production and consumption of “sham images”, creating directly the huge mass of simulative space between natural world and human being that results in greater isolation from his organic existence: “*The modernity is defined by power of the simulacrum*”^[1] (Deleuze). It is no coincidence that the issue of “sociocultural demise” or “death”, along with the topic of the problem of postmodern civilization decline, are the most widespread topics of contemporary ontology.

^[1] This refers to Kierkegaard’s notorious sentence: “A young lad falls in love with a princess, and this love is the entire substance of his life, and yet the relation is such that it cannot possibly be realized, cannot possibly be translated from ideality into reality”. Of course, *the slaves of the finite, the frogs in the swamp of life*, scream: “That kind of love is foolishness; the rich brewer’s widow is just good and solid a match. Let them go on croaking in the swamp” – from “Fear and Trembling” (1982), *Edited and Translated with Introduction and Notes* by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. – Princeton, University Press, Pp. 41-42.

[2] Martin Heidegger. Letter on Humanism https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjyui2gr39AhXyg_0HHe-wBWwQFnoECCcQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwagner.edu%2Fpsychology%2Ffiles%2F2013%2F01%2FHeidegger-Letter-On-Humanism-Translation-GROTH.pdf&usg=AOvVaw1lFEjw-ZaC uZk19He8_cQ

Fpsychology%2Ffiles%2F2013%2F01%2FHeidegger-Letter-On-Humanism-Translation-GROTH.pdf&usg=AOvVaw1lFEjw-ZaC uZk19He8_cQ

[3] Martin Heidegger. What is Metaphysics? https://www.academia.edu/3150996/Translation_of_Martin_Heidegger_What_Is_Metaphysics

[4] Jaspers, K. (1958). *Philosophy II*. Madrid: Ediciones Revista de Occidente., Pp. 72.

[5] Deleuze G. (1990) *The simulacrum and ancient philosophy [The logic of sense]* Translated by Mark Lester with Charles Stivale, London: Athlone Press, Pp. 258.

[6] *Ibid.* 257.

[7] *Ibid.* 258.

[8] *Ibid.* 262.

[9] Referent as that, which actually corresponds to a certain word, thought, symbol or sign.

[10] <http://www.naturalthinker.net/trl/texts/Baudrillard,Jean/simulations.html>

[11] Deleuze G. (1990) *The simulacrum and ancient philosophy [The logic of sense]* Translated by Mark Lester with Charles Stivale, London: Athlone Press, P. 167.

TOPIC 4. The Most Relevant Narratives in Philosophical Anthropology.

4.1. The groundbreaking influence of Nietzsche's ideas on philosophical anthropology. The core problem of philosophical anthropology is connected with the issue of searching for human essence, that is to say, with the issue of human nature. But if in classic philosophy the essence of human being was considered definitely, starting with the “homo-sapiens” (rationalism) and ending with the “subject, who produces the tools for labor” (Marxism), then today all these views are leveled with complete relativism. In other words, on the part of most authors it is sociocultural determinacy that is emphasized; therefore, the relativity of human nature is referred. Furthermore, from the early 20th century to the current moment, we can find a lot of reasoning around human nature, focused, mostly, on the issues of passions and affects, rather than the structures of pure Reason as it took place within the framework of classical discourse.

Furthermore, the issue of human being cannot be regarded outside of the issue of its essential transformations under conditions of contemporary production relations. The first grounded “accusations” against the entire rational paradigm, including rationalistic anthropology, was brought by the most characteristic representative of so-called *philosophy of life*, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900). Nietzsche introduced into modern philosophical discourse a few significant concepts, in particular, the concept of *Nihilism*, which, according to him, was aimed at “revaluation” of all previous values, especially, rationalism, Christian morality and spiritualist metaphysics.

All these old ideals were based on a firm belief in God, while advancing modernity turned them into “sham images”. As Heidegger accurately noted, Nietzsche's nihilism signified, primarily, the complete absence of not so much faith in God as the need for faith, that all those were no longer relevant.

When employing the concept of *Nihilism* Nietzsche intended to express, first of all, the essence of Modernity *per se*, reflected in his notorious words “*God is dead*”. That is the reason why Nietzsche evaluated his own teaching as extremely critical, but it was the criticism, which was totally different from Kant's “Critique of Pure Reason”, for example.

Nihilism was founded on complete negation of both the previous metaphysics and *transcendental idealism*^[1] as such, *in particular, transcendental ethics of Kant, based on belief in unconditionality of moral debt*^[2]. In contrast to a *priorism* of the established transcendental approach in rationalism, Nietzsche offered the *principle of historicity*, but which, unlike Hegel's notion of historical consciousness, for example, did not have any theological premises.

Nietzsche's assurance that "God is dead" meant a criticism of the entire previous culture, since its highest values had already devalued themselves. That is why, in almost all of his works he constantly emphasizes and convincingly proves the artificial origin of values that confirms only their relative nature.

In this regard, he operates by the concept of "*economy of power*" *in terms of elaborating the definite power technologies* ("*the bloody technique of mnemonics*"), focusing on the importance of ruling classes in their creation: "The seignorial privilege of giving names even allows us to conceive of the origin of language itself as a manifestation of the power of the rulers"; "I used the word "state": it is obvious who is meant by this – some pack of blond beasts of prey, a conqueror and master race... these born organizers"^[3].

These Nietzschean ideas are further developed by other, prominent scholars of the Civilizing process, namely, by Felix Guattari and Michel Foucault. Due to their profound studies, they clearly illustrate the relativity of the value system, its functional nature in terms of political and economic expediency. Put it another way, *the value system undergoes essential decline, especially when it is unable to meet the interests of the ruling classes*.

In its core, the entire Nietzsche's philosophy can be reduced solely to anthropology, since generally it revolves around the idea of "*Overman*". It is this concept that is an alternative to human being of old rationalistic doctrine.

As Nietzsche declared, if there is any sense to talk about human being, then it is only about the "*beast of prey*", *who creates the values*, because only this way, in the form of institutional brutality, humanity can survive and grow, therefore human being is, primarily, the species of animal, but *this is such an animal, who invents the values*.

Values are important for the well-being of the human animal, that is why belief in them is essential to human existence. But humanity prefers

to forget that values are their creations and to *live through them* as if they were absolute, developing completely false theories.

But Nietzschean anthropological doctrine, which is directly associated with the concepts of “*Will to Power*” and “*Overman*” is of the greatest interest. It is noteworthy that both of these concepts are correlated in terms of that one is impossible without the other, since, according to Nietzsche, *Overman* is such a “creature”, which is endowed with “*Will to Power*”.

Despite various interpretations of this concept, it is worth paying attention to some fragments from notorious *Nietzsche's paper, entitled* “On the Genealogy of morality”. In particular, when *Nietzsche* discusses the question about the essence of basic worldview categories, he talks about the existence of *two main forms of ethics*, which, in accordance with his deep conviction, are connected with the duality of human nature, rather than class structure of society. Thus, *the existence of social inequality, according to Nietzsche, is an effect of the established natural inequality.*

Therefore, the class structure of society in terms of permanent presence of *upper and under-classes* (“bottoms”) is due to the permanent presence of two kinds of humanity, where some people are the brave, endowed with the striving for greatness and power. Whereas others tend to submit, they are powerless, cowardly, and negligible. *The dualism of human nature resulted in dualism of two opposite types of morality.*

In other words, according to *Nietzsche* there are some people, who are endowed with the morality of “masters”, associated with “aristocratic” values and ideals that prevailed for a long time, and, in Nietzsche’s view, they incarnate the desire for power, the ancient Dionysian spirit (“Gestalt”). Along with the “*Will to power*” “true aristocracy” inevitably should be striving for art and beauty.

The above aristocratic ethos is completely opposite to Christianity with its *false and hypocritical virtue of pity, since it is this pity that is core to the morality of the “herd”, “mass”* in terms symbolizing absolutely different system values. When referring to ancient cult of Dionysus, the philosopher means, primarily, the values of affirmation of life, even in its terrible manifestations, since in general *the Dionysian spirit is will to life and joy in life, including the joy in destruction* (“What I Owe the Ancients”).

To clarify what exactly he keeps in mind, when he talks about the *aristocracy*, he refers to the original Greek meaning of the term “aristos,” which, as is well-known, meant “the good man, the man with power.”

Meanwhile, talking about the “aristocracy”, he, probably, refers to his own construct, rather than *estate aristocracy* in its real existence.

That is why, in many places, Nietzsche notes that the “Overman” has not yet come, as the Christian “*contagion*” has engulfed the entire civilization, distorting the true meaning of religious faith. Nevertheless, the philosopher discusses some cases of “Overman” in history, for example, Napoleon, who was one of his favorite heroes.

When analyzing Nietzsche’s anthropological visions, it is critical to mention another concept, namely, the concept of *resentment (impotent fury)*, which he attributes to representatives of Judeo-Christian moral tradition. According to Nietzsche most people are the people of *resentment*, who are definitely envious and weak, even somewhere mean. And *in their impotent fury* they are most dangerous. It is *resentment* that is a solid affective basis for “genealogy” of *slave morality*, which, in Nietzsche’s words, found its embodiment in Judeo-Christianity.

Due to extensive widespread of Christianity, ancient “lord’s morality” has been replaced by “morality of slave”, which *stemmed from impotency, pessimism, cunning and the creative reaction of a “bad conscience” coming to form as it turns against itself in hatred*. While the former morality was a consequence of strength, cheerful optimism and naiveté. German philosopher constantly appeals to the “Greeks”, who for him are one of the best exemplars of hope against a meaningless existence and a response to the wisdom of Silenus, expressed in his notoriously words: “it is best not to be born at all”; it is better to die than to live.

By virtue of his own vision of human nature that Nietzsche elaborated his philosophy of “evil” and “good”, dividing the human being into two “kinds”, where the central place belonged to the concept of *Overman*. There is, primarily, a dispute over his “low opinion of compassion” and self-sacrifice, which seems to have been caused by his own existential experience in terms of his possible inability to be compassionate; *and also, about his conviction in that the moral consciousness in the form of sense of duty, for example, arises only due to strong fear of punishment in accordance with the logic: if there is no fear, then there is no morality*.

When considering some ideas from Nietzschean “On the Genealogy of morality”, we can find evidence of his conviction, especially where he writes about ancient law, namely, about bloody systems of punishment.

In particular, it is worth drawing attention to a chapter “On the Genealogy...”, entitled “Guilt”, “Bad Conscience”, and “Related

Matters”, where Nietzsche clearly formulates a thesis about the genealogy, more precisely, about the genealogy of moral feelings, referring to their “long history and metamorphosis”. In that study Nietzsche clearly puts forward a hypothesis on so-called “collective memory”, inherent in humanity, which is created by means of the most sophisticated tools of cruelty.

The philosopher was convinced that the animal-man was inspired to be a moral being by virtue of “terrible” and “bloody technique mnemonics”, that created the man-slave, since only one way was possible: pain and incredible suffering could “give a memory to the man”, impress something upon this partly dull, partly idiotic, inattentive mind, this personification of forgetfulness, so that it would stick? This age-old question was not resolved with gentle solutions and methods, as imagined, there is nothing more terrible and stranger in man’s prehistory than his “*technique of mnemonics*” ...when man decided he had to make a memory for himself, it never happened without blood, torments and sacrifices; the most horrifying sacrifices and forfeits... the most disgusting mutilations (for example castration) ... [4].

“Have these genealogists of morality up to now ever remotely dreamt that, for example, the main moral concept “*Schuld*” (“guilt”) descends from the very material concept of “*Schulden*” (“debts”); ...the creditor could inflict all kinds of dishonor and torture on the body of the debtor, for example, cutting as much flesh off as seemed appropriate for the debt” [5].

In general, there are three main discoveries of Nietzsche’s “On the Genealogy of morality”, or why exactly this study should be considered as the most significant for further philosophical explorations: firstly, his thesis that it is the fear of punishment that promotes the formation of a moral Subject; secondly, power has a libidinal basis, which explains the phenomenon of superfluous cruelty, for example, the practices of “the most disgusting mutilations”. And finally, the idea of the economic origins of morality, in particular, the statement of dependence of the views on moral duty on its expediency.

All these ideas were adapted and further developed by the most prominent representatives of psychoanalytic and postmodern philosophy. Some of them will be reviewed by other developers of psychoanalytic approach, in particular, by Erich Fromm, who, similar to Nietzsche, regarded power as a main source of cruelty and destruction. Fromm was convinced that the striving for power was an effect of the system of

social relations. But in contrast to Nietzsche, Fromm believed that “The Will to Power” was inherent in weak and mean people. Some people tend to enjoy power since for them it is the only way to compensate for the awareness of their own inferiority.

Nietzschean doctrine would receive support and the greatest development in postmodern sociopolitical theory of Guattari and Deleuze, especially in their notorious work, entitled “Anti-Oedipus...”, where they demonstrated their firm belief in the dominance of the social system over humans in terms of the effectiveness of sophisticated technologies of suppression and control.

[1] *The System of Transcendental Idealism* was elaborated by a prominent representative of German classical philosophy, Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). It is the philosophical doctrine based on examining *transcendental (a priori)* structures of consciousness, that is, the structures, which are not dependent on sensory experience. It does mean that these structures are the effect of self-activity of human thinking, based on a human productive (constitutive) ability for fantasy, that is also *a priori*. In his famous “Critique of Pure Reason” Kant focused on such structures as “time” and “space”, which he defined to be *a priori forms of perception; a priori concepts, that is, the categories; transcendental ideas of pure Reason, namely, ideas of world, soul, God and freedom.*

[2] It is well-known Kant believed that *Ethical Reason* was also based on the transcendental core, which he designated as “*categorical imperative*” in the sense of unconditional requirement of acting “only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law”. In a more general sense, this imperative coincides with the “golden rule of ethics” with its requirement: “you should behave the way you want others to behave toward you”.

[3] Nietzsche Friedrich (2010) *On the genealogy of Morality*, [in] *Ethics: The Essential Writings* (ed), Gordon Marino, The Random House Publishing: 58-59.

[4] Deleuze G. Guattari F. (1983) *Anti-Oedipus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia.* / Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari: [Translated by Robert Hurley, Seem Mark, and Helen R. Lane]: 38.

[5] *Ibid.* 39-41.

4.2. The main psychoanalytic narratives in philosophical anthropology.

Along with the radical ideas of Nietzsche, it is *psychoanalysis* that exercised the greatest impact on the development of the entire philosophical thought of the 20th, in particular, on philosophical anthropology. Psychoanalysis, which in some sense was grounded on Nietzschean ideas, affected the development of the entire postmodern criticism of the previous “transcendentalism”.

Conventionally, *psychoanalysis* is, primarily, a theory in humanities that was founded by an Austrian psychiatrist Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), aimed, initially at examining the nature of the human *unconscious*^[1].

Unconscious is a latent component or layer of a human mental life that is considered to be basic for elaborating the psychoanalytic paradigm.

Meanwhile, *psychoanalysis* as a whole should be divided into two parts, namely, practical (clinical) *psychoanalysis* and theoretical, including the doctrine of human nature and *psychoanalytical* theory of culture, which significantly influenced structuralist and post-structuralist views. In methodological terms, *psychoanalysis is associated with structuring the unconscious, especially regarding its nuclear structure.*

In general, there are many structures, which are relevant to the *unconscious*. These are various *desires, phobias, resentment* (grievance), images, etc., which, supposedly, at an early age, are *displaced* from consciousness, but retain an ability to affect it.

Displacement – is a key term of psychoanalytic theory of personality, which designates the act of the moving (“transferring”) of unpleasant desires or impulses deeply inwards that generates the structure of the psychic unconscious.

Upon later research the central structure of the unconscious would focus on the phenomenon of *phantasm*, that is, with *the effect of desiring fantasy of person*. Before analyzing the major phantasm of the *unconscious*, which according to Freud is directly associated with the “desire for mother” (“*Oedipus complex*”), one should refer to *psychoanalysis* in terms of both the methodological strategy and the most vivid trend of contemporary philosophy.

Oedipus (father) complex is the nuclear component of mental unconscious, which is directly associated with the libidinal attachment of a little child towards his parents that evokes a latent conflict between child's opposite desires – between child's need for love and care and the unconscious striving to kill them or hatred toward them.

The above-mentioned structure is mostly associated with a source of human misfortunes, which manifest itself in the form of profound neurosis, accompanied by profound moral feelings, in particular, a sense of duty and guilt. Furthermore, *Freud's psychoanalysis* and his narratives affected deeply the further elaboration of such methodologies as *structuralism*^[2] and *post-structuralism*^[3], and essentially changed the subject field of the entire contemporary studies in philosophy, including anthropology.

Due to a revision of some Freud's ideas, offered, mainly by the representatives of neo-Freudianism and post-structuralist philosophy, Freud's psychoanalysis was entitled the "orthodox" one. There is much speculation on some revision of his basic ideas, in particular, Freud's *doctrine of the unconscious structure*, and his perspective on *the nature of human destructiveness*.

The problem of Oedipus construct is, primarily, the issue of the human complexes, which exist and manifest themselves in the form of various *phobias* that have the ability to evoke the neurotic disorders, for example, *hysteria, defined as a psychic protest against the dependence on desire*.

In other words, "Oedipus complex" forms a neurotic person that is also the issue of so-called "affective values". Starting with G. Jung^[4] (1875–1961) in many humanities the term "Oedipus complex" was leveled solely by the theme of affective structures. But, later, this topic has been substituted with the topic of *schizophrenia* in postmodernist studies.

Schizophrenia is a long-term mental disorder of a type involving a breakdown in the relation between thought, emotion, and behavior, leading to faulty perception, inappropriate actions and feelings, detached from reality and personal relationships into fantasy and illusion, and a sense of mental fragmentation.

The founder of psychoanalysis was known to be convinced that it was the child's attachment towards their parents that was a strong emotional basis for internalization (mastering) of moral imperatives in terms of child's fear of losing parental love and care. Nevertheless, at the same time, Freud had no doubts about the major role of *the fear of punishment* in the emergence of *moral Subject*.

Freud considered human emotions to be partly relative (fictive), claiming, for example, that human "hate as a relation to objects is older than love". But he nevertheless believed that the "need for love and care" were inherent in all humans. Despite the fact that the Oedipus complex in adults transforms into a component called the *Super-Ego* with its demands of duty and guilt, the structure of the unconscious remains relatively unchanged, since it always depends on the "*father complex*" *both in terms of the fear of losing parental affection and the guilt towards parents*.

Summarizing psychoanalytic views on this issue, we conclude that *human unconscious mostly contains various human phobias (complexes) and inhibited (repressed) desires, which people persist throughout their own life*, since under conditions of civilized social world, the individuals have to restrict and suppress or restrain their instinctive impulses and desires, *displacing them* by psychic way – by virtue of moral activity of *Super-Ego*, especially, libidinal and aggressive strives.

Meanwhile, in the middle of the 20th century there emerged an alternative philosophical approach to the exploration of the unconscious, based on the criticism of Freud's *psychoanalysis* – the so-called *schizoanalysis* which, on the one hand, was a continuation of *psychoanalysis in terms of structuring the unconscious* and, on the other hand, was aimed at studying *Schizoid unconscious*, which was correlated with another *anthropological type* – "Schizoid Subject", thus, opposite to neurotic Subject and its *familial unconscious*.

In view of the above, the *unconscious can be defined as both the mental consequence of displaced desires or phobias and as "desiring production" of any delirium, or the unlimited delirium production*. The production of delirium is a direct effect of co-existence-legitimation of any discourse in postmodern culture. One might even assume it is co-existence-legitimation to be the *sociocultural code* of postmodern civilization.

Sociocultural code is defined as a complex of values and symbols (“the signs”), which are conventional within certain human communities.

The *schizoanalysis* is at its core both the philosophical methodological strategy and most critical anthropological theory, grounded on denying humaneness (morality) in postmodern people.

Anthropological type is the relative model of distinctive abilities of human being, mainly, mental structures that emerge as a result of socializing and mastering the social experience of the corresponding historical epochs or cultural traditions (“people of Antiquity”, “modern subject”, “man of the Postmodern era”, etc.); the key concept of the social anthropology, designating the relativity of the human mental structure due to historicity of certain sociocultural practices.

According to the developers of the above approach, namely, to J. Deleuze and F. Guattari, the postmodern man is largely Schizoid, rather than “*madman of family*”, who is absolutely beyond “miserable whimpering about not being loved or understood”. It does mean that the Schizoid occupies a completely anti-family position, therefore they are essentially beyond the Oedipus complex. The latter allows these authors to consider Oedipus complex as artificial and relative, that is to say, as exclusively false construct, “sham image”: “*Oedipus is first the idea of an adult paranoiac, before it is the childhood feeling of a neurotic*”; “... it is the father who is first in relation to the child. The paranoiac father oedipalizes the son. Guilt is an idea projected by the father before it is an inner feeling experienced by the son. The first error of psychoanalysis is in acting as if a situation originates from the child. This leads psychoanalysis to develop an absurd theory of fantasy, in terms of which the father, the mother, and their real actions and passions must first be understood as “fantasies” of the child”^[1].

Indeed, Freud believed that morality is a direct effect of acting *Oedipus complex* in terms of the fear of punishment that enables to develop an internal moral censor in the form of *Super-Ego structure*, which emerges due to internalization of “image of severe father”, who “brandishes the law” (Deleuze), disciplines and punishes (Foucault),

experiencing and strengthening of Super-Ego *controls, restraining aggression and sexuality*.

Similar to Neurotic, Schizoid feels some emotions, but these emotions, as the authors write, are quite “material”, directed only to things and financial flows. Emphasizing that, for example, marriage in history is not an alliance between a man and a woman, but an alliance between two families, “a transaction between men concerning women”, “*schizo-analysis*” is aimed to manifest that so-called human relationships, or affections cannot be involved into unconscious.

Despite the experience of communications between parents and their child at the level of *unconscious* (Deleuze and Guattari had to recognize that fact, discovered by the mentioned above Jung)^[5], postmodernists were convinced that a child’s first experience of the world was neither personal nor biological – a fact which, from their perspective, “psychoanalysis has not succeeded in grasping”. That is why, they tried to fully rationalize the relativity of human affection and declared that society itself imposed the affection for the parents, whereas, in nature, a child *libido* could be directed to absolutely impersonal objects. In other words, the primary individual unconscious is neither spiritual, nor familial in terms of its almost complete indifference to interpersonal relationships.

Thus, in contrast to *rationalist anthropology of classical philosophy*, which focused, mostly, on theoretical Reason as on human ability to explore the world, as well as on practical One in terms of behavior in accordance with moral obligations contrary to instinctive impulses, *psychoanalytic anthropology* emphasizes irrationality.

According to psychoanalysts, it is human instincts or passions that play a major role in both individual life and civilization “destinies”. It is not a coincidence that the issue of *transgressive experiences*^[6] is the subject matter in humanities.

In other words, the above classical anthropology that was grounded on the narrative about human Reason and its Divine genesis was replaced by the narrative of *infernal*ity of humans under power of instincts, in particular, under power of so-called *death instinct*, and also “*malignant (libidinal) aggression*”.

Death instinct (Thanatos) is a term introduced into modern philosophical glossary by Freud to designate the presence in human psyche the desire for death, based on strong hatred for life.

Malignant aggression (destructiveness) is a concept that was offered by Erich Fromm to distinguish the instinctive (adaptive) aggression from destructive one, expressed by passion or desire for violence, based on libidinal pleasure, for example, bloodiness and cruelty, pleasure for killing, etc^[7].

And only a few of the modern authors, namely, Max Scheler, who is a prominent representative of phenomenology, as well as a founder of modern philosophical anthropology insist on the *spiritual essence* of human being, examining *Spirit* in various senses, namely as the ability for transcendental thinking, ascetic morality and personal self-identification due to the feeling of *Self*.

According to Scheler, humans tend to deny biological nature in general, or have the “contempt for living” primarily due to their spiritual essence, and such essence is inherent in people alone, as well as the people alone are “ascetics of life”. Even human abilities to love and hate are “emotive experiences of value” that have a spiritual dimension, which the philosopher expressed by means of “*Ordo amoris*” concept: “Whoever grasps the *ordo amoris* of a man, has hold of man himself. He possesses him as a moral subject...he sees the core of man as a spiritual being” (Max Scheler). Despite most of human attachments, which, according to Scheler, *transcendental*, in particular, an aesthetic sense of beauty, kindness, etc., with regard to hatred, he claimed its emergence due to the “lack” of love.

Meanwhile, numerous writings in philosophy under review prove that there is no simple way to bring this issue to the close as well as there is no common ground for all representatives of the psychoanalytic trend to find a solution to this problem, that is, the problem of *destructiveness* in its various expressions or *modalities*^[8].

Adler’s hypothesis of inferiority phobia as a possible origin of hatred, that could cause cruelty in human relationships, was supported by Fromm. Both of them emphasized a specific love for power, in other words – on a human desire for dominance, regarded as a result of an unsatisfied or uncompensated narcissism. *It is this super-narcissism that causes a morbid desire for dominance in all possible senses, that, in addition, can be evoked by equal morbid envy.*

It is noteworthy that Sigmund Freud, for example, pointed to the fundamental role of narcissism in the emergence of destructive impulses,

such as sadism. In its turn, human narcissism can be considered as a specific manifestation of *self-preservation instinct*, which was described in Erich Fromm's writings, as well as an expression of the reaction of displeasure, evoked by objects; it (hate) always remains in an intimate relation with the self-preservation instinct. In his view, the Ego hates and disgusts the objects with intent to destroy all of them, especially when they are a source of unpleasant feeling for it. Therefore, some relations of hate can be derived not from sexual life, but from the Ego's struggle to preserve and maintain itself.

All of the above does not mean that contemporary anthropology totally rejects the classical thesis about the rational essence of humans or a widespread doctrine of *special capacity to deny the value of natural existence through spiritual perfection*, as Max Scheler insisted. Nevertheless, when considering the human being "as an animal, aimed at making of the values" (Nietzsche), all modern, especially, postmodern anthropology deals with the sociocultural origins and conditionality of human mental structures.

Concisely, modern and postmodern thinkers adhere to the principles of *sociocultural determinism* in philosophical anthropology, namely, *the principles of institutional dependency and historicity*. Thus, *philosophical anthropology has ceased to be contemplative, that is, to be such a theory of human being, which is based on the belief in its general and unified nature*.

Postmodern philosophy is mostly founded on comprehending and proving the historicity of various value systems or so-called "rationality" ("world-image", "a picture of the world", etc.), caused, primarily, by particularities of social structure of their communities. But even in terms of sociocultural relativity, the issue of human being remains relevant, especially, in terms of their libidinal nature, which is the basic point for consideration of the above transgression, therefore social tension.

[1] Deleuze G. Guattari F. (1983) *Anti-Oedipus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. / Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari: [Translated by Robert Hurley, Seem Mark, and Helen R. Lane]: 274-275.

4.3. Destructiveness as a separate matter of philosophical anthropology. Almost the entire philosophical tradition of the 20th century, especially its main trends, testify that the problem of “superfluous violence” or “the desire for violence” in its various forms turned into the central problem of the most significant studies in philosophy, including postmodern theory. That is why, the fundamental notion of many researchers within the framework of philosophy is related to *destructive libido*, rather than just *libido* as such.

A number of postmodern authors focus on the dominance of the *destructive libido* in the structure of mental enjoyment, a theory which is confined to the issue of clarifying its origins, that is directly related to the issue of human mind (rationality) and its dependence on sociocultural impacts.

It is worth emphasizing that the above issue, that is, the constant presence of some excess of violence in any society, especially in interpersonal relationships, both has been posed and developed by the representatives of modern philosophy. In addition, many of them turned out to be very skeptical about the idea of *libidinal labor*, which, as well-known, is closely related to the Freudian hypothesis of *sublimation*.

***Sublimation** (borrowed from Latin word “sublimo” – to elevate) is a fundamental concept of psychoanalysis, which denotes a psychological way of modeling inferior instincts and desires in terms of turning them into the social-adaptive (“aesthetic”) forms of expression; the reorientation of libidinal energy as the energy of gratification into social and cultural activities.*

However, when comparing Freud’s grasping of sublimation with the conception of Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979), for example, the former may be found to be rather contemplative. Marcuse is known to have believed that human need for destructiveness (*Thanatos*) is the constant feature of human being, which undergoes essential transformations by virtue of the technogenic essence of the civilization with its permanent strive for industrial progress and comfort. In its turn, the civilization, which is initially based on repression and coercion, in particular, on *forced labor*, fulfills the constructive function in terms of creating the immanent mechanism of *sublimation*, especially sublimation of human aggressiveness, therefore, the need for violence in its various forms.

Marcuse argued that the established system of industrial capitalism allows humanity to sublimate a huge amount of destructive libidinal energy with help of labor or the virtue of labor. In contrast to Freud, Marcuse *distinguished between “repressive” and “non-repressive” sublimation*, where the latter, according to Marcuse is an effect of the “developed industrial society”, based on libidinal labor as an opportunity to enjoy work.

As a result of sublimation by labor, “the biological drive becomes a cultural drive... There is sublimation, and, consequently, culture; but this sublimation proceeds in a system of expanding and enduring libidinal relation, which are in themselves in work relations”, thus “*libidinal component impulse” may enter in work*”¹.

Meanwhile, Freud, for example, did not trust humanity and insisted that every civilization must be built upon *coercion* and “renunciation of instinct”. “One has, I think, to reckon with the fact that *there is a present in all men* destructive, and therefore anti-social and anti-cultural trends... there are two widespread human characteristics, which are responsible for the fact that *the relation of civilization can only be maintained by a certain degree of coercion – namely, that men are not spontaneously fond of work and that arguments are of no avail against their passions*”².

Along with that, a number of postmodern authors show a more critical attitude to the idea of sublimation. According to many of them, the very concept of sublimation is absolutely groundless, or limited to a small number of examples. Suffice it to recall the notorious treatise that was written by the representatives of postmodern philosophy, namely “Anti-Oedipus, Capitalism and Schizophrenia”, attempted to exercise the rationale for the doubtfulness of any *sublimation* at the current stage of civilization.

Furthermore, referring to the above studies, especially, the representatives of critical social theory, one can get an impression that postmodern people mainly deal with the enjoyment of “flows and power”, rather than with the enjoyment of esthetics or labor.

¹ Marcuse, Herbert (1955) *Eros and Civilization. A Philosophical Inquiry Into Freud*. Vintage Books: 212-217.

² Freud, Sigmund (2005) *Civilization and its discontents – The electronic version is copyright. Chrysoma Associated Limited. Publications Division. Electronic Books Library: 24.*

Nevertheless, the modern thinkers admit the existence of the so-called repressive sublimation, especially in the conditions of advanced economies, whereas the reasons, which supposedly allow humans to be more creative, gentle, noble, etc. have yet to be clarified, being the subject matter of heated discussions.

In order to grasp the complexity of the above issue, one may refer to a prominent psychoanalytic theoretician, namely Wilhelm Reich (1897–1957), who completely denied the sublimation. Whereas the desire for work, for example, or human tendency to kindness and creativity he explained by quite natural reasons, in more precisely, by very human nature.

It is known that Reich regarded a special tendency of humans to superfluous violence in the sense of more destructive behavior and atrocity as the effect of inhibited sexual desire, as he wrote, “the effect of unhappiness in love life”.

Reich did not want to accept the old philosophical truth, which had been pronounced by Aristotle: “*man is by nature a political animal*” in terms that humanity is the “result” of a permanent historical sociocultural process. Put it another way, the human being is the effect of the complex fusion of biological and social determinants, where the main reason of life enjoyment, mostly, is to satisfy so-called social instincts: human need for superiority or recognition and domination. That is why, it was Erich Fromm who, as it turned out, to be closer to the truth, when he tried to rationalize the *significance of the desire for power in spreading destructive trends, especially in conditions of total indifference regarding the moral constraints on the part of the social majority*.

There is a certain dependence of the above theories on the common “spirit” of the time, related to them. Furthermore, referring to a logic of developing some ideas within the framework of leading philosophical trends of the 20th century, the thesis on the existence of some correlation between the dominant system of social relations and relevant social subject, for instance, between certain system of production and certain mentality or “ethos”, seems to be quite valid.

A number of modern thinkers had to recognize the key impact of the development of the monetary economy on both the social structure of the “Western world” and the transformation of the libidinal basis of personality. More precisely, so-called “Western world” differs from other civilizations, primarily, by its “schizoid’s obsessions with the

economy”, as Deleuze quite solidly stated, that could not but affect the human psyche in terms of some “softening” of human mores or customs, when the desire for violence is substituted with the desire for accumulation. It is only necessary “to ensure that the Desire of the most disadvantaged creature will invest with all its strength, irrespective of any economic understanding or lack of it, the capitalist social field as a whole. Flows, who doesn’t desire flows, and relationships between flows, and breaks in flows? – all of which capitalism was able to mobilize and break under these hitherto unknown conditions of money. While it is true that capitalism is industrial in its essence or mode of production, it functions only as merchant capitalism. While it is true that it is a filiative industrial capital in its essence, it functions only through its alliance with commercial and financial capital”¹.

It is noteworthy to point out that the *emotional make-up* of the postmodern Subject is referred to a more differentiated structure of economy rather than to just differentiated “communal life”, especially in terms of developing capitalism, mediated by increase in production and consumption.

Meanwhile, it has been a debatable issue. The outstanding sociologist of modernity, namely Norbert Elias (1897–1990), for example, fully agrees with Deleuze, that is, with Nietzschean vision, which is based on an exceptional emphasis on the “original savagery of feelings” and “joy in destruction” of previous generations, including their ruling class (estate). In addition, some authors of a later period regretfully remark that despite increasing self-control in most of current societies, cruelty and “enjoy in the destruction” and “torment of other” continue, which in Elias’s words, for instance, are “exceptional phenomena of pathological degeneration”, that is, we still encounter those in later phases of social development. That is why grasping the “prime causes” of destructive impulses is the most fundamental issue for many scholars.

The above phenomenon, that is, *the need for destructive hatred and enjoyment in violence*, which sometimes comes into contact with “death instinct”, has become a special subject matter of examination for almost the entire contemporary social theory. From a postmodern, post-structuralist point of view, current humanity moves toward

¹ Deleuze G. Guattari F. (1983) *Anti-Oedipus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia.* / Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari: [Translated by Robert Hurley, Seem Mark, and Helen R. Lane]: 229.

self-destruction. In regard to libidinal urges, they hardly have some humanistic component. In any case, if it still exists, it manifests itself weakly and impassively: “*desire knows only gift and theft*” (Deleuze & Guattari), and also there is always some concern with death and “bloody festival of punishment”.

In fact, when humans behave destructively, they do not merely become like animals (animals do not know about prohibition). As Fromm expertly argued, such humans become even worse than animals, since they know about prohibition, but they ignore it for the sake of passionate desire, even when such a desire destroys and annihilates them. The passions turn into the main source of life enjoyment and purport of existence. *Thus, the discussion about why reason and rationality in consciousness do not always dominate over unreason and irrationality is absolutely unnecessary. It is obvious, but both are equally inherent only to human being.*

Along with the phenomenon of *superfluous violence* that presumably has a libidinal basis, there is another obvious reason for intensifying the destructive trends, especially, in social terms. We have in mind a particular concern with the discourse of individual experiences and passions from the part of supporters of Western tradition. One can conceive the whole cult of passions and feelings, conditioned by postmodern hedonism, have completely replaced any ethical arguments. Put it another way, we can observe that the self-control is decreasing, loosening codes and increasing emotional alternatives.

Meanwhile, some postmodern authors are convinced that in the conditions of postindustrial economy all human passions are, mostly, leveled with the striving for profit and comfortable life. It is *material emotions* (Deleuze&Guattari) that are dominant nowadays. In the circumstances of “advanced societies” with their no less highly developed system of production and consumption, including their virtual forms, we have become mostly “pampered” people with previously an unthinkable and comfortable lifestyle. But as evidenced by everyday life experience, the enjoyment of “items” and “services” does not exclude the enjoyment of old human passions, rather *vice versa*, they peacefully coexist.

A particular concern with personal feelings and passions, or obsession with them is constantly accompanied by weak ability to self-restraint in terms of restricting one's own affective urges or desires.

Can this fact lead to a mental disorder? Presumably, for example, it is no coincidence that Baudrillard, when describing the postmodern “community”, uses the term “therapeutic society”, having in mind, obviously, the psychiatric clinic that dominates there.

Indeed, nowadays the system of social relations is being totally swallowed up by market relations. *As Marxists rightly state, the production system is the production of a relevant type of sociality, including a relevant type of humans.* For the postmodern anthropological type, brought up by the liberal ideology of equal rights and opportunities, and, therefore, without recognizing any social “pecking order”, there is only one thing that has an absolute value – it is Themselves, perhaps even their intimate circle.

In such a system of value coordinates the concept of collective solidarity is more a myth than reality. This fact has found its most vivid conceptual reflection in many philosophical works of modern era, in particular, in the *existential phenomenology* of Jean Paul Sartre, where *the Other* always represents a potential danger: not in the terms that it confesses a different faith, morality, or ideas about the world (as the guardians of the progressive approach try to assure us), but precisely because it is *not-Me*. Furthermore, there is no certainty that the Other treats somebody as a partner or as a friend, and that it is attached to anybody etc.

Presumably, *Other* gets into a relationship or communication only to enslave somebody, to absorb their freedom, to destroy as a person, thus Sartre, in fact, reproduced the Freud’s viewpoint, once expressed by his well-known “Civilization and its Discontents”: “men are not gentle, friendly creatures, wishing for love, who simply defend themselves if they are attacked, but that a powerful measure of desire for aggression... *homo homini lupus*. Who has the courage to dispute it in the face of all the evidence in his own life and in history?”¹

Nevertheless, as for “sociality” *in the sense of people’s need for community*, the final sentence was passed not even by existentialism, but by representatives of postmodern philosophy, who attacked psychoanalysis due to completely unfounded “belief” in affection, an

¹ Freud, Sigmund. (2005) Civilization and its discontents – The electronic version is copyright. Chrysoma Associated Limited. Publications Division. Electronic Books Library: 24.

attachment between a man and a woman, and *vice versa*, between a woman and a man, between children and their parents, etc.

For postmodern thinkers such assumptions are myths, created by human civilization for the sole purpose of “enslaving” humans, motivating them to work for the family and the State, for the entire system of public relations, which were grounded on the urge for “surplus value”.

Meanwhile, it is hard to accept the above skepticism as unfounded. People who, currently, live in conditions of material and informational excesses and advanced technology, actually, are swallowed up by various “things”, which, in contrast to philosophers, are not considered as “terror” by them. Furthermore, contemporary information technologies have unlimited possibilities with regard to replacing or simulating real relationships by virtual signs-symbols of relationships, including feelings and emotions.

[1] According to Freud, the activity of this structure is directly associated with various phobias and fantasies, which, generally, revolve around a nuclear structure (“constellation”) of the Oedipus complex.

[2] *Structuralism* is the complex of approaches in humanities and the leading strategy in philosophical thought that is related to finding some *structure as an objective pattern (latent meanings) of relatively fixed relationships and interaction among “individuals”*.

[3] *Post-structuralism* is a set of methodologies in postmodern philosophy, which implies the presence of a number of approaches and ideas that, primarily, are based on the criticism of structuralism. For instance, the *deconstructive approach*, developed in the 1960s by the French philosopher Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) and a *Schizoanalysis*, belonging to such prominent French philosophers as J. Deleuze and F. Guattari.

[4] Carl Gustave Jung is a Swiss psychiatrist and psychoanalyst who founded a theory, entitled the *analytical psychology*. He mainly dealt with the study of the phenomenon of schizophrenia and child’s neurosis. When researching the schizophrenia, Jung developed the hypothesis of existence of so-called collective memory in human *unconscious (collective unconscious)* in the form of so-called *archetypes (borrowed from Greek words of ἀρχῶ that means “to begin” and τύπος, that is, “type”, which he defined as universal and prime image (symbol), laid the basis of all cultures, and which are the unconscious experience and evaluation of something. According to Jung, this collective unconscious or mind, along with personal phobias and phantasms is a part or component of the individual unconscious, which have a tendency to be transmitted genetically from generation to generation. In modern psychoanalytic studies there are several widespread archetypes, for instance, archetypes of “trickster”, “saint”, “hero”, feminine images in man’s mind and, vice versa, masculine images in woman’s mind, etc.*

[5] For example, in “Anti-Oedipus ...” there is the place, where the authors claim: “But in effect, Oedipus begins in the mind of the father. And the beginning is not absolute: it is only constituted starting from investments of the social historical field that are affected by the father. And if it passes over to the son, this is not by virtue of a familial heredity, *but by virtue of a much more complex relationship that depends on the communication of the unconscious*” (178).

[6] *Transgressive experience* or transgression – is a concept, expressing such human acts that are regarded as an appearance of abnormal, amoral or unlawful behavior, as breaking the conventional norms, as a rule, in the form of various destructiveness, the excess of violence, the experience of madness, etc.

[7] In a brilliant study of the above problem, titled “The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness”, another representative of *psychoanalysis*, namely, Erich Fromm emphasizes that the term “aggression” he uses for *defensive*, reactive aggression is subsumed under “*benign aggression*”, but called “destructiveness” and “cruelty” to denote the specifically human propensity to destroy and to strive for absolute control (“malignant aggression”), P. XVI.

[8] Modality (borrowed from Latin *modus* that means “mode”, “way”, “form” is a particular mode, in which something exists or is expressed.

[9] Alfred Adler (1870–1937) is known as a founder of so-called analytical psychology, which offered a popular clarification of human tendency to destructiveness.

[10] Erich Fromm (1973) “The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness”. Holt, Rinehart and Winston. New York Chicago San Francisco: 289-291.

TOPIC 5. Consciousness as a Philosophical Issue.

5.1. Phenomenological theory of consciousness. If we agree with the existential view on the being, that is, we associate it primarily with human existence, we inevitably face the issue of consciousness, since *it is consciousness in terms of a meaningful attitude to the being that is an essential ability of human “creature”*.

Put it another way, a human being is, first of all, a being, capable of thinking and life reasonably. That is why, the issue of consciousness is central for philosophical theory as such, in particular, for modern ontology and philosophical anthropology. When considering the philosophical approaches related to the issue of *consciousness*, it should be pointed to the most significant of them, namely, *phenomenology*, focused on the human *reason as ability to generate and understand the meanings*, and *psychoanalysis*, examining consciousness in its relation to the *unconscious*.

Phenomenology is a particular philosophical approach that offers only *descriptive analysis*. In other words, *an essential trait or principle of phenomenological strategy is associated with conceptualizing in terms of the capability to define the essential meaning of a certain “phenomenon” – a necessary condition of any theoretical explorations, especially philosophical*.

From the very beginning, phenomenology focused on discovering the various forms (“phenomena”) of *consciousness* in the context of “seeing” their “essence”. According to Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), who is the founder of phenomenology, it is phenomenology that can turn philosophy into “rigorous science” like mathematics.

Husserl claimed that *phenomenology* is, primarily, “*the science about meanings, rather than about facts*”, *based on the descriptive analysis in terms of conceptualizing the psychic phenomena from angle of comprehending their essences, rather than their elucidation, as it occurred to metaphysics*.

According to Husserl the methodological premise of phenomenological philosophy is the *transcendental idealism*. That is the reason why, phenomenology in its core is “transcendental-phenomenological philosophy” as a science about essential structure of *various forms of consciousness*, that is, a science about phenomena of *immanence*.

Immanence (borrowed from Latin “*immanere*” in the sense of “to dwell in”, “remain”) – is the traditional philosophical term that denotes to internal (interior) being contrary to external, that is mostly related to human mental experiences in the forms of consciousness and self-consciousness, in other words, which implies all personality structures, including various affections and feelings.

The philosophical term of “immanence” is opposite to the term of “transcendence”, that is, to the external objective world, which exists beyond the inner world of individual consciousness. These notions, or the terms of *immanence* and *transcendence*, are mainly the philosophical ones. In Husserl’s view, the basic means to designate consciousness is by applying the Cartesian *cogito*, expressed in words: “I think”, broadly by Descartes in: “I perceive, I feel, I will” and also “the Ego itself”. Later this vision was developed by Immanuel Kant, who defined “consciousness” as “the transcendental unity of apperception (self-consciousness)”. Put it another way, the essential abilities of “consciousness or its attributive features are associated with, first, the ability to cognitive activity (reflection) and, second, the structure of the Ego. In regard to the definition above Kant clarifies: “The “I think” must be able to accompany all my representations”.

Meanwhile, Husserl focuses mostly on its essential marker such as *intentionality* – “directedness to” the objects that means in the essence of the mental process itself lies not only an idea that it is consciousness, but also where consciousness is, and in which determinate, or indeterminate sense it is that: “Universally it belongs to the essence of every actional *cogito* to be consciousness of something”^[1].

The phenomenological approach to study of consciousness is unthinkable beyond its fundamental principle, namely, beyond the principle of *phenomenological reduction* or so-called *epoche* (from Greek word, that is translated as “to refrain”), which means the ability of eliminating any “objects” from consciousness, except for very consciousness and its activities in the forms of various mental phenomena – perception, memory, fantasy, humor, hatred, etc.: “The most global form of *epoche* is employed when this reality in total is in bracketed”.

The direct aim of phenomenological *epoche* is to prepare for “seeing” the essence (“*eidos*”) of any intentional act, since “any tone in and itself has an essence, and highest at all, the *universal essence* of

tone as such, or rather sound as such”. We are “*seeing* the pure essence” of some experience on the basis of “ideation” *a priori*. By virtue of this “ideation” we “can see any pure essence originality...ether of essence of any spatial shape, whatever any melody, whatever any social practices...”^[2].

Below are some brilliant examples of phenomenological studies, which are related to descriptive analysis of ordinary perception. As Husserl believed, the ordinary *sensory perception* differs from other *manifestations (phenomena) of sensory consciousness*, for instance, from remembering or fantasizing by the certainty of immediate existence of its “things”.

The *perception* is directly correlated with its object, that is why it is defined as such a “perception, the essence of which is the *nuancing* (“*adumbration*”) in terms of unlimited presence of projections of objective “things” within consciousness, regardless of will of consciousness, that is, the essence of sensory perception is its *transcending*”.

While the essence of fantasy, for example, is the “*image*” – as an effect of designing activity of consciousness. In terms of its origin, the phenomenon of “*phantasm*” is similar to “*image*”. But, in contrast to this, the *phantasm* is the result of both the designing activity and *libidinal* desire.

If we take for example a musical perception, we can understand why music is defined in phenomenology as “*an irrational constituting of numerical rations in consciousness*”. Music is an irrational duration with its own *matter* in the form of specific sensibility. But, contrary to the matter of ordinary perception, this matter evokes the “aesthetics pleasure”, caused by the mathematics of tempo, rhythm and interval. Such mathematics determines the transcendental structure of music, regardless of its ability to evoke pleasure. In contrast to psychoanalysis, for instance, which focuses on the origins of human mental activity in various forms, phenomenologists explore them in terms of their essences, expressed only conceptually. For example, phenomenology deals with an ironic consciousness in terms of its essence that ultimately means searching for its differences from other modes that constitute the comic meaning.

Thus, from the very beginning, phenomenology deals with the structures of *consciousness* in terms of grasping their universal essences

(essence of perception, emotion, affection and so on). Therefore, *phenomenology is, mainly, a theory on transcendental meanings, that is such meanings, which are distinguished by highest degree of generalization*. It is worthy to mention the existential views of an outstanding philosopher of the 20th century, namely Jean Paul Sartre, in regard to another authentic conception of consciousness within the framework of phenomenological approach. According to Sartre, the most essential feature of consciousness, its central attributive feature is related to freedom, rather than to mental activity.

Along with freedom there is another category, which equally describes the very essence of human beings: the determining role of the *anxiety*, which always haunts human existence. In other words, *the aware existence is not possible on the whole without this anxiety in terms of both the fear of real death and fear of someone else's freedom*.

The consciousness *is nothing mainly in terms of a fixed "thing that exists"*: *"The paradox is not that there are "self-activated" existences but that there is no other kind"*. Consciousness has nothing substantial; it is pure "appearance" in the sense that it exists only to the degree to which it appears. But because it is precisely this consciousness that is pure *appearance*, it is the total emptiness (since the entire world is outside it)^[3].

In other words, this theory is grounded on the essential demarcation between being of real things [that does exist] and *aware existence in terms of human being*, put in Sartre's language, as between the *"being-in-itself"* and *"being-for-itself"*. But, according to the French existentialist, there is the third dimension of being that he credits as *"being-for-other"*, considered as the most problematic one.

A vivid eloquent example of this dimension is his *phenomenology of ethical consciousness*. According to Sartre, it is *ethical consciousness* that is evidence of the other existences, providing a person's confidence in their presence. Starting point of his philosophy is the phrase that only human *consciousness*, that is the structure, named as "Ego", can be a subject, and never be an object, and that only human *consciousness* is endowed with the ability to be absolutely free. But the other people, who are present in front of a person, initially, are the objects.

Moreover, when the "other" or the "others" look at somebody, they also ascribe the characteristics of the object, so to speak, "objectify me". It is this "objectifying" that consists in their absolute freedom, which

never belongs to a person, and it is this freedom that one should absolutely have in order to objectify the “other”, that is, to define the “other” exactly as one sees them, to evaluate regardless of any desire: “First, the Other’s *look* as the necessary condition of my *objectivity* is the destruction of all objectivity for me... I am looked-at in a world which is looked-at me... Thus, for me the Other is first the being for whom I am an object; that is, the being *through whom* I gain my abjectness... I experience the inapprehensible subjectivity of the Other directly and with my being. At the same time, I experience my own infinite freedom”^[4].

In regard to the thesis on absolute freedom, Sartre substantiated it in his famous *phenomenology of love relationships*, namely he was convinced that individuals within their immanence, that is their consciousness, were completely free, since they could think about the others, whatever they wanted. The others urged for appropriate “my” freedom by denying the personality of “my” being, and “I” did the same. But this “project” can never be exercised because everyone has their own consciousness, therefore, their own freedom.

This *negative dialectic* of both freedoms (“the fact that there is other’s freedom”) is the direct cause of the inevitable conflict between individuals, which cannot be resolved even by virtue of love, which, moreover, can be accompanied by hatred. According to Sartre, each person in relationship with the “others” seeks recognition of their personality (“Ego”), especially in love relationships, where everyone, who has fallen in love, strives to be an absolute value for the other, since the other is an absolute value for them; but the other’s consciousness is not available for “me” that necessary causes “existential anxiety”, and finally lead to the “death” of love feeling.

The basic narratives of existential phenomenology of consciousness deal with the experience of *loneliness* in both the social and metaphysical meanings, as well as with the issue of human death, designated by the term “Nothing”. The subject matter of existential description is, primarily, spiritual experiences and feelings.

5.2. Sociocultural determinacy of consciousness. When referring to the issue of structure of human *consciousness*, one should note that it is the nature of human emotions or so-called human “passions” that has become the main subject matter of most philosophical studies of the 20th century. Transformations of the subject field within the framework of

a number of philosophical explorations testify to essential changes in the sociocultural space that directly has affected the issue of “human consciousness”.

In addition, *many contemporary studies in humanities are based on the idea of “sociogenesis” of human feelings or so-called doctrine of “genealogy of the Subject”*. This is relevant not only to the problem of some sociocultural determinants, but also to the issue of possible psychic genesis, including “sociogenesis” of some destructive impulses such as *the desire for violence and the need for hatred*.

First and foremost, we mean psychoanalysis, which was founded by Freud, namely, his hypothesis on social genesis of human feelings (“affective values”). Freud developed a theory of the decisive role of basic social institutions, primarily, religious and familial, influencing the development of the individual, in particular, formation of the moral Subject.

One should pay special attention to the hypothesis of a significant influence on a person’s mental structure on the part of Christian tradition, offered by Denis de Rougemont. But Freud who was known to be the first to substantiate this thesis, especially in his reasoning with regard to the nature of basic human passions, such as *romantic love*.

In addition, several of Freud’s works assure that humanity constantly deals with destructive impulses, which are subject to a sociocultural impact in terms of their essential restrictions or transformations. It is speculated that human destructiveness in the sense of permanent desire for aggression can be transformed by virtue of *designing its substitute*, entitled *ersatz* in psychoanalysis. Put it another way, *the ersatz is the psychic substitute for inferior desires or impulses*.

The functioning of the *ersatz* is relevant to the basic human instincts, for instance, to sexual desire, that found its direct embodiment in the value of so-called *romantic love*. In other words, the Love Affair, for example, in psychoanalytic view, is a vivid example of cultural substitute for sexual desire.

The same applies to laughter, which can be defined as an ersatz of aggressive impulses. It is no coincidence that Freud considered *joking* as a “symbolic way of expression of aggressiveness”. Both in psychoanalytic theory, and further in philosophy this “symbolism”, that is, the process of mental transformation of these “impulses” is associated with the above *sublimation*.

The point is that according to the psychoanalytic approach, laughter is a certain way of mental satisfaction through finding a compromise between the subjective *desire to humiliate* someone and the social prohibition on the explicit manifestation of aggressiveness. In other words, from a psychoanalytic point of view (such a vision is very common), laughter is a civilized way of obtaining pleasure, derived from aggressive urges.

Conventionally, so-called “culture of laughter” in its very origins had an absolutely destructive character, performing, primarily, the function of collective or social ostracism in relation to certain individuals – those who went beyond the shared behavioral standards.

But due to further development of human civilization, mediated by individualizing the human relationships, from the core of the folk “culture of laughter” the relevant individualistic culture emerged, where socially repressive laughter is replaced by “intellectual laughter” – phenomena of *joke* and *humor itself*.

Individualization and the growing role of mind and reason in culture resulted in diversification of laughter split into a number of forms that went beyond both the ancient medieval dissolution in the elements of the collective unconscious and the social semantics of social ostracism.

In other words, in the course of history the collectively-repressive purport of primitive laughter was replaced by the art of manifesting personal superiority. Its most popular forms were namely *irony* and *joke* – the elevated examples of laughter, more precisely, *subtle* and *delightful* humor, which at the same time had an aggressive component, accompanied by *χάρις* (beauty and grace, as the Greeks believed).

As a result of the above, laughter transforms into social-adaptive types of manifestation of aggressiveness in the sense of the “cultivated laughter” or the pleasure, created by reason. Irony, for example, is regarded as the latest form of “culture of laughter”, the type of intellectual laughter *that has a double meaning*. Put it another way, *irony is such a denial of the significance of something or someone, when affirmation does actually mean negation*. It is no coincidence that the word irony was borrowed from Greeks *ειρων* with all literally negative semantics: pretense, hypocrisy, cunning, trickery, etc.

When Freud describes the very technique of joking, he notes that joking in its core is associated with a certain activity that “aims at deriving pleasure from mental processes, whether intellectual or

otherwise”. However, the main role in this “pleasure” is played by destructive impulses: “The purposes of jokes can easily be reviewed. Where a joke is not an aim in itself – that is, where it is not an innocent one – there are only two purposes that it may serve, and these two can themselves be subsumed under a single heading. It is either a hostile joke (serving the purpose of aggressiveness, satire, or defense) or an obscene joke (serving the purpose of exposure). ...within our own circle we have made some advances in the control of hostile impulses”. As Lichtenberg puts *it in drastic terms*: “Where we now say: “Excuse me!”, we used to give a box on the ears. Brutal hostility, forbidden by law, has been replaced by verbal invective... A whole class of obscene jokes allows one to infer the presence of a concealed inclination to exhibitionism in their inventors; aggressive tendentious jokes succeed best in people in whose sexuality a powerful sadistic component is demonstrable, which is more or less inhibited in real life”^[5].

Thus, Freud points to three types of jokes, namely, “innocent” joke that is based on a play on words or meaning, “obscene joke”, indicating a latent sexual interest, and “tendentious” joking that is a symbolic expression of aggressiveness. According to Freud, tendentious joking is an “offensive technique” by which pleasure is obtained due to the internal cancellation of the inhibition to aggressiveness.

He supports the British definition of laughter as “release from restraint” that completely manifests itself in joking behavior. In Freud’s view, *joke is an effect of expression of logically right thought by logically wrong method*. It is awareness of this contrast that evokes emotional gratification.

But in the case of tendentious joking the pleasure in the very technique of joke is connected with pleasure in awareness of the latent desire to humiliate one’s companion in order to demonstrate one’s superiority. Due to intellectual devices the tendentious joking creates the illusion of “propriety”, though it has the exact opposite purport.

Freud argues that the joke is a result of strict economy (“suppression”) of libidinal energy, including aggressive impulses. Furthermore, the **humor** Freud defines *as an art of deriving pleasure from displeasure*, emphasizing the fact that it is personal dissatisfaction with life that is the main reason for the need for humor.

However, Freud believes that pleasure, derived from a joke, is more powerful in the listener than in its creator. The listener does not waste

energy on creating a joke, so “the pleasure is, so to speak, presented to them”.

The creator of jokes has an “inhibitory blockage, unconditionally abolished”, otherwise joking would be impossible. However, the pleasure of a witty joke, which is also inherent in its creator, depends not so much on the removal of inhibition or the discharge of negative energy, but on observing the reaction of its listener. The message of a joke “to other people should serve several purposes: firstly, to give me objective evidence that the wit is successful, and secondly, *to supplement my own pleasure with the return effect on me of the other person's satisfaction*”^[6].

But according to Freud the joke should be distinguished from humor. The art of *humor* is no less widespread form of manifesting the intellectual laughter, which is also directly associated with the *sublimation of destructive impulses, or with the sum of negative experiences*. But in contrast to the destructiveness of irony and tendentious jokes, the humor tends to compromise, aimed, primarily, to reconciliation with suffering by overcoming it with laughter. In humor a transformation of dissatisfaction (suffering) into pleasure takes place. Put in another way, *the true purpose of humor is to overcome personal suffering, that is, it cannot be associated with “evil”, “aggression” and “sexuality” in any way*.

It is no coincidence that Freud concluded his psychoanalysis of laughter with a philosophy of humor, and defined humor as saved suffering – “a means of pleasure in spite of painful affects that interfere with him”. “So, we are able to laugh even when we do not want to laugh at all. Such is, for example, the “gallows humor”, which is nothing more than a powerful psychological defense against unpleasant thoughts. Thus, if ironic or tendentious wit is an aesthetically veiled way of attack, then “humor should be understood as the highest among defensive actions”^[7].

In the context of the above one should pay attention to study entitled “Love in the Western World” by Denis de Rougemont, where its author, primarily, focuses on the origins of human affective impulses, including sociocultural ones. To convince us of his truth, Rougemont interprets the “romantic love” as the myth of “passionate love” that is “an absolutely anonymous expression of collective or, more precisely, social facts”.

In a narrower sense this was a pattern of “a typical relationship between a man and a woman in a certain historical group – the dominant

social caste, *court society*. This group is really long gone. But its laws remain our laws in some unexpected and diluted form”^[8].

Meanwhile, according to Rougemont this “myth” is necrophilia in its essence, that is, it has a destructive impulse. “Courtly love symbolizes a desire of death and advance toward death. But this is the death for the sake of love”. *Therefore, he admits the idea of the dual origin of “romantic discourse” in terms of its libidinal and social premises. The libidinal nucleus of passionate love consists, presumably, in the love of suffering and desire for death.* However, it is unclear which “historical group” he means.

After a detailed analysis of the *courtly romance*, Rougemont concluded that in the history of Western culture one can find the motives of struggle between the two opposite modalities of love, namely between the “fatal Eros” (with its desire for death) and the friendly Agape of canonical Christianity.

According to the cultural theorist, these patterns may be regarded as an expression of antagonism between the mystical doctrine of courtly chivalry and the feudal customs, supported by Catholicism in the 12th century, especially with regard to marriage. In other words, the narrative of “passionate love” is historically relative, closely associated with an ascetic “courtly ideal” of medieval chivalry.

Despite the fact that “courtly chivalry was never more than an ideal”, Rougemont suggested that the courtly doctrine basis was identical to the medieval ascetic ethics of Christian heretical communities, which were focused on the religion of Cathar heresy. Being grounded on the imperatives of fidelity, exclusive devotion and denial of sexual relations, this religion had influenced mostly the formation of the Western standard (ideal) of delicate love relationship, which appeared to be “fatal” in its essence.

Denis de Rougemont declares that it was a completely *ascetic ideal* widespread especially among courtly poets (minnesingers), with the followers not recognizing any “corporal contact” between man and woman up to full negation of life values. For example, this ideal was used in the medieval legend of *Tristan and Isolde*, to which he referred.

Rougemont believed that this legend reflected an artificial construct based on negation and even hatred toward life: this was “courtly-ascetic ideal”, which was an embodiment of “unhappy mutual love” that only meant suffering and, finally, death...Passion means suffering... Why

does Western man wish to suffer this passion which lacerates him and which all his common-sense rejects? ...The answer is that he reaches self-awareness and tests himself only by risking his life – in suffering and on the verge of death... It represents the essential disaster of our sadistic genius – the repressed longing for death^[9].

Indeed, the end of “love affair” is fatal: “Romance only comes into existence where love is fatal”. The basis of this “fatal love” consists in the old moral code with its aesthetic virtues, its spiritual and tragic values. In other words, this is actually a story about the Fair Maiden, who always refuses. However, we lost all this long ago and are totally unaware of it; we are only left with “a dull and diluted pain, something unclean and gloomy”^[10].

But *sociogenetic approach* as such has become widespread in modern humanities due to the fundamental research of Norbert Elias, an outstanding sociologist and cultural theorist of the 20th century, who was the first to clearly ground the correlation between the features of societal structures and features of *affective codes* that are conventional in a relevant society. The point is that Elias introduced such concepts as “*threshold of shame and repugnance*”, so he was inclined to consider human feelings in terms of their historicity, that is, their relativity.

A number of his most prominent research papers testify that the structure and examples of high behavioral standards was, previously, defined in terms of “*courtization*” and “*rationalization*”, that is *ethical imperatives, based on the affective alienation, and strict self-control*. In Elias’s view, the process of “*rationalization*” is primarily to “gradual transition to more rational behavior, and thought like the transition to a more differentiated, a more comprehensive type of self-control”, mediated by mental transformation in direction to ultimate “refinement” of affective person structure with regard to affective outbursts and drive-impulses.

Another important argument is related to the statements about “class character” of morality, especially of the Western one, in the history of which two key “*ethos*” – *aristocratic and bourgeois* – were formed.

Elias believed that another significant factor, which influenced the development of noble culture in general, should be considered as a sense of social superiority. When the knights (“warries”) actually turned into “courtiers,” it created a hierarchical system of feudal society, which found its expression in the “tables of ranks”. Nobles looked for

distinguishing themselves not only as the ruling class, but as the *upper-class*.

Thus, Elias had also to recognize that a growing sense of class superiority led to create high behavioral patterns, for example, standard of “gallantry”. We clearly see that “delicacy”, the growing sensitivity to the spoken and written words, to the nuances of rhythm, sound and meaning, arise first in a small circle of “good society”. For this circle, such sensitivity and “good taste” are associated with prestige: everything that hurts their sensitivity, “all that smells of the bourgeois”, is to the socially inferior. Both the development of feelings of “unpleasant” and “shameful”, expressed in physiological repugnancies and a *class sense of social exclusivity*, generally led to *class mental distinctions*, became an effective mechanism for refinement of human sensibility.

But the entire Elias philosophy is mostly devoted to the issue of proving the complete relativity of a number of so-called emotional attitudes. Elias was convinced in “the types of personal emotions, which are known to civilized men are products of an evolution in which emotions have taken a new direction...The instruments and means of this adaptation are the institutions... Each institution as it has become established has developed in all individuals who come under its influence *a mode of behavior* and emotional attitude could not have been perfected until the institution itself was created. The effort of individuals to adapt themselves to institutional demands results in what may be properly described as a wholly new group of pleasures and displeasures”^[11].

Elias was convinced that it was the financial dependence of courtiers on the royal treasury in the age of Absolutism that aggravated competition and the desire to serve the “overlord” as best as possible. Due to development of the monetary economy, which strengthened the financial positions of the bourgeoisies and the monarch, the mental structure of the representatives of these social strata began to change significantly: *the struggle for the king’s special favor intensified competition that led to the need to calculate every step and weigh every word, both in the presence of enemies and the suzerain, hence, to restrain the impulsivity and emotions as much as possible.*

According to Elias, the entire *policy system* and economic power in the era of Absolutism contributed to the formation of specific *refinement of tastes*, which was called then as the “delicacy”. In the situation of a

person's dependence on the suzerain, the courtiers had to elaborate such behavioral standards that demonstrated their total devotion and respect.

All the above testifies that mental structure is subject to historical changes, caused, primarily, by the changes of sociocultural environment. From society humans learn a specific language and way of speech, a particular pattern of psychical self-control, and even a distinctive emotional make-up. As many contemporary humanitarians reasonably state, the psyche is the structure formed through the social relationships and certain cultural traditions, to which humans belong by virtue of certain functions they carry out within a group or groups.

[1] Edmund *Husserl*. Ideas pertaining to pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy. First book [translated by F. Kersten] Husserl E. Collected works Vol. II. – Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983. – 73.

[2] *Ibid.* 8-11.

[3] Jean Paul *Sartre*. Being and Nothingness. – VI. *The being of the percipi, lvii-lx*. http://www.ahandfulofleaves.org/documents/BeingAndNothingness_Sartre.pdf

[4] *Ibid.* 268-270.

[5] Freud S. (1905), *Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious*, URL=<https://www.sigmundfreud.net/jokes-and-their-relation-to-the-unconscious-pdf-ebook.jsp> [Accessed 23.11.2019]. – 104.

[6] *Ibid.* 16.

[7] *Ibid.* 19.

[8] Rougemont D. (1983), *Love in the Western World*, trans. M. Belgion, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 19.

[9] *Ibid.* 51.

[10] *Ibid.* 25.

[11] Judd Ch.H. *The Psychology of Social Institutions*. N.Y., 1926. P. 276.

TOPIC 6. The Social Issues of Philosophical Theory.

6.1. Society as a subject matter of philosophical reasonings. It is well known the notion of society is borrowed from the Latin word “socialis” with its literal meaning – “friendly”, “civil”, “common”, that is, it symbolizes everything related to aware coexistence and interaction.

The fact of co-existing living entities in the form of specific social organization can also be studied in nature. *Nevertheless, in contrast to the program of social instincts of certain animals, inherent in them by nature, human society is constantly subject to transformations, it constantly changes the behavior patterns and relationship in the form of evolution or, vice versa, involution, including the very instincts.*

The term of *evolution* in philosophical tradition is considered as *the historical tendency, aimed at complicating and perfecting existent things, starting with material systems and ending with the social ones.* The term *involution* often does mean *the process of degradation and decadence of different phenomena, including those mentioned above.*

It is clear that philosophical views on society are historically mutable. For instance, in classical philosophy the society was regarded in terms of finding the “ideal pattern” of mutual existence. In other words, it was, mainly, utopian. The best example of similar reasoning we can find in *Plato*, namely in his searching for an “ideal government”, mediated by the issue of *Fair State* or *Fair Society*^[1].

Today, social philosophy distinctly differs from another social science, in relation to which it occupies the nearest position – sociology, different from social philosophy in both its subject matter and approaches.

The subject matter of social philosophy is defined as the society, which is regarded in its totality that involves a high degree of generalization in terms of its conceptualization. This is *an obvious marker of any philosophical theory.* This generalization is shown, first of all, by constructing certain classifications of society through their differentiation into slave-owning, feudal, capitalist or traditional, modern and postmodern, mass society, etc.

The high degree of generalization in social philosophy is expressed in its attempts to find the main causes and basic patterns of social development. It refers to possible absolutization of a certain “prime-cause” or “principle”, regardless of how exactly it is defined. This prime

cause can be designated as the “production” (Marx), the desire (Freud), the structure (Levi-Strauss), the “simulacrum” (Baudrillard), and so on. A number of scholars use the term “*social metaphysics*”^[2], referring precisely to social philosophy.

A vivid example of dealing with the metaphysical thinking in social theory is associated with Marx’s definition of society as a ***socio-economic formation***, based on the thesis of the determining role of production (economic “base”^[3] or production criteria) in the classification of historical types of societies.

The above determinism was further developed in the theory of ***postindustrial society*** and postmodern metaphysical projects.

Postindustrial society is a widespread marker of highly developed (advanced) society, in which the unusual evolution in information and service areas is observed, that causes the socio-structural transformation, related to increasing the service class and social stratum of so-called technocrats (borrowed from the Greek: techno – skills, and cratos – power), that is, the class of professionals, which, theoretically, manage in accordance with the principles of scientific and technological rationality.

Meanwhile, the controversy between the representatives of the so-called *formational* and *civilizational paradigms*, especially with regard to interpretations of sociohistorical process, takes the central place in humanities.

In general, the *formational paradigm* is a complex of socio-philosophical theories that are based on idea of evolution and production relations influence all aspects of social life, including nominal *ideology*, which in Marxism is defined as a quintessence of the forms of social consciousness – politics, law, religion, morality and so on.

According to Marx, it is the economic base and the stage of its development that impacts on *the historical path* of civilizations in relation to which certain types of society are distinguished, that is the *socio-economic formations are defined*.

The core of the socio-economic formation concerns primarily, the *mode of production* or *major production resource*.

In addition, this mode of production is *determined in accordance with who exactly the owner of the tools of production is (a large landowner, a capitalist, etc.) as well as the method of producing and obtaining material goods*.

The term *mode of production* was elaborated in Marxism, where it was considered as *the unity of certain relations of production and production capacities (forces)*. It means that the production relations are determined by characteristics of social relations and grounded on the peculiarity of *production, appropriation and distribution* of material goods.

Marx paid a special attention to capitalist's mode of production as *production of surplus value-labor, that is, the value, created by the unpaid labor of wage workers, over and above the value of their labor power, and appropriated without compensation by the capitalist*. *Production capacities* are composed of materials, which are used in the production process, personal activity of people ("living labor"), and instruments, which are used to transform the materials into products. The level of development of the production capacities depends on technologies, machines, and scientific achievements.

The formational approach found its continuation in the theory of *postindustrial society*, namely in the writing of an outstanding American sociologist Daniel Bell (1919–2011). Contrary to Marx's classification of the society into "*slave-owning*", "*feudal*", "*capitalist*" and "*socialist*" (communist) *formation*, Bell offered a theory on three stages of historical evolution.

If the productive resource of pre-industrial society is the *natural bowels* of the earth, then the industrial mode of production has a complex production system, mediated by technical development and high-level development of worker's qualifications. The major productive resource of the industrial economy is *energy*, while in conditions of postindustrial production this is *information (high technologies)*, which transform essentially *social structure*^[4] and culture. It refers to the dominance of *the service class* over the rest of the social layers, as well as the so-called *popular culture, arising* under conditions of post-industrialism.

Popular (mass) culture is the term, introduced into scientific language around the 19th century to separate the folk culture, created by the common people from the so-called "high culture" of narrow social groups, based on imperatives of professionalism and high aesthetic ideals; an example of commercial objects that are produced for mass consumption, as well as a direct tool, used by the elites to suppress or take advantage of the masses. In general, it has negative connotations, for example, this culture is often considered as a primitive, low-grade, unspiritual, and in some cases, obscene product.

6.2. What is the civilizational approach in social philosophy? Meanwhile, it is the *civilizational paradigm* that proved to be dominant among contemporary scholars, who mostly, tend to level the very concept of “society” with that of “civilization”. What is the *civilizational paradigm* in general? It is suggested to be *a complex of various doctrines, which, as a rule, is considered as an opposite to formational approach in terms of rationale for significance of the cultural tradition in national history, including the cultural influence on the production relations.*

There is a number of outstanding theories that have been elaborated on the basis of civilizational approach, starting with its founder *Oswald Spengler* (1880–1936) and his notorious “*The Decline of the West*”(1918) and ending with contemporary geopolitical treatise of *Samuel Huntington* (1927–2008), called as “*The Clash of Civilizations*”.

Spengler, for example, did not make a clear distinction between such fundamental concepts of his theory as “nation” and “culture”, since, from his point of view, a nation as such was a kind of community and a true embodiment of culture. But so-called culture, regardless of its historical variety, inevitably underwent two main stages (phases) in its development, namely, cultural and civilizational, where the cultural phase symbolized the sublimed values and ideals, while the civilizational stage was an expression of utilitarianism and comfort.

Nations or “*rac*es” have had a deep cultural implication, since they had a noble Estate: “Every nation is represented in history by a minority...So, long as a people is a nation and works out the Destiny of a nation, there is in it a minority, which in the name of all represents and fulfills its history” (172–173). At the same time, *Spengler* explicitly focuses on the fact that there were numerous peoples, who had not become nations precisely due to their inability to have “*aristocracy*”, that is, the “*noble minority*”, who could glorify and preserve them in eternity.

The above-mentioned peoples he entitles “*fellaheen*” (peasant), who do not know either destiny or history, they are not able to create the statehood, so they have disappeared or will disappear without leaving a trace. Thus, *Spengler* manifested himself as a loyal follower of *elitism*^[5], if we consider his theory in terms of social matters. Put it another way, he was convinced in the determining role of the aristocratic minority in the creation of *cultural patterns*, hence *a kind of national cultural code in the form of dominant values and beliefs.*

Furthermore, Spengler was, probably, the first thinker who put forward the idea of culture-civilization as a metaphysical phenomenon, conditioned by nothing only by its individual fate (“destiny”), in particular, he indicated the existence of eight such civilizations: *Babylonian*; *Indian*, which was based on the idea of Nirvana; *Egyptian*; ancient *Greek* with its corporeal – Apollonian soul; *Western*; *Chinese*; *Arabic* and *Russian*: “World-history is the history of the great Cultures, and peoples are but the symbolic forms and vessels in which the men of these Cultures fulfill their Destinies” (Spengler).

But he drew special attention to peculiarities of Western civilization. He clearly pointed to specific “*morphe*”, “*prime symbol*” or “*habitus*” of Western (“Faustian”) culture, for instance, which he associated with the *rationality*, *profound feeling of dynasty* or *blood purity*, and the *striving for dominance*.

According to Spengler, it is all connected with the main “cosmic Fate” (“physiognomy”) of those peoples who belong to the so-called picture of the world of Western man. More precisely, the “soul-image” of Western man was born out of the conflict concerning the primacy of *will* or *reason*, the basic problem of Gothic philosophy, contemplated for a long time. Faustian peoples are, primarily, the “creatures”, who like other great *races*, related to the embodiment of the dynastic idea: “All nations of the West are of dynastic origins” (Spengler).

In contrast to Spengler, another outstanding representative of the civilizational paradigm, namely, German philosopher Max Weber, emphasizes more the *rationality of Western culture as its distinct feature*, rather than its dynasticism, or desire for world power.

According to Weber, Western rationality manifests itself in quite certain practices, especially in terms of permanent striving for cognition that affected the continuous development of scientific-technical progress and industrial economy. The Western cult of “*pure Reason*”, primarily, Reason that is “*detached*” or “*alienated from nature*”, found its direct expression in philosophical *rationalism* as the leading trend of the entire history of Western philosophy, starting with Plato and his belief in the divine origin of thinking, and ending with Rene Descartes and Edmund Husserl with their beliefs in perfection of mathematics. One should not forget about rationality in terms of specific Western behavioral traditions in the form of constraining the passionate feelings to an “unhealthy degree”.

The Western cult of “*pure Reason*” in both the theoretical-scientific and practical-ethical terms continued in the economic activity of modern peoples, namely, in their “rational conduct of the household”, with regard to that it gained another implication. That implication was the subject of detailed analysis by Max Weber.

When describing Western rationality, Weber completes it by “rational organization of the capitalistic enterprise”, which “would not have been possible without two other important factors in its development: the separation of business from the household, which completely dominates modern economic life, and closely connected with it, rational book-keeping” (Weber).

This developed “rational book-keeping”, that is, considerable rationalization of “capitalistic calculation” has provided the emergence of modern capitalistic enterprises. Henceforth, “everything is done in terms of balances: at the beginning of the enterprise an initial balance, before every individual decision a calculation to ascertain its probable profitableness, and at the end a final balance to ascertain how much profit has been made” (Weber). Weber associates all this approach directly with the *spirit of modern industrial capitalism*. This “spirit” corresponds to quite ascetic imperatives of Protestantism, more precisely, to Franklin’s labor ethics, predicated on the imperatives of “*industriousness*”^[6] and “*the saving*” that, in his view, laid the basis of the Western successes in the field of economic and technical achievements.

Put it another way, the spirit of capitalism is related to “strict calculating between profits and expenses”, accompanied by the above “saving” of surplus or excess of profits that allowed the owners of production capacities to invest in industry, therefore, in its modernization and development.

Another brilliant representative of the civilizational paradigm, namely Samuel Huntington, close to postmodernity, to a greater degree focuses on the religious basis of current established civilizations, rather than peculiarities of their “world-images”, “ethos”, “gestalt”, etc. Though, apparently, his famous geopolitical treatise, entitled “The Clash of Civilizations” can be subsumed to some synthesis of Spengler’s and Weber’s ideas.

Similar to Spengler, for example, Huntington forecasts a possible “decline” of the West, in relation to that he notes: “the central issue for the West is whether, quite apart from any external challenges, it is

capable of stopping and reversing the internal processes of decay. Can the West renew itself or will sustained *internal rot* simply accelerate its end and/or subordination to other economically and demographically more dynamic civilizations?” (Huntington). He is also in solidarity with Weber in relation to his perspective on religious faith as the determining origin of civilizational development as its “central component”.

Huntington’s reasoning around the “fate” of contemporary cultures-civilizations testifies that he deals with the civilizational paradigm, and even with regard to the civilizational approach he fully supports such concept as paradigm, convinced that this notion is the “simple map” for understanding the contemporary world subject matter. Furthermore, similar to all representatives of civilizational interpretation, he points to the greatest impact of culture on the entire social field, especially before the era of industrial capitalism.

Huntington draws attention precisely to the ethical “component” of culture, resorting to moral argumentation, when summarizing the “modernization”, which, according to him, “has generally enhanced the material level of Civilization throughout the world. But has it also enhanced the moral and cultural dimensions of Civilization? In some respects, this appears to be the case. Slavery, torture, vicious abuse of individuals, have become less and less acceptable in the contemporary world... Much evidence exists in the 1990s for the relevance of the “sheer chaos” paradigm of world affairs: a global breakdown of law and order, failed states and increasing anarchy in many parts of the world, a global crime wave, transnational mafias and drug cartels, increasing drug addiction in many societies, a general weakening of the family, a decline in trust and social solidarity in many countries, ethnic, religious, and civilizational violence and rule by the gun prevalent in much of the world” (Huntington).

Almost all representatives of the civilizational paradigm are convinced that *particularities of economic life are subordinate to particularities of cultural tradition*, which, presumably, predetermine the destiny of “great nations”. Furthermore, some of them stated that “it is by reason of the existence of culture and cultural tradition that human social life differs very markedly from the social life of other species” (Radcliffe Brown)^[7]. Due to the power of civilizational interpretation in modern philosophy, the issues of society and social evolution were for a time replaced by the issue of culture.

Both *formational* and *civilizational paradigms* are mostly founded on the more general *approach*, namely the *systems, related to a vision of society as a complex of interdependent economic, political, legal, religious and other relations, arising in the process of historical development of civilizations*. Supposedly, it was French political philosopher of 18th century *Montesquieu* (1689–1755) who was the first to offer the systemic vision of society, in particular, he claimed that the laws of any society were connected with the political constitution, the economic life, the religion and so on.

An example of application of the systems approach in social theory is connected with Marx's thesis that a certain mode of production with necessity gives rise to a corresponding type of sociality (social structure), and along with that to a corresponding anthropological type.

Despite that a lot of thinkers recognized the great importance of civilizational approach to interpretation of socio-historical process, namely the argument of cultural identity, almost the entire postmodern philosophy exhibits as "art" of the political-economic reasoning. It is the representatives of critical social theory who support this trend, that is, exploration of contemporary sociocultural processes from the angle of economic analysis, aimed at finding the economic causes of current political, cultural and social transformations.

As Huntington remarks above today, capitalism has finally turned into a non-alternative way of civilization's self-assertion. Postindustrial capitalism differs from its early forms by full power of capital and consumption. Within the framework of this capitalism there has emerged a special kind of capital, marked as a "fictitious", with a special focus on financial speculations and the cultural industry. It has provoked a significant increase in utilitarian consumption, political and spiritual manipulation over a large number of people with imposed artificial needs and concerns.

It is clear that such a process is impossible without active participation of the global market that promotes essential transformations of modern civilizations in the sense of turning them into a "global consumer society".

The aforementioned Bell, for example, was convinced that social basis of postindustrial formation was the *service class* and so-called *technocrats*, and but overlooked or underestimated the growing of social

inequality and destructiveness of so-called “consumer-society”, which were inherent in postindustrial formation.

In fact, the most famous *narrative*^[8] in philosophical theory is a narrative of mass society, related to the issue of finding the grounds of socio-cultural decline. That is why, the next essential issue of contemporary philosophy has to do with the issue of social structure and its current transformation, rather than profound cultural decline, which has been emphasized by many representatives of both formational and civilizational approaches.

[1] This is the theory, developed by Plato, in which, in his view, there should be only three classes in accordance with their mental abilities that determine their social functions, in particular, *the upper class of Guardians* is the people of reason, mind and intellect, who should be rulers of State, because they are the embodiment of the truth or true knowledge the middle class is the people of Will and strong Spirit, who seek honor, that is why they are defenders of State, in other words, they are true warriors (*Auxiliaries*). And finally, the people of appetite, desire and emotion, who seek only material goods. They are simple *Producers*, who love their labor, security and comfort, that is, material well-being above all. They can provide solely for the economic needs of the State, and nothing beyond. Furthermore, Plato believed that democracy was the worst form of political régime, because it could lead to power fools and dishonesty, therefore it should not be in an *Ideal State*. In addition, he declared that material possession in forms of property, privacy and family should also not be there, because they only corrupted everyone.

[2] *Social metaphysics* is the philosophical concept, which, as a rule, means inherent in philosophy’s way of reasoning, which is based on absolutization of a certain social phenomenon, mediated by its reduction to a certain “prime-cause”.

[3] *Base* and *Superstructure* are the main categories of traditional Marxism, where Base refers to the production capacities (“forces”), or the materials and resources, that generate the goods needed by society. Superstructure (ideology) describes all other departments of social being, in particular, the forms of social consciousness.

[4] The term *social structure* generally means the differentiation of society into various groups in accordance with certain criteria (economic state, age, gender, etc.). Yet in contemporary social theory this definition is subject to numerous discussions. For example, a prominent sociologist of the 20th century, namely, Pitirim Sorokin (1889–1968) reviewed this concept, completed it by the term of *social stratification*. Due to his studies the established *class approach* was substituted with so-called doctrine of *social stratification – differentiation of certain communities into classes, strata, etc. In accordance with hierarchical order*. Hence, the term of *social stratification* means, primarily, the differentiation of a given population into *upper* and *lower social layers*.

Thus, one can conclude that the concept of *social stratification* is similar to the notion of social inequality, that is, some “pecking order”, inherent in every community

(“society”) from beginning to end. According to Sorokin it is the universal law of social development.

But despite the above dominance of the *class or stratification approach to social structure*, according to structuralist strategy its major component is associated with a certain model of relationship. This perspective, in particular, was supported by Norbert Elias, who applied the title of “*figuration*” in the sense of *a certain pattern of interdependence or interrelationship*, expressed in relevant institutes.

[5] Elitism is a political strategy, aimed at establishing the power of so called “aristocratic minority” due to a belief in its superiority and justifying an idea of people inequality, which was developed by a number of representatives of philosophical thought, starting with Plato and ending with prominent Spanish philosopher Jose Ortega y Gasset (1883–1955).

[6] Regarding to Christian origin of the value of “industriousness” Weber notes: “the concept of *industria*, on the other hand, is differently on colored account of Christian influence. And there is just the difference. In the conception of *industria*, which comes from monastic asceticism and which was developed by monastic writers, lies the seed of an *ethos*, which was fully developed later in the Protestant worldly asceticism...” (Ibid, 196). It is also noteworthy, that the idea of *economic ethos* with its certain religious orientation was proposed long before books by Weber, namely, by Spengler in his prominent “The Decline of the West”.

[7] English [social anthropologist](#) (1881–1955) who developed the theory of [structural functionalism](#) and [coadaptation](#).

This scholar is regarded as a founder of structuralism in humanities.

[8] *Narrative* (from Latin *narrare* – speech act, verbal translation) is the concept of postmodern philosophy, fixing the procession of author’s self-actualization in the form of an arbitrary story (according to R. Barth “text-message”), the most important feature of which is self-sufficiency and completeness.

TOPIC 7. Structuralism and the Issue of Social Structure.

7.1. The category of structure in its relation to social system. When discussing the issue of structure, one should mention, first of all, its most widespread definition, elaborated by a prominent founder of structuralism, French anthropologist *Claude Levi-Strauss (1908–2009)*.

The concept of structure usually *means the presence of some order in the disposition of parts of some systems*. But according to Levi-Strauss, the idea of *structure, primarily, symbolizes the presence of some model (“pattern”) of relationships between main participants of the sociocultural process*.

In general, structuralism aims to *grasp the opposition or “archetypal” duality within this model*, since to Levi-Strauss’s deep belief, there is always a division into halves in any society, the one of them, as a rule, is dominant and another is subordinate. *In general, there is talking about such fundamental structures as institutions, especially about familial institutions*. Since this term is basic for a lot of modern discourses^[1], namely, for psychoanalysis and structuralism itself, including *phenomenology* and *existentialism*, it can be considered as almost metaphysical principle of the entire contemporary philosophy.

However, the so-called structural approach in structuralism is completed by a *system principle*. Put it another way, structuralism is seen to *be a complex of approaches in contemporary humanities, according to which the notion of structure is closely associated with the notion of system that conventionally means the relationship between components of a certain entirety, where changes with one of them lead to changes with the rest*.

Thanks for structuralism and psychoanalysis the concept of *structure* have received an additional clarification, primarily, it means *the presence of a stable and relatively fixed pattern of relationship between elements of complex systems, especially, the social ones*: “When a set of interdependent phenomena shows sufficiently definite patterning and stability over time then we can say that it has a structure and that it is fruitful to treat it as a system” (T. Parsons).

First and foremost, the above applies to patterns of social relations, which are reflected in the moral imperatives, myths, behavior rules, that is, in the elements of culture. “The form of a social structure has therefore to be described by patterns of behavior to which individuals and groups conform in their dealing with one another. These patterns are

partially formulated in rules, which in our own society, we distinguish as rules of etiquette, of morals and law” (A.R. Radcliff-Brown).

However, psychoanalytic, structuralist and post-structuralist scholars are more concerned with studying the structures that are the basis of both individual and collective unconscious. For example, in psychoanalysis this model is designated as an “*Oedipus complex*”, structuralist Levi-Strauss talks about an “*avunculate*”, Denis de Rougemont as a representative of both psychoanalysis and structuralism associates this pattern with the myth of “*fatal love*”. All these thinkers recognize these “structures” are caused by certain social practices (“agencies”), rather than “some transcendental grounds”.

Becoming of structuralism is reflected in a few main stages, namely, the appearance of a structural principle in linguistics, as well as the elaboration of philosophical methodology of structuralism in contrast to theory of social *evolution*, and finally, development of *structural functionalism*^[2], that was introduced by an outstanding American sociologist and philosopher Talcott Parsons (1902–1979) in his theory of “social systems”.

Mentioned-above Levi-Strauss popularized his arguments in favor of structural approach, in particular, within the framework of the developed “Structural Anthropology”^[3]. According to the author’s *intention*, structural anthropology is devoted to the study of barbarian tribal societies.

Yet, similar to Freud, Levi-Strauss paid special attention to structuring the *unconscious*, primarily, to descriptive analysis of its myths. In other words, from his point of view, structural anthropology should provide the opportunity to find out those latent meanings that laid the basis of culture itself. There is, primarily, an argument over certain mores, myths, images of collective *unconscious*, which have an impact on perception and evaluation of human relations.

First and foremost, Levi-Strauss tried to refute Freud’s theory of father’s complex in cultural process, that is, the “myth of Oedipus”, which according to psychoanalytic view was the structural core of the *unconscious*, starting with tribal societies and ending with modern ones. Nevertheless, the representatives of post-structuralism, for example, especially J. Deleuze, F. Guattari and M. Foucault have rejected the structuralist-affirmation about the permanence (stability) of *unconscious structure*, grounding its historicity, that is, its dependence on sociocultural practices.

In the context of the above, it is worth recalling the critical discussion in relation to the Oedipus complex, started by C. Lévi-Strauss. It is believed that Lévi-Strauss was the first thinker, who called into question whether the Oedipus complex was possible in *primitive society*.

As for the term of *primitive society*, Lévi-Strauss remarks that it has firmly come into the modern scientific language, and it primarily designates “*a large group of people, which did not know the writings and therefore inaccessible to purely historical research methods*”.

Lévi-Strauss was convinced that under conditions of weak social differentiation and lack of centralized power in tribal communities, the enforcing of the norms was carried out by the efforts of *totem* clan – “*male alliances*”.

***Totem** is a natural object or animal that is believed by a particular society to have magical(sacred) significance, which generated the totemism, regarded as the primary form of further religious and moral-legal institutions.*

When referring to extensive ethnographic material, Lévi-Strauss focuses on the fact of there are rigid rules in primitive societies in relation to transfer of kinship, to regulation of marriage unions, etc., which in their totality provided the stability of the social group through interweaving like tissue, relationships by kinship and property.

Anthropologists classify the concept of *kinship system* as a type (*pattern*) of family-marriage relations and norms of behavior, which should be understood as a system of psychological and conventional attitudes that individuals adhere to in relation to each other.

At the same time, a significant proportion of these attitudes belonged to emotional patterns that arose on the basis of opposition: tenderness/aggressiveness. According to the thinker’s personal observations on the people’s behavior of different tribes, the relationship between son and father was quite clear: either friendly and “gentle” or, on the contrary, hostile and conflicting.

When describing the models of affective attitudes of the simplest structure of kinship, for example, *avunculate*, Lévi-Strauss found out that a connection between the attitude towards the uncle from the maternal side and attitude towards the father in groups where there is a relationship of intimacy between the father and the son, the relationship between the maternal uncle and the nephew is strict. But where the father

acts as a staunch guardian of family power, relations with his uncle are distinguished by arbitrariness.

This statement is supposed to refute Freud's hypothesis about the primary ambivalence of affective attitudes in the relationship between father and son. Furthermore, with regard to the issue of the genesis of the social system, Lévi-Strauss *insisted on the primacy of an exchange function, rather than coercion or constraint, as Freud believed*. It is this statement that is subjected to refutation or serious discussion within the framework of postmodern philosophy.

7.2. Institutional background of social systems. As it has been emphasized, when one refers to the term of *social structure*, primarily, it means the differentiation of society into various groups, collectives, layers, stratum, etc. Put it in more definite sense, its nuclear component is associated with some *collectivity*, that is, with such community "in terms of specified memberships of concrete individuals", which at the same time designates a certain *normative culture*, "determining the values, norms, target orientation, and it is also ordering the roles within certain system of person's relationship" (Parsons).

In general, structuralists claim that if we talk about some collective formation as a certain human community, we should recognize that the existence of society is impossible without a developed normative culture. This idea exactly *expresses the structuralist perspective on society, where society is able to self-reproduction only due to its ability for reproduction of its institutional basis*.

Thus, the term of *social structure* is closely related to the term of *social institution*^[4], which, as a rule, denotes *some set of conventional instruments for organizing the social life, executed, in general, by constraining the instinctive or arbitrary drives, and later – by controlling over the social processes of production, exchange and distribution of consumer items*.

Put it another way, along with cultural institutions, in particular, the institutions of religion, there are the structures of power and economy that are the most important for the development of sociocultural formation, entitled "*modern*"^[5].

Even ancient philosophers discovered that any *social relations were based on the relations of power and property*. Meanwhile, as many scientists reasonably argue, all social institutions are interconnected, that is, there is always a close interdependence between cultural institutions,

aimed primarily at conserving the behavioral pattern, and political-economic departments of social life.

But under conditions of current social being, the most important social institutions are largely related to the economic and political spheres. So-called *modern societies* can even be regarded as the manifestation of the complete power of economy, the complete power of *capital* and *capitalism*^[6], which has long been considered as the pattern of social development, inherent mostly in the “Western world”.

As generally known, modern societies as well as so-called *Westernization* in its core is a rather controversial process, closely associated with the contradictory nature of capitalism. We keep in mind that capitalism, at the beginning led to *humanized face of social methods of control and constraints*, but at the end *the same capitalism*, more precisely its post-industrial stage, resulted in dehumanization as an essential trait of present mass culture, called “postmodern”.

The institutional interpretation of social structure was developed in general by Parsons. However, its specific continuation can also be seen in “sociological theory” of Antony Giddens (1938). They both are regarded as prominent explorers of complex issues of social theory, writing about “advanced societies” on the level of modern.

Both Parsons and Giddens constantly focus on *normative patterns as on significant part of culture, which are institutionalized*, that is, generally accepted (conventional) within the frameworks of certain community, for example, the system of law: “law is a part of the machinery by which a certain social structure is maintained. The system of laws of a particular society can only be fully understood if it is studied in relation to the social structure, and inversely, the understanding of the social structure requires amongst other things, a systematic study of the legal institutions” (Radcliffe Brown).

In addition, *this institutional culture is directly related to various forms of organization-ordering of social life, that is, to the various instruments for influence on individuals*, who, supposedly, complies with these patterns.

For instance, in his vision of social structure Parsons, primarily, refers to a determining role of *normative patterns* in social relationships that, according to him, is expressed by so-called *relational values* – *the conventional attitudes towards the value/ non-value of relationships*.

According to Parsons, *institutionalized normative culture does mean that conventional conduct patterns can be functioned solely due*

to *institutional agency*, classified into four main groups. Namely, he refers to the structures of kinship or familial institutes of “control of sex relations and socialization” (Parsons); the structures of achievement roles and general stratification; the correlation between structure of power and repressive institutes, and at last, the institutions of religion.

When considering, for example, the institutes of kinship (this concern is popular within the frameworks of structuralism), Parsons pays close attention to the social value (multifunctionality) of the family, especially to its affective basis, which is closely related to the so-called modern or nuclear family. Following Freud’s theory of Oedipus complex and justifying a patriarchal pattern, Parsons specifically regards kinship as a central focus of social structure, where the most essential point is that a child grows up with a deeply rooted need for adult attachments.

It is clear that the traditional economic function of family in psychoanalytic vision is leveled by affection or a compensatory function. That is why, despite contemporary transformations of both traditionally patriarchal family and also nuclear one, Parsons is confident in the longevity of their existence, because, in his view, there is always need for interpersonal attachment, and that “the basic need-disposition structure on which motivation for the familial roles of adults is built up, is developed in the context of childhood attachments” (Parsons).

It is the family that has been performing the essential function of *socialization*, which is impossible without the notorious coercion, that is, without some pressure. In this regard, Parsons insists on the importance of the traditional role of father in child upbringing and in conserving the male identity.

If Parsons, for example, focuses more upon the personality (“individual actor”) as a key structure of social system (that elucidates his interest to psychoanalysis), then Giddens is basically inclined to emphasize “the duality of structure” in terms of mutual dependence of individuals and social institutions on each other.

Giddens refers to Goffman’s narrative of “*middle-class society, a cynical society of amoral role players*”, mediated by the central issue of most post-structuralists studies, namely the issue of essential significance of institutional constraints.

In regard with the above, Giddens claims that the structure refers not only to rules implicated in the production and reproduction of social systems, but also to resources, which contribute to production and

reproduction of social institutes. It is social institutions that are the most stable markers of social life.

For example, the most effective social institute is associated with institutes of power, which have dual structure, namely, on the one hand, the power always constraints and enforces, but at the same time, on the other, it enables to create the conditions for constructive agency and relationships.

However, Giddens was convinced that *in the contemporary world the power largely belongs to economic institutions, where it is capitalism that plays a key role*. It is the *capital*, which, in fact, is grounded on production of *surplus value* and the relationship between *private owners* and *wage workers*, that is a fundamental institute in the structure of contemporary society, entitled capitalistic.

In order to become an institute in its proper sense, *capital must obtain the legal protection from the part of law that is impossible beyond centralization of power in the form of the State. This capital had a tendency to both create various forms of production, accompanied by development of the financial system and strengthening the central power in the form of the State.*

The same idea was pronounced by Norbert Elias, who in his widely-known study “The Civilizing Process. Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations” examined in detail the history of Western civilization in relation to centralizing the State Power with its key role in development of the so-called “bourgeois class” as a marker of the advancing capitalism.

In particular, he refers to the economic transformation that European countries already underwent in the Renaissance, which was due to the development of *money economy* and manufacturing, especially, the formation of a centralized tax system and power, that is, the *State*. All these affected essential modifications in social structures of Western societies, including systems of political power.

Elias believed that transformation of production relations had provided both the growth of the economic power of the bourgeois class, and along with that helped to strengthen the political position of the monarch and his courtly aristocracy.

It was the bourgeois layer that was concerned with strengthening the central government, since that made it possible to legalize and, therefore, protect their property on the part of sovereign power. That is why the so-called bourgeois estate made a great contribution to the strengthening and formation of the absolutist state.

Having received a monopoly on tax collection as well as on violence, the monarch moderately balanced the claims of the nobility and the bourgeoisie. He held in his hands all the excess of power through skillful manipulation: for their obedience the bourgeoisie received aristocratic titles and privileges from him, and the nobility received decent financial support. *All this, according to Elias, contributed finally to the strengthening of the State, so far only in the form of Absolutism, but at the same time, increasing the economic role of the bourgeoisie, which in the nearest future has become the strongest basis for development of the upcoming capitalism.*

The issue of structuring society is associated with the issue of personality sociogenesis. As many thinkers have substantiated, it is the social system that governs the personality in terms of that, first, the society exercises a rigid control over certain subjects (actors), and second, their own personal structure is shaped under the direct influence of variety social practices.

In other words, the most principal issue of contemporary explorations in philosophy is related to the idea of “*designing of Subjectivity*” in the context of which conventional institutions take a leading part.

[1] *Discourse is an author's style of thinking and speech*, aimed at a specific audience.

[2] *Structural functionalism is a methodological derivative of structuralism*, aimed at classifying certain sociocultural systems as certain patterns of interaction among “persons”.

[3] https://www.google.com.ua/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwiPudfA5JDYAhVvSZoKHQgBAYQQFggzMAE&url=https%3A%2F%2Fmonoskop.org%2Fimages%2F%2Fe8%2FLevi-Strauss_Claude_Structural_Anthropology_1963.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2LsXT_XdcdON7pZZWYBcsc

[4] In Cambridge Dictionary, for example, it is indicated that the word *institution* was borrowed from Latin, which literally means “to set up”, “establish” – a custom or a tradition that has been existing for a long time, accepted as an important part of a particular society.

[5] The term *modern society* is a marker of society, largely the Western one, which, at first glance, symbolizes the historical stage of its development, based on development of rational knowledge, elaboration of various technical devices and triumph of *industrial capitalism*, that is, capitalism, grounded on production of *surplus value (capital in its proper sense)*, which is appropriated by owner of production resources with necessity. This era and most contemporary societies are considered to be capitalist in their core.

[6] It is well known that the word “capital”, which the word “capitalism” comes from, is the oldest. The etymology of the *capital* is the Latin word “caput”, which originally meant “head” or “chief”. However, in English old speech-tradition the word “capital” was used as an adjective with the semantics of “lethal”. So, in the 28th Chapter of “Leviathan” by the famous English philosopher of Hobbes, it was talked about existence of two basic forms of punishment: “some be capital, some less than capital”, in relation to this Baudrillard, for instance, states that power of capital is the “delayed death”. French historian and economist Fernand Braudel (1902–1985), for instance, argued that contrary to a widely spread scientific thought that concept came into usage thanks to Karl Marx (1818–1883), in fact, a term “capitalism” was introduced by a German economist and philosopher Werner Sombart (1863–1941). However, Marx formulated and proved that the “starting point”, and a direct condition for the emergence of capital is “the production of commodities” and “commodity circulation”.

But there are also the authors, who insist on appearing the word of *capitalism* rather late, at the beginning of the 20th century in terms of *the tool of production*, that is, as *resource*. But in the 18th century the word “capitalist” was designated to the man, who *obtained the money* and could provide a loan. At that time, the capitalist was not yet considered as an *entrepreneur*. According to Marx, capitalism, its ability to adapt and transform testifies to its extreme flexibility. *But true capitalism corresponds to the industry of its stage*. In any case, capitalism is the way of growth and accumulation of wealth and power, it promotes the emergence of such a phenomenon as *political economy*.

In everyday life *the capital usually means some wealth, which can be used to invest into the production process*. In addition, under capitalism a variety of socio-economic systems is understood, based on wage labor, concentrated in the hands of a few owners of capital and production resources, aimed to maximize profits and the “reproduction” of relevant social systems in the form of both modern and postmodern (postindustrial) societies.

TOPIC 8. Institutional Power as the Basis of Social Systems.

8.1. Poststructuralist refutation of structuralism: a factor of “libidinal economy”. It is obvious that Lévi-Strauss was not inclined to regard the tribal kinship systems only as a collective mechanism of coercion, that is, as a part of “authoritarian social machine”. In any case, Freud’s exaggeration of repressive function of culture is leveled with the fact of mutual exchange, whereas in some postmodern studies, especially, in the post-structural projects it is stated that even “the primitive, territorial machine ...marks bodies to such a degree that circulating – exchanging – is a secondary activity in comparison with the task that sums up all the other: marking bodies... tattooing, excising, incising, carving, scarifying, mutilating, encircling and initiating” (Guattari and Deleuze).

Baudrillard, for example, also insists on primacy of exchange function, since he believes that under conditions of group marriage, the emergence of a clearly fixed idea of the father, that is, the Oedipus structure seems to be impossible *per se*. But, as Deleuze reasonably remarks, the lack of a clearly fixed idea of the father does not yet mean the lack of a repressive apparatus.

Even is the authority of the Father does not appear, being resolved, for example, in the team of rival brothers and aggressiveness is shifted horizontally as rivalry between brothers, *overcompensated* by the strongest solidarity, as Baudrillard argued, the question then becomes: “*with what kind of goal even in primitive society the technique of inscriptions in naked flesh is used’ so sophisticated in its cruelty, ‘the institutes, which, on the other hand, as it is recognized, are not refer to exchange?’*, ‘*with what kind of goal the social reality is complicated by bloody festive of punishment and suffering?’*” (Guattari and Deleuze).

The superfluous cruelty of executing these “inscriptions” enables Guattari, for example, to suggest that even real solidarity is not able to “overcompensate” the suppressed libido. Furthermore, he remarks that can hardly talk about the “overcompensation” and inhibited libido everywhere, especially, in the past. In other words, it would be more than doubtful to consider that predatory ruler classes felt to be constrained; on the contrary, they would rather possess total freedom in their behavior, especially in relation to the layers below. That is why, a number of scholars directly point to a dynamic human tendency to incomprehensible super-violence and suffering, which, apparently, causes the social destructiveness.

Along with that, in French postmodern philosophy the so-called *libidinal economy* concept was elaborated, which is often associated with explorations of a prominent thinker, namely Jean Francois Lyotard (1924–1998). In general, this concept denotes *constant dependence between the desire and politics or production system in terms of economic dominance*. Since on the one hand, the existence of such correlation is generally not questioned in the sense that desire mostly depends on social practices. On the other hand, the very social practices are directly dependent on human desire, especially, on the desire to produce: “*In any case desire belongs to the infrastructure, not to ideology, desire is in production as social production*” (Guattari and Deleuze).

Put it another way, the above thinkers tried to assure that under the condition of modern capitalism one implies the complete power of desire over production *that transforms the very essence of economy, turning it in libidinal totally*.

Weber, for example, believed that industrial capitalism at its early stage was connected with an ascetic imperative of *industriousness*, resulting in leveling a labor coercion, that is, an economic repression with the unconscious “libidinal investment” into production in the sense of liking for work. Presumably, it is due to this “libidinal investment” there emerges the phenomenon of *the libidinal labor* as a key component of *libidinal economy*.

But Guattari and Deleuze, for example, offered another connotation of the above term, which is related to the unconscious process of “*desiring production*”, *that is to say, with production for the sake of production itself, which in fact is the most sophisticated form of repression*. The sophistication of this repression presupposes that individuals are not aware of it, to observe the situation, as the authors write, repressing of the desire, not only for others but for oneself in the sense of “being the cop for others and for oneself – that is what arouses, and it is not ideology, it is economy”.

Thus, *there is always a direct connection between human desires and the established system of production, especially the production of surplus value in terms of its complete dependence on “libidinal investment”*.

Furthermore, the desire for violence is not leveled with desire for accumulation, as Elias believed, even under the conditions of advanced societies. Therefore, ancient cruelty, for example, can be considered both as a kind of *libidinal-economic structure* and the basis of social

organization, where it is the violence that is the object of libidinous cathexis no less than “flows of abstract quantities”.

Society itself is a symbol and an immediate source of super-violence, since according to the authors’ conviction “the soft structure” would never create either political or social organization: “Cruelty has nothing to do with some ill-defined or natural violence, that might explain the history of mankind; cruelty is the movement of culture that is realized in bodies and inscribed on them, *belaboring* them. That is what cruelty means. This culture is not the movement of ideology, on the contrary, *it forcibly injects production into desire*, and conversely, *it forcibly inserts desire into social production and reproduction*. For even death, punishment, and torture are desired, and are instances of production” (Guattari and Deleuze).

In other words, in terms of *libidinal economy* theory violence can also be classified as an economic category – as a kind of “surplus value”, which skillfully is derived from human pain and suffering. *More precisely, libidinal violence is considered as a kind of mental compensation for economic injury or failure:*“...How can one “pay back” with suffering? ...something that Nietzsche himself calls the evaluating eye, or the eye of the gods who enjoy cruel spectacles, “and in punishment there is so much that is festive!”... The equation injury – pain has nothing to do with an exchange and in this extreme case it shows that the debt itself has nothing to do with exchange (Guattari and Deleuze).

But neither Lévi-Strauss nor Baudrillard are subject to doubt of their vision of primitive society. Apparently, both of them underestimate the destructive power of human instincts, especially the instincts of savage men. At any rate, the primitive peoples, most likely, were fully aware of this power. They were also fully aware that to enforce the alliance, or to train towards alliance and, thereby, to promote the exchange, it is necessary to limit the desire to make it to be controlled, as Guattari writes: “to encode its flows”.

Thus, the representatives of all the above-mentioned trends are inclined to treat culture as a highly developed system of ethical standards – normative models, which, in general, have the institutional referents. Structuralism and post-structuralism proved clearly that if we observe the demise of fundamental social institutes, we would have a collapse of the whole social life, including its political and economic departments.

Nevertheless, a determining role of normative models in the social system has remained in the historical past, when culture, especially, morality, in fact, mattered. There a lot of contemporary thinkers focus on the actual “demise” of even normative culture. In other words, the postmodern culture is “beyond good and evil” (Nietzsche), since it expresses largely the imperatives of pleasure to satisfy any desires. In contrast to this, *the true culture always functions on the basis of restricting the desires, that is, on the basis of prohibition.*

In postindustrial societies the ethics mostly function at the formal level, for example, corporate ethics. That is why, it is the issue of human personality in terms of upbringing and *adaptation-integration into* the social field that is the most urgent problem of contemporary social theory. A number of philosophers of the 20th century are convinced that social issues cannot be considered regardless of the issues of mental development of humanity, or the so-called “anthropological type”, that is, without taking into account human historicity, therefore, relativity of human being and their sociality.

8.2. The concept of “Discourses of power” and postmodern criticism.

If structuralists emphasized a determining importance of familial institutions in the above “*designing of Subjectivity*”, the representatives of poststructuralism focus more on the institutions of State power and economy that found its vivid expression in the doctrine of the *Discourses of Power*^[1].

If Guattari and Deleuze, for example, examine in detail the issue on historicity of the correlation between mental structure of individuals and socio-economic dominance, which always belonged to “male alliances”, whereas Foucault draws his attention on the history of impersonal “structures” of State power in the forms of so-called penitentiary system – “punitive power”, represented by his notorious “Discipline&Punish. The Birth of the Prison”.

In this work Foucault considers the most widespread “discourses of power” – *the methods of self-representation on the part of State power*, or in more drastic term – the strategies for establishing total coercion and subjugation of “masses”, in particular, the ancient “*ritual anatomy of torture*” and *discipline methods*, related to further stages of civilizational development.

Originally, the State power found the most effective mechanisms of social control over *bottom classes* in terms of both modeling

“docile bodies” and “docile souls”. It is these mechanisms that are the direct subject matter of Foucault’s study, where they are interpreted from a perspective of illuminating the main reasons for their further “humanization” – *institutional, that is, conventional process of softening the sanctions, including the cultivation of aversion to violence in its various forms*. The thinker is convinced that “*gloomy festival of punishment*” of premodern societies met two demands: it had to mark the victim and intended either by the scars it left on the body, or by spectacle that accompanied it, to brand the victim with infamy. The blood torture was only a “technique of repression”, “regulated pain”, aimed to demonstrate the absolute “sovereign power”.

In contrast to Guattari and Deleuze, Foucault is not inclined to discuss these old “bloody spectacles” with their excess of cruelty and atrocity in libidinal terms. In this regard he notes: “...The term of penal tortures does not cover all corporal punishment. It is differentiated production of pain, an organized ritual for the marking of victims and the expression of the power that punishes; not the expression of a legal system driven to exasperation and, forgetting its principles, losing all restraint. In excess of torture, a whole economy of power is invested” (Foucault).

In modern society we do not have the “super-power” of “royal brute” anymore, but the contemporary power seems to be more total, employing more subtle devices of social control and coercion, related to the emergence of capitalist mode of production. It is capitalism that created a quite new system of official power, which had a need in saving (“conserving”) human lives.

It is under conditions of industrial production that the gentle way of punishment became inevitable, as more effective to make the human body serve the State “in a slavery”: without eliminating a life, the State had to appropriate and turn the human body into “a sort of rentable property”.

That is why, the “*genealogy of Subject*” should be defined in general, as a set of technologies for “punishment”, “observation”, and “disciplining” – the technologies of power for its absolute establishment and control over everyone.

Thus, according to Foucault, the phenomenon of humanization is the effect of industrial and political transformation of modern societies, that is, *humanism* is, primarily, *an economy determined notion*. In other words, it is the industrial revolution has caused a need for saving human

lives, while in economics of preindustrial mode (“régime”) “labor power, and therefore the human body has neither the utility nor the commercial value that are conferred on them, in an economy of an industrial type” (Foucault).

Due to the capitalist economy, there happened so-called “softening” of both punitive sanctions and human mores, mediated by the “accumulation of men”, that is, the substitution of preindustrial “gloomy festival of punishment” with *disciplines*, which Foucault defines as *the methods, assuring the constant subjection of bodily forces and imposed upon them a relation of docility-utility*. In this regard he notes: “The growth of capitalist economy gave rise to the specific modality of disciplinary power. In fact, the two processes – the accumulation of men and accumulation of capital – cannot be separated, it would not have been possible to solve the problem of accumulation of men without the growth of an apparatus of production capable of both subjecting them and using them, and conversely” (Foucault).

But a number of other postmodern studies of this problem are closely associated with the issue of the modern Subject as, primarily, the “Subject of capitalist production”. It refers to the issue of such sociogenesis of human being, where the social field is considered in terms of absolute dominance of economic institutes, rather than of the dependence on the conventional and complex system of power.

According to Deleuze, for instance, postmodern humans are neither “moral Subjects” nor “docile bodies” anymore. They are even no “existences” in existential sense. The so-called “advanced societies” largely deal with the *Schizoid Subject*, which is the owner of corresponding unconscious in the sense of “desiring production”. Spreading the “person” like the above, that is, the *Desiring Subject* with their Schizoid unconscious is a direct refutation of conventional psychoanalytic “myths”, that caused a need for developing the new strategy – *schizoanalysis*.

Contrary to Giddens, who believed that madness in its various forms “is expressed in social impotence, rather than in a mysterious access to an unknown space of the absurd”, post-structuralists are convinced of the social genesis of *schizophrenia*, that it is the direct result of modern industrial civilization, which differs from previous stages by more sophisticated methods of social suppression. Put it another way, it is the society, the established system of social, primarily, production relations,

that is responsible for the sick psyche of the modern individual, rather than their social impotence.

Schizoanalysis was mainly aimed at substantiating the existence of another *anthropological type*, that is a schizo-person or a person-of-desire, who could not care less about the family, the father's prohibition, mother's love, persons and morality as such with "gloomy sense of duty", etc.

All of the above for Schizoid is "*Oedipal filth that sticks to our skin*", regarding this Guattari and Deleuze use such a notion as "material emotion", which the Schizoid experiences with different intensity. It means that Schizoid life is connected with "flows" and "environments". As the authors claim, Schizoid is the greatest materialist in the materialist community, since he lives, enjoys and suffers only due to influence from the material world.

However, there is no debate on the matter in modality of natural desires or organic dependence one cannot stand. Schizoid lives in the mode of "*body without organs*" (this notion refers to Schizoid's self-experience, or attitude of anti-production, which is mostly represented by social and political structures, State and capital). Schizoid is always "an orphan" in the sense of their full indifference to other people, including the "familial images", their though unconscious manifests itself as libidinal production. *In this regard, "schizoanalysis" is aimed to manifest that so-called human relations cannot be involved into both the unconscious and the conscious.*

The postmodern people are just the "desire machine", and nothing more: "Cynicism has said, or claimed to have said, everything there is to say about love: *that it is a matter of a copulation of social and organic machines on a large scale (at bottom, love is in the organs; at bottom, love is a matter of economic determinations, money)*" (Guattari and Deleuze).

Thus, so-called post-structuralists generally focused on the relativity of human attachment and stated that society itself imposes love toward parents, while children's libido by its nature can be directed to absolutely impersonal objects: "*it would seem that some subjects have a libido so viscous or, on the contrary, so fluid that nothing succeeds in "taking hold"*" (Guattari and Deleuze). All their arguments seem to be based on the deepest skepticism about human attachments.

In contrast to "madman of family" Schizoid is obsessed with production, "the whole flow of schizes and phantasms". Their

unconscious, in fact, looks like a factory. Put it another way, their unconscious manifests itself as libidinal production: similar to capitalism, the Schizoid unconscious symbolizes the infinity process of producing everything, even the most disgusting and inhumane: “our society produces schizos the same way it produces Prell shampoo or Ford cars, the only difference being that schizos are not salable”.

That is why, they perform as a completely “*celibate machine*”, which can be considered as a certain symbol of dehumanization and the triumph of death instinct. In accordance with metaphysical attitudes, these authors tend to recognize the absolute power of desire, that is, insist on the libidinal “origin” of the entire system of social production and reproduction, including the system of social sanctions. To their deepest conviction, humans by their nature are largely the “flows of desires”. Therefore, even the deadliest forms of social reproduction, including the desire for death, seem to be a result of a person’s constant desire for satisfaction in any way.

The afore-mentioned process finds its manifestation both in interpersonal relations and in State institutes, which are not accidentally to be conventional. It is no coincidence, French post-structuralism is often considered a form of theoretical continuation of the ideas of *Frankfurt School*^[2] that led to strengthening the traditional criticism in contemporary social theory, in particular, to elaboration of the concept of *mass society*^[3].

^[1] *Discourses of power* is the concept that was developed by Michel Foucault to indicate to constant striving on the part of State institutes (“agencies”) for establish the full power over the whole society by virtue of “inventing” various instruments (“technologies”) of influence and control.

Meanwhile, other postmodern philosophies, namely, Guattari and Deleuze in relation to State power support some Nietzsche’s sayings: “churches, armies, states – which of all these dogs wants to die?”; “It could be that spiritual or temporal, tyrannical or democratic, capitalist or socialist, there has never been but a single State, the State – as dog, that speaks with flaming roars” [2, p. 132].

^[2] The Frankfurt School was founded on the basis of the Institute for Social Studies at the University of Frankfurt am Main. Officially, it is believed to be founded in 1930, when the institute was headed by Max Horkheimer. His ranks include thinkers of different directions, such as the founder of neo-Freudianism, for example, E. Fromm, the neo-Marxist D. Lukach and the founder of the communicative philosophy of Y. Habermas.

Under conditions of the strengthening of the Nazi party in 1933, “Frankfurt” were forced to immigrate to the United States, where the Institute was transferred.

^[3]*Mass society* is a concept introduced into the philosophical glossary in 1937 by Max Horkheimer to the significance of specificity of social philosophy. Nowadays, it is the central concept of philosophy, which is the basis for development of *critical social theory per se*. In addition, when summarizing the entire philosophical reasoning in regard to this issue, one can conclude that there are two main views on this social phenomenon, namely, psychoanalytic and post-structuralist, where one perspective is related to emphasizing the destructive impulses and irrationality (a tendency towards primitive pleasures and collective suggestion), while the other point of view explicitly exaggerates the simplicity of mass consciousness, its uniformity and consumerism.

TOPIC 9. Mass Society in the Context of Modern Theory of Capitalism and Related Globalization.

9.1. Mass society as a subject of philosophical discussion. Towards the end of the 20th century, in philosophical discourse we can observe radical changes, caused by the rapid transformation of modern societies. It refers to replacing the opposition of the political-economic and civilizational interpretation with the issue of social reproduction under conditions of the current global crisis, related to the phenomenon of *mass society*.

It is known that *mass society* is a fundamental concept of modern social theory, which is, primarily, elaborated by representatives of psychoanalytic and postmodernist trends to designate the presence in any society of a such group of individuals, which tend to superficial thinking, when the passions dominate over reason due to their inability to exercise self-control as well as to be aware of consequences of their own behavior. This concept has been long rooted into modern philosophical discourse, and it, primarily, means the socio-cultural decline in general, and the ethical decline in particular.

Let's refer to a general analysis of some well-known studies of *mass society* ("mass man"), developed by brilliant thinkers of the 20th century, such as Oswald Spengler and Jose Ortega y Gasset.

Indeed, the first strong accusations against *mass society* within frameworks of civilizing approach were offered by Spengler. According to him, the power of "mass" symbolizes the power of "pampered society" and "ignorant crowd", which spreads intensively under conditions of the civilizational stage in cultural development. The masses should only be designated as the "Fourth Estate", which is a marker of cultural demise, since it plays a key role in sociocultural degradation.

At the first glance, Spengler is far from idealizing a certain culture, and in some places, he demonstrates his negative attitude to relevant idealizations, especially in relation to ancient heritage. In particular, he explicitly accuses of his contemporaries, who, according to him, offer the "audacious descriptions" of Antiquity and not even desire to mention about real life both "Classical cities" and "world-cities of to-day", where we can also find the same "dirt and *riffraff*, terrors and brutalities, pleasure-boys ... phallus worship and imperial orgies": "In the cities life is bad; there are too many of the lustful", also sprach Zarathustra^[1].

The humankind always generates an unavoidable anthropological type, which Spengler characterizes as “a new sort of nomad, cohering unstably in fluid masses, the parasitical city dweller, traditionless, utterly matter-of-fact, religionless, clever, unfruitful, deeply contemptuous of the countryman and especially that highest form of countryman, the country gentleman. This is a very great stride towards the inorganic, towards the end”^[2].

Nevertheless, such a critical perspective does not mean at all that Spengler is the follower of economic determinism. The close correlation between social structure and the production system, that is, between production “decadence” and universally social degradation for a number of representatives of sociocultural thinking in the 20th century is obvious. But, not in the case of Spengler.

According to him, every civilization is inherent in the relevant structure of power and ethics, and even its own economic life, in connection with that Spengler declares there “are the economic histories of the high Cultures, each of which has its own economic style. With the State rule radially from cities appears the urban economy of money, and these rises, with the oncoming of the Civilization, into the dictatorship of money, simultaneously with the victory of world-city democracy... Bodily money of the Apollonian style is as antithetical to relational money of the Faustian-dynamic style...”^[3].

Therefore, Spengler is not inclined to explain the sociocultural decline only by productive capitalism, but, nevertheless, he recognizes the corrupting role of money and robbery at a later level of Civilizing Process, which, as he is convinced, must again be subordinated to the tasks of true government, “tradition and ambitions of strong families”.

In other words, Spengler insists on the revival of aristocracy, which unites him with ideas of Nietzsche. Like Nietzsche, Spengler *is obsessed with* the idea of a *noble race* – the nations, which have aristocratic dynasties. Aristocratic minority is to be selected by destiny and does differ from other *Estates* in its extreme sense of honesty, rank, significance and purity of blood. It is this “intuition of noble race” that underlies Spengler’s gestalt-analysis, if we put it in postmodern terms.

According to a lot of thinkers, the mass society in the industrial era is subject to a higher level of utilitarianism, conformism and consumerism than in previous eras. Another brilliant example of critical approach was offered by Jose Ortega y Gasset, who elaborated his theory

of masses, contrasting their *nullity* with virtues of true aristocracy. In regard to modern western society, then Ortega defines it as exactly mass ones. According to him, this society is “captured” by the masses, and this fact will inevitably cause the collapse of this society totally.

The essential traits of mass are their amorphic crowding and *faceless multitude*. Meanwhile, sociocultural and, mainly, historical significance belongs to the elite, which, to him, should be regarded as the intellectual and educated minority, who creates the values and purports, and confronts to mass-man. The marker of a person’s elite, that is, of the presence within human being of this “noble” source, according to Ortega, is to the constant dissatisfaction with oneself and, hence the strive for self-development in the terms of creation and morality.

Ortega emphasizes that due to industrial and postindustrial achievements, especially, due to technological progress, the contemporary people got a possibility to live comfortably, for their own pleasure, whereas in the past, it was the lifestyle of only a few. But, if these few cultivated the “good manners”, which were, primarily, serving as the symbol of their social superiority, the mass had turned out extremely hedonistic, with apparent lack of any moral obligations and restrictions. This is definitely a rough society with barbarian manners, devoid, indeed, “of all respect for orderliness” (Spengler).

Thus, it is an ethical component of culture that is significant for most of representatives of both the civilizing approach and followers of more critical view on cultural nuclear that, as will be found out, cannot be reduced to only language, religion or some “metaphysic” gestalt: the problem of contemporary “civilizations” is, primarily, the issue of social degradation.

Both Ortega and many other thinkers insist that an essential attribute of the mass society is the lack of cultural differences between the upper and the so-called declassed layers. Despite of Nietzschean “eternal accusation against Christianity” that can be written “upon all walls, wherever are found”, Ortega is convinced that peoples have long refused on moral ideals in the form of both “aristocratic ethos”, and Christianity, with its imperatives and suffering rhetoric: “Only the Devil’s world, with its grim-all-presentences remained” (Spengler)^[4].

A vivid example of the substantiating the connection between postindustrial capitalism and growing consumerism, that is, “mass

society” can be observed in the philosophy of French postmodernism, namely in Jean Baudrillard (1929–2007).

In contrast to any civilizational interpretations, Baudrillard convincingly proves that the postindustrial “advanced” society, in general, is the *consumer society*, caused by the total economic dominance, the essential traits of which are the permanent pursuit for profits and gratifications. In other words, the society in conditions of postmodern capitalism is the, primarily, *mass society*.

Moreover, postindustrial capitalism inevitably leads to the fact that almost any aspect of current human existence becomes part of the current economic system. According to Baudrillard, in the circumstances of the postindustrial cult of “consuming” occurs the dissolution of both the cultural tradition and “desiring-production”. And it is this desiring-production that became the foundation of contemporary capitalism in terms of libidinal investing in financial flows.

Starting with “The Decline of the West” (1920) by Spengler and ending with the “Transparency of evil” (1990) by Baudrillard, the philosophical literature for a long time was filled with apocalyptic moods. Even the most convinced supporter of the civilizational triumph, American philosopher Huntington, nevertheless, had to admit that in the era of postmodern formation “there is no law, no order”.

For example, Baudrillard names the postindustrial phase of capitalism the *aesthetic* one and regarded it as a main reason for the “decomposition” of postmodern society. At the same time, he draws special attention to the issue of “decomposition” of capitalism itself, referring precisely to the functioning of *simulacrum*.

In his view, along with the above meanings of this concept, it does mostly symbolize the “death” of all achievements of contemporary civilization. The simulacrum is a pure sign, that is the symbolic expression of death and, at the same time, it means the “demise” of all departments of social life, starting with the production and ending with the human relations. Baudrillard refers to the economic death of so-called “advanced society” with the concept of “symbolic value”, which he contrasts with classical, that is, Marxist *political economy*.

As well-known, Marx described the essence of three main value forms, namely, “use value”, “exchange value”, along with development of the concept of “surplus” value, which he directly associated with industrial capitalism. According to Baudrillard, it is “*symbolic value*”

that is the basis for postindustrial economy, in connection with that he employs the concept of “political economy of the sign”.

Symbolic value is regarded as *simulacrum*, since it looks like a *use value*, but does not coincide with it. Actually, it is a fictive value, largely, imposed one. There are many various things, items and services, which are not needed as such, enhancing the increase over the cost price, etc. are widespread examples of manifesting the *symbolic value – simulacrum* in the economic area.

Baudrillard is convinced that contemporary market, for example, forces modern people to consume “signs”, “models” in terms of artificially created forms, rather than use values: commodities turn out into simulacra in forms of symbols or signs of wealth, prosperity, prestige, where certain labor and quality is leveled with “glamorous images” of real nullities.

Contemporary capital annihilates any limits of political economy with the aim of enhancing the commodity production, “playing with it like with a simulative model” to maintain the illusion of use-value. The very core of contemporary capitalism consists in its tendency to inflate financial flows through speculation on the world market, banking operations, etc., resulted in emancipation of capital from material production, that is, to total power of *fictitious capital*, which Marx defined as *the right to profit, and not about value*.

Baudrillard focuses exactly on postmodern examples of *fictitious value*, that is, such value that, in fact, “is severed from material production”, for example, when we refer to money. At the first glance, the money both in the past and in the present is a symbolic expression of the value: “Money is the first “commodity” to assume the status of a sign and to escape use-value...”. But today “money escapes exchange-value. Freed from the market itself, it becomes an autonomous simulacrum, relieved of very message itself and every signification of exchange, becoming a message itself and exchanging amongst itself. Money is no longer a commodity, since it no longer contains any use-value or exchange-value, nor is it any longer a general equivalent, that is, it is no longer a mediating abstraction of the market. Money circulates at a greater rate than everything else and has no common measure with anything else”.

9.2. The concept of Globalization. Meanwhile, the issue of postmodern mass society cannot be considered outside the issue of the ongoing process of the so-called *Globalization*, which is the subject of study for a lot of contemporary authors. It is conventional that within a number of western countries, State power and financial capitalism, step by step, has found support in each other, which eventually led to its transformation into so-called Global Capitalism.

What does the term *globalization mean*? According to Immanuel Wallerstein (1930–2019)^[5], for example, *globalization is primarily an expansion of capitalism by virtue of its involvement in most world economies that carries out on the basis of modernization*, where the *modernization* as noted the above, *symbolizes the transition from traditional (pre-industrial) society to contemporary phase of its historical development*.

The most widespread point of view belongs to George Ritzer (a reputable expert on this question), who states the following: “it is likely that no single topic has received as much popular and academic attention in recent years as globalization”. Considering this phenomenon as “*the spread of worldwide practices, relations, consciousness, and organization of social life*”, Ritzer quite rightly remarks that within the contemporary academic world is observed a near-obsession with this topic.

Furthermore, describing of contemporary globalization, Ritzer uses such term as “grobalization”, which, as he states, does mean of linking together the notions of “grow” (in the sense of profits grow) and “globalization”, in connection with that he emphasizes: “What is central here is the idea of grobalization (a companion to the notion of glocalization), or the imperialistic ambitions of nations, corporations, organizations, and their desire, indeed need, to impose themselves on various geographic areas... Their main interest is in seeing their power, influence, and in some cases, profits grow (hence the term of grobalization) throughout the world. Grobalization involves a variety of subprocesses. Three of them – capitalism, Americanization, and McDonaldization – are central driving forces in grobalization and are of great significance in the worldwide spread of nothingness”^[6].

In these sentences, Ritzer directly points out to cultural and the ideological risks, caused by globalization, using the term of *nothingness*, that, according to him, does express largely empty forms that are devoid of distinctive content. Like the most contemporary researchers, Ritzer

underlines exactly the “Western bias of globalization”, the common conviction in the preeminence accorded to developments in the West.

According to the scholar, this process occurs “often dramatically”, in relation to that we would like to pay a particular attention to dramatic effects of globalization, to the “*nothingness*” of social and cultural life of contemporary peoples, especially those countries (nations), which are dragged into this process.

For example, with regard to the organization of social life, in the result of globalization we actually received the most common type of society, namely the *mass-society* with its obvious values of consumption and enjoyment. The global economy is not only based on these principles, but it also requires them, dragging more and more people into the consumer swamp and credit slavery.

That is why, for most contemporary authors, it is the economic explanation of this phenomenon that turned out to be closer. We are referring to, primarily, the representatives of so-called *critical social theory*, especially the current followers of *postmodern philosophy*. It is their social theories, which are based on systems approach, that allows us to grasp some processes, such as the crisis of liberal ideology and so-called western civilization and finally, the crisis of capitalism itself.

In other words, the representatives of the above-mentioned critical paradigm tend to consider globalization as primarily the widespread of western capitalism, liberalism and most importantly, the market economy, represented in the form of such institutes as WTO and IMF, and this is a generally recognized fact.

Moreover, there is a number of thinkers, which criticize this global economic system, and do it, not without reason, believing that the IMF in particular, and globalization in general just have worked to the advantage of the wealthy nations, especially the United States (which effectively has veto power over IMF decisions), and to the detriment of poor nations. The gap between rich and poor has actually increased as a result of globalization.

The liberal ideology that is a direct derivative of industrial capitalism, has turned out to be a solid foundation for globalization in its recognition of only one model of civilizing development, that is western one. This model is aimed to maximize integration of all local economies everywhere into a unique “global market”, that is governed by transnational corporations.

Due to the permanent rhetoric of consumption and enjoyment, the high level of atomism and the lack of direct interpersonal communication, inherent in postindustrial society, people are becoming, increasingly, dehumanized. The contemporary “masses” are not only indifferent, but they are also potentially aggressive, since there are many explanations for this.

Most of the reasons for mass aggression are explained as both the total heightened the material risk and the risk of survival. Relying on a number of postmodern papers, one can presume that globalization, primarily, generates the monoete global society, designated *as mass one in terms of inability of most individuals to create relatively stable connections and alliances*. It is this society that is the basis of most problems of contemporary civilization, including both the ideology and culture.

[1] Spengler Oswald (1926) *The Decline of the West: Form and Actuality*. Charles Francis Atkinson [translation with notes], Georg Allen & Unwin Atkinson LTD, London: 1 Vol. P. 31.

[2] *Ibid*: 35.

[3] Spengler Oswald (1928) *The Decline of the West: Perspectives of World-history*. Charles Francis Atkinson [translation with notes], Georg Allen & Unwin Atkinson LTD, London: 477.

[4] Spengler Oswald (1928) *The Decline of the West: Perspectives of World-history*. Charles Francis Atkinson [translation with notes], Georg Allen & Unwin Atkinson LTD, London: 293.

[5] Wallerstein Immanuel – an outstanding American sociologist and economic historian, who is known as a developer of the so-called *world-system approach* in contemporary social theory.

[6] Ritzer, George (2011) *Sociological theory / George Ritzer*. — New York., 8th ed.: 587.

PLAN OF SEMINARS (PRACTICAL LESSONS)

Seminar 1. The Relationship between Mythical and Religious Worldviews.

- Questions for the seminar:**
1. Describe the general features of “mythical thought”.
 2. What are the main characteristics of religious worldview?
 3. The essence of religious faith on the part of existentialism.

- Suggested reading:**
1. Cassirer, E. (1944) *An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture*, Yale&New Haven.
 2. Kierkegaard, S. (1941) *Fear and Trembling* by Johannes DE SILENTIO, 1843. (alias Søren Kierkegaard) [tr. Walter Lowrie], 71 p. <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/4a5d/511fc8ffc332ed1622b94ee7c9de8c59fdfe.pdf>
 3. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1989) *The Philosophy of Art* [Edited, translated, and introduced by Douglas W. Stott], in *Theory and History of Literature*, Volume 58, Chapter 2., Pp. 33-46.

Seminar 2. Historical Development of Western Classical Philosophy.

- Questions for the seminar:**
1. Established branches of philosophy.
 2. Historical stages in the development of Western philosophy.
 3. What is the main question of classical philosophy?

- Suggested reading:**
1. Blackburn, Simon (2007) *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*. – Oxford University Press, USA, 407 p.
 2. Hegel G.W.F. (1979) *Phenomenology of Spirit*. [Translated by A. V. Miller]. – Oxford University Press, USA, 640 p.
 3. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1989) *The Philosophy of Art* [Edited, translated, and introduced by Douglas W. Stott], in *Theory and History of Literature*, Volume 58, 345 p.

Seminar 3. Ontological Categories of Contemporary Philosophy.

- Questions for the seminar:**
1. Conceptual and methodological premises of existential ontology.
 2. Existentialist elucidation of the metaphysical question in Heidegger.
 3. Developers of the simulacrum category about its main characteristics.

- Suggested reading:**
1. Blackburn, Simon. (2007) The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. – Oxford University Press, USA, 407 p.
 2. Heidegger, M. (1949) What is Metaphysics [TRANSLATED BY MILES GROTH, PhD] https://www.academia.edu/3150996/Translation_of_Martin_Heidegger_What_Is_Metaphysics
 3. Baudrillard, Jean. (1983) Simulations [Translated by Paul Foss, Paul Patton and Philip Beitchman] Foreign Agents Series, Columbia University New York City, New York <http://www.naturalthinker.net/trl/texts/Baudrillard,Jean/simulations.html>

Seminar 4. The Irrational Context of Philosophical Anthropology.

- Questions for the seminar:**
1. Nietzschean doctrine of the genesis of the moral Subject.
 2. Oedipus complex as the central narrative of the entire modern anthropology.
 3. Mental “make-up” of the “postmodern humans”.

- Suggested reading:**
1. Nietzsche Fr. (2007) On the Genealogy of Morality [Translated by Carol Diethe], CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS.
 2. Rougemont D. (1983), Love in the Western World, trans. M. Belgion, Princeton University Press, New Jersey.
 3. Erich Fromm (1973) The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness. Holt Rinehart&Winston, New York. Pp. 218-228.

Seminar 5. The Phenomenon of Consciousness from an angle of Philosophical Theory.

- Questions for the seminar:**
1. What is consciousness from a phenomenological point of view?
 2. Existential theory of consciousness.
 3. The sociocultural determinacy of consciousness.

- Suggested reading:**
1. Blackburn, Simon (2007) *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*. – Oxford University Press, USA, 407 p.
 2. Sartre, Jean-Paul (2003) *Being and Nothingness. The principal text of modern existentialism*. – [Translated by Hazel E. Barnes], University of Colorado, Pp. 221-364.
 3. Elias, Norbert (2000) “The Civilizing Process: sociogenetic and psychogenetic investigations”, Vol. I, [Translated by Edmund Jephcott with some notes and corrections by the author], Blackwell Publish.

Seminar 6. The Sociocultural Context of Philosophical Thought.

- Questions for the seminar:**
1. Development of economic determinism in social theory.
 2. The correlation between social structure and culture.
 3. Ethical focus of civilizational paradigm.

- Suggested reading:**
1. Spengler, Oswald. (1928) “The Decline of the West” *Perspectives of Word-History*). – [Translation with notes by Charles Francis Atkinson], LONDON Georg Allen&Unwin LTD. Ruskin House, Vol.II., Pp. 165-186.
 2. Weber, Max. (1950) “The Protestant Ethics and The Spirit of Capitalism”. – [Translated by Talcott Parsons], Harvard University NEW YORK: Charles Scribner’s Sons, LONDON: Georg Allen&Unwin LTD, Pp. 13-78.
 3. Schweitzer, Albert. (1949) “The Philosophy of Civilization. The Decay and Restoration of Civilization”. – [Translated by Campion C.T.], Part I, Chapter III. – Macmillan Company, Pp. 35-62.

Seminar 7. The System Approach in Philosophical Theory of Society.

- Questions for the seminar:**
1. The relationship between the “system approach” and “structuralist method”.
 2. “Kinship System” as the institutional basis of the social structure in pre-industrial society.
 3. Structuralist theory of culture and related post-structuralist criticism.

- Suggested reading:**
1. Ritzer, George. Sociological theory / George Ritzer. — Published by McGraw-Hill, a business unit of The McGraw-Hill Companies, New York., 8th ed.: 664 [Accessed 23.02.2020] https://www.academia.edu/33077856/_George_Ritzer_Sociological_Theory_8th_Edition_BookFi.org_
 2. Radcliffe-Brown, A. (1952) The Structure and Function in Primitive Society – THE FREE PRESS GLENCOE, ILLINOIS. – Pp. 226-240.
 3. Parsons, Talcott. (1961) “An outline of the Social System” from Talcott Parsons, Edward A. Shils, Kaspar D. Naegle, and Jesse R. Pitts (eds.), Theories of Society. – New York: Simon Schuster, The Free Press., Pp. 421-440.

Seminar 8. Social Knowledge and Established Philosophical Criticism.

- Questions for the seminar:**
1. Socio-economic expediency of family institutions.
 2. Dependence of personality mental structure on the social structure.
 3. The evolution of social sanctions as a philosophical issue.

Suggested reading:

1. Deleuze G. and Guattari F. 2009. *Anti-Oedipus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Translated by R. Hurley / Penguin Putnam Inc, New York, USA, 432 p.
2. Foucault, M. (1977). *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. New York: Pantheon Books. (in English).
3. Parsons, Talcott. (1961) "An outline of the Social System" from Talcott Parsons, Edward A. Shils, Kaspar D. Naegle, and Jesse R. Pitts (eds.), *Theories of Society*. – New York: Simon Schuster, The Free Press., Pp. 421-440.

Seminar 9. The Issue of Mass Society and the Current Cultural Crisis.

Questions for the seminar:

1. Psychoanalytical theory of mass society.
2. Tension between "civilizations" as a matter of global crisis.
3. Postmodern comprehending of mass society.

Suggested reading:

1. Baudrillard J. *Symbolic exchange and death* (Published in association with *Theory, Culture&Society*) / Translated by Lain Hamilton Grant. – SAGE. – Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore, Washington, 2017.
2. Freud Z. *Civilization and its discontents* (2005) – The electronic version is copyright / Chrysona Associated Limited. Publications Division – Electronic Books Library. – P. 40.
3. Huntington, Samuel P. (2011). *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* / English: Simon&Schuster; P. 386.

TEST TASKS

1. What is the fundamental issue of classical ontology?

- A. the issue of human existence;
- B. the issue of essence;
- C. the issue of sham (false) images.

2. The idea of the dual nature of essence lies into the basis of:

- A. pluralism;
- B. dualism;
- C. monism.

3. Which approach identifies itself as a descriptive analysis?

- A. phenomenology;
- B. dialectics;
- C. metaphysics.

4. Who exactly is the founder of dialectics?

- A. Plato;
- B. Immanuel Kant;
- C. Edmund Husserl.

5. What is the main characteristic of religion in Cassirer' view?

- A. the presence of high developed moral standards;
- B. magic;
- C. the fear of God.

6. According to whom religious faith is the greatest paradox:

- A. Friedrich Joseph Schelling;
- B. Søren Kierkegaard;
- C. Friedrich Nietzsche.

7. Whom does the development of the system of absolute idealism belong to?

- A. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel;
- B. Immanuel Kant;
- C. Friedrich Joseph Schelling.

8. Existential ontology, primarily, focuses on:

- A. the issue of nothing;
- B. the analysis of consciousness;
- C. the thing does exist.

9. Classification of simulacra was offered by:

- A. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel;
- B. Jean Paul Sartre;
- C. Jean Baudrillard.

10. Whom does the existential elucidation of metaphysics belong to?

- A. Martin Heidegger;
- B. Søren Kierkegaard;
- C. Jean Paul Sartre.

11. The issue of universal substance is the subject matter of study for:

- A. philosophy of nature;
- B. phenomenology;
- C. philosophical anthropology.

12. The term of paradigm does symbolize:

- A. the set of representations about the world;
- B. the form of scientific knowledge;
- C. the pattern of behavior.

13. The category of existence in philosophy means:

- A. the usual presence of all that exists in the world;
- B. the presence of every person;
- C. the inner world of personality in terms of certain spiritual needs.

14. For which approaches the principle of contradiction is the fundamental?

- A. structuralism;
- B. phenomenology;
- C. dialectics.

15. Elaboration of major rules of dialectic thinking was carried out by:

- A. Karl Theodor Jaspers;
- B. Michel Foucault;
- C. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.

16. Point to the historical type of worldview, based on fantasy and collective creativity:

- A. philosophy;
- B. mythology;
- C. science.

17. Who mostly operated with the concept of “Overman”?

- A. Michel Foucault;
- B. Martin Heidegger;
- C. Friedrich Nietzsche.

18. Who exactly is the founder of the civilizational paradigm?

- A. Oswald Spengler;
- B. Talcott Parsons;
- C. Gilles Deleuze.

19. What is the major problem of Nietzsche’s philosophy?

- A. the issue of prime cause of all that exists;
- B. the purport of human existence;
- C. the genesis of morality.

20. Who is a follower of the theory of libidinal economy?

- A. Erich Fromm;
- B. Felix Guattari;
- C. Rene Descartes.

21. The term of social stratification means:

- A. social tension;
- B. public relations;
- C. social inequality.

22. Development of concepts of “base” and “superstructure” belong to:

- A. John Locke;
- B. Daniel Bell;
- C. Karl Marx.

23. Differentiation of society into pre-industrial, industrial and post-industrial one refers to:

- A. Daniel Bell;
- B. Max Weber;
- C. Jean Baudrillard.

24. An essential marker of post-industrial stage of production development is:

- A. production of surplus value-labor;
- B. production of goods;
- C. information production.

25. Rationale the influence of Protestantism on the industrial capitalism belong to:

- A. Jean Baudrillard;
- B. Max Horkheimer;
- C. Max Weber.

26. Which of this term expresses the highest degree of generalization:

- A. notion;
- B. idea;
- C. category.

27. From Weber' view the Spirit of capitalism consists in:

- A. the rational organization of the enterprise;
- B. the pursuit for maximum profit;
- C. the maintenance of commodity circulation.

28. The notion of categorical imperative according to Immanuel Kant is:

- A. moral principle;
- B. the methodological principle;
- C. the ontological category.

29. The development of economic meanings of simulacrum refers to:

- A. Jean Baudrillard;
- B. Michel Foucault;
- C. Talcott Parsons.

30. Identify, please, what exactly notion corresponds to this definition: ...is the fundamental category of philosophical thinking that designates the immanent origins of things or phenomena, which is primary for them and defined by need connections and fundamental principles of their existences:

- A. essence;
- B. subject;
- C. simulacrum.

31. ...this is the philosophical theory about prime principles of being, or, certain style of thinking, which is associated only with philosophy, since it differs with the highest level of conceptualization and generalization:

- A. dialectics;
- B. phenomenology;
- C. metaphysics.

32. this is fundamental concept of the entire psychoanalytic philosophy that designates the existence of specific energy of desire, aimed at obtaining the pleasure or gratification:

- A. libido;
- B. Oedipus complex;
- C. archetype.

33. Which representative of existentialism is regarded as a follower of phenomenology?

- A. Karl Theodor Jaspers;
- B. Jean Paul Sartre;
- C. Albert Camus.

34. ...is one of the latent components or layers of human mental life that is considered to be basis for elaborating the psychoanalytic paradigm:

- A. reason;
- B. unconscious;
- C. consciousness.

35. The concept of infernality in philosophy does symbolize:

- A. instincts;
- B. morality;
- C. thinking.

36. ...expresses the human tendency to so-called spiritual needs, namely, the need for God, faith, etc:

- A. essence;
- B. existence;
- C. phantasm.

37. Who exactly is the founder of existentialism?

- A. Karl Theodor Jaspers;
- B. Søren Kierkegaard;
- C. Jean Paul Sartre.

38. What is the fundamental issue of existentialism?

- A. the issue of the human being;
- B. the issue of knowledge;
- C. the issue of the essence.

39. Who exactly is the founder of psychoanalysis?

- A. Carl Gustav Jung;
- B. Alfred Adler;
- C. Sigmund Freud.

40. What is the main “metaphysical issue” of post-structural philosophy?

- A. the primacy of matter or idea;
- B. the primacy of economic or culture;
- C. the primacy of exchange or repression.

LIST OF THEMES FOR WRITTEN STUDENT'S WORK

1. What is the use of philosophy?
2. Phenomenology as a scientific approach.
3. The theme of loneliness in existentialist philosophy.
4. Sartre's theory of shame in its correlation with Elias' views.
5. Existential view on the nature of religious faith.
6. Methodological and conceptual premises of existentialism.
7. Psychoanalytic theory of humor and the importance of cultural ersatz in the social field.
8. Transgression as a subject matter of postmodern analysis.
9. Structure of existence from standpoint of M. Heidegger.
10. The narrative of "death instinct" in existentialism and psychoanalysis.
11. Destructive libido as a central issue of contemporary anthropology.
12. Content and relevance of Cassirer's theory of religion.
13. Schelling's naturalistic metaphysics as an example of classical discourse.
14. Peculiarities of the rationalistic metaphysics developed by Hegel.
15. What do the ideas of Sartre and Heidegger have in common?
16. Deleuze about essential features of simulacrum.
17. Impact of Nietzsche's ideas on psychoanalytic anthropology.
18. Nietzschean doctrine of the genesis of the moral Subject.
19. "Oedipus complex" as a central narrative of contemporary philosophy.
20. The nature of capital as the focus of philosophical theory.
21. What kind of feelings one can entitle "socially generated"?
22. Methodological origins of postmodern ontology.
23. Concept and particularities of "phenomenology of presence".
24. Postmodern ontology in terms of political economy of value.

MATERIALS FOR SELF-STUDENTS WORK

Regarding seminar 1. The Relationship between Mythical and Religious Worldviews.

Ernst Cassirer

*An Essay on Man: An Introduction
to a Philosophy of Human Culture*

Myth and Religion.

Of all the phenomena of human culture myth and religion are most refractory to a merely logical analysis. Myth appears at first sight to be a mere chaos – a shapeless mass of incoherent ideas.

To seek after the “reasons” of these ideas seems to be vain and futile. If there is anything that is characteristic of myth it is the fact that it is “without rhyme and reason”. As to religious thought, it is by no means necessarily opposed to rational or philosophic thought.

To determine the true relation between these two modes of thought was one of the principal tasks of medieval philosophy. In the systems of high scholasticism, the problem appeared to be solved. According to Thomas Aquinas religious truth is supra-natural and supra-rational; but it is not “irrational”. By reason alone we cannot penetrate into the mysteries of faith. Yet these mysteries do not contradict, they complete and perfect reason. Nevertheless, there were always deep religious thinkers who took issue with all these attempts to reconcile the two opposite forces.

They maintained a much more radical and uncompromising thesis. Tertullian’s *dictum Credo quia absurdum* never lost its force. Pascal declared obscurity and incomprehensibility to be the very elements of religion.

The true God, the God of Christian religion, always remains *a Deus absconditus*, a hidden God. Kierkegaard describes religious life as the great “paradox”. To him an attempt to lessen this paradox meant the negation and destruction of religious life, and religion remains a riddle not only in a theoretical but also in an ethical sense. It is fraught with theoretical antinomies and with ethical contradictions. It promises us a communion with nature, with men, with supra-natural powers and the gods themselves. Yet its effect is the very opposite. In its concrete

appearance it becomes the source of the most profound *dissensions* and fanatic struggles among men. Religion claims to be in possession of an absolute truth; but its history is a history of errors and heresies. It gives us the promise and prospect of a transcendent world — far beyond the limits of our human experience—and *it remains human, all too human*. The problem appears however in a new perspective as soon as we decide to change our point of view. A philosophy of human culture does not ask the same question as a metaphysical or theological system. Here we are not inquiring into the subject matter but into the form of mythical imagination and religious thought...

...

Anthropologists and ethnologists were often very much surprised to find the same elementary thoughts spread over the whole world and under quite different social and cultural conditions.

The same holds good for the history of religion. The articles of faith, the dogmatic creeds, the theological system are engaged in an interminable struggle. *Even the ethical ideals of different religions are widely divergent and scarcely reconcilable with each other*. Yet all this does not affect the specific form of religious feeling and the inner unity of religious thought. The religious symbols change incessantly, but the underlying principle, the symbolic activity as such remains the same...A theory of myth is, however, from the beginning laden with difficulties. Myth is nontheoretical in its very meaning and essence. It defies and challenges our fundamental categories of thought. Its logic—if there is any logic — is incommensurate with all our conceptions of empirical or scientific truth. But philosophy could never admit such a bifurcation. It was convinced that the creations of the myth-making function must have a philosophical, an understandable “meaning”. If myth hides this meaning under all sorts of images and symbols, it became the task of philosophy to unmask it. Since the time of the Stoics philosophy has developed a special, very elaborate technique of allegorical interpretation...

Though myth is fictitious, it is an unconscious, not a conscious fiction. The primitive mind was not aware of the meaning of its own creations... Myth combines a theoretical element and an element of artistic creation. What first strikes us is its close kinship with poetry. “Ancient myth”, it has been said, “is the “mass” from which modern poetry has slowly grown by the processes which evolutionists call

differentiation and specialization. The mythmaker's mind is the prototype; and the mind of the poet, ...is still essentially mythopoeic". But in spite of this genetic connection we cannot fail to recognize the specific difference between myth and art. A clue to this is to be found in Kant's statement that aesthetic contemplation is "*entirely indifferent to the existence or nonexistence of its object*".

Precisely such an indifference, however, is entirely alien to mythical imagination. In mythical imagination there is always implied an act of belief. Without the belief in the reality of its object, myth would lose its ground. By this intrinsic and necessary condition, we seem to be led on to the opposite pole. In this respect it seems to be possible and even indispensable to compare mythical with scientific thought.

Of course, they do not follow the same ways. But they seem to be in quest of the same thing: reality. In modern anthropology this relationship was emphasized by Sir James Frazer. Frazer propounds the thesis that there is no sharp boundary separating magical art from our modes of scientific thought. Magic, too, however imaginary and fantastic in its means, is scientific in its aim. Theoretically speaking, magic is science, although practically speaking it is an elusive science – a pseudo-science. For even magic argues and acts upon the presupposition that in nature one event follows another necessarily and invariably without the intervention of any spiritual or personal agency. The conviction here is "*that the course of nature is determined not by the passions or caprice of personal beings, but by the operation of immutable laws acting Mechanically*". Hence magic is a faith, implicit, but real and firm in the order and uniformity of nature. This thesis could not, however, stand a critical test; modern anthropology seems entirely to have given up the views of Frazer. It is now generally admitted that it is a very inadequate conception of myth and magic to look upon them as typically etiological or explanatory. *We cannot reduce myth to certain fixed static elements; we must strive to grasp it in its inner life, in its mobility and versatility, in its dynamic principle.*

It is easier to describe this principle if we approach the problem from a different angle. *Myth has, as it were, a double face.* On the one hand, it shows us a conceptual, on the other hand a perceptual structure. It is not a mere mass of unorganized a perceptual structure; it depends upon a definite mode of perception. If myth did not *perceive* the world in

a different way, it could not judge or interpret it in its specific manner. We must go back to this deeper stratum of perception in order to understand the character of mythical thought.

What interests us in empirical thought are the constant features of our sense experience.

Here we always make a distinction between what is substantial or accidental, necessary or contingent, invariable or transient. By this discrimination we are led on to the concept of a world of physical objects endowed with fixed and determinate qualities. But all this involves an analytical process that what myth primarily perceives are not objective but *physiognomic characters*.

Nature, in its empirical or scientific sense, may be defined as “the existence of thing as far as it is determined by “general laws”. Such a “nature” does not exist for myths. The world of myth is a dramatic world – a world of actions, of forces, of conflicting powers. In every phenomenon of nature it sees the collision of these power. Mythical perception is always impregnated with these emotional qualities. Whatever is seen or felt is surrounded by a special atmosphere – an atmosphere of joy or grief, of anguish, of excitement, of exultation or depression”.

Here we cannot speak of “things” as a dead or indifferent stuff. All objects are benignant or malignant, friendly or inimical, familiar or uncanny, alluring and fascinating or repellent and threatening. We can easily reconstruct this elementary form of human experience, for even I the life of the civilized man it has by no means lost its original power. If we are under the strain of a violent emotion we have still this dramatic conception of all things. They no longer wear their usual faces; they abruptly change their physiognomy; they are tinged with the specific color of our passions, of love or hate, of fear or hope.

There can scarcely be a greater contrast than between this original direction of our experience and the ideal of truth that is introduced by science. All the efforts of scientific thought are directed to the aim of obliterating every trace of this first view. In the new light of science mythical perception has to fade away. But that does not mean that the data of our physiognomic experience as such are destroyed and annihilated. They have lost all objective or cosmological value, but their anthropological value persists. In our human world we cannot

deny them and we cannot miss them; they maintain their place and their significance...

Hence if we wish to account for the world of mythical perception and mythical imagination we must not begin with a Criticism of both of them from the point of view of our theoretical ideals of knowledge and truth. We must take the qualities of mythical experience on their "immediate qualitateness".

For what we need here is not an explanation of mere thoughts or beliefs but an interpretation of mythical life. Myth is not a system of dogmatic creeds. It consists much more in actions than in mere images or representations. It is a mark of definite progress in modern anthropology and modern history of religion that this view has become more and more prevalent. That ritual is prior to dogma, both in a historical and in a psychological sense, seems now to be a generally adopted maxim. Even if we should succeed in analyzing myth into ultimate conceptual elements, we could, by such an analytical process, never grasp its vital principle, which is a dynamic not a static one; it is describable only in terms of action. Primitive man expresses his feelings and emotions not in mere abstract symbols but in a concrete and immediate way; and we must study the whole of this expression in order to become aware of the structure of myth and primitive religion.

One of the clearest and most consistent theories of this structure has been given by the French sociological school, in the work of Durkheim and his disciples and followers. Durkheim starts from the principle that we can give no adequate account of myth as long as we seek its sources in the physical world, in an intuition of natural phenomena. ***Not nature but society is the true model of myth.*** All its fundamental motives are projections of man's social life. By these, projections nature becomes the image of the social world; it reflects all its fundamental features, its organization and architecture, its divisions and subdivisions...

We find many spheres of primitive life and culture that show the well-known features of our own cultural life. As long as we assume an absolute heterogeneity between our own logic and that of the primitive mind, as long as we think them specifically different from and radically opposed to each other, we can scarcely account for this fact. Even in primitive life we always find a secular or profane sphere outside the holy sphere. There is a secular tradition that consists of customary or legal

rules, determining the manner, in which social life is conducted. “The rules which we find here”, says Malinowski, “are completely independent of magic, of supernatural sanctions, and they are never accompanied by any ceremonial or ritual elements”.

It is a mistake to assume that, at an early stage of development, man lived in a confused world, where the real and the unreal formed a medley, where mysticism and reason were as interchangeable as forged and real coin in a disorganized country. To us the most essential point about magic and religious ritual is that it steps in only where knowledge fails. Supernaturally founded ceremonial grows out of life, but it never stultifies the practical efforts of man. In his ritual of magic or religion, man attempts to enact miracles, not because he ignores the limitations of his mental powers, but, on the contrary, because he is fully cognizant of them. To go one step farther, the recognition of this seems to me indispensable if we want once and for ever to establish the truth that religion has its own subject-matter, its own legitimate field of development.

And even in the latter field, in the legitimate field of myth and religion, the conception of nature and of human life are by no means devoid of any rational meaning. What we, from our own point of view, may call irrational, prelogical, mystical, are the premises from which mythical or religious interpretation starts, but not the mode of interpretation. If we accept these premises and if we understand them aright if we see them in the same light that primitive man does—the inferences drawn from them cease to appear illogical or antilogical.

To be sure all attempts to intellectualize myth – to explain it as an allegorical expression of a theoretical or moral truth – have completely failed. They ignored the fundamental facts of mythical experience. *The real substratum of myth is no a substratum of thought but of feeling.* Myth and primitive religion are by no means entirely incoherent, they are not bereft of sense or reason. But their coherence depends much more upon unity of feeling than upon logical rules. This unity is one of the strongest and most profound impulses of primitive thought.

If scientific thought wishes to describe and explain reality it is bound to use its' general method, which is that of classification and systematization. Life is divided into separate provinces that are sharply distinguished from each other. The boundaries between the kingdoms of

plants, of animals, of man – the differences between species, families, genera are fundamental and ineffaceable. But the primitive mind ignores and rejects them all. *Its view of life is a synthetic, not an analytical one. Life is not divided into classes and subclasses. It is felt as an unbroken continuous whole which does not admit of any clean-cut and trenchant distinctions...*

What is characteristic of primitive mentality is not its logic but *its general sentiment of life.*

Primitive man does not look at nature with the eyes of a naturalist who wishes to classify things in order to satisfy an intellectual curiosity. He does not approach it with merely pragmatic or technical interest. It is for him neither a mere object of knowledge nor the field of his immediate practical needs. We are in the habit of dividing our life into the two spheres of practical and theoretical activity. In this division we are prone to forget that there is a lower stratum beneath them both.

Primitive man is not liable to such forgetfulness. All his thoughts and his feelings are still embedded in this lower original stratum. *His view of nature is neither merely theoretical nor merely practical; it is sympathetic. If we miss this point, we cannot find the approach to the mythical world.*

The most fundamental feature of myth is not a special direction of thought or a special direction of human imagination. Myth is an offspring of emotion and its emotional background imbues all its productions with its own specific color. Primitive man by no means lacks the ability to grasp the empirical differences of things. But in his conception of nature and life all these differences are obliterated by a stronger feeling: the deep conviction of a fundamental and indelible solidarity of life that bridges over the multiplicity and variety of its single forms. He does not ascribe to himself a unique and privileged place in the scale of nature...

The feeling of the indestructible unity of life is so strong and unshakable as to deny and to defy the fact of death. In primitive thought death is never regarded as a natural phenomenon that obeys general laws. Its occurrence is not “necessary but accidental. It always depends upon individual and fortuitous causes. It is the work of witchcraft or magic or some other personal inimical influence.

In their description of the aboriginal tribes of Australia Spencer and Gillen point out that no such thing as natural death is ever realized by the

native. A man who dies has of necessity' been killed by some other man or perhaps even by a woman; and sooner or later that man or woman will be attacked. "Death has not always been it came into being by a particular event, by a failure of man or some accident. Many mythical tales are concerned with the origin of death. *The conception that man is mortal, by his nature and essence, seems to be entirely alien to mythical and primitive religious thought*".

In this regard there is a striking difference between the mythical belief in immortality and all the later forms of a pure philosophical belief. If we read Plato's *Phaedo* we feel the whole effort of philosophical thought to give clear and irrefutable proof of the immortality of the human soul. In mythical thought the case is quite different. Here the burden of proof always lies on the opposite side. If anything is in need of proof, it is not the fact of immortality but the fact of death. *And myth and primitive religion never admit these proofs. They emphatically deny the very possibility of death. In a certain sense the whole of mythical thought may be interpreted as a constant and obstinate negation of the phenomenon of death...*

There is no radical difference in this respect between mythical and religious thought. Both of them originate in the same fundamental phenomena of human life. *In the development of human culture we cannot fix a point where myth ends or religion begins.* In the whole course of its history religion remains indissolubly connected and penetrated with mythical elements. On the other hand myth, even in its crudest and most rudimentary forms, contains some motives that in a sense anticipate the higher and later religious ideals. Myth is from its very beginning potential religion...

In the history of Greek culture we find a period in which the old gods, the gods of Homer and Hesiod, began to decline. The popular conceptions of these gods are vigorously attacked. *There arises a new religious ideal formed by individual men.* The great poets and the great thinkers-Aeschylus and Euripides, Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras-create new intellectual and moral standards. When measured by these standards the Homeric gods lose their authority. Their anthropomorphic character is clearly seen and severely criticized.

Nevertheless, this anthropomorphism of Greek popular religion was by no means devoid of a positive value and- significance. The humanization of the gods was an indispensable step in the evolution of religious thought. In many local Greek cults we still find definite traces of animal worship and even totemistic creeds...

The general feeling of the solidarity of life gave way to a new and stronger motive-to the specific sense of man's individuality. There was no longer a natural kinship, a consanguinity that connects man with plants or animals. In his personal gods man began to see his own personality in a new light. This progress is clearly to be felt in the development of the highest god, of the Olympian Zeus. Even Zeus is a god of nature, a god worshiped on the mountain tops, holding sway over the clouds, the rain, the thunder.

But gradually he assumes new shape. In Aeschylus *he has become the expression of the highest ethical ideals, the guardian and protector of justice...*

In this progress of religious thought, we become cognizant of the awakening of a new strength and a new activity of the human mind. *Philosophers and anthropologists have often told us that the true and ultimate source of religion is man's feeling of dependency. According to Schleiermacher religion has arisen from "the feeling of absolute dependence on the Divine"...*

The relation between magic and religion is one of the most obscure and most controversial subjects. Philosophical anthropologists have over and over again attempted to clarify this question. But their theories are widely divergent and often in flagrant contradiction with each other. It is natural to desire a clear-cut definition that would enable us to trace a sharp line of demarcation between magic and religion.

Theoretically speaking, we are convinced that they cannot mean the same, thing and we are loath to trace them to a common origin. *We think of religion as the symbolic expression of our highest moral ideals; we think of magic as a crude aggregate of superstitions. Religious belief seems to become mere superstitious credulity if we admit any relationship with magic.* On the other hand the character of our anthropological and ethno-graphical material makes it extremely difficult to separate the two

fields. The attempts made in this direction have become more and more questionable. *It seems to be one of the postulates of modern anthropology that there is complete continuity between magic and religion.*

Frazer was one of the first to try to prove that *even from an anthropological point of view magic and religion cannot be subsumed under a common heading.* According to him they are entirely different in psychological origin and they tend to opposite aims. The failure and breakdown of magic paved the way to religion. Magic had to collapse that religion might arise. Man saw that he had taken for causes what were no causes, and that all his efforts to work by means of these imaginary causes had been vain. His painful toil had been wasted, his curious ingenuity had been squandered to no purpose...

This distinction, however, seems to be rather artificial both from a systematic point of view and from that of the ethnological facts. *We have no empirical evidence at all that there ever an age of magic that has been followed and superseded by an age of religion.* And even the psychological analysis, on which this distinction between the two ages is based, is questionable. Frazer regards magic as the offspring of a theoretical or scientific activity, as a result of the curiosity of man. This curiosity inquired man to inquire into the causes of things; but since he was unable to discover the real causes he had to satisfy himself with fictitious causes. Religion, on the other hand, has no theoretical aims; *it is an expression of ethical ideals.* But both of these views seem to be untenable if we look at the facts of primitive religion.

From the first religion had to fulfill a theoretical and a practical function. *It contains a cosmology and an anthropology; it answers the question of the origin of the world and the origin of human society. And from this origin it derives man's duties and obligations. These two aspects are not sharply distinguished; they are combined and fused together in that fundamental feeling that we have tried to describe as the feeling of the solidarity of life. Here we find a common source of magic and religion.* Magic is not a kind of science – a pseudo-science. Nor is it to be derived from that principle which in modern psychoanalysis has been described as the “omnipotence of thought”.

Neither the mere wish to know nor the mere wish to possess and to master nature can account for the facts of magic. Frazer makes a sharp

distinction between two forms of magic that he designates as “imitative magic” and “sympathetic magic”. But all magic is “sympathetic” in its origin and in its significance; for man would not think of coming into a magical contact with nature if he had not the conviction that there is a common bond that unites all things – that the separation between himself and nature and between the different kinds of natural objects is, after all, an artificial, not a real one...

*The belief in the “sympathy of the Whole” is one of the firmest foundations of religion itself. But religious sympathy is of a different kind from the mythical and magical. It gives scope for a new feeling, that of individuality. Yet we appear to be confronted here with one of the fundamental antinomies of religious thought. Individuality seems to be a negation or at least a restriction of that universality of feeling that is postulated by religion: *omnis determinatio est negatio*¹³. It means finite existence – and as long as we do not break the barriers of this finite existence we cannot grasp the infinite. It was this difficulty and this riddle that had to be solved by the progress of religious thought. We can follow this progress in a threefold direction.*

We can describe it in its psychological, its sociological, and its ethical implications. The development of the individual, the social, the moral consciousness tends to the same point. It shows a progressive differentiation that finally leads to a new integration. The conceptions of primitive religions are much vaguer and more indeterminate than our own conceptions and ideals. The *mana* of the Polynesians, like the corresponding conceptions that we find in other parts of the world, shows this vague and fluctuating character.

It has no individuality, either subjective or objective. It is conceived as, a common mysterious stuff that permeates all things. According to the definition of Codrington, who was the first to describe the concept of *mana*, it is power of influence, not physical, and in a way super-natural; but it shows itself in physical force, or in any kind of power or excellence which a “man possesses”. It may be the attribute of a soul or spirit; but it is not in itself a spirit — it is not an animistic but a pre-animistic conception. It is to be found in all things whatsoever regardless of their special nature and their generic distinction. A stone which attracts

¹³ This is a Latin saying that means: “every definition is a negation”.

attention by its size or its singular shape is filled with *mana* and will exert magical powers. It is not bound up with a special subject; the *mana* of a man may be stolen from him and transferred to a new possessor. We can distinguish in it no individual features, no personal identity. One of the first and most important functions of all the higher religions were to discover and to reveal such personal elements in was called the Holy, the Sacred, the Divine.

But in order to attain this end religious thought had to come a long way. *Man could not give his gods a definite individual shape before he had found a new principle of differentiation in his own existence and in his social life. He found this principle not in abstract thought but in his work. It was in fact the division of labor that introduced a new era of religious thought.* Long before the appearance of the personal gods we meet with those gods that have been called functional gods. They are not as yet the personal gods of Greek religion, the Olympian gods of Homer. On the other hand they no longer have the vagueness of the primitive mythical conceptions. They are concrete beings; but they are concrete in their actions, not in their personal appearance or existence. They have, therefore, no proper names – like Zeus, Hera, Apollo – but adjectival names that characterize their special function or activity. In many cases they are bound up with a special place; they are local, not general gods. If we wish to understand the true character of these functional gods and the role they play in the development of religious thought we must look at Roman religion...

It is quite a different aspect of the Divine which we meet with in the great monotheistic religions. *These religions are the offspring of moral forces; they concentrate upon a singlet point, upon the problem of good and evil.* In the religion of Zoroaster there is only one Supreme Being Ahura Mazda, the “Vise lord”. Beyond him, apart from him, and without him nothing exists. *He is the first and foremost, the most perfect being, the absolute sovereign. Here we find no individualization, no plurality of gods that are the representatives of different natural powers or different mental qualities. Primitive mythology is attacked and overcome by a new force, a purely ethical force.* In the first conceptions of the holy, the supernatural, such a force is entirely unknown...

From its very beginnings the religion of Zoroaster is radically opposed to this mythical indifference or to that aesthetic indifference which is characteristic of Greek polytheism. *This religion is not a product of mythical or aesthetic imagination; it is the expression of a great personal moral will, even nature assumes a new shape, for it is seen exclusively in the mirror of ethical life...*

Without the great creative spirits, without the prophets that felt themselves inspired by the power of God and destined to reveal his will, religion would not have found its way. But even these individual powers could not change its fundamentally social character. They could not create a new religion out of nothing. The great individual religious reformers were not living in empty space, in the space of their own religious experience and inspiration.

By a thousand bonds they were tied to their social environment. It is not by a sort of revolt that mankind passes from moral obligation to religious freedom. Even Bergson admits that, historically speaking, the mystic spirit that he thinks to be the spirit of true religion is no break in continuity. Mysticism reveals to us, or rather would reveal to us if we actually willed it, a marvelous prospect; but we do not, and in most cases we could not, will it; we should collapse under the strain.

Therefore, we remain with a mixed religion. In history we find interposed transitions between two things which are as a matter of fact radically different in nature and which, at first sight, we can hardly believe deserve the same name. *For the philosopher, for the metaphysician* these two forms of religion always remain antagonistic. He cannot derive them from, the same origin, for they are expressions of totally different forces. *One is entirely based on instinct; it is the instinct of life that has created the myth-making function. But religion does not arise from instinct nor from intelligence or reason. It does not mean the complete destruction of the first and fundamental characteristics of mythical thought.* If the great individual religious reformers wished to be heard and understood they had to speak not only the language of God but the language of man. But the great prophets of Israel no longer spoke merely to their own nations. Their God was a god of Justice and His message was not restricted to a special group. The prophets predicted a new heaven and a new earth. *What is really new is not the contents of this prophetic religion but its*

inner tendency, its ethical meaning. One of the greatest miracles that all the higher religions had to perform was to develop their new character; their ethical and religious interpretation of life, out of the crude raw material of the most primitive conceptions, the grossest superstitions.

There is perhaps no better example of this transformation than the development of the concept of *taboo*. There are many stages of human civilization in which we find no definite ideas of divine powers and no definite animism – no theory of the human soul. But there seems to be no society, however primitive, that has not developed a system of *taboo* – and in most cases this system has a very complex structure. *In the Polynesian islands from which the term “taboo” is derived the name stands for the whole system of religion.* And we find many primitive societies, in which the only offense known is taboo breaking. In the elementary stages of human civilization the term covers the whole field of religion and morality. In this sense many historians of religion have ascribed to the *taboo* system a very high value. In spite of its obvious defects it was declared to be the first and indispensable germ of a higher cultural life; it was even said to be an a priori principle of moral and religious thought...

From: Cassirer E. (1944), *An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture*, Yale&New Haven, Pp. 97-135.

Søren Kierkegaard (Johannes De Silentio)
Fear and Trembling

1843

(Translated by Walter Lowrie, 1941)

Fear and Trembling

Problem II.

Is there such a thing as an absolute duty toward God? The ethical is the universal, and as such it is again the divine. One has therefore a right to say that fundamentally every duty is a duty toward God; but if one cannot say more, then one affirms at the same time that properly I have no duty toward God. Duty becomes duty by being referred to God,

but in duty itself I do not come into relation with God. Thus it is a duty to love one's neighbor, but in performing this duty I do not come into relation with God but with the neighbor whom I love. If I say then in this connection that it is my duty to love God, I am really uttering only a tautology, inasmuch as "God" is in this instance used in an entirely abstract sense as the divine, i.e. the universal, i.e. duty. So, the whole existence of the human race is rounded off completely like a sphere, and the ethical is at once its limit and its content.

God becomes an invisible vanishing point, a powerless thought, His power being only in the ethical which is the content of existence. If in any way it might occur to any man to want to love God in any other sense than that here indicated, he is romantic, he loves a phantom which, if it had merely the power of being able to speak, would say to him, "I do not require your love. Stay where you belong." If in any way it might occur to a man to want to love God otherwise, this love would be open to suspicion... So in case what has been expounded here is correct, in case there is no incommensurability in a human life, and what there is of the incommensurable is only such by an accident from which no consequences can be drawn, in so far as existence is regarded in terms of the idea, Hegel is right; but he is not right in talking about faith or in allowing Abraham to be regarded as the father of it; for by the latter he has pronounced judgment both upon Abraham and upon faith...

Faith, on the contrary, is the paradox... In the ethical way of regarding life it is therefore the task of the individual to divest himself of the inward determinants and express them in an outward way. Whenever he shrinks from this, whenever he is inclined to persist in or to slip back again into the inward determinants of feeling, mood, etc., he sins, he is in a temptation (Anfechtung).

The paradox of faith is this, that there is an inwardness which is incommensurable for the outward, an inwardness, be it observed, which is not identical with the first but is a new inwardness. This must not be overlooked. Modern philosophy has permitted itself without further ado to substitute in place of "faith" the immediate. When one does that, it is ridiculous to deny that faith has existed in all ages. In that way faith comes into rather simple company along with feeling, mood, idiosyncrasy, vapors, etc. To this extent philosophy may be right in saying that one ought not to stop there. But there is nothing to justify

philosophy in using this phrase with regard to faith. Before faith there goes a movement of infinity, and only then, by virtue of the absurd, faith enters upon the scene. This I can well understand without maintaining on that account that I have faith. If faith is nothing but what philosophy makes it out to be, then Socrates already went further, much further, whereas the contrary is true, that he never reached it. In an intellectual respect he made the movement of infinity.

... The paradox of faith is this, that the individual is higher than the universal, that the individual (to recall a dogmatic distinction now rather seldom heard) determines his relation to the universal by his relation to the absolute, not his relation to the absolute by his relation to the universal. *The paradox can also be expressed by saying that there is an absolute duty toward God; for in this relationship of duty the individual as an individual stands related absolutely to the absolute.* So, when in this connection it is said that it is a duty to love God, something different is said from that in the foregoing; for if this duty is absolute, the ethical is reduced to a position of relativity.

From this, however, it does not follow that the ethical is to be abolished, but it acquires an entirely different expression, the paradoxical expression – that, for example, love to God may cause *the knight of faith*... This paradox does not permit of mediation, for it is founded precisely upon the fact that the individual is only the individual. As soon as this individual [who is aware of a direct command from God] wishes to express his absolute duty in [terms of] the universal [i.e. the ethical, and] is sure of his duty in that [i.e. the universal or ethical precept], he recognizes that he is in temptation [i.e. a trial of faith], and, if in fact he resists [the direct indication of God's will], he ends by not fulfilling the absolute duty so called [i.e. what here has been called the absolute duty]; and, if he doesn't do this, [i.e. doesn't put up a resistance to the direct intimation of God's will], he sins, even though realer his deed were that which it was his absolute duty to do.

So, what should Abraham do? If he would say to another person, "Isaac I love more dearly than everything in the world, and hence it is so hard for me to sacrifice him"; then surely the other would have shaken his head and said, "Why will you sacrifice him then?" – or if the other had been a sly fellow, he surely would have seen through Abraham and

perceived that he was making a show of feelings which were in strident contradiction to his act.

In the story of Abraham, we find such a paradox. His relation to Isaac, ethically expressed, is this, that the father should love the son. This ethical relation is reduced to a relative position in contrast with the absolute relation to God. To the question, “Why?” Abraham has no answer except that it is a trial, a temptation (Fristelse) – terms which, as was remarked...

Thus, when we see a man do something which does not comport with the universal, we say that he scarcely can be doing it for God’s sake, and by that we imply that he does it for his own sake. The paradox of faith has lost the intermediate term, i.e. the universal. *On the one side it has the expression for the extremest egoism (doing the dreadful thing it does for one’s own sake); on the other side the expression for the most absolute self-sacrifice (doing it for God’s sake). Faith itself cannot be mediated into the universal, for it would thereby be destroyed.*

Faith is this paradox, and the individual absolutely cannot make himself intelligible to anybody. People imagine maybe that the individual can make himself intelligible to another individual in the same case. Such a notion would be unthinkable if in our time people did not in so many ways seek to creep slyly into greatness. The one *knight of faith* can render no aid to the other. Either the individual becomes a knight of faith by assuming the burden of the paradox, or he never becomes one. In these regions partnership is unthinkable. Every more precise explication of what is to be understood by Isaac the individual can give only to himself. And even if one were able, generally speaking, to define ever so precisely what should be intended by Isaac (which moreover would be the most ludicrous self-contradiction, i.e. that the particular individual who definitely stands outside the universal is subsumed under universal categories precisely when he has to act as the individual who stands outside the universal), the individual nevertheless will never be able to assure himself by the aid of others that this application is appropriate, but he can do so only by himself as the individual.

Hence even if a man were cowardly and paltry enough to wish to become a knight of faith on the responsibility of an outsider, he will never become one; for only the individual becomes a knight of faith as

the particular individual, and this is the greatness of this knighthood, as I can well understand without entering the order, since I lack courage; but this is also its terror, as I can comprehend even better.

In Luke 14:26, as everybody knows, there is a striking doctrine taught about the absolute duty toward God: "*If any man cometh unto me and hated not his own father and mother and wife and children and brethren and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple.*" This is a hard saying, who can bear to hear it? For this reason, it is heard very seldom. This silence, however, is only an evasion which is of no avail...

One must at all events be honest enough to acknowledge what stands written and to admit that *it is great, even though one has not the courage for it*. He who behaves thus will not find himself excluded from having part in that beautiful story which follows, for after all it contains consolation of a sort for the man who had not courage to begin the tower. But we must be honest, and not interpret this lack of courage as humility, since it is really pride, whereas the courage of faith is the only humble courage.

One can easily perceive that if there is to be any sense in this passage, it must be understood literally. *God it is who requires absolute love*. But he who in demanding a person's love thinks that this love should be proved also by becoming lukewarm to everything which hitherto was dear – that man is not only an egoist but stupid as well, and he who would demand such love signs at the same moment his own death-warrant, supposing that his life was bound up with this coveted love.

Thus, a husband demands that his wife shall leave father and mother, but if he were to regard it as a proof of her extraordinary love for him that she for his sake became an indolent, lukewarm daughter etc., then he is the stupidest of the stupid. If he had any notion of what love is, he would wish to discover that as daughter and sister she was perfect in love, and would see therein the proof that she would love him more than anyone else in the realm. What therefore in the case of a man one would regard as a sign of egoism and stupidity, that one is to regard by the help of an exegete as a worthy conception of the Deity.

But how hate them? I will not recall here the human distinction between loving and hating – not because I have much to object to in it

(for after all it is passionate), but because it is egoistic and is not in place here. However, if I regard the problem as a paradox, then I understand it, that is, I understand it in such a way as one can understand a paradox. *The absolute duty may cause one to do what ethics would forbid, but by no means can it cause the knight of faith to cease to love. This is shown by Abraham. The instant he is ready to sacrifice Isaac the ethical expression for what he does is this: he hates Isaac. But if he really hates Isaac, he can be sure that God does not require this, for Cain and Abraham are not identical. Isaac he must love with his whole soul; when God requires Isaac he must love him if possible even more dearly, and only on this condition can he sacrifice him; for in fact it is this love for Isaac which, by its paradoxical opposition to his love for God, makes his act a sacrifice. But the distress and dread in this paradox is that, humanly speaking, he is entirely unable to make himself intelligible. Only at the moment when his act is in absolute contradiction to his feeling is his act a sacrifice, but the reality of his act is the factor by which he belongs to the universal, and in that aspect he is and remains a murderer.*

Moreover, the passage in Luke must be understood in such a way as to make it clearly evident that the knight of faith has no higher expression of the universal (i.e. the ethical) by which he can save himself. Thus, for example, if we suppose that the Church requires such a sacrifice of one of its members, we have in this case only a tragic hero. *For the idea of the Church is not qualitatively different from that of the State, in so far as the individual comes into it by a simple mediation, and in so far as the individual comes into the paradox he does not reach the idea of the Church; he does not come out of the paradox, but in it he must find either his blessedness or his perdition. . . . On the other hand, he is not a knight of faith, and he has also a different answer from that of Abraham: he does not say that it is a trial or a temptation in which he is tested.*

People commonly refrain from quoting such a text as this in Luke. They are afraid of giving men a free rein, are afraid that the worst will happen as soon as the individual takes it into his head to comport himself as the individual. Moreover, they think that to exist as the individual is the easiest thing of all, and that therefore people have to be compelled to become the universal. I cannot share either this fear or this opinion, and both for the same reason. *He who has learned that to exist as the individual is the most terrible thing of all will not be fearful of saying*

that it is great, but then too he will say this in such a way that his words will scarcely be a snare for the bewildered man, but rather will help him into the universal, even though his words do to some extent make room for the great...

Let us consider a little more closely *the distress and dread in the paradox of faith*. The tragic hero renounces himself in order to express the universal, the knight of faith renounces the universal in order to become the individual. As has been said, everything depends upon how one is placed. He who believes that it is easy enough to be the individual can always be sure that he is not a knight of faith, for vagabonds and roving geniuses are not men of faith. The knight of faith knows, on the other hand, that it is glorious to belong to the universal. He knows that it is beautiful and salutary to be the individual who translates himself into the universal, who edits as it were a pure and elegant edition of himself, as free from errors as possible and which everyone can read. He knows that it is refreshing to become intelligible to oneself in the universal so that he understands it and so that every individual *who understands him understands through him in turn the universal, and both rejoice in the security of the universal*. He knows that it is beautiful to be born as the individual who has the universal as his home, his friendly abiding-place, which at once welcomes him with open arms when he would tarry in it. *But he knows also that higher than this there winds a solitary path, narrow and steep; he knows that it is terrible to be born outside the universal, to walk without meeting a single traveler.*

He knows very well where he is and how he is related to men. *Humanly speaking, he is crazy and cannot make himself intelligible to anyone.* And yet it is the mildest expression, to say that he is crazy. If he is not supposed to be that, then he is a hypocrite, and the higher he climbs on this path, the more dreadful a hypocrite he is. The knight of faith knows that to give up oneself for the universal inspires enthusiasm, and that it requires courage, but he also knows that security is to be found in this, precisely because it is for the universal. He knows that it is glorious to be understood by every noble mind, so glorious that the beholder is ennobled by it, and he feels as if he were bound; he could wish it were this task that had been allotted to him. Thus Abraham could surely have wished now and then that the task were to love Isaac as becomes a father, in a way intelligible to all, memorable throughout all ages; he could

wish that the task were to sacrifice Isaac for the universal, that he might incite the fathers to illustrious deeds – and he is almost terrified by the thought that for him such wishes are only temptations and must be dealt with as such, for he knows that it is a solitary path he treads and that he accomplishes nothing for the universal but only himself is tried and examined. Or what did Abraham accomplish for the universal? *Let me speak humanly about it, quite humanly. He spent seventy years in getting a son of his old age. What other men get quickly enough and enjoy for a long time he spent seventy years in accomplishing. And why? Because he was tried and put to the test. Is not that crazy?*

But Abraham believed, and Sarah wavered and got him to take Hagar as a concubine – but therefore he also had to drive her away. He gets Isaac, then he has to be tried again. He knew that it is glorious to express the universal, glorious to live with Isaac. But this is not the task... Who can bear it? Would not his contemporary age, if we can speak of such a thing, have said of him, “Abraham is eternally procrastinating. Finally, he gets a son. That took long enough. Now he wants to sacrifice him. So, is he not mad? And if at least he could explain why he wants to do it – but he always says that it is a trial”. Nor could Abraham explain more, for his life is like a book placed under a divine attachment and which never becomes public juris.

This is the terrible thing. He who does not see it can always be sure that he is no knight of faith, but he who sees it will not deny that even the most tried of tragic heroes walks with a dancing step compared with the knight of faith, who comes slowly creeping forward. And if he has perceived this and assured himself that he has not courage to understand it, he will at least have a presentiment of the marvelous glory this knight attains in the fact that he becomes God’s intimate acquaintance, the Lord’s friend, and (to speak quite humanly) that he says “Thou” to God in heaven, whereas even the tragic hero only addresses Him in the third person.

The tragic hero is soon ready and has soon finished the fight, he makes the infinite movement and then is secure in the universal. The knight of faith, on the other hand, is kept sleepless, for he is constantly tried, and every instant there is the possibility of being able to return repentantly to the universal, and this possibility can just as well be a temptation as the truth. He can derive evidence from no man which it

is, for with that query he is outside the paradox. So, the *knight of faith* has first and foremost the requisite passion to concentrate upon a single factor the whole of the ethical which he transgresses, so that he can give himself the assurance that he really loves Isaac with his whole soul. I would elucidate yet once more the difference between the collisions which are encountered by the tragic hero and by the knight of faith. The tragic hero assures himself that the ethical obligation [i.e., the lower ethical obligation, which he puts aside for the higher in the present case, accordingly, it is the obligation to spare his daughter's life] is totally present in him by the fact that he transforms it into a wish...

Thus, Agamemnon can say, "The proof that I do not offend against my parental duty is that my duty is my only wish". So here we have wish and duty face to face with If he cannot do that, he is in temptation (Anfechtung). In the next place, he has enough passion to make this assurance available in the twinkling of an eye and in such a way that it is as completely valid as it was in the first instance. If he is unable to do this, he can never budge from the spot, for he constantly has to begin all over again. The tragic hero also concentrated in one factor the ethical which he teleologically surpassed, but in this respect he had support in the universal. The knight of faith has only himself alone, and this constitutes the dreadfulness of the situation. Most men live in such a way under an ethical obligation that they can let the sorrow be sufficient for the day, but they never reach this passionate concentration, this energetic consciousness. The universal may in a certain sense help the tragic hero to attain this, but the knight of faith is left all to himself. The hero does the deed and finds repose in the universal, the knight of faith is kept in constant tension...

Whether the individual is in temptation (Anfechtung) or is a knight of faith only the individual can decide. Nevertheless, it is possible to construct from the paradox several criteria which he too can understand who is not within the paradox. The true knight of faith is always absolute isolation, the false knight is sectarian. This sectarianism is an attempt to leap away from one another. The fortunate chance in life is that the two correspond, that my wish is my duty and vice versa, and the task of most men in life is precisely to remain within their duty and by their enthusiasm to transform it into their wish. The tragic hero gives up his

wish in order to accomplish his duty. For the knight of faith wish and duty are also identical, but he is required to give up both. Therefore, when he would resign himself to giving up his wish he does not find repose, for that is after all his duty. If he would remain within his duty and his wish, he is not a knight of faith, for the absolute duty requires precisely that he should give them up. The tragic hero apprehended a higher expression of duty but not an absolute duty. Preliminary expectation the narrow path of the paradox and become a tragic hero at a cheap price. The tragic hero expresses the universal and sacrifices himself for it. The sectarian punchinello, instead of that, has a private theatre, i.e. several good friends and comrades who represent the universal just about as well as the beadles in *The Golden Snuffbox* represent justice. The knight of faith, on the contrary, is the paradox, is the individual, absolutely nothing but the individual, without connections or pretensions. This is the terrible thing which the sectarian manikin cannot endure. For instead of learning from this terror that he is not capable of performing the great deed and then plainly admitting it (an act which I cannot but approve, because it is what I do) the manikin thinks that by uniting with several other manikins he will be able to do it. But that is quite out of the question. In the world of spirit, no swindling is tolerated. A dozen sectaries join arms with one another, they know nothing whatever of the lonely temptations which await the knight of faith and which he dares not shun precisely because it would be still more dreadful if he were to press forward presumptuously. The sectaries deafen one another by their noise and racket, hold the dread off by their shrieks, and such a hallooing company of sportsmen think they are storming heaven and think they are on the same path as the knight of faith who in the solitude of the universe never hears any human voice but walks alone with his dreadful responsibility.

The knight of faith is obliged to rely upon himself alone, he feels the pain of not being able to make himself intelligible to others, but he feels no vain desire to guide others. The pain is his assurance that he is in the right way, this vain desire he does not know, he is too serious for that. The false knight of faith readily betrays himself by this proficiency in guiding which he has acquired in an instant. He does not comprehend what it is all about, that if another individual is to take the same path, he must become entirely in the same way the individual and have no need of any man's guidance, least of all the guidance of a man who

would obtrude himself. At this point men leap aside, they cannot bear the martyrdom of being uncomprehend, and instead of this they choose conveniently enough the worldly admiration of their proficiency.

The true knight of faith is a witness, never a teacher, and therein lies his deep humanity, which is worth a good deal more than this silly participation in others' weal and woe which is honored by the name of sympathy, whereas in fact it is nothing but vanity. He who would only be a witness thereby avows that no man, not even the lowliest, needs another man's sympathy or should be abased that another may be exalted. But since he did not win what he won at a cheap price, neither does he sell it out at a cheap price, he is not petty enough to take men's admiration and give them in return his silent contempt, he knows that what is truly great is equally accessible to all.

Either there is an absolute duty toward God, and if so it is the paradox here described, that the individual as the individual is higher than the universal and as the individual stands in an absolute relation to the absolute/or else faith never existed, because it has always existed, or, to put it differently, Abraham is lost, or one must explain the passage in the fourteenth chapter of Luke as did that tasteful exegete, and explain in the same way the corresponding passages and similar ones.

**From: *Søren Kierkegaard (Johannes De Silentio)*
Fear and Trembling (1941),
[Translated by Walter Lowrie].**

Regarding seminar 2. Historical Development of Western Classical Philosophy.

Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling
THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART

Part I.

General Section of the Philosophy of Art

Chapter 1.

Construction of Art as Such and in General

§27. *Particular things, to the extent they are absolute in that particularity, and thus to the extent they as particulars are simultaneously universes, are called ideas.*

This proposition is merely an *explication* and is thus in no need of proof, though one could demonstrate that even the first author of the doctrine of ideas understood the same thing by this even if he did not explain it in just *this* way.

Elucidation. Every idea is — universe in the form of the particular. For just this reason, however, it is not real as this particular. The real is always only the universe itself. Every idea has two unities: the one through which it exists *within itself and is absolute* — hence the one through which the absolute is formed into the particularity of the idea — and the one through which it is taken up as a particular into the absolute as into its own center. This double unity of every idea is actually the mystery by which the particular can be comprehended both within the absolute and, in spite of this, also as a particular.

§28. *These same syntheses of the universal and particular that viewed in themselves are ideas, that is, images of the divine, are, if viewed on the plane of the real, the **gods**, for their essence, their essential nature, — god. They are ideas only to the extent that they are god in a particular form. Every idea, therefore, — god, but a particular god.*

Annotation. This proposition needs no explanation, particularly since what follows will serve to illuminate it further. The idea of the gods is necessary for art. Our systematic construction of art leads us back precisely to the point to which instinct first led poesy at its inception. What ideas are for philosophy, the gods are for art, end *vice versa*.

§29. *The absolute reality of the gods follows directly from their absolute ideality*, for they are absolute, and within the absolute, ideality and reality are one, absolute possibility — absolute actuality. The highest identity is at once the highest objectivity.

Anyone who has not yet elevated himself to the level upon which the absolutely ideal is also immediately the absolutely real for him, possesses neither philosophical nor poetic sensibility. The question posed by ordinary consciousness concerning reality is of no significance regarding what is absolute, neither in a poetic nor in a philosophical sense. This *common* reality is no true reality at all but is rather in the true sense nonreality. All figures and forms in art, and thus particularly the gods, are *actual* because they are *possible*. Anyone who is still able to ask how such highly cultivated spirits as the Greeks were able to believe in the reality or actuality of the gods, how Socrates was able to direct sacrifices, how the Socratic Xenophon as an army officer during the famous retreat was himself able to offer up sacrifices, and so forth — the person posing such questions proves only that he himself has not yet arrived at that stage of cultivation at which precisely the *ideal* is the real and is much more real than the so-called real itself. The Greeks did not at all take the gods to be real in the sense, for example, that common understanding believes in the reality of physical objects; from that perspective the Greeks considered the gods to be neither real nor unreal. In the higher sense they were more real for the Greeks than every other reality...

§31. *The world of the gods is the object neither of mere understanding nor of reason, but rather can be comprehended by only fantasy.*

It is not an object of understanding, since understanding remains bound to limitation; nor is it one of reason, since even in scientific or systematic thinking reason can portray or present the synthesis of the absolute with limitation only ideally (archetypally). Hence, it is the object only of fantasy, which presents this synthesis in images.

Explication. I define creative imagination in relation to fantasy as that in which the productions of art are received and formed, fantasy as that which intuits them externally, casts them out from within itself, as it were, and to that extent also portrays them. The relationship is the same as that between reason and intellectual intuition. Ideas are formed within

reason and, in a sense, from the material of reason; intellectual intuition is that which presents them internally. Fantasy is thus the intellectual intuition within art.

§32. *The gods are in themselves neither moral nor immoral, but rather are freed from this relationship and are absolutely blessed.* (One must necessarily keep this in mind in order to comprehend the appropriate angle of vision particularly for the poetry of Homer. We all know how much has been said concerning the immorality of his gods, from which some critics have even tried to prove the superiority of modern poesy. The following discussion, however, shows that this standard of measurement cannot be applied to these higher beings of fantasy.)

Proof. Morality and immorality are based on disunion inasmuch as morality is nothing more than the taking up of the finite into the infinite in action. Wherever both are one to the point of absolute indifference, however, the former — and accordingly, morality — is eliminated along with its opposite. Immorality thus expresses itself in the Homeric figures for just that reason not as immorality, but rather only as pure limitation. Those figures act completely within this limitation and are divine only insofar as they do act within those parameters; only in this way is the infinite truly one with the element of limitation within them. They are to be viewed as beings of a higher nature. Within their own limitations they act with both the same freedom and the same necessity as does every natural creature within its own limitation. They act *with freedom*, since it is their nature to act thus and they know no other law than their own nature. They act with *necessity* for the same reason, since their actions are prescribed to them by their own nature. In their immorality, the Homeric gods are therefore merely naive and truly neither moral nor immoral, but rather are completely freed from this contrast.

We can also express the same proposition in the following way: *The gods are absolutely blessed.* No other attribute is applied to them more frequently. Their lives constitute the perpetual antithesis of human life, which is full of toil and discord and is subjected to illness and age. In Sophocles, too, the aged Oedipus says to Theseus: “Kind son of Aegaeus, to the gods alone comes never old age or death, but all else is confounded by all-mastering time. Earth’s strength decays, and the strength of the body; faith dies, distrust is born”... For precisely that

reason, the gods, in whose nature both unities are united, do not live a dependent, determined life, but rather a free and independent one. *As particular* beings they nonetheless enjoy the blessedness of the absolute, and vice versa (to strive toward blessedness — to strive as a particular to partake of absoluteness). This is a relationship for which perhaps only the cosmic bodies, as the first physical symbols of the gods, can serve as an example, since they are simultaneously as particulars nonetheless absolute — within themselves — and on the other hand in that absoluteness nonetheless *particular*. Accordingly, they are both outside of and in their own centers. To the extent, then, that both unities in their absoluteness include one another within themselves — since the particular cannot be absolute without, for the same reason, also being in the absolute — and to the extent that from this perspective blessedness and morality are actually one and the same, one can also assert that the gods are absolutely moral precisely because they are absolutely blessed.

§33. *The basic law of all portrayals of the gods is the law of beauty, for beauty is the absolute intuited in reality.* Now, since the gods are the *absolute itself intuited actually* (or synthesized with limitation) within the particular, their basic law of portrayal is that of beauty.

One might object that precisely because the gods are limited, they are not absolutely beautiful. I, however, would rather assert the reverse, namely, that the absolute cannot be beautiful at all except as intuited within limitation, that is, within the particular. The complete removal of all limitation is either the complete negation of all form (this is only the case, however, where the negation of form is at the same time absolute form, as is the case in the beauty of the sublime — something we will discuss later), or thoroughgoing mutual restriction, that is, reduction to nullity. The former kind of beauty is found, for example, in the dignified and sublime figure of Jupiter, which is the same kind of expression of wisdom and power without boundary as in Juno, who is the pure expression of power without loss of beauty. These limitations are thus merely that which for now we will call the various modes of beauty, since we can present that particular investigation successfully only when we speak about the different forms of the plastic arts.

One might, however, lodge an objection with evidence based on Greek mythology itself: Vulcan, the various forms of Pan, of Silenus, of

the fauns, satyrs, and so on. As regards the form of Vulcan, it shows us the considerable identity between the formations of the fantasy and those of nature, which creates organically. Just as nature is compelled by the eminent development of one organ or impulse in one type of creature to neglect it somewhat in another, fantasy here has had to extract from Hephaestus's feet — which are lame — what it gave to his powerful arms. As regards the ugly forms within Greek mythology in general, however, all of these are in their own turn also ideals, albeit *reverse ideals*, and as such are included in the realm of the beautiful. Yet even this merely anticipates our explication. As regards Vulcan himself, the limitations that in his case culminate in ugliness become for poetry a source of inexhaustible humor and of inextinguishable laughter within the circle of the gods whenever he passes around the cup of nectar.

The beautiful reveals itself eminently as the canon of all concepts of the gods in its alleviation of all that is frightful and terrible by means of the beautiful. The Fates — according to the oldest poetry daughters of the night, according to a later source daughter of Jupiter and Themis — are conceived in sublime beauty not only within the plastic arts; indeed, but the entire conception of fantasy also as regards them suggests this mollification. As servants of unbending necessity, they yet execute the highest office, the steering of all human affairs, as if it were the easiest, lightest work — as a delicate thread that runs through their hands and is then gently severed without the least effort...

§42. *Mythology can be neither the work of an individual person nor of a collectivity nor of the race (to the extent that the latter is merely a composite of individuals), but rather exclusively of the collectivity to the extent that it itself constitutes an individual and is the equal of an individual person.*

It is not the product of an individual, since mythology must possess absolute objectivity and should be a second *world* that cannot be that of the individual. It cannot be the product of a collectivity or of a race to the extent that these are merely a composite of individuals, since in that case it would lack harmonious agreement and congruity. Hence, its possibility necessarily demands a collectivity that is an individual as *one* person. The incomprehensibility this idea may well present to our own age can detract nothing from its truth. It is the highest idea for *all* history as such.

Even nature itself contains analogies and distant allusions to this kind of relationship; the manner in which the formative impulses of animals express themselves is an example, the way in which with several species an entire collectivity acts together, each individual as the whole, and the whole itself as an individual. Such a state of affairs can hardly surprise us in art, particularly since precisely here, at the highest level of production, we see the antithesis of *nature and freedom* enter once more, and since Greek mythology, for example, brings *nature itself back* to us in art, as I will show more specifically later. Yet it is precisely only in art that nature is able to effect such concord between the individual and the species (in action nature asserts her rights, though less obviously, more in the whole than in the individual, and in that individual only for certain moments). In Greek mythology nature has presented us with such a work of one common formative impulse that has been extended to include an entire collectivity. The counterculture to the Greeks — modernity — displays nothing of this sort, though it did indeed instinctively intend something similar in its formation of a universal church.

This state of affairs through which we must understand Greek mythology as having been generated — this unique possession of an entire collectivity by a common formative impulse — can be made completely clear only in its juxtaposition with the origin of modern poetry, something I cannot undertake at this time. Let me recall Wolf's hypothesis concerning Homer in which he asserts that Homer, too, in his original form, was not the work of a single person, but rather of several individuals driven by the same spirit. Wolf as a critic simply views the whole matter too empirically and too narrowly limited to the written work itself that we call Homer — in a word, he views the matter in too subordinated a fashion to present clearly and concretely the quintessence of the matter itself and the universal element residing perhaps in his own conception. I will not contest here the unqualified correctness of Wolf's view of Homer, but I do want, by using this statement, to assert the same for mythology as Wolf does for Homer.

Mythology and Homer are one and the same; Homer was already involved in the first poetic products of mythology and was, as it were, potentially present. Since Homer, if I may put it this way, was already spiritually — archetypally — predetermined, and since the fabric of his own poetry was already interwoven with that of mythology, it is easy

to see how poets from whose songs Homer might be put together were each able to have a hand in the whole, though completely independently of one another, without suspending its harmony or departing from that initial identity. What they were reciting was a poem that was already there, though perhaps not empirically. The origin of mythology and the origin of Homer thus coincide; it is therefore understandable that their respective beginnings were equally hidden even to the earliest Hellenic historians, and that as early a figure as Herodotus conceives the matter one-sidedly, namely, that Homer was the first to relate stories of the gods to the Hellenes.

The ancients themselves designate mythology and — since it is one with Homer — the Homeric poems as the common source of poesy, history, and philosophy. For poesy it is the primal matter from which all else issued, the ocean, to use an image the ancients themselves used, from which all rivers flow out and to which all flow back. Since mythology is nothing other than the archetypal world itself and the initial universal intuition of the universe, it was the foundation for philosophy, and it is easy to show that it determined the entire direction and development of Greek philosophy. The first element that wrested itself away from mythology was the oldest philosophy of nature of the Greeks, which was yet purely realistic until first Anaxagoras (νοῦς), and more fully after him Socrates, introduced the idealistic element. Yet it was also the first source of the ethical part of philosophy...

Chapter 3.

3. Construction of the particular, or of the form of art

... We began with the construction of art as the *real* manifestation or presentation of the absolute. Such presentation could not be designated as real unless it rendered the absolute by means of individual finite things. We reconstructed the synthesis of the absolute with limitation. and the result was the world of ideas of art. Yet as regards the manifestation or presentation of which we are speaking, this world itself is merely content or universal material to which is now juxtaposed the element of form or of the particular.

How does this universal content make the transition into the particularity of form and actually become the true material of a particular work of art?

Referring to the principle presented at the beginning, we already can see that the resolution here will involve synthesizing the two opposing elements and presenting content and form in indifference by means of a new synthesis. The following propositions refer to this process and will begin our construction of the work of art as such.

§62. *The immediately productive element or force of the work of art or of the individual, real thing through which the absolute becomes real-objective in the ideal world, is the eternal concept or idea of man in God, a concept that is one with the soul itself and is united with it.*

Proof. The proof is to be provided on the basis of §23, according to which the formal or absolute cause of all art is God. God, however, produces directly and from within himself only the ideas of things, and produces real or particular things only indirectly or mediately in the reflected world. Hence, to the extent that this principle of divine informing, that is, God himself, becomes objective through particular things, *God* directly and viewed in himself is not that which actually produces particular things, but rather only God as the essence of a particular and in relationship to a particular thing. Now, God is related to the particular, however, only through that wherein it is one with its own universal, that is, through its idea or its eternal concept. In the case under discussion here, this idea is that of the absolute itself. This idea acquires an immediate relationship to a particular or is produced objectively only in the organism or in the faculty of reason, both conceived as one (for only the former is the real reflection, the latter the ideal reflection of the absolute in the real or created world, according to §17 and §18). The indifference of the organism and of reason, however, or the *one* in which the absolute becomes equally real and ideal in its objectivity, is the human being. It is thus God to the extent that he acquires a relationship to the human being by means of an idea or an eternal concept: that is, it is the eternal concept in God of the human being himself through which the work of art is produced. The idea of the human being, however, is nothing other than the *essence* or *essential nature* of the human being himself that becomes objective in the soul and in the body, and which accordingly is directly united with the soul.

Elucidation. All things are in God only through their idea, and this idea becomes objective where in the reflex as well, the unity of the infinite within the finite is produced in the form. Since this is indeed the case in human beings, inasmuch as here the finite — the body — as well as the soul is the entire unity itself, the idea as idea becomes objective here; since it is its essence or nature to produce, it becomes productive in the larger sense.

§63. *This eternal concept of the human being in God as the immediate cause of his productions is that which one calls genius, as it were the daemon, the indwelling element of divinity in human beings. It is, so to speak, a piece of the absoluteness of God. Each artist can thus produce only as much as is united or allied with the eternal concept of his own essence in God. The more within that essence in and for itself the universe is intuited, the more organic he is; the more he links finitude to infinitude, the more productive will he be.*

Elucidations. 1. God produces nothing from within himself that does not in its own turn contain and express his entire essence, and hence nothing that is not productive in its own turn and is itself a universe. This is the state of affairs within the *essential nature* itself. That this productiveness of God that is, the idea as idea, might also emerge within the phenomenal world depends on factors inherent in that world, factors which to that extent appear to us to be accidental, although, viewed from a higher perspective, even the appearance of the genius is always a necessary occurrence.

2. The productiveness of God is an eternal act of self-affirmation having absolutely no relationship to time, and itself contains both a real and ideal side. In the former he begets his own infinitude into finitude and is *nature*: in the latter he takes finitude back again into his infinitude. Yet precisely this is also contained in the idea of genius, namely, that it is conceived on the one hand just as much as a natural principle as from the other as an ideal principle. It is accordingly the entire absolute idea viewed in the phenomenal realm or in relationship to a particular. It is one and the same relationship through which in the original act of cognition the world in and for itself is produced on the one hand, and through which in the activity of genius the world of art — as the same world in and for itself, but simply now in the phenomenal world — is

produced. (Genius distinguishes itself from everything that is merely talent by the fact that the latter possesses merely an empirical necessity that is itself accidental, while the former possesses absolute necessity. Every true work of art is an absolutely necessary one; one that might equally be or not be does not deserve this name.)

§64. *Explication. The real side of genius, or that unity that constitutes the informing of the infinite into the finite, can be call a poesy in the narrower sense; the ideal side, or that unity that constitutes the informing of the finite into the infinite, can be called the art within art...*

§65. *Explication. The first of the two unities, that which constitutes the informing of the infinite into the finite, expresses itself within the work of art primarily as sublimity; the other, that which constitutes the informing of the finite into the infinite, as beauty.*

We cannot prove this except by showing that that which according to common agreement is the prerequisite of sublimity and beauty is precisely that which is expressed by our own explication. The point is actually this: wherever we encounter the infinite being taken up into the finite as such — whenever we distinguish the infinite within the finite — we judge that the object in which this takes place is sublime. All sublimity is either nature or inner disposition (in the following reflections we will find that the being or substance of the sublime is always one and the same, and that only the form changes) ...

...This intuition of the sublime, in spite of its kinship with the element of the ideal and the ethical, is an aesthetic intuition, to use this word here finally. The infinite is the predominating element within it, yet it predominates only to the extent that it is intuited within the physically infinite, which to that extent is itself merely finite. This intuition of the truly infinite within the infinite element of nature is the poesy that any human being can practice, since the one who is himself intuiting is the one for whom the relatively colossal element within nature becomes the sublime, and this occurs when he makes it into the symbol of the absolutely colossal.

Moral and intellectual flaccidity weakness, and cowardice of disposition invariably shy away from these great perspectives that hold up to them a terrible image of their own nothingness and

contemptibility. The sublime in nature, just as that of tragedy and of art in general, cleanses the soul by liberating it from mere suffering. At the very moment when all the hostile forces of nature and of fate simultaneously close in upon a person, at the moment of highest suffering itself, the courageous person is able to make the transition to the ultimate liberation and otherworldly pleasure transcending all the limitations of suffering. Similarly, the person who bears the countenance of nature in all its terror and destruction, nature's ultimate offering of its own most destructive forces, is granted that absolute vision that is like the sun itself that finally breaks through dark storm clouds. In an age of petty resolve and of crippled sensibility I doubt one could find a more appropriate means of preserving and cleansing oneself from such pettiness than such acquaintance with the greatness of nature. I doubt also that there is a richer source of great thoughts and of heroic resolve than the ever-renewed pleasure in the vision of that which is concretely and physically terrible and great. Our previous discussion has dealt with the sublime in its two forms. In the first, the dimensions of nature itself become absolute in the confrontation with our powers of comprehension. In the other, the power of nature in comparison with our own physical strength becomes absolute and infinite. In both cases, however, nature is only relatively great or relatively infinite in relation to the truly infinite. We now must determine more specifically than earlier *the form* of this vision of the sublime. Here, too, form, as always, is the finite element, except that here the condition has been added that it must appear relatively infinite, and from the physical perspective must appear absolutely colossal. This, however, negates *the form* of the finite, and we now see how it is precisely formlessness that most immediately acquires the character of *sublimity* for us, that is, that most immediately becomes the symbol of the infinite as such. That particular form that is distinguished as form posits thereby the finite as a particular. The finite that is to accommodate the infinite must, however, be appropriate as a symbol for the infinite. This can take place in two ways. Either it is absolutely formless or absolutely formed, for both are one and the same. Absolute formlessness is precisely the highest or absolute form; the infinite forms itself within something finite without being subject to its limitations. For just this reason, however, the genuinely absolute form in which all limitations are suspended — such as in the figures of

the gods Jupiter, Juno, and so on — has the same effect on us as absolute formlessness. Nature is sublime not only in its greatness to the extent that it is inaccessible to our powers of comprehension, and not only in its power to the extent that it remains absolutely impervious to our own physical strength. It is also sublime in a general fashion within chaos, or, as Schiller puts it in the *confusion* of its own appearances at large...

... From this perspective we also encounter now the sublimity of *disposition* or of *character*, particularly to the extent that the person in whom it manifests itself can simultaneously serve as a symbol of all of history. The same world that as nature still controls itself through barriers of law that are drawn broadly enough to allow yet at least the appearance of lawlessness, as history appears to have cast aside all adherence to law. The element of the real revenges itself here and returns in all its strict necessity in order rather to destroy all laws that the free or unrestrained element has given itself, and to present itself to that freedom as itself being free. The laws and plans of men are not laws for nature. The latter, to use a passage from Schiller yet again, “treads into the dust the creations of wisdom and of chance with equal indifference” . . . [nature] drags down with her in a *single* collapse both the important and the trivial . . . she often wastes in a wanton hour the most tediously won achievements, while often working for centuries on some inane labor — in a word, this disregard by nature as a whole of the laws of science (which she obeys in individual cases) renders obvious the absolute impossibility of explaining *nature herself* by means of *natural laws*, and of imputing to her domain what holds *in* her domain, and thus the mind is irresistibly driven out of the world of phenomena into the world of ideas, out of the conditioned into the unconditioned. The hero of tragedy, one who nonetheless calmly bears all the severity and capriciousness of fate heaped upon his head, represents for just that reason that particular *essential nature* or unconditioned and absolute itself in his person. Secure in his own plan, one that no time executes, but also none destroys, he gazes down serenely at the course of the world. The misfortune that *physically* casts down and destroys the tragic person is as necessary an element of the ethically sublime as the conflict of natural forces and the superiority of nature over the mere physical capacity for comprehension is for *the physically* sublime. Only in misfortune is virtue tested, only in danger is bravery tested. The courageous person engaged in a struggle

with misfortune, a struggle in which he neither wins a physical victory nor capitulates morally, is only the symbol of the infinite, of that which *transcends all suffering*. Only within the maximum of suffering can that principle be revealed in which there is *no* suffering, just as everywhere things are revealed only in their opposites. The genuinely tragically sublime depends for just this reason on two conditions, namely, that the moral person capitulate to the forces of nature and simultaneously be victorious through his *inner character*. It is essential that the hero be victorious only through that which is not an effect of nature or of chance, and hence only through inner character or disposition, as is always the case with Sophocles. It is inappropriate that something extraneous or external apparently mitigates the bitterness of his fate, as is often the case with Euripides. *False* indulgence, something embraced by limpid taste that cannot bear the hard sight of necessity, is itself not only despicable but also completely abrogates the actual artistic effect it intends.

We have now adequately elucidated to what extent the sublime constitutes the informing of the infinite into the finite, except that the finite itself always appears as something relatively infinite (for only in this case is the *truly infinite* as such thrown into relief) — be it as regards one's powers of comprehension, one's own physical power, or one's inner disposition. Such is the case in tragedy, where it is defeated by the infinite quality of one's moral character. I would like to make just one more comment regarding the sublime, something actually following from our previous presentation, namely, that only in *art* is the object itself sublime. Nature is not sublime in itself, since here the disposition or the principle by which the finite is reduced to a symbol of the infinite is actually found in the subject. In the sublime, we said, the physically infinite is coerced or subdued by the truly infinite. Within *beauty* the finite is allowed to show itself once again by appearing within the beautiful as already informed into the infinite. There (within the sublime) the finite still manifests itself as it were in a condition of revolt against the infinite, although in this very relationship it becomes a symbol of it. Here (in the beautiful) it is reconciled with the infinite from the very start. That the relationship between the beautiful and the sublime really must be this way *to the extent* that the two are juxtaposed, emerges in an antithetical fashion from what has already been proved concerning the sublime. On the basis of precisely this juxtaposition we can then assert the following.

§66. *The sublime in its absoluteness encompasses the beautiful, just as the beautiful in its absoluteness encompasses the sublime...*

§70. *(Borrowed proposition.) The absolute becomes objective in the phenomenal realm by means of the three unities to the extent that the latter are not taken in their absoluteness, but rather in their relative difference as potencies, thereby becoming symbols of the idea.* This proposition needs only elucidation here, since it is merely a borrowed proposition from general philosophy.

Content and form are one within the absolute. The latter has no other content of production than itself in the all-encompassing all-ness of its forms. It cannot *appear*, however, unless each of these unities as a *particular* unity becomes a symbol of it. Within absoluteness itself, these unities are not differentiated from one another. Here we find only content, pure infinity, and idea. The new unities can become objective as the primal ideas only to the extent that each *as a particular unity* takes itself as a body or reflected image. As far as the phenomenal realm is concerned, this directly posits the differentiation of that which is actually one within the absolute itself. Hence, the first of the two unities in its absoluteness is idea. Insofar as it as a potency — as a particular unity — takes itself as a symbol, it is matter. Everything within the phenomenal realm is a mixture of essence and potency (or particularity). The essence of all particularity is within the absolute itself, but this essence manifests itself through the particular.

Presupposing this, it follows necessarily that the absolute as the principle of art becomes objective in the sphere of appearances or differentiation only if *either* the real *or* the ideal unity becomes its symbol. Hence, it becomes objective only in separate manifestations: on the one hand symbolized by the appearance of a relative-real world, on the other by the appearance of a relative-ideal world.

§71. *(Borrowed proposition) To the extent that its symbol is the real unity as particular unity, the idea is matter.*

The proof of this proposition is given in general philosophy. Matter that actually appears is the idea, but from the perspective of the simple informing of the infinite into the finite such that this informing itself is only relative, not absolute. Matter as it appears is not the essence, it is

only form, symbol; yet it is — *only as form, as relative difference* — in its own turn the same as that of which it is the symbol, and which is the idea as the absolute informing of the infinite into the finite.

§72. Hence, *insofar as art takes up the form of the informing of the infinite into the finite as particular form, it acquires matter as its body or symbol.* This follows automatically.

Addendum 1. In this respect, art is — the general formative or plastic arts. Normally this designation is used in the narrower sense, namely, for the formative arts that express themselves through corporeal objects. This designation as formative arts, however, does not exclude the possibility that within this general unity all potencies recur that are encompassed by matter itself in the larger sense; it is precisely on this recurrence that the distinction within the individual formative arts is based. *Addendum 2.* The formative arts constitute the *real* side of the world of art.

§73. *The ideal unity, as the resolution of the particular into the universal, of the concrete into the concept, becomes objective in speech or language.*

The proof of this proposition also belongs in general philosophy. Viewed from the real perspective, language constitutes the same resolution of the concrete into the universal, of being into knowledge, which, viewed from the ideal perspective, is thinking. Viewed from the one side, language is the direct expression of something *ideal* — knowledge, thought, feeling, will, and so on — in something *real*, and is to that extent itself a work of art. Yet viewed from the other side it is just as definitely a work of nature, since it is the one necessary form of art that cannot be conceived as being invented or generated by art. Hence, it is a natural work of art, just as more or less everything produced by nature is.

The most convincing proof of this proposition can be given only within a larger context, particularly, however, by *the juxtaposition* of language and the other form of art, matter.

The significance of language can be understood best on the basis of the following relationships, *particular unity, the idea is matter.* The absolute is by nature an eternal act of producing. This producing is its essence. Its producing is an absolute act of affirming or of knowing, whose two sides constitute the two postulated unities.

Wherever this absolute cognitive act becomes objective only by the *one* side as a particular unity becoming form, there it appears necessarily transformed into an other, namely, into a being. The absolute informing of the infinite into the finite, which is the *real* side of this act, is in itself not a being. In its absoluteness it is the entire idea, the entire infinite self-affirmation. Only when taken in its relativity, and thus only *as a particular unity*, does it no longer appear as idea or as self-affirmation, but rather as something itself affirmed, as matter. The real side as a particular unity becomes the symbol of the absolute idea here, which only through this husk or covering first becomes recognized as such.

Wherever the ideal unity itself, as a particular unity, functions as the form for the idea — in the ideal world — it is not distorted into something else. It remains ideal, yet such that it leaves the other side behind and thus does not appear as something absolutely ideal, but rather merely as something relatively ideal that possesses the real outside of itself — standing over against it. As purely ideal, however, it does not become objective, but rather returns to the subjective and is itself the subjective. Thus, it necessarily strives *yet again* toward a covering, a body, through which it may become objective without detriment to its ideality. It integrates itself again through something real. In this integration the most appropriate symbol of the absolute or infinite affirmation of God arises, since this affirmation *here* represents itself through something real without ceasing to be ideal (which is precisely the highest requirement), and *this* symbol is language, as one can easily see.

For this reason, language and reason (which is precisely absolute knowledge, the knowing of the ideas) have one and the same expression in most languages. Furthermore, in most philosophical and religious systems, particularly those of the Orient, the eternal and absolute act of self-affirmation in God — his eternal act of creating — is designated as the *speaking word* of God, the *logos*, which is simultaneously God himself.

One views the word or speaking of God as the outflow of the divine science, as the creating, multifarious, and yet congruous harmony of the divine act of creation.

Considering this sublime significance of language, namely, that it is not merely the relative act of knowledge, but rather the act that is

simultaneously integrated with its counterpart and is *to that extent* absolute, we will not juxtapose absolutely the formative arts with the verbal arts as do most authors (which is why, for example, they have difficulty counting music as one of the formative arts and thus grant it a special position). Just as knowledge still grasps or renders itself symbolically in language, so also does divine knowledge apprehend itself symbolically in the world such that also the whole of that real world (whole in as much as it is itself the unity of the real and the ideal) is itself a primal act of speaking. Yet the *real* world is no longer the living word, the speech of God himself, but rather only the spoken — or expended — word...

... the forms of art are the forms of things as they are in God, the real side of the universe itself constitutes the plastic arts, the ideal side constitutes the poetic or verbal arts, and all particular forms that recur within these basic forms will in their own turn merely express the manner in which particular things inhere within the absolute.

Part II.

Specific section of the Philosophy of arts

Chapter 4.

Construction of the Forms of Art in the Juxtaposition of the Real and Ideal Series. (Pp. 107–121)

... In general, philosophy, like art. is not concerned with things themselves, but rather only with their forms or eternal essence. The thing itself, however, is precisely nothing other than this particular mode or form of being, and through these forms one possesses the things. In its plastic works, for example, art does not strive to compete with similar products of nature as regards actual concrete elements. It seeks rather the pure form, the ideal, of which the thing itself, of course, is simply the other perspective...

... The first unity within the absolute essence is in general the one whereby it bears its subjectivity and eternal unity into objectivity or multiplicity, and this unity, conceived in its absoluteness or as the one side of the absolute act of pro-duction. is eternal matter or substance or eternal nature itself. Without this the absolute would be and remain a self-enclosed subjectivity without being discerned or distinguished. Only

through subject-objectivation does it manifest itself within objectivity and then as a recognized object guide itself back from this objectivity into its own self-recognition. This reverse development of objectivity into itself is the other unity that within it is inseparable from the first. Just as we see the perfected informing of subjectivity into objectivity within the organism immediately change into reason as the absolute ideal, so also within the absolute. There, where the informing is always absolute, the objective element of that subject-objectivation immediately transfigures itself into the ether of absolute ideality, such that the absolutely real element is always simultaneously the absolutely ideal element, and both are essentially one and the same. The absolute, insofar as it manifests itself in the phenomenal world through the first of the two unities, is the essence of matter.

§84. Borrowed proposition. *The infinite concept of all finite things, insofar as it is contained in the real unity, is light.* Since this proof is a part of general philosophy, I will offer only the main points here.

For now, let us note the following points: (a) Light — concept, *ideal* unity, (b) but ideal unity within the real unity. The proof is given most expediently by the juxtaposition with the other unity. In the latter, the identity of eternal matter as such is formed into difference and therefore into differentiated and particular things. Here, difference or particularity is the predominating element; identity can be comprehended only as unity within *multiplicity*. In the opposing unity, identity, the essence, the universal is the predominating element. Reality dissolves or suspends itself again into ideality. Yet this ideality must in the larger sense be subordinated to reality and to difference, since it is the ideal unity within the real unity. Since the universal form of the real within difference is space, it must thus appear as an ideal element of or within space. Hence, it must describe space without filling it, and as the ideal unity of matter it must everywhere display in an ideal fashion all the attributes which matter displays in a real fashion. All these conditions, however, are met only by light; thus light is the infinite idea, *within* the real unity, of all difference, which is precisely what was to be proved. The relationship of light to matter can also be clarified in the following fashion.

The idea in its dual aspects repeats itself within both individuality and the whole. In its real aspect, where it forms its subjectivity into an

objectivity, it is still fully idea even though it does not appear as such, but rather as *being*. Within the real element of appearance, the idea leaves only one of its characteristics behind. In the ideal element of appearance, it manifests itself as something ideal, but for just that reason does so only in opposition or juxtaposition to that real element, and thus as something *relatively* ideal. The *essential nature* is precisely that wherein the two sides are one. Applied to the case at hand, we can say that the element of corporeality is the one side of the idea in its objectivity, the real side. The other side, where the idea appears as something *ideal*, is light, but it appears as something ideal only inasmuch as it leaves behind the other side, or the real side; we can already anticipate here that the higher element in nature, too, will be that in which matter and light are again one. Light is the element of the ideal that is manifested in nature, the first break-through of idealism. The *idea itself is light*, but *absolute* light. In phenomenal light, the idea appears *as* something ideal, as light, but only as *relative* light, as something relatively ideal.

It casts off its outer covering with which it clothes itself in *matter*; yet in order to *appear as* something ideal it must appear in contrast to the real. It is not possible for me to discuss this view of light in all its ramifications, and I therefore refer to its treatment in general philosophy. Here I must discuss further first the relationship of light to sonority, and second the sense of sight as the necessary condition for the existence of light for art. (a) Concerning the *relationship of light to sonority*, it is well known how many comparisons have been made, even though the true identity and distinction concerning the two has, to my knowledge, not yet been determined. We remarked that essence or identity gives itself form within matter. In light, on the other hand, form or particularity is transfigured again into essence. This set of circumstances must also give us some insight into the relationship between light and sonority. As we know, sonority is not posited absolutely.

It is posited only under the condition of a movement transmitted to the body itself whereby it is set out of indifference with itself. Sonority itself is nothing other than the indifference of soul and body. It constitutes this indifference, however, only insofar as it resides in the first dimension. Wherever the eternal concept is combined absolutely with the thing itself, as is the case with what we may call the cosmic body, which as finite is also infinite, there emerges that inner music of

the movements of the stars. Wherever that eternal concept is combined in a merely relative fashion with the thing, sonority emerges, which is nothing other than the act of the reinforcing of the ideal into the real, and thus the manifestation of indifference after both have been wrested from indifference.

The element of the ideal is not essentially *sonority*, just as the concept of a thing is not essentially soul. The concept of the human being becomes *soul* precisely only in its relationship to the body or corporeality, just as the body is only body in its relationship to the soul. Similarly, what we call the sonority of a body is precisely that ideal element posited in relationship to its body. Hence, if that which reveals itself in sonority is only the concept of the thing, then we in contrast will equate light with the *idea* of things, or with that wherein the finite is truly joined to the infinite. Sonority is thus the indwelling or finite light of corporeal things, and light is the infinite soul of all corporeal things.

Absolute light itself, however, light as genuinely absolute suspension or resolution of difference into identity, would never of itself fall into the sphere of objectivity as an actual phenomenon. Only as something relatively ideal and thus simultaneously in both opposition and relative unity with corporeality can it *appear as* light.

The question is, how can one conceive of such a unity between light and body? Our fundamental presuppositions do not allow us to admit any direct effect of one upon the other. As little as we can assume that the soul is able to become the immediate *cause* of an effect within the body, or the body within the soul, just as little can we allow light to have an immediate effect on corporeality or in a reverse fashion the latter to have an immediate effect on light. Light and body can thus, if at all, be one only through preestablished harmony, and only through that wherein they *are* one, and not affect one another through some one-sided causal relationship. It is gravity that reappears here in the higher potency, the absolute identity that, be it in reflection or in refraction, unites light and corporeality. The general expression of such light synthesized with corporeality is *obscured* light, or color. Hence, as an *addendum* to §84 we may state the following: *Light can appear as light only in opposition or contrast to nonlight, and hence only as color.*

The body in general is nonlight, just as light in contrast is non body. As certainly as absolute light appears within empirical light only

as something relatively ideal, just as certainly can it appear in general only in contrast to the element of the real. Light combined with nonlight is in general obscured light, that is, color.

From: Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling
THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART, Part I. General Section of the Philosophy of Art
(Chapter 1. Construction of Art as Such and in General, Pp. 33-52;
Chapter 3. Construction of the particular, or of the form of art, Pp. 83-103);
Part II. Specific section of the Philosophy of arts.
(Chapter 4. Construction of the Forms of Art in the Juxtaposition
of the Real and Ideal Series Pp. 107-121)
[Edited, translated, and introduced by Douglas W. Stott],
Theory and History of Literature, Volume 58. — University of Minnesota Press,
Minneapolis, 1989.

G.W.F. HEGEL
“PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT”

C. (AA.) REASON
V. THE CERTAINTY AND TRUTH OF REASON

231. In grasping the thought that the *single* individual consciousness is *in itself* Absolute Essence, consciousness has returned into itself. For the Unhappy Consciousness the in-itself is the beyond of itself. But its movement has resulted in positing the completely developed single individual, or the single individual that is an *actual* consciousness, as the *negative* of itself, viz, as the *objective* extreme; in other words, it has successfully struggled to divest itself of its being-for-self and has turned it into [mere] being. In this movement it has also become aware of its *unity* with this universal, a unity which, for us, no longer falls outside of it since the superseded single individual is the universal, and which, since consciousness maintains itself in this its negativity, is present in consciousness as such as its essence. Its truth is that which appears in the syllogism whose extremes appeared as held absolutely asunder, as the middle term which proclaims to the unchangeable consciousness that the single individual has renounced itself, and, to the individual, that the Unchangeable is for it no longer an extreme, but is reconciled with it. This middle term is the unity directly aware of both and connecting them, and

is the consciousness of their unity, which it proclaims to consciousness and thereby to itself, *the consciousness of the certainty of being all truth*.

(*Idealism*). Now that self-consciousness is Reason, its hitherto negative relation to *otherness* turns around into a positive relation. Up till now it has been concerned only with its independence and freedom, concerned to save and maintain itself for itself at the expense of the *world*, or of its own actuality, both of which appeared to it as the negative of its essence. But as Reason, assured of itself, it is at peace with them, and can endure them; for it is certain that it is itself reality, or that everything actual is none other than itself; its thinking is itself directly actuality, and thus its relationship to the latter is that of idealism. Apprehending itself in this way, it is as if the world had for it only now come into being, previously it did not understand the world; it desired it and worked on it, withdrew from it into itself and abolished it as an existence on its own account, and its own self *qua* consciousness – both as consciousness of the world as essence and as consciousness of its nothingness. In thus apprehending itself, after losing the grave of its truth, after the abolition of its actuality is itself abolished, and after the singleness of consciousness is for it in itself Absolute Essence, it discovers the world as *its* new real world, which in its permanence holds an interest for it which previously lay only in its transiency; for the *existence* of the world becomes for self-consciousness its own *truth* and *presence*; it is certain of experiencing only itself therein.

233. Reason is the certainty of consciousness that it is all reality; thus, does idealism express its Notion. Just as consciousness, that comes on the scene as Reason, possesses that certainty *directly* in itself, so too does idealism give direct expression to that certainty! “I am I, in the sense that the “I” which is an object for me is the sole object, is all reality and all that is present. Here, the “I” that is object for me, is not merely an *empty* object in general, as it is for (self-consciousness as such) nor is it, as in free (self-consciousness) merely an object that withdraws itself from other objects which retain their worth *alongside* it; on the contrary, it is for self-consciousness an object such that any other object whatever is a *non-being*. But self-consciousness is all reality, not merely *for itself* but also *in itself*, only through *becoming* this reality, or rather through *demonstrating* itself to be such. It demonstrates itself to be this *along the*

path in which first, in the dialectic movement of meaning”, perceiving and understanding, otherness as an *intrinsic being* vanishes. Then, in the movement through the independence of consciousness in lordship and bondage, through the conception of freedom, through the liberation that comes from Skepticism and the struggle for absolute liberation by the consciousness divided against itself, otherness, in so far as it is only *for consciousness*, vanishes for *consciousness itself*. There appeared two aspects, one after the other: one in which the essence or the True had for consciousness the determinateness *of being*, the other in which it had the determinateness of being only *for consciousness*. But the two reduced themselves to a single truth, viz, that what *is*, or the in-itself, only *is* in so far as it is *for consciousness*, and what is *for consciousness* is also *in itself* or has *intrinsic being*. The consciousness which is this truth has this path behind it and has forgotten it and comes on the scene *immediately* as Reason; in other words, this Reason which comes immediately on the scene appears only as the *certainty* of that truth. Thus, it merely *asserts* that it is all reality, but does not itself comprehend this; for it is along that forgotten path that this immediately expressed assertion is comprehended. And equally, anyone who has not trodden this path finds this assertion incomprehensible when he hears it in this pure form — although he does as a matter of fact make the assertion him-self in a concrete shape i.e., the assertion is implicit in his behavior.

234. The idealism that does not demonstrate that path but starts off with this assertion is therefore, too, a pure *assertion* which does not comprehend its own self, nor can it make itself comprehensible to others. It proclaims an *immediate certainty* which is confronted by other immediate certainties, which have, however, been lost on that same path. With equal right, therefore, the assertions of these other certainties, too, take their place alongside the assertion of that certainty. Reason appeals to the self-consciousness of each and every consciousness: “*I am I, my object and my essence is I*”; and no one will deny Reason this truth. But in basing itself on this appeal, Reason sanctions the truth of the other certainty, viz, that there is for me another; that another than I is object and essence for me, or, in that I am object and essence to myself, I am only so by drawing back from the “other” altogether and taking my place as an actuality *alongside* it. Not until Reason comes on the scene as a

reflection from this opposite certainty does its affirmation about itself present itself not merely as a certainty and an assertion, but as truth; and not merely alongside other truths but as the sole truth. Its *immediate appearance* on the scene is the abstraction of its *actual presence*, the essence and the in-itself of which is the absolute Notion, i.e., *the movement which has brought it into being*. Consciousness will determine its relationship to otherness or its object in various ways, according to the precise stage it has reached in the development of the World-Spirit into self-consciousness. How it *immediately* finds and determines itself and its object at any time, or the way in which it is *for itself*, depends on what it has already *become*, or what it already is in *itself*.

235. Reason is the certainty of being all *reality*. This *in-itself* or this *reality* is, however, a universal pure and simple, the pure *abstraction* of reality. It is the first *positivity* in which self-consciousness is *in its own self explicitly for itself*, and “I” is therefore only the *pure essentiality* of the existent or is the simple *category*. The category, which formerly had the meaning of being the essentiality of the existent and it was *undetermined* whether of the existent as such, or of the existent contrasted with consciousness is now the essentiality or simple *unity* of the existent only as a reality that thinks; in other words, the category means this, that self-consciousness and being are the same essence, the same, not through comparison, but in and for themselves. It is only the one-sided, spurious idealism that lets this unity again come on the scene as consciousness, on one side, confronted by an *in-itself*, on the other. But now this category or *simple* unity of self-consciousness and being possesses difference *in itself*; for its essence is just this, to be immediately one and selfsame in *otherness*, or in absolute difference. The difference therefore *is*, but is perfectly transparent, and a difference that is, at the same time none. It appears as a *plurality* of categories. Since idealism proclaims the simple unity of self-consciousness to be all reality, and *immediately* makes it the essence without having grasped it as the absolutely negative essence—only this has negation, determinateness, or difference within it—this second assertion is even more incomprehensible than the first, viz, that in the category there are *differences* or *species* of categories. The assertion as such, as also the assertion as to any *specific number* of species of categories, is a new assertion which, however, itself implies that we no

longer have to accept it as an assertion. For since the difference originates in the pure “I”, in the pure Understanding, itself, it is thereby made explicit that the *immediacy*, the making of assertions and [mere] finding of differences, is here given, and we begin to *comprehend*. But to pick up the plurality of categories again in some way or other as a welcome find, taking them, e.g., from the various judgements, and complacently accepting them so, is in fact to be regarded as an outrage on Science. Where else should the Understanding be able to demonstrate a necessity, if it is unable to do so in its own self, which is pure necessity?

236. Now, because, in this way, the pure essentiality of things, like their difference, belongs to Reason, we can, strictly speaking, no longer talk *of things* at all, i.e., of something which would be for consciousness merely the negative of itself. For to say that the many categories are *species* of the pure category means that this latter is still their *genus* or *essence* and is not opposed to them. But ambiguity already attaches to them, since in their *plurality* they possess otherness in contrast to the pure category. In fact, they contradict the pure category by such plurality, and the pure unity must supersede them in itself, thereby constituting itself a *negative unity* of the differences. But, as *negative unity*, it excludes from itself both the differences as such, as well as that first *immediate* pure unity as such, and is a *singular individual*; a new category which is consciousness as exclusive, i.e., consciousness for which there is another. The singular individual is the transition of the category from its Notion to an *external* reality, the *pure schema*, which is both consciousness, and, since it is a singular individual and an exclusive unit, the pointing to another. But this “other” of the category is merely the other first-mentioned categories, viz, *pure essentiality* and *pure difference*; and in this category i.e., just in the posited-ness of the “other”, or in this “other” itself, consciousness is equally itself. Each of these different moments points or refers to another; but at the same time, they do not attain to otherness. The pure category points to the species, which pass over into the negative category or singular individual; this latter, however, points back to them. It is itself pure consciousness which is aware in each of them of being always this clear unity with itself, but a unity which equally is referred to another, which in being, has vanished, and in vanishing also comes into being again.

237. Here we see pure consciousness posited in a twofold manner: once as the restless movement to and from through all its moments, aware in them of an otherness which is superseded in the act of grasping it; and again, rather as the *tranquil unity* certain of its [own] truth. For this unity that movement is the “other”, while for this movement that tranquil unity is the “other”; and consciousness and object alternate within these reciprocal determinations. Thus, on the one hand consciousness finds itself moving about searching here and there, its object being the *pure in-itself* and essence; on the other hand, it knows itself to be the simple category, and the object is the movement of the different moments. Consciousness, however, as essence is this whole process itself, of passing out of itself as simple category into a singular individual, into the object, and of contemplating this process in the object, nullifying the object as distinct [from it], *appropriating* it as its own, and appropriating itself as this certainty of being all reality, of being both itself and its object.

237. Its first declaration is only this abstract empty phrase that everything is *its own*. For the certainty of being all reality is at first [only] the pure category. This Reason which first recognizes itself in the object finds expression in the empty idealism which grasps Reason only as it first comes on the scene; and fancies that by pointing out this pure “mine” of consciousness in all being, and by declaring all things to be sensations or ideas, it has demonstrated this “mine” of consciousness to be complete reality. It is bound, therefore, to beat the same time absolute empiricism, for in order to give filling to the empty “mine”, to get hold of *difference* with all its developed formations, its Reason requires an extraneous impulse, in which first is to be found the *multiplicity* of sensations and ideas.

This idealism therefore becomes the same kind of self-contradictory ambiguity as Skepticism, except that, while this expresses itself negatively, the former does so positively; but it fails equally with Skepticism to bring together its contradictory thoughts of pure consciousness being all reality, while the extraneous impulse or sensations and ideas are equally reality. Instead of bringing them together, it shifts from one to the other, and is caught up in the spurious, i.e., the sensuous, infinite.

Since Reason is all reality in the sense of the abstract “mine”, and the “other” is for it something indifferent and extraneous, what is here made explicit is that kind of knowing of another by Reason, which we met with in the form of “meaning”, “perceiving” and the “Understanding”, which apprehends what is “meant” and what is “perceived”. Such a knowing is at the same time pronounced by the very principle of this idealism not to be a true knowing, for only in the unity of apperception lies the truth of knowing. The pure Reason of this idealism, in order to reach this “other” which is *essential* to it, and thus is the *in-itself*, but which it does not have within it, is therefore thrown back by its own self on to that knowing which is *not* a knowing of what is true; in this way, it condemns itself of its own knowledge and volition to being an untrue kind of knowing, and cannot get away from “meaning” and “perceiving”, which for it have no truth. It is involved in a direct contradiction; it asserts essence to be a duality of opposed factors, the *unity of apperception* and equally a *Thing*; whether the Thing is called an extraneous impulse, or an empirical or sensuous entity, or the Thing-in-itself, it still remains in principle the same, i.e., extraneous to that unity.

239. This idealism is involved in this contradiction because it asserts the *abstract Notion* of Reason to be the True; consequently, reality directly comes to be for it a reality that is just as much *not* that of Reason, while Reason is at the same time supposed to be all reality. This Reason remains a restless searching and in its very searching declares that the satisfaction of *finding* is a sheer impossibility. Actual Reason, however, is not so inconsistent as that; on the contrary, being at first only the *certainty* that it is all reality, it is aware in this *Notion* that *qua certainty*, qua *I*, it is not yet in truth reality, and it is impelled to raise its certainty to truth and to give filling to the empty “mine”.

A. OBSERVING REASON

240. It is true that we now see this consciousness, for which Being means what is its own [*Seinen*], revert to the standpoint of, “meaning” and “perceiving”; but not in the sense that it is certain of what is merely an ‘other? Previously, its perception and *experience* of various aspects of the Thing were something that only *happened to* consciousness; but here, consciousness *makes its own* observations and experiments. “Meaning” and “perceiving”, which previously were superseded or

us, are now superseded by and for consciousness itself. Reason sets to work to *know* the truth, to find in the form of a Notion that which, for “meaning” and “perceiving”, is a Thing; i.e. it seeks to possess in thing hood the consciousness only of itself. Reason now has, therefore, a universal *interest* in the world, because it is certain of its presence in the world, or that the world present to it is rational. It seeks its “other”, knowing that therein it possesses nothing else but itself: it seeks only its own infinitude.

241. While at first it is only dimly aware of its presence in the actual world, or only knows quite simply that this world is its own, it strides forward in this belief to a general appropriation of its own assured possessions, and plants the symbol of its sovereignty on every height and in every depth. But this superficial “[it is] mine”, is not its ultimate interest; the joy of this general appropriation finds still in its possessions the alien “other” which abstract Reason does not contain within itself. Reason is dimly aware of itself as a profounder essence than the pure “I” is, and must demand that difference, that being, in its manifold variety, become its very own, that it be hold itself as the *actual* world and find itself present as an [outer] shape and Thing. But even if Reason digs into the very entrails of things and opens every vein in them so that it may gush forth to meet itself, it will not attain this joy; it must have completed itself inwardly before it can experience the consummation of itself.

242. Consciousness *observes*, i.e., Reason wants to find and to have itself as existent object, as an object that is actually and sensuously present. The consciousness that observes in this way means, and indeed says, that it wants to learn, not about itself but, on the contrary, about the essence of things *qua* things. That this consciousness means and says this, is implied in the fact that it is Reason; but Reason as such is not as yet object for this consciousness. If it knew that *Reason* is equally the essence of things and of consciousness itself, and that it is only in consciousness that Reason can be present in its own proper shape, it would go down into the depths of its own being and seek Reason there rather than in things. If it did find it then, it would be directed to the actual world outside again, in order to behold therein Reason’s sensuous expression, but at the same time to take it essentially as Notion. Reason, as it *immediately* comes before us as the certainty of consciousness that it is all reality, takes its reality in

the sense of the *immediacy of being*, and similarly, the unity of the with this objective being in the sense of an *immediate unity*, in which it has not yet divided and reunited the moments of being and the “I”, or which has not yet discerned them. Reason, therefore, in its observational activity, approaches things in the belief that it truly apprehends them as sensuous things opposite to the “I”; but what it actually does, contradicts this belief, for it apprehends them *intellectually*, it transforms their sensuous being into *Notions*, i.e. into just that kind of being which is at the same time “I”, hence transforms thought into the form of being, or being into the form of thought; it maintains, in fact, that it is only as Notions that things have truth. Consciousness, in this observational activity, comes to know what *things* are; but *we* come to know what *consciousness itself* is. The outcome of its movement will be that what consciousness is *in itself* will become *explicit* for it.

243. This *action* of Reason in its observational role we have to consider in the moments of its movement: how it looks upon Nature and Spirit, and, lastly, upon the relationship of both in the form of sensuous being, and how it seeks itself as actuality in the form of immediate being...

*From: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm
Fredrich “PHENOMENOLOGY
OF SPIRIT”, [Translated by
Miller, Arnold Vincent]. — Oxford
University Press, Pp. 139-147.*

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel:
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline,
Part 1, Science of Logic: Part I: Science of Logic

Second Subdivision: Essence

B. APPEARANCE

World of Appearance — Content&Form

§ 131

The *Essence must appear or shine forth*. Its shining or reflection in it is the suspension and translation of it to immediacy, which, while as reflection-into-self it is matter or subsistence, is also form, reflection-on-something-else, a subsistence which sets itself aside. To show or shine is the characteristic by which essence is distinguished from Being — by which it is essence; and it is this show which, when it is developed, shows itself, and is Appearance. Essence accordingly is not something beyond or behind appearance, but — just because it is the essence which exists — the existence is Appearance (Forth-shining).

Existence stated explicitly in its contradiction is Appearance. But appearance (forth-showing) is not to be confused with a mere show (shining). Show is the proximate truth of Being or immediacy. The immediate, instead of being, as we suppose, something independent, resting on its own self, is a mere show, and as such it is packed or summed up under the simplicity of the immanent essence. The essence is, in the first place, the sum total of the showing itself, shining in itself (inwardly); but, far from abiding in this inwardness, it comes as a ground forward into existence; and this existence being grounded not in itself, but on something else, is just appearance. In our imagination we ordinarily combine with the term appearance or phenomenon the conception of an indefinite congeries of things existing, the being of which is purely relative, and which consequently do not rest on a foundation of their own, but are esteemed only as passing stages. But in this conception, it is no less implied that essence does not linger behind or beyond appearance. Rather it is, we may say, the infinite kindness which lets its own show freely issue into immediacy, and graciously allows it the joy of existence. The appearance which is thus created does not stand on its own feet and has its being not in itself but in something else. God who is the essence,

when he lends existence to the passing stages of his own show in himself, may be described as the goodness that creates the world: but he is also the power above it, and the righteousness, which manifests the merely phenomenal character of the content of this existing world, whenever it tries to exist in independence.

Appearance is in every way a very important grade of the logical idea. It may be said to be the distinction of philosophy from ordinary consciousness that it sees the merely phenomenal character of what the latter supposes to have a self-subsistent being. The significance of appearance however must be properly grasped, or mistakes will arise. To say that anything is *mere* appearance may be misinterpreted to mean that, as compared to what is merely phenomenal, there is greater truth in the immediate, in that which *is*. Now, in strict fact, the case is precisely the reverse.

Appearance is higher than mere Being — a richer category because it holds in combination the two elements of reflection-into-self and reflection-into-other: whereas Being (or immediacy) is still mere relationlessness, and apparently rests upon itself alone. Still, to say that anything is *only* an appearance suggests a real flaw, which consists in this, that Appearance is still divided against itself and without intrinsic stability. Beyond and above mere appearance comes in the first place Actuality, the third grade of Essence, of which we shall afterwards speak.

In the history of Modern Philosophy, Kant has the merit of first rehabilitating this distinction between the common and the philosophic modes of thought. He stopped half-way, however, when he attached to Appearance a subjective meaning only, and put the abstract essence immovable outside it as the thing-in-itself beyond the reach of our cognition. For it is the very nature of the world of immediate objects to be appearance only. Knowing it to be so, we know at the same time, the essence, which, far from staying behind or beyond the appearance, rather manifests its own essentiality by deposing the world to a mere appearance. One can hardly quarrel with the plain man who, in his desire for totality, cannot acquiesce in the doctrine of subjective idealism, that we are solely concerned with phenomena. The plain man, however, in his desire to save the objectivity of knowledge, may very naturally return to abstract immediacy and maintain that immediacy to be true and actual.

In a little work published under the title *A Report, Clear as Day, to the Larger Public touching the Proper Nature of the Latest Philosophy: an Attempt to force the Reader to understand*, Fichte examined the opposition between subjective idealism and immediate consciousness in a popular form, under the shape of a dialogue between the author and the reader, and tried hard to prove that the subjective idealist's view was right.

In this dialogue the reader complains to the author that he has completely failed to place himself in the idealist's position and is inconsolable in the thought that things around him are not real things but mere appearances. The affliction of the reader can scarcely be blamed when he is expected to consider himself hemmed in by an impervious circle of purely subjective conceptions. Apart from this subjective view of Appearance, however, we have all reason to rejoice that the things which environ us are appearances and not steadfast and independent existences; since in that case we should soon perish of hunger, both bodily and mental.

(a) The World of Appearances.

§ 132

The Apparent or Phenomenal exists in such a way that its subsistence is *ipso facto* thrown into abeyance or suspended and is only one stage in the form itself. The form embraces in it the matter or subsistence as one of its characteristics. In this way the phenomenal has its ground in this (form) as its essence, its reflection-into-self in contrast with its immediacy, but in so doing, has it only in another aspect of the form. This ground of it is no less phenomenal than itself, and the phenomenon accordingly goes on to an endless mediation of subsistence by means of form, and thus equally by non-subsistence. This endless intermediation is at the same time a unity of self-relation; and existence is developed into a totality, into a world of phenomena — of reflected finitude.

(b) Content and Form.

§ 133

Outside one another as the phenomena in this phenomenal world are, they form a totality, and are wholly contained in their self-relatedness. In this way the self-relation of the phenomenon is completely specified, it has the **Form** in itself: and because it is in this identity, has it as essential

subsistence. So, it comes about that the form is **Content**: and in its phase is the **Law of the Phenomenon**. When the form, on the contrary, is not reflected into self, it is equivalent to the negative of the phenomenon, to the non-independent and changeable: and that sort of form is the indifferent or External Form.

The essential point to keep in mind about the opposition of Form and Content is that the content is not formless, but has the form in its own self, quite as much as the form is external to it. There is thus a doubling of form. At one time it is reflected into itself; and then is identical with the content. At another time it is not reflected into itself, and then it is external existence, which does not at all affect the content. We are here in presence, implicitly, of the absolute correlation of content and form: viz, their reciprocal revulsion, so that content is nothing but the revulsion of form into content, and form nothing but the revulsion of content into form. This mutual revulsion is one of the most important laws of thought. But it is not explicitly brought out before the Relations of Substance and Causality.

Form and content are a pair of terms frequently employed by the reflective understanding, especially with a habit of looking on the content as the essential and independent, the form on the contrary as the unessential and dependent. Against this it is to be noted that both are in fact equally essential; and that, while a formless *content* can be as little found as a formless *matter*, the two (content and matter) are distinguished by this circumstance, that matter, though implicitly not without form, still in its existence manifests a disregard of form, whereas the content, as such, is what it is only because the matured form is included in it. Still the form still suffers from externality. In a book, for instance, it certainly has no bearing upon the content, whether it be written or printed, bound in paper or in leather. That however does not in the least imply that apart from such an indifferent and external form, the content of the book is itself formless. There are undoubtedly books enough which even in reference to their content may well be styled formless: but want of form in this case is the same as bad form, and means the defect of the right form, not the absence of all form whatever. So far is this right form from being unaffected by the content that it is rather the content itself. A work of art that wants the right form is for that very reason no right or true work of

art: and it is a bad way of excusing an artist, to say that the content of his works is good and even excellent, though they want the right form. Real works of art are those, where content and form exhibit a thorough identity. The content of the Iliad, it may be said, is the Trojan war, and especially the wrath of Achilles. In that we have everything, and yet very little after all; for the Iliad is made an Iliad by the poetic form, in which that content is molded. The content of Romeo and Juliet may similarly be said to be the ruin of two lovers through the discord between their families: but something more is needed to make Shakespeare's immortal tragedy.

In reference to the relation of form and content in the field of science, we should recollect the difference between philosophy and the rest of the sciences. The latter are finite, because their mode of thought, as a merely formal act, derives its content from without. Their content therefore is not known as molded from within through the thoughts which lie at the ground of it, and form and content do not thoroughly interpenetrate each other. This partition disappears in philosophy, and thus justifies its title of infinite knowledge. Yet even philosophic thought is often held to be a merely formal act; and that logic, which confessedly deals only with thoughts qua thoughts, is merely formal, is especially a foregone conclusion. And if content means no more than what is palpable and obvious to the senses, all philosophy and logic, in particular, must be at once acknowledged to be void of content, that is to say, of content perceptible to the senses. Even ordinary forms of thought, however, and the common usage of language, do not in the least restrict the appellation of content to what is perceived by the senses, or to what has a being in place and time.

A book without content is, as everyone knows, not a book with empty leaves, but one of which the content is as good as none. We shall find as the last result on closer analysis, that by what is called content an educated mind means nothing but the presence and power of thought. But this is to admit that thoughts are not empty forms without affinity to their content, and that in other spheres as well as in art the truth and the sterling value of the content essentially depend on the content showing itself identical with the form.

§ 134

But immediate existence is a character of the subsistence itself as well as of the form: it is consequently external to the character of the content; but in an equal degree this externality, which the content has through the factor of its subsistence, is essential to it. When thus explicitly stated, the phenomenon is relativity or correlation: where one and the same thing, viz, the content or the developed form, is seen as the externality and antithesis of independent existences, and as their reduction to a relation of identity in which identification alone the two things distinguished are what they are.

§ 138

[c] The **Inward** (Interior) is the ground, when it stands as the mere form of the one side of the Appearance and the Correlation — the empty form of reflection-into-self. As a counterpart to it stands the **Outward** (Exterior) — Existence — also as form of the other side of the correlation, with the empty characteristic of reflection-into-something-else. But Inward and Outward are identified: and their identity is identity brought to fullness in the content, that unity of reflection-into-self and reflection-into-other which was forced to appear in the movement of force. Both are the same one identity, and this unity makes them the content.

§ 139

In the first place then, Exterior is the same content as Interior. What is inwardly is also found outwardly, and vice versa. The appearance shows nothing that is not in the essence, and in the essence, there is nothing but what is manifested.

§ 140

In the second place, Inward and Outward, as formal terms, are also reciprocally opposed, and that thoroughly. The one is the abstraction of identity with self; the other mere multiplicity or reality. But as stages of the one form, they are essentially identical so that whatever is at first explicitly put only in the one abstraction, is also plainly and at one step in the other. Therefore, what is only internal is also only external: and what is only external, is so far only at first internal.

It is the customary mistake of reflection to take essence to be merely the interior. If it be so taken, even this way of looking at it is purely external, and that sort of essence is the empty external abstraction.

*Ins Innere der Natur
Dringt kein erschaffner Geist,
Zu glücklich wenn er nur
De äussere Schaale weisst.*

It ought rather to have been said that, if the essence of nature is ever described as the inner part, the person who so describes it only knows its outer shell. In Being as a whole, or even in mere sense-perception, the notion is at first only an inward, and for that very reason is something external to Being, a subjective thinking and being, devoid of truth. In Nature as well as in Mind, so long as the notion, design, or law are at first the inner capacity, mere possibilities, they are first only an external, inorganic nature, the knowledge of a third person, alien force, and the like. As a man is outwardly, that is to say in his actions (not of course in his merely bodily outwardness), so he is inwardly: and if his virtue, morality, etc. are only inwardly his — that is if they exist only in his intentions and sentiments, and his outward acts are not identical with them — the one half of him is as hollow and empty as the other.

The relation of Outward and Inward unites the two relations that precede, and at the same time sets in abeyance mere relativity and phenomenality in general. Yet so long as understanding keeps the Inward and Outward fixed in their separation, they are empty forms, the one as null as the other. Not only in the study of nature, but also of the spiritual world, much depends on a just appreciation of the relation of inward and outward, and especially on avoiding the misconception that the former only is the essential point on which everything turns, while the latter is unessential and trivial. We find this mistake made when, as is often done, the difference between nature and mind is traced back to the abstract difference between inner and outer. As for nature, it certainly is in the gross external, not merely to the mind, but even on its own part. But to call it external “in the gross” is not to imply an abstract externality — for there is no such thing. It means rather that the Idea which forms the common content of nature and mind, is found in nature as outward only, and for that very reason only inward. The abstract understanding, with its “either-or”, may struggle against this conception of nature. It is none the less obviously found in our other modes of consciousness, particularly in religion. It is the lesson of religion that nature, no less than

the spiritual world, is a revelation of God: but with this distinction, that while nature never gets so far as to be conscious of its divine essence, that consciousness is the express problem of the mind, which in the matter of that problem is as yet finite. Those who look upon the essence of nature as mere inwardness, and therefore inaccessible to us, take up the same line as that ancient creed which regarded God as envious and jealous; a creed which both Plato and Aristotle pronounced against long ago. All that God is, he imparts and reveals; and he does so at first in and through nature.

Any object indeed is faulty and imperfect when it is only inward, and thus at the same time only outward, or (which is the same thing) when it is only an outward and thus only an inward. For instance, a child, taken in the gross as human being, is no doubt a rational creature; but the reason of the child as child is at first a mere inward, in the shape of his natural ability or vocation, etc. This mere inward, at the same time, has for the child the form of a mere outward, in the shape of the will of his parents, the attainments of his teachers, and the whole world of reason that environs him. The education and instruction of a child aim at making him actually and for himself what he is at first only potentially and therefore for others, viz, for his grown-up friends. The reason, which at first exists in the child only as an inner possibility, is actualized through education: and conversely, the child by these means becomes conscious that the goodness, religion, and science which he had at first looked upon as an outward authority, are his own nature. As with the child so it is in this matter with the adult, when, in opposition to his true destiny, his intellect and will remain in the bondage of the natural man. Thus, the criminal sees the punishment to which he has to submit as an act of violence from without; whereas in fact the penalty is only the manifestation of his own criminal will.

From what has now been said, we may learn what to think of a man who, when blamed for his shortcomings, or, it may be, his discreditable acts, appeals to the (professedly) excellent intentions and sentiments of the inner self he distinguishes therefrom. There certainly may be individual cases where the malice of outward circumstances frustrates well-meant designs and disturbs the execution of the best-laid plans. But in general, even here the essential unity between inward and outward is maintained.

We are thus justified in saying that a man is what he does; and the lying vanity which consoles itself with the feeling of inward excellence may be confronted with the words of the Gospel: "By their fruits ye shall know them". That grand saying applies primarily in a moral and religious aspect, but it also holds good in reference to performances in art and science. The keen eye of a teacher who perceives in his pupil decided evidences of talent, may lead him to state his opinion that a Raphael or a Mozart lies hidden in the boy: and the result will show how far such an opinion was well-founded. But if a daub of a painter, or a poetaster, soothe themselves by the conceit that their head is full of high ideas, their consolation is a poor one; and if they insist on being judged not by their actual works but by their projects, we may safely reject their pretensions as unfounded and unmeaning. The converse case however also occurs. In passing judgment on men who have accomplished something great and good, we often make use of the false distinction between inward and outward. All that they have accomplished, we say, is outward merely; inwardly they were acting from some very different motive, such as a desire to gratify their vanity or other unworthy passion. This is the spirit of envy. Incapable of any great action of its own, envy tries hard to depreciate greatness and to bring it down to its own level. Let us, rather, recall the fine expression of Goethe, that there is no remedy but Love against great superiorities of others. We may seek to rob men's great actions of their grandeur, by the insinuation of hypocrisy; but, though it is possible that men in an instance now and then may dissemble and disguise a good deal, they cannot conceal the whole of their inner self, which infallibly betrays itself in the *decursus vitae*. Even here it is true that a man is nothing but the series of his actions.

What is called the "pragmatic" writing of history has in modern times frequently sinned in its treatment of great historical characters, and defaced and tarnished the true conception of them by this fallacious separation of the outward and the inward. Not content with telling the unvarnished tale of the great acts which have been wrought by the heroes of the world's history, and with acknowledging that their inward being corresponds with the import of their acts, the pragmatic historian fancies himself justified and even obliged to trace the supposed secret motives that lie behind the open facts of the record. The historian, in that case, is supposed to write with more depth in proportion as he succeeds in tearing away the aureole from all that has been heretofore held grand

and glorious, and in depressing it, so far as its origin and proper significance are concerned, to the level of vulgar mediocrity. To make these pragmatic researches in history easier, it is usual to recommend the study of psychology, which is supposed to make us acquainted with the real motives of human actions. The psychology in question, however, is only that petty knowledge of men, which looks away from the essential and permanent in human nature to fasten its glance on the casual and private features shown in isolated instincts and passions. A pragmatic psychology ought at least to leave the historian, who investigates the motives at the ground of great actions, a choice between the “substantial” interests of patriotism, justice, religious truth, and the like, on the one hand, and the subjective and “formal” interests of vanity, ambition, avarice, and the like, on the other. The latter, however, are the motives which must be viewed by the pragmatist as really efficient, otherwise the assumption of a contrast between inward (the disposition of the agent) and the outward (the import of the action) would fall to the ground. But inward and outward have in truth the same content; and the right doctrine is the very reverse of this pedantic judiciality. If the heroes of history had been actuated by subjective and formal interests alone, they would never have accomplished what they have. And if we have due regard to the unity between the inner and the outer, we must own those great men willed what they did and did what they willed.

§ 141

The empty abstractions, by means of which the one identical content perforce continues in the two correlatives, suspend themselves in the immediate transition, the one into the other. The content is itself nothing but their identity (§138): and these abstractions are the seeming of essence, put as seeming. By the manifestation of force, the inward is put into existence: but this putting is the mediation by empty abstractions. In its own self the intermediating process vanishes to the immediacy, in which the inward and the outward are absolutely identical, and their difference is distinctly no more than assumed and imposed. This identity is Actuality.

*Part One of the Encyclopedia of
Philosophical Sciences: Science of Logic.*
[https://www.marxists.org/reference/
archive/hegel/works/sl/slappear.
htm#SL132](https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/slappear.htm#SL132)

Regarding seminar 3. Ontological Categories of Contemporary Philosophy.

Martin Heidegger *WHAT IS METAPHYSICS? (1929)*

“What is metaphysics?” The question leads one to expect talk about metaphysics. We will forgo that. Instead, we will elucidate a definite metaphysical question. In this way, it seems, we will be placed in the midst of metaphysics. Only thus will we make it really possible for metaphysics to explain itself. Our task begins by presenting a metaphysical question, goes on to elaborate the question, and ends with its answer.

The Presentation of a Metaphysical Question

According to Hegel, philosophy is from the point of view of good common sense “the world turned upside down”⁹⁰. The peculiarity of our undertaking therefore requires some preparatory remarks. This results from the twofold character of metaphysical questions.

First, every metaphysical question always grasps the whole of the problematic of metaphysics. In every case it is the whole itself. Furthermore, every metaphysical question can only be asked in such a way that the one doing the questioning, such as he is, is there (in) the question, that is, is put into question. From this we take the following directive: a metaphysical question must be put in its entirety and from the essential position of (the) questioning existence [des fragenden Daseins]. We, here and now, question on our *own* behalf. Our existence in the

⁹⁰ “Die Philosophie ist ihrer Natur nach etwas esoterisches, für sich weder für den Pöbel gemacht, noch einer Zubereitung für den Pöbel fähig; sie ist nur dadurch Philosophie daß sie dem Verstande, und damit noch mehr dem gesunden Menschenverstande, worunter man die lokale und temporäre Beschränktheit eines Geschlechts der Menschen versteht, gerade entgegengesetzt ist; im Verhältniß zu diesem ist an und für sich die Welt der Philosophie eine verkehrte”. G.W.F. Hegel, “Einleitung. Über das Wesen der philosophischen Kritik überhaupt, und ihr Verhältnis zum gegenwärtigen Zustand der Philosophie insbesondere[Introduction. On the Essence of Philosophical Criticism in General, and its Relation to the Present State of Philosophy in Particular]” (1802), in Hegel’s *Gesammelte Werke*, edited by Hartmut Buchner and Otto Pöggeler (Hamburg: Meiner, 1968) IV, p. 124-25. The text is Hegel’s general introduction to the *Critical Journal of Philosophy*, which he and Schelling edited.

community of scholars, teachers and students is determined by science. What is really happening to us at the heart [im Grunde] of our existence, now that science has become our passion?

The fields of science are widely separated from each other. Their ways of dealing with the objects they inquiry about are fundamentally different. In our time such dissociated diversity of disciplines is held together only thanks to the technical organization of the universities and their faculties and is given meaning by establishing a common practical aim for the various departments. But, as a result, close contact among the sciences in their essential common ground has died off.

And yet — in all the sciences, when we follow their own most proper aim we relate ourselves to *be-ing itself*. Precisely from the point of view of science, no field takes precedence over the others, neither nature over history nor vice versa. No one method of dealing with objects dominates the others. Mathematical knowledge is no stricter than philological-historical knowledge. It merely has the character of “exactness”, which is not the same as strictness. To demand exactness of the study of history goes against the specific strictness of the humanities [Geisteswissenschaften]. The relationship [Bezug] to the world prevailing in all the sciences as such allows them to look for be-ing itself with a view to making it an object of investigation and substantiating definition according to its whatness [Wasgehalt] and mode of being [Seinsart]. The idea is that the sciences effect a *rapprochement* [In-die-Nähe-kommen] with the essential [Wesentlichen] in all things [Dinge].

This distinctive relationship of the world to be-ing itself is borne out and guided by a freely adopted attitude [Haltung] of human life [menschlichen Existenz]. To be sure, man’s prescientific and extra-scientific dealings are also related to be-ing. But science is distinctive in that, in its own way, it lets the matter itself [die Sache selbst] explicitly and solely have the last word. With such objectivity [Sachlichkeit] of questioning, defining and substantiating, a certain limited submission to be-ing itself is effected, so that it can thereby itself. This submissive position taken by research and teaching comes to be the basis of the possibility of a unique, though limited kind of guiding influence on the entirety of human life. The particular relationship of science to the world and the guiding attitude of man within it can be fully conceptualized,

of course, only when we see and grasp what happens in a relationship to the world attained in this way. Man — one [kind of] be-ing among others — “pursues the sciences”. In this “pursuit” nothing less happens than the disruption by one be-ing, called man, of the entirety of be-ing, so that in and through this disruption be-ing thereby gives over what and how it is. In its own way, this eruptive disruption helps be-ing first come into its own.

In its radical unity, this triality — relationship to the world, attitude, invasion — brings an enlivening simplicity and keenness to existence [Da-sein]⁹¹ in the life of science [wissenschaftliche Existenz]. If we expressly take over for ourselves such an enlightened scientific existence [Da-sein], then we must say: That to which the relationship to the world refers is be-ing itself — and nothing more [und sonst nichts]^{92 *93}.

That from which any attitude takes its direction is be-ing itself — and more than that, nothing [und weiter nichts]. That which scholarly discussion effects with its disruption is be-ing itself — and above and beyond that, nothing [und darüber hinaus nichts]. But it is remarkable that just when scientific man makes sure of what is most his own, he speaks of something else. *Only be-ing (entity) is supposed to be studied, and besides that — nothing; only be-ing, and more than that — nothing; solely be-ing, and beyond that — nothing* [und darüber hinaus nichts]. *How do things stand with this no-thing* [Nichts]?⁹⁴

⁹¹ “Da-sein” (hyphenated) stresses the *being* there of existence and will be translated as “being there”. This instance and the next occurrence of “Da-sein” are exceptions.

⁹² “Worauf der Weltbezug geht, ist das Seiende selbst — und sonst nichts”. (WM 105) Variant: The relationship to the world extends to be-ing — and nothing else besides.

^{93*} First edition (1929): “Man hat diesen Zusatz hinter dem Gedankenstrich als willkürlich und künstlich ausgegeben und weiß nicht, daß Taine, der als Vertreter und Zeichen eines ganzen, noch herrschenden Zeitalters genommen werden kann, wissentlich diese Formel zur Kennzeichnung seiner Grundstellung und Absicht gebraucht [The addition after the hyphen may seem arbitrary and artificial without knowing that Taine, who can be called the representative and symbol of the whole of the still prevailing era, knowingly used this formula as the characterization of his starting point and purpose]”. (WM 105) Hippolyte-Adolphe Taine (1828–1893), philosopher and “psychologist”, was one of the leading lights of positivism in France and an influence, for example, on Jean Piaget’s genetic epistemology and, indirectly, on contemporary cognitive psychology.

⁹⁴ I have translated “das Nichts” as no-thing (hyphenated) to reflect Heidegger’s point that “das Nichts” is the absence of any effective actuality (be-ing) of any kind whatsoever. No thing of any sort can be detected. This contrasts with “das Seiende” (be-ing) in all its various modes. Here begins a proliferation of terms used by Heidegger in his discus-

Is it an accident that we speak quite automatically in this way? Is it then only a manner of speaking — and nothing more?

But why do we trouble ourselves about this no-thing? In fact, nothing is indeed turned away by science and given up [on] as the null and void [das Nichtige]. But if we give up no-thing in such a way, do we not indeed accept it? But can we talk about an acceptance if we accept nothing [nichts]? Yet maybe all this back and forth has already turned into empty verbal wrangling. Science must then renew its seriousness and assert its soberness in opposition to this, so that it has only to do with be-ing [um das Seiende geht].

No-thing — what can it be for science except a horror and a phantasm? If science is right, then one thing is for certain: science wants to know nothing of no-thing [vom Nichts nichts wissen]. In the end, this is the scientifically strict comprehension of no-thing. We know it in wanting to know nothing about the no-thing ^{*95}. Science wants to know nothing of no-thing. But even so it is nonetheless certain that, when it

sion of no-thing. Some are in common use in German, some have technical resonances in the literature of philosophy, and some are Heidegger's neologisms (marked with an *). Occasionally, an English neologism (marked **) has been required. The terms and their place of first appearance in the text are as follows: the pronoun "*nichts*" [nothing, nothing (at all)] (105) and its related noun **"das Nichts"* [no-thing] (105); the noun **"das Nicht"* [the not] (108); the verb **"nichten"* [to nihilate] (114), its related present participle and adjective **"nichtend"* [nihilating] (114), and the nouns **"die Nichtung"* [nihilation] (114) and *"das Nichten"* [nihilating] (115); the noun **"das Nichthaft"* [the not-like] (108), based on an implied neologism, the adjective **"nichthaft"*; the verb *"vernichten"* [to annihilate] (113) and the noun *"die Vernichtung"* [annihilation] (113); two composite nouns *"das Nicht-Seiende"* [what is not be-ing; i.e. what is other than one kind of be-ing or another] (108) and *"das Nichtseiend"* [not-be-ing; i.e. what is not at the time be-ing] (119); the nouns **"das Nichtige"* [the null and void] (106) and *"ie Wichtigkeit"* [nullity] (119) (from the adjective *"nichtig"* [null, invalid, void]); the verb *"verneinen"* [to negate] (109), its past participle *"verneint"* [negated] (109) and related adjective *"verneinend"* [negative, negating] (113), based on the present participle of "verneinen", and five related nouns: *"die Verneinung"* [negation, in the sense of what is accomplished by placing a negative sign in front of a term in symbolic logic or mathematics] (107), **"das Verneint"* [the negated, the ***negated*] (108), **"die Verneinheit"* [negativity] (108), **"das Zu-verneinend"* [what is do the negating] (116), and *"das Verneinen"* [negating] (117); the noun **"das Verneinbar"* [the ***negatable*], based on a neologism, the adjective *"verneinbar"* [***negatable*] (116); the adverb *"nein"* ["no"] used as an interjection (118), and its related noun **"das Nein"* [the No] (117); and the adverb *"kein"* [no, none, or not any] (112).

⁹⁵ * "Wir wissen es, indem wir von ihm, dem Nichts, nichts wissen wollen". (WM 106)

attempts to talk about its own essence [Wesen],*⁹⁶ it calls on no-thing for help. It claims for its own what it has rejected. What sort of conflicted*⁹⁷ essence unveils itself here?

Reflection on our present life [augenblickliche Existenz] as one determined by science finds us in the midst of a conflict. In the dispute a question has already presented itself. The question merely needs to be articulated. *How do things stand with no-thing?*

The Elaboration of the Question

The development of the question about no-thing must put us in the position to be clear about whether it is possible or impossible to answer this question. No-thing *has been* admitted. With overweening indifference toward it, science commends it as what “is not [a] given” *⁹⁸ .

All the same, we will try to speak about no-thing. What is no-thing? Our first approach to this question already shows us something unusual about it. From the outset in asking this question we posit no-thing as something that “is” such and such, as be-ing. But plainly it has in fact been distinguished from just that*⁹⁹ . The question about no-thing — what and how it, no-thing, is — turns what is being questioned into its opposite. The question robs itself of its own object.

Accordingly, every answer to this question is impossible from the outset. For it necessarily starts out in the form: no-thing “is” this or that. Question and answer alike are themselves just as nonsensical with respect to no-thing.

But such a dismissal doesn’t have to come from science. The commonly referred to ground rule of all thinking (*the principle of avoiding contradiction*), everyday “logic” puts down [niederschlagen] this question. For thinking, which in essence is always thinking about

⁹⁶ * Fifth edition (1949): “die positive und ausschließliche Haltung zum Seienden [the positive and exclusive attitude toward be-ing]”. (WM 106)

⁹⁷ * Third edition (1931): “ontologische Differenz [ontological difference]”. (WM 106)
Fifth edition (1949): “Nichts als “Sein” [no-thing as “be(ing)】”. (WM 106)

⁹⁸ * “Die Wissenschaft gibt es, mit einer überlegenen Gleichgültigkeit gegen es, preis als das, was “es nicht gibt”.” (WM 107)

⁹⁹ * Fifth edition (1949): “der Unterschied, die Differenz [the distinction, the difference]”. (WM 107) “Unterschied” also refers to the difference in a subtraction problem. “Differenz” may also mean difference of opinion or discrepancy (implying error).

something [etwas], would be working against its own nature in thinking about no-thing. Because we keep on failing to make no-thing as such into an object [Gegenstand], we have already come to the end of our question about no-thing, on the assumption that “logic”^{*100} is the highest authority on this question, that the intellect [Verstand] is the means and thinking the way to grasp no-thing in an original way and to decide about its disclosure [Enthüllung].

But can the rule of “logic” be challenged? Isn’t the intellect really lord and master in this question about no-thing? After all, only with its help can we determine no-thing at all and formulate it as a problem, even ^{101 102} if only as one that eliminates itself.

Generality [Allheit] of be-ing, simply not be-ing [das schlechthin Nicht-Seiende]. Yet with that we subsume no-thing under the higher determination of the not-like [das Nichthaft] and therewith, so it seems, the negated [das Verneint]. But under the ruling and never challenged doctrine of “logic”, negation [Verneinung] is a specific mental act. How then can we with the question of no-thing, and indeed with the question about its questionability, hope to bid adieu to the intellect? Are we that certain about what we presuppose here? Does the not [das Nicht], negativity [die Verneinheit], and hence negation have about it a higher determination under which no-thing, as a particular species of the negated, falls? Is there no-thing only because there is the not, i.e., negation? Or is it the other way around? Is there negation and the not only because there is no-thing?¹⁰³ This has not been decided; indeed not once has the question been expressly raised. We maintain that no-thing is more original^{*104} than the not and negation. If our thesis is correct, then the possibility of negation as a mental act, and therewith the intellect itself, depends in some way upon no-thing. What hope is there then to decide about this? Does the seeming absurdity of the question and answer

¹⁰⁰ * First edition (1929): “d.h. Logik im gewöhnlichen Sinne, was man so dafür nimmt [that is, logic in the usual sense that one uses the term]”. (WM 107)

¹⁰¹ “Nur mit seiner Hilfe können wir doch überhaupt nur das Nichts bestimmen und als ein wenn auch nur sich selbst verzehrendes Problem ansetzen”. (WM 107)

¹⁰² This sense of negation is exemplified by what the negative sign does in mathematics.

¹⁰³ “Gibt es das Nichts nur, weil es das Nicht, d.h. die Verneinung gibt? Oder liegt es umgekehrt? Gibt es die Verneinung und das Nicht nur, weil es das Nichts gibt?” (WM 108)

¹⁰⁴ * Fifth edition (1949): “Ursprungsordnung [(in the) order of origin or origination]”. (WM 108)

regarding no-thing rest solely on the blind single-mindedness*¹⁰⁵ of our far-ranging intellect?

However, if we do not allow ourselves to be led astray by the formal impossibility of the question about no-thing and still confront the question, we must then at the very least satisfy what is still as the basic requirement of the possible development of any question. If no-thing is to be questioned in the way questioning works, then it must itself be given in advance. We must be able to encounter it.

How do we go after [suchen] no-thing? How do we find no-thing? In order to find something [etwas], must we not already know that it is there [daß es da ist] at all? Indeed! First and foremost, a person is able to look for something only if he has already anticipated the actual presence [Vorhandensein] of what is being sought [das Gesuchte]¹⁰⁶.

But what is sought here is no-thing. In the end, is there seeking without some anticipation, a seeking to which a proper finding belongs? Be that as it may, we know no-thing even if only as that which we casually talk about day in and day out. Without further ado, we can work out a “definition” of this pale no-thing, which in all the colorlessness of self-evidence so inconspicuously hangs around our talk.

No-thing is the complete negation of the generality of be-ing. In the end, isn't this characteristic of no-thing a sign of the only direction from which it can encounter us? Generality of be-ing must be given beforehand in order to be made invalid [verfallen zu können] as such by negation, in which no-thing itself then must manifest [bekunden] itself.

But even if we ignore the questionability of the relation between negation and no-thing, how should we as finite essences, make the whole of be-ing in its generality accessible in itself and to ourselves in particular [zumal]?¹⁰⁷ If need be, we can think of the whole of be-ing as an “idea [Idee]”, and then negate what has been thus thought up and “think” of it as negated. *In this way we do reach the formal concept of a no-thing itself, “thought up” [eingebildeten] no-thing, but never no-*

¹⁰⁵ * Fifth edition (1949): “die blinde Eigensinnigkeit: die *certitudo* des *ego cogito*, Subjektivität [blind single-mindedness: the certainty of the I think, subjectivity]”. (WM 108)

¹⁰⁶ “Zunächst und zumeist vermag der Mensch nur dann zu suchen, wenn er das Vorhandensein des Gesuchten vorweggenommen hat”. (WM 109)

¹⁰⁷ “Zumal” also means “at the same time”

*thing itself*¹⁰⁸. But nothing is nothing¹⁰⁹ and no difference can prevail between the thought up nothing and “real [eigentlich]” no-thing, unless no-thing represents something other than the complete absence of difference [Unterschiedslösigkeit]¹¹⁰. But real nothing itself it once again that concealed and absurd concept of an actual no-thing [eines seienden Nichts]?¹¹¹ For one last time now the objections of our intellect would call a halt to our search, the legitimacy of which can be demonstrated only through a fundamental experience [Gründerfahrung] of no-thing.

As surely as we never get a sure grasp of the generality of be-ing in itself, just as surely do we all the same find ourselves somehow placed in the midst of the generality of bare [enthüllt] be-ing. In the end, there continues to be [besteht] an essential difference between getting a grasp of the whole of be-ing in itself and finding oneself in the midst of be-ing as a whole [des Seienden im Ganzen] impossible in principle¹¹².

The latter happens all the time in our existence. Of course, it looks just as though in our everyday comings and goings we were holding fast to only just this or that [kind of] be-ing, as though we were lost in this or that realm of be-ing. But no matter how fragmented the daily round may seem, it always maintains be-ing in the unity of a “whole [Ganzes]”, although only in the shadows¹¹³. Even then and precisely just then, when we are not especially busy with things?¹¹⁴ This “as a whole”¹¹⁵ overcomes us, for example, in genuine boredom. This is a long way off far off when this or that book or play, job or leisure activity¹¹⁶, is boring [langeweilt]. It breaks out when “it’s boring [es einem langweilig ist]”. Profound boredom, like a silent fog insinuating itself in the depths of existence, pulls things, others and oneself into it altogether with remarkable indifference. Such boredom reveals be-ing as a whole.

¹⁰⁸ The “thought up” is in one sense the imaginary. The point is, we can never imagine away everything.

¹⁰⁹ “Aber das Nichts ist nichts . . .” (WM 109)

¹¹⁰ “Unterschiedslösigkeit” also means indifference, the condition of having lost all capacity for making (a) difference or for making differentiations.

¹¹¹ Here Heidegger is pointing to the patent [seienden] latency [Nichts] of anything whatsoever.

¹¹² The fundamental sense of “das Seiende im Ganzen” seems to be “be-ing at all”.

¹¹³ This is the unity of what is simultaneously minimally (“at all”) and maximally (“all”) delimited.

¹¹⁴ The sense here is of when we are whiling away the time, fooling around, tinkering about.

¹¹⁵ This is the “at all” of “being at all”.

¹¹⁶ Today Heidegger would likely have referred to watching television, playing video games, or passing the time with other such diversions.

Another possibility of such revelation [Offenbarung] lies concealed in our joy in the present [Gegenwart]¹¹⁷ [of the] existence not merely the person, of someone we love. Being attuned in such a way that we “are” one way or another, we find ourselves [befinden] in the midst of be-ing as a whole being attuned by it. Not only does the situatedness [Befindlichkeit]¹¹⁸ of mood disclose (reveal) be-ing as a whole in its own way, but this disclosing, far from being a mere incident, is at the same time the fundamental event [Grundgeschehen] of our *being* there.

What we call our “feelings [Gefühle]”, then, are neither the fleeting concomitant [Begleiterscheinung] of our thinking and willing behavior, nor a mere causal impetus to such, nor even an actually present condition [vorhandener Zustand] with which we have to come to terms — in some way. Yet just when moods in such a way bring be-ing as a whole before us, they hide from us the no-thing we are looking for. We are then even less of the opinion that the negation of be-ing as a whole revealed in mood puts no-thing before us. Accordingly, that sort of thing could happen to begin with [ursprünglich] only in a mood that reveals no-thing in the most proper sense of disclosing it.

Does such being attuned in which no-thing itself is brought before us happen in human existence? This event is possible and happens, though only rarely and only for an instant, in the fundamental mood of dread [Angst]. In this sense, dread does not refer to the regularly occurring anxiety [Ängstlichkeit] that has its source in the fearfulness [Furchtsamkeit] that so easily appears in us. Dread is fundamentally different from fear [Furcht]. We are afraid of this or that determinate [kind of] be-ing which threatens us in this or that regard. Fear of . . . is also in every case being afraid of something determinate [etwas Bestimmtes]. Since fear has about it the limitation of an “of what” and “about what”, the frightening and frightful become bound by that in which one finds himself. In striving to save himself from it, from this determinate [something], one becomes unsure of himself with regard to everything else, that is, “in a panic” about everything. (All shades of fear there are in this fragment).

¹¹⁷ “Gegenwart” actually means “the present” (in contrast with “the past” and “the future”) or the grammatical “present tense”. This is a telling usage. Heidegger here points to the coincidence of tense and temporal mode in existence. He refers in the same way to no-thing (WM 112).

¹¹⁸ Finding ourselves at all means finding ourselves somewhere, in a particular place, as *χώρα*.

Dread does not give rise to such confusion. On the contrary, an odd calm pervades it. Dread is indeed always dread of...,but not of this or that. Dread of...is always dread about..., but not about this or that. The indeterminacy of and about what we are in dread is not some sort of failure of determinacy, but rather the essential impossibility of determinacy. This is illustrated by the following familiar explanation. In dread, as we say, “something is uncanny [ist es einem unheimlich]”. What do we mean by “something” and “is”? We cannot say what the uncanny something is about. There is something like this about the “as a whole [im Ganzen]”¹²¹: all things [Dinge] and we ourselves sink into indifference*¹²². Not in the sense of merely disappearing, but rather, in its very moving away [Wegrücken], it turns to us. This¹²³ moving away of be-ing as a whole that closes in on [umdrängt] us in dread pressures [bedrängt] us.¹²⁴ There’s nothing to get a hold on. All that remains and comes over us in the slipping away of be-ing is this “no [kein]”.

Dread reveals no-thing. We are “suspended [schweben]” in dread.¹²⁵ More clearly, dread leaves us hanging because it brings on the slipping away of be-ing. So it is that we actual human beings [seienden Menschen]¹²⁶* slip away from ourselves in the midst of be-ing. For at bottom this is not uncanny to you or me, but rather “it” is like that. In the shuddering [Durchschütterung] of this suspense [Schweben], where one can hold on to nothing [nichts], only really *being* there [das reine

¹²¹ “Im Ganzen ist einem so”. (WM 111) Variant: There is also something of this about the “at all”.

¹²² * Fifth edition (1949): “das Seiende spricht nicht mehr an [be-ing no longer appeals to this]”.

¹²³ In the following lines, Heidegger plays off the verbs “bedrängen” (to pressure, in the sense of forcing someone’s hand), “umdrängen” (to close in on the way a storm approaches), and “andrängen” (to play against, the way actors “play off” one another on stage).

¹²⁴ “Es bleibt kein Halt”. (WM 112) Variant: There’s no getting a hold on anything.

¹²⁵ Variant: We are “at sea” in dread.

¹²⁶ The play is on the convertibility of the expressions “human being” and “be-ing human”, in which be-ing means effective actuality.

* Fifth edition (1949): “aber nicht der Mensch als Mensch “des” Da-sein [but not man a man “in” existence]”. (WM 112) Heidegger is not speaking of the “human (being)” (man or woman) understood as somehow the *result* (therefore, a “finished” being) of *being* there at all [Da-sein]. The additional play here is on “Dasein” [existence], “Da-sein” [(the emphatic state of) *being* there], and the verb “da-sein” [to be there].

Da-sein] remains*¹²⁷. Dread strikes us dumb¹²⁸ every saying “Is” [jedes “Ist”-Sagen] about it is silent in the face of it.

That in the uncanniness of dread we even often attempt to break the empty stillness with random chatter is only proof of [the] present [Gegenwart] [of] no-thing. That dread discloses no-thing is then immediately confirmed when dread has eased off. In light of what we had just seen while it was still fresh in our memory, we are forced to say that that about and of which we were in dread was “really [eigentlich]” nothing at all [nichts]. Indeed, no-thing itself, as such, was there¹²⁹. Because be-ing as a whole slips away and straightaway no-thing rushes in, thing itself, as such, was there. In the fundamental mood of dread we have reached the event of existence in which no-thing is made¹³⁰ manifest and in which it must be questioned. How do things stand with no-thing?

The Answer to the Question

We have already initially given what, for our purposes, is the only essential answer to our question, if we take care that the question about no-thing has actually been posed. For this demands that we carry out the conversion of man*¹³¹ into his *being* there [des Menschen in sein Da-sein], which every instance of dread occasions in us, in order to apprehend no-thing, which is obvious in it*¹³² as it manifests itself. At the same time the demand finally comes to ward off characterizations of no-thing that have not arisen from what is being claimed here. No-thing discloses

¹²⁷ All that remains is pure, unalloyed *being* there. Variant: Here, in the shuddering of such suspense, where there is no thing of any kind to hold on to, there remains only / nothing other than pure *being* there. *Fifth edition (1949): “das Da-sein “im” Mensch [the being there “of” man]”. The point is that existence belongs only to human beings. See the Introduction to the address.

¹²⁸ “Die Angst verschlägt uns das Wort”. (WM 112) Variant: Dread leaves us speechless (with nothing to say, without words to express ourselves).

¹²⁹ “In der Tat: das Nichts selbst — als solche — war da”. (WM 112) *Fifth edition (1949): “heißt: enthüllte sich; Entbergung und Stimmung [that is to say, discloses itself; opening up and mood]”. “Entbergung” is a neologism with allusions to confessing, letting one’s real “feelings” show through, opening up, letting go.

¹³⁰ In dread, we have caught up with existence and see it as it first comes to pass.

¹³¹ * Fifth edition (1949): “als Subjekt! Da-sein aber schon denkend heir vorerfahren, nur deshalb die Frage “Was ist Metaphysik?” hier fragbar geworden [as subject! Only by thinking of *being* there as already having been experienced beforehand has the question “What Is Metaphysics?” become questionable]”. (WM 113)

¹³² *Fifth edition (1949): “Entbergung [opening up]”. (WM 113)

itself in dread, but not as [a kind of] be-ing. Just as little is it given as an object. Dread¹³³ is not an apprehension of no-thing. Nevertheless, no-thing is made manifest by and in it, although once again, not as if no-thing appeared [zeigte sich] separate “from [neben]” be-ing as a whole, which we found happening in uncanniness*²³⁴. Rather, we have said that it happens no-thing is at one with be-ing as a whole¹³⁵. What does this “at one with” mean?*¹³⁶

In dread, be-ing as a whole becomes untenable. In what sense does this happen? After all, be-ing is not annihilated [vernichtet] so that no-thing is left over. How could it be otherwise, when dread finds itself completely powerless in the face of be-ing as a whole! Moreover, no-thing manifests itself specifically with and in be-ing as something that is slipping away as a whole [im Ganzen]. No annihilation [Vernichtung] of all of [ganzen] be-ing comes about in dread, though just as little do we carry out a negation of be-ing as a whole [im Ganzen] in order to reach no-thing in the first place. Apart from the fact that the express making of such a negative statement is foreign to dread, we have always come too late with the very negation that is supposed to give us no-thing. No-thing comes to pass long before that¹³⁷. As we have said, it happens “at one with” be-ing as a whole that is slipping away. In dread there is found a giving way to . . ., which is admittedly not so much a fleeing as a spellbound calm...¹³⁸. This [falling] back before [Zurück vor . . .] takes its point of departure in no-thing. It is not a pulling in on itself, but rather essentially a turning away¹³⁹.

¹³³ “Die Angst ist kein Erfassen des Nichts”. (WM 113)

¹³⁴ * Fifth edition (1949): “Unheimlichkeit und Unverborgenheit [uncanniness and emergence]”. (WM 113)

¹³⁵ “. . . das Nichts begenet in der Angst in eins mit dem Seienden im Ganzen”. (WM 113)

¹³⁶ * Fifth edition (1949): “der Unterschied [the difference]”.

¹³⁷ “Das Nichts begegnet vordem schon”. (WM 114)

¹³⁸ “In der Angst liegt ein Zurückweichen vor . . ., das freilich kein Fliehen mehr ist, sonderneine gebante Ruhe”. (WM 114) Variant: This falling back in the face of/ retreating from what we find in dread is admittedly not a fleeing but rather a spellbound calm.

¹³⁹ Two senses of “abweisen” are at work here: turning away from (actively rejecting) and turning down (refusing, as in turning down a job offer).

The turning away, however, is as such an expelling¹⁴⁰ of be-ing as a whole that *lets* it slip out of one's grasp. The whole rejecting expulsion*¹⁴¹ of be-ing as a whole that is slipping away, which is the way dread closes in on existence, is the essence of no-thing: nihilation [die Nichtung]. Neither is it an annihilation of be-ing nor does it come from [entspringt] negation. Nor can nihilation be accounted for by annihilation or negation. No-thing nihilates of its own*¹⁴². Nihilating¹⁴³ is not an occurrence of some sort, but rather as the refusing expelling of be-ing as a whole that is slipping by, it reveals be-ing in its full, previously obscured foreignness as the "other than" *per se* with regard to no-thing. In the clear night of dread's no-thing, the original openness of be-ing as such arises [ersteht] for the first time in such a way that it is [a kind of] be-ing and not no-thing...

...Beholden to no-thing, existence is already beyond be-ing as a whole. We call this being above and beyond be-ing transcendence. If existence were not of essence fundamentally transcending, which now means, were it not already beholden to no-thing, then it could not relate itself to be-ing and so not even to itself. Without [the] original manifestness of no-thing, no selfhood and no freedom. With that the answer to the question about no-thing is found. No-thing is neither an object nor, above all, be-ing. No-thing comes neither in and of itself nor along with be-ing, upon which it depends all the same. No-thing is the potential for a manifestness of be-ing as some such thing for human existence. *No-thing does not primarily provide the antithesis of be-ing, but is originally of the very essence.* ["Absolute"] excludes all nullity [Nichtigkeit] as well.

This simple historical reminder marks [zeigt] no-thing as the antithesis of authentic be-ing, that is, as its negation [als dessen Verneinung]. But

¹⁴⁰ This may also be construed as a referring (back [zurück]) to be-ing as a whole, based on another sense of "Verweisen" (referring).

¹⁴¹ * Fifth edition (1949): "ab-weisen: das Seiende für sich; ver-weisen: in das Sein des Seienden [to turn away or turn down: be-ing in and of itself; to expel or refer back: within the be[ing] of be-ing]".

¹⁴² "Das Nichts selbst nichtet". (WM 114)

* Fifth edition (1949): "als Nichten west, währt, gewährt das Nichts [in the way nihilating makes be, sustains, gives (up) no-thing]". (WM 114)

¹⁴³ Nihilating does not begin at some point. The sense seems to be that nihilating only goes on happening. We never see its inception. No-thing has always already gotten underway.

when no-thing somehow becomes a problem, this opposing relation does not merely experience some sort of more meaningful determination, but rather awakens for the first time a authentically metaphysical interrogative disposition toward the *be[ing]* of be-ing. No-thing does not remain the indeterminate opposite of be-ing, but rather discloses itself as belonging to the *be[ing]* of be-ing. “Pure *be[ing]* and pure no-thing is the same”. This proposition of Hegel’s (*Science of Logic*) is correct. *Be[ing]* and no-thing belong together, not because both of them agree in their indeterminacy and immediacy, but rather because *be[ing]* itself is in essence finite and revealed only in the transcendence of existence enduring no-thing [in das Nichts hinausgehaltenen Daseins]. Because the question about *be[ing]* as such is also the comprehensive question of metaphysics, the question about no-thing is shown to be of a kind that encompasses the whole of metaphysics. However, at the same time, the question about no-thing seizes upon the whole of metaphysics, insofar as it forces us to face the problem of the origin of negation, that is, to face what is fundamentally a decision about the legitimate dominance of “logic” in metaphysics. The old proposition *ex nihilo nihil fit* has another sense, which happens to speak to the problem of *be[ing]*¹⁶⁸ and goes like this: *ex nihilo omne ens qua ens fit*. Be-ing as a whole first comes to itself in accordance¹⁶⁹ with its very own possibility, that is, only in the no-thing of existence. If it is metaphysical, to what extent then has the question about no-thing taken up our questioning existence? We note that our existence, as currently experienced, is determined essentially by science. Determined in this way, if our existence is posed in the question about no-thing, then it must have become questionable through this question.

...The supposed seriousness and superiority of science becomes foolishness if it does not take no-thing seriously. Only because no-thing is obvious [to it] can science make be-ing an object of study. Only if science grows out of [existiert aus]¹⁷⁰ metaphysics, can it ever prevail afresh in its essential task, which consists, not in the accumulation and classification of knowledge, but rather in an always fresh ongoing disclosure of the whole field of the truth of nature and history.

¹⁶⁸ “Every thing as a thing comes from no-thing”.

¹⁶⁹ “Im Nichts des Daseins kommt erst das Seiende im Ganzen seiner eigensten Möglichkeit nach, d.h. in endlicher Weise, zu sich selbst”. (WM 120)

¹⁷⁰ See Introduction to the lecture (above), written twenty years later, in which the meaning of “existieren” is re(de)finied. Only man exists, since [the] no-thing comes of [his] existing. Man is an original.

Only because no-thing is manifest at the heart of existence can the full strangeness of be-ing come over us. Only if the strangeness of be-ing impresses us does it waken us and open us up to wonder. Only on the basis of wonder, that is, the manifestness of no-thing, does the “Why?” come up [entspringt]. Only because the Why as such is possible can we ask in a determinate way about and establish [begründen] the basics [Gründen]. Only because we can ask and establish is the fate our life in the hands of scientists. The question about no-thing puts us, the questioners, into question. It is a metaphysical one. Human existence can relate to be-ing only if it is itself beholden to no-thing¹⁷¹. Going above and beyond be-ing is of the essence of existence. This going beyond, however, is metaphysics itself¹⁷².

That is how metaphysics belongs to “the nature of man” [zur “Natur des Menschen”]. It is neither of branch of academic philosophy nor a realm of scattered notions [Einfälle]. Metaphysics is the basic event of existence. It is existence itself. Because the truth of metaphysics dwells in this unfathomable ground, it has about it the ever-lurking possibility of deepest error about what is in closest proximity [to it]. Hence, no strictness of a science attains the seriousness of metaphysics. Philosophy can never be measured by the yardstick of the idea of science...

*From: <https://wagner.edu/psychology/files/2013/01/Heidegger-What-Is-Metaphysics-Translation-GROTH.pdf>
[TRANSLATED BY MILES GROTH, PhD]*

¹⁷¹ “Das Hinausgehen über das Seiende geschieht im Wesen des Daseins”. (WM 121) Variants: Exceeding be-ing is of the essence of existence. The essence of existence is being more than be-ing.

¹⁷² The reference is to Kant. See the Introduction to the lecture where it is repeated.

Jean Baudrillard
The Orders of Simulacra

Three orders of appearance, parallel to the mutations of the law of value, have followed one another since the Renaissance:

- *Counterfeit* is the dominant scheme of the “classical” period, from the Renaissance to the industrial revolution.
- *Production* is the dominant scheme of the industrial era.
- *Simulation* is the reigning scheme of the current phase that is controlled by the code.

The first order of simulacrum is based on the natural law of value, that of the second order on the commercial law of value, that of the third order on the structural law of value.

The Stucco Angel

Counterfeit (and fashion at the same time) is born with the Renaissance, with the destructuring of the feudal order by the bourgeois order and the emergence of open competition on the level of the distinctive signs. There is no such thing as fashion in a society of cast and rank, since one is assigned a place irrevocably, and so class mobility is non-existent. An interdiction protects the signs and assures them a total clarity; each sign then refers unequivocally to a status. Likewise no counterfeit is possible with the ceremony — unless as black magic and sacrilege, and it is thus that any confusion of signs is punished: as grave infraction of the order of things. If we are starting to dream again, today especially, of a world of sure signs, of a strong “symbolic order”, make no mistake about it: this order has existed and it was that of a ferocious hierarchy, since transparency and cruelty for signs go together. In caste societies, feudal or archaic, *cruel* societies, the signs are limited in number, and are not widely diffused, each one functions with its full value as interdiction, each is a reciprocal obligation between castes, clans or persons. The signs therefore are anything but arbitrary. The arbitrary sign begins when, instead of linking two persons in an unbreakable reciprocity, the signifier starts referring back to the disenchanted universe of the signified, common denominator of the real world toward which no one has any obligation.

End of the *obliged* sign, reign of the emancipated sign, that all classes will partake equally of. Competitive democracy succeeds the endogamy of signs proper to statutory order. At the same time we pass, with the transfer of values/signs of prestige from one class to another, necessarily into *counterfeit*. For we have passed from a limited order of signs, which prohibits “free production”, to a proliferation of signs according to demand. But the sign multiplied no longer resembles in the slightest the obliged sign of limited diffusion: it is its counterfeit, not by corruption of an “original”, but by extension of a material whose very clarity depended on the restriction by which it was bound. No longer discriminating (it is no more than competitive), unburdened of all restraint, universally available, the modern sign still simulates necessity in taking itself as tied somehow to the world. The modern sign dreams of the signs of the past and would well appreciate finding again, in its reference to the real, an *obligation*: but what it finds again is only a *reason*: this referential reason, this real, this “natural” off which it is going to live. But this bond of designation is only the simulacrum of symbolic obligation: it produces neutral values only, that can be exchanged in an objective world. The sign here suffers the same destiny as work. The “free” worker is free only to produce equivalents—the “free and emancipated” sign is free only to produce the signs of equivalence.

It is therefore in the simulacrum of a “nature” that the modern sign finds its value. Problematic of the “natural”, metaphysics of reality and appearance: that is the history of the bourgeoisie since the Renaissance, mirror of the bourgeois sign, mirror of the classical sign. And still today the nostalgia for a natural referent of the sign is still alive, in spite of the revolutions that have come to break up this configuration, including one in production, where the signs refer no longer to any nature, but only to the law of exchange, and come under the commercial law of value.

It is in the Renaissance that the false is born along with the natural. From the fake shirt in front to the use of the fork as artificial prosthesis, to the stucco interiors and the great baroque theatrical machinery. The entire classical era belongs *par excellence* to the theatre. Theatre is the form which takes over social life and all of architecture from the Renaissance on. It’s there, in the prowess’s of stucco and baroque art, that you read the metaphysic of the counterfeit and the new ambitions of Renaissance man — those of a *worldly demiurge*, a transubstantiation

of all of nature into a unique substance, theatrical like social life unified under the sign of bourgeois values, beyond all differences in blood, rank, or of caste. Stucco means democracy triumphant over all artificial signs, the apotheosis of theatre and fashion, and it betrays the new classes' infinite capabilities, its power to do anything once it has been able to break through the exclusiveness of signs. The way lies open to unheard-of combinations, to all the games, all the counterfeits — the Promethean verve of the bourgeoisie first plunged into the *imitation of nature* before throwing itself into *production*. In the churches and palaces stucco is wed to all forms, imitates everything — velvet curtains, wooden corniches, charnel swelling of the flesh. Stucco exorcizes the unlikely confusion of matter into a single new substance, a sort of general equivalent of all the others, and is prestigious theatrically because is itself a representative substance, a mirror of all the others.

But simulacra are not only a game played with signs; they imply social rapports and social power. Stucco can come off as the exaltation of a rising science and technology; it is also connected to the baroque — which in turn is tied to the enterprise of the Counter Reformation and the hegemony over the political and mental world that the Jesuits — who were the first to act according to modern conceptions of power — attempted to establish.

There is a strict correlation between the mental obedience of the Jesuits (“*perinde ac cadaver*”) and the demiurgic ambition to exorcize the natural substance of a thing in order to substitute a synthetic one. *Just like a man submitting his will to his organization, things take on the ideal functionality of the cadaver.* All technology, all technocracy is incipiently there: the presumption of an ideal counterfeit of the world, expressed in the invention of a universal substance and *of a universal amalgam of substances*. Reunify the scattered world (after the Reformation) under the aegis of a homogenous doctrine, universalize the world under a single word (from New Spain to Japan: The Missions), constitute a political elite *of the state*, with an identically centralized strategy: these are the objectives of the Jesuits. *In order to accomplish this, you need to create effective simulacra: the apparatus of the organization is one, but also is clerkly magnificence and the theatre (the great theatre of the cardinals and grey eminences). And training and education are other simulacra*

that aimed, for the first time ever in a systematic manner, at remodeling an ideal nature from a child. That architectural sauce of stucco and baroque is a great apparatus of the same kind. All of the above precedes the productivist rationality of capital, but everything testifies already — not in production, but in counterfeit to the same project of control and universal hegemony — to a social scheme where the internal coherence of a system is already at work...

...The counterfeit is working, so far, only on substance and form, not yet on relations and structures. But it is aiming already, on this level, at the control of a pacified society, ground up into a synthetic, deathless substance: an indestructible artifact that will guarantee an eternity of power. Is it not man's miracle to have invented, with plastic, a non-degradable material, interrupting thus the cycle which, by corruption and death, turns all the earth's substances ceaselessly one into another? A substance out-of-the-cycle; even fire leaves an indestructible residue. There is something incredible about it, this simulacrum where you can see in a condensed form the ambition of a universal semiotic. This has nothing to do with the "progress" of technology or with a rational goal for science. It is a project of political and cultural hegemony, the fantasy of a closed mental substance — like those angels of baroque stucco whose extremities meet in a curved mirror.

The Automation of the Robot

A whole world separates these two artificial beings. One is a theatrical counterfeit, a mechanical and clock-like man; technique submits entirely to *analogy* and to the effect of semblance. The other is dominated by the technical principle; the machine overrides all, and with the machine *equivalence* comes too. The automaton plays the part of courtier and good company; it participates in the pre-Revolutionary French theatrical and social games. The robot, on the other hand, as his name indicates, is a worker: the theatre is over and done with, the reign of mechanical man commences. The automaton is the *analogy* of man and remains his interlocutor (they play chess together!). The machine is man's equivalent and annexes him to itself in the unity of its operational process. This is the difference between a simulacrum of the first order and one of the second.

We shouldn't make any mistakes on this matter for reasons of "figurative" resemblance between robot and automaton. The latter is an interrogation upon nature, the mystery of the existence or non-existence of the soul, the dilemma of appearance and being. It is like God: what's underneath it all, what's inside, what's in the back of it? Only the counterfeit men allow these problems to be posed. The entire metaphysics of man as protagonist of the *natural theatre* of the creation is incarnated in the automaton, before disappearing with the Revolution. And the automaton has no other destiny than to be ceaselessly compared to living man — so as to be more natural than him, of which he is the ideal figure. A perfect double for man, right up to the suppleness of his movements, the functioning of his organs and intelligence — right up to touching upon the anguish there would be in becoming aware that there is no difference, that the soul is over with and now it is an ideally naturalized body which absorbs its energy. Sacrilege. This difference is then always maintained, as in the case of that perfect automaton that the impersonator's jerky movements on stage imitate; so that at least, even if the roles were reversed, no confusion would be possible. In this way the interrogation of the automaton remains an open one, which makes it out to be a kind of mechanical optimist, even if the counterfeit always connotes something diabolical.

No such thing with the robot. The robot no longer interrogates appearance; its only truth is in its mechanical efficacy. It is no longer turned towards a resemblance with man, to whom furthermore it no longer bears comparison. That infinitesimal metaphysical difference, which made all the charm and mystery of the automaton, no longer exists; the robot has absorbed it for its own benefit. Being and appearance are melted into a common substance of production and work. The first-order simulacrum never abolished difference. It supposes an always detectable alteration between semblance and reality (a particularly subtle game with trompe-l'oeil painting, but art lives entirely off of this gap). The second-order simulacrum simplifies the problem by the absorption of the appearances, or by the liquidation of the real, whichever. It establishes in any case a reality, image, echo, appearance; such is certainly work, the machine, the system of industrial production in its entirety, in that it is radically opposed to the principle of theatrical illusion. No more resemblance or lack of resemblance, of God, or human being, but an imminent logic of the operational principle.

From then on, men and machines can proliferate. It is even their law to do so — which the automatons never have done, being instead sublime and singular mechanisms. Men themselves only started their own proliferation when they achieved the status of machines, with the industrial revolution. Freed from all resemblance, freed even from their own double, they expand like the system of production, of which they are only the miniaturized equivalent. The revenge of the simulacrum that feeds the myth of the sorcerer's apprentice doesn't happen with the automaton. It is, on the other hand, the very law of the second type; and from that law proceeds still the hegemony of the robot, of the machine, and of *dead work over living labor*. This hegemony is necessary for the cycle of production and reproduction. *It is with this reversal that we leave behind the counterfeit to enter (re)production*. We leave natural law and the play of its forms to enter the realm of the mercantile law of value and its calculations of force.

The Industrial Simulacrum

It is a new generation of signs and objects which comes with the industrial revolution. Signs without the tradition of caste, ones that will never have known any binding restrictions. They will no longer have to be *counterfeited*, since they are going to be produced all at once on a gigantic scale. The problem of their uniqueness, or their origin, is no longer a matter of concern; their origin is technique, and the only sense they possess is in the dimension of the industrial simulacrum.

Which is to say the series, and even the possibility of two or of identical objects. The relation between them is no longer that of an original to its counterfeit — neither analogy nor reflection — but equivalence, indifference. In a series, objects become undefined simulacra one of the other. And so, along with the objects, do the men that produce them. Only the obliteration of the original reference allows for the generalized law of equivalence, that is to say, the *very possibility of production*.

The entire analysis of production changes according to whether you no longer see in it an original process, or even one that is at the core of all the others, but on the contrary a process of absorption of all original being and of introduction to a series of identical beings. Until now we have considered production and work as potential, as force, as historical process, as generic activity; the energetic-economic myth

proper to modernity. We must now ask if production does not interfere *in the order of signs*, as a *particular* phase — if it is not basically only an episode in the line of simulacra: that precisely when, thanks to technique, potentially identical beings are produced in an indefinite series. The immense energies that are at work in technique, industry, and the economy should not hide the fact that it is basically only a matter of attaining to that indefinite reproducibility.

That is the challenge certainly to the “natural” order, but finally is only a second-order simulacrum, and rather inadequate as an imaginary solution to the problem of mastering the world. By comparison to the era of the counterfeit (the time of the double and the mirror, of theatre and the games of mask and appearance), the serial and technical era of reproduction is all-in-all a time of lesser scope (the era that follows — that of models of simulation and of third-order simulacra — is of more considerable dimension) ...

The Metaphysic of the Code

“Leibniz, that mathematical spirit, saw in the mystic elegance of the binary system that counts only the zero and the one, the very image of creation. The unity of the supreme Being, operating by binary function in nothingness, would have sufficed to bring out of it all the beings”. — McLuhan

The great simulacra constructed by man pass from a universe of natural laws to a universe of force and tensions of force, today to a universe of structures and binary oppositions. After the metaphysic of being and appearance, after that of energy and determination, comes that of indeterminacy and the code. Cybernetic control, generation from model, differential modulation, feed-back, question/answer, etc.: such is the new *operational* configuration (industrial simulacra are only *operational*). Digitality is its metaphysical principle (the God of Leibniz), and DNA its prophet. It is in effect in the genetic code that the “genesis of simulacra” today finds its most accomplished form. At the limit of an always more extensive abolition of references and finalities, of the loss of resemblance and designation, we find the digital program-sign, whose value is purely tactical, at the intersection of the other signals (corpuscles of information/test) and whose structure is that of a macro-molecular code of command and control.

At this level the question of signs, of their rational destination, their real or imaginary, their repression, their deviation, the illusion they create or that which they conceal, or their parallel meanings — all of that is erased. We have already seen signs of the first order, complex signs and rich in illusion, change, with the machines, into crude signs, dull, industrial, repetitive, echoless, operational and efficacious. What a mutation, even more radical still, with signals of the code, illegible, with no gloss possible, buried like programmatic matrices light-years away in the depths of the “biological” body — black boxes where all the commandments, all the answers ferment! End of the theatre of representation, the space of signs, their conflict, their silence; only the black box of the code, the molecular emitter of signals from which we have been irradiated, crossed by answers/questions like signifying radiations, tested continuously by our own program inscribed in the cells. Jail cells, electronic cells, party cells, microbiological cells: always the search for the smallest indivisible element, whose organic synthesis would be made according to the givens of the code. But the code itself is but a genetic cell, a generator where myriads of intersections produce all the questions and possible solutions, so that choices (by whom?) can be made. No finality involved with these “questions” (informational and signifying impulsions) but the answer, genetically unchangeable or inflected by minute and aleatory differences. Space is no longer even linear or one-dimensional: *cellular* space, indefinite generation of the same signals, like the tics of a prisoner gone crazy with solitude and repetition. Such is the genetic code: an erased record, unchangeable, of which we are no more than cells-for-reading. All aura of sign, of significance itself is resolved in this determination; all is resolved in the inscription and decodage.

Such is the third-order simulacrum, our own. Such is the “mystic elegance of the binary system, of the zero and the one”, from which all being proceeds. Such is the status of the sign that is also the end of signification: DNA or operational simulation. All of this is perfectly well summed up by Sebeok (“Genetics and Semiotics”, in Versus):

Numerous observations confirm the hypothesis that the internal organic world descends in a straight line from the primordial forms of life. The most remarkable fact is the omnipresence of the DNA molecule. The genetic material of all organisms known on earth is in great measure made up of the nucleonic acids DNA and RNA that contain in their

information structure, transmitted by reproduction from one generation to another and furthermore gifted with the capacity of self-reproduction and imitation. Briefly, the genetic code is universal, or almost. Its deciphering was an immense discovery, in the sense that it showed that "the two languages of the great polymers, the language of nucleonic acid and that of protein, are tightly correlated" (Crick, 1966; Clarck/Narcker, 1968). The Soviet mathematician Liapounov demonstrated in 1963 that all living systems transmit by prescribed canals with precision a small quantity of energy or of matter containing a great volume of information, which is responsible for the ulterior control of a great quantity of energy and matter. In this perspective numerous phenomena, biological as well as cultural (stockage, feed-back, canalization of messages and others) can be seen as aspects of the treatment of information. In the last analysis information appears in great part as the repetition of information, or even as another sort of information, a sort of control that seems to be a universal property of terrestrial life, independent of form or substance...

...Practically and historically, this signified the substitution of social control by the *end* (and by a more or less dialectical *providence* which surveys the accomplishment of this *end*) for social control by anticipation, simulation and programming, and indeterminate mutation directed by the code. Instead of a process which is finalized according to its ideal development, we generalize from a *model*. Instead of a right to a prophecy, we have the right of *registration*. There is no really radical difference between the two, only the schemes of control have become fantastically perfected. *From a capitalist-productivist society to a neo-capitalist cybernetic order that aims now at total control.* This is the mutation for which the biological theorization of the code prepares the ground. *There is nothing of an accident in this mutation. It is the end of a history in which, successively, God, Man, Progress, and History itself die to profit the code, in which transcendence dies to profit immanence, the latter corresponding to a much more advanced phase in the vertiginous manipulation of social rappings...*

The Tactile and the Digital

This regulation on the model of the genetic code is not at all limited to laboratory effects or to the exalted visions of theoreticians. Banal, everyday life is invested by these models. Digitality is with us. It is that which haunts all the messages, all the signs of our societies. The most

concrete form you see it in is that of the test, of the question/answer, of the stimulus/response. All content is neutralized by a continual procedure of directed interrogation, of verdicts and ultimatums to decode, which no longer arise this time from the depths of the genetic code but that have the same tactical indeterminacy — the cycle of sense being infinitely shortened into that of question/answer, of bit or minute quantity of energy/information coming back to its beginning, the cycle only describing the perpetual re-actualization of the same models. The equivalent of the total neutralization of the signified by the code is the instantaneousness of the verdict of fashion, or of any advertising or media message. Any place where the offer swallows up the demand, where the question assimilates the answer, or absorbs and regurgitates it in a decodable form, or invents and anticipates it in a predictable form. Everywhere the same “scenario”, the scenario of “trial and error” (guinea pigs in laboratory experiments), the scenario of the breadth of choice offered everywhere (“the personality test”) — everywhere the test functions as a fundamental form of control, by means of the infinite divisibility of practices and responses.

We live by the mode of *referendum* precisely because there is no longer any *referential*. Every sign, every message (objects of “functional” use as well as any item of fashion or televised news, poll or electoral consultation) is presented to us as question/answer. The entire system of communication has passed from that of a syntactically complex language structure to a binary sign system of question/answer — of perpetual test. Now tests and referenda are, we know, perfect forms of simulation: the answer is called forth by the question, it is designated in advance. *The referendum is always an ultimatum*: the unilateral nature of the question, that is no longer exactly an interrogation, but the immediate imposition of a sense whereby the cycle is suddenly completed. Every message is a verdict, just like the one that comes from polling statistics. The simulacrum of distance (or even of contradiction between the two poles) is only — like the effect of the real the sign seems to emit — a tactical hallucination...

...Every image, every media message, but also any functional environmental object, is a test — that is to say, in the full rigor of the term, liberating response mechanisms according to stereotypes and analytic models. Today, the object is no longer “functional” in the traditional meaning of the word; it no longer serves you; it *tests* you. It has nothing

to do with the object of yesteryear, no more than does media news with a “reality” of facts. Both objects and information result already from a selection, a montage, from a point-of-view. They have already tested “reality”, and have asked only questions that “answered back” to them. They have broken down reality into simple elements that they have reassembled into scenarios of regulated oppositions, exactly in the same way that the photographer imposes his contrasts, lights, angles on his subject (any photographer will tell you: you can do anything, all you have to do is approach the original from the right angle, at that right moment or mood that will render it the *correct answer* to the instantaneous test of the instrument and its code). It is exactly like the test or the referendum when they translate a conflict or problem into a game of question/answer. And reality, thus tested, tests you according to the same grill; you decode it according to the same code, inscribed within each message and object like a miniaturized genetic code.

All is presented today in a spread-out series, or as part of a line of products, and this fact alone tests you already, because you are obliged to make decisions. This approximates our general attitude toward the world around us to that of a *reading*, and to a selective deciphering. We live less like users than readers and selectors, reading cells. But nevertheless: by the same token you also are constantly selected and tested by the medium itself. Just like cutting out a sample for the ends of the survey, the media frame and excise their message bundles, which are in fact bundles of selected questions, samples of their audience. By a circular operation of experimental modification, of incessant interference, like a nervous input, tactile and retractile, that explores an object by means of brief perceptive sequences, until it has been localized and controlled. What the media thereby localize and control are no real and autonomous groups, but samples, samples modelled socially and mentally by a barrage of messages. “Public opinion” is evidently the prettiest of these samples — not an unreal political substance, but one that is hyperreal — a fantastic hyperreality that lives only off of montage and test-manipulation...

The political sphere entirely loses its specificity when it enters into the game of the media and public opinion polls, that is to say into the sphere of the integrated circuit of question/answer. The electoral sphere is in any case the first great institution where social exchange is reduced to obtaining an answer. It is due to this sign-simplification that it is the

first one to become universal. Universal suffrage is the first of the mass-media. All through the 19th and 20th centuries political and economic practice merge increasingly into the same type of discourse. Propaganda and advertising fuse in the same marketing and merchandising of objects and ideologies. This convergence of language between the economic and the political is furthermore what marks a society such as ours, where “political economy” is fully realized. It is also by the same token its end, since the two spheres are abolished in an entirely separate reality, or hyperreality, which is that of the media. There, too, there is an elevation of each term to a greater power, that of the third-order simulacra.

“That many regret the “corruption” of politics by the media, deploring that TV and public opinion polls have replaced so quickly the formation of opinion, shows only that they understand nothing about politics”.

What is characteristic of this phase of political hyperrealism is the necessary conjunction between the bipartite system and the entry into the play of the polls as mirror of this alternating equivalence of the political game.

The polls are located in a dimension beyond all social *production*. They refer only to a simulacrum of public opinion. A mirror of opinion analogous in its way to that of the Gross National Product: imaginary mirror of the productive forces, without regard to their social ends or lack thereof. What is essential is only that “it” reproduces itself. The same as for public opinion: what is essential is that it shadow itself incessantly in its own image. Therein lies the secret of mass representation. It is no longer necessary that anyone produce an opinion, all that is needed is that all reproduce public opinion, in the sense that all opinions get caught up in this kind of general equivalent, and once more proceed from it (reproduce it, whatever they make of it, on the level of individual choice). For opinions as for material goods: production is dead, long live reproduction...

What is true of the statistics scenario is also true of the regulated partition of the political sphere: the alternation of the forces in power, majority/minority, substitutive, etc. On this limit of pure representation, “that” no longer represents anything. Politics die of the too-well-regulated game of distinctive oppositions. The political sphere (and that of power in general) becomes empty. This is somehow the payment for the

accomplishing of the political class' desire: that of a perfect manipulation of social representation. *Surreptitiously and silently, all social substance has left this machine in the very moment of its perfect reproduction.*

The same thing holds true for the polls. The only ones who believe in them finally are the members of the political class, just as the only ones who really believe in advertising and market studies are the marketeers and advertisers. This is not because they are particularly stupid (though that we can't exclude either) but because the polls are homogenous with the current functioning of politics. They take on a "real" tactical value, they come into play as a factor in the regulation of the political class according to its own rules of the game. It therefore has reason to believe in them, and it believes. But who else does, really? It is the political class' burlesque spectacle, hyper-representative of nothing at all, that people taste by way of the polls and media. There is a jubilation proper to spectacular nullity, and the last form it takes is that of statistical *contemplation*. This is accompanied always, we know, by a profound disappointment — the kind of disillusion that the polls provoke in absorbing so utterly the public's voice, in short-circuiting all process of expression. The fascination they exercise is in accordance with this neutralization by emptiness, with this trance they create by anticipation of the image over all possible reality.

The problem of the polls is not at all that of their objective influence. Just as for propaganda or publicity, their influence is negated by individual or collective inertia or resistance. The problem is the operational simulation that they institute over the entire spectrum of social practices: that of the progressive *leucemization* of all social substance, that is the substitution for blood of the white lymph of media...

...We live everywhere already in an "esthetic" hallucination of reality. The old slogan "truth is stranger than fiction", that still corresponded to the surrealist phase of this aestheticization of life, is obsolete. There is no more fiction that life could possibly confront, even victoriously — it is reality itself that disappears utterly in the game of reality — radical disenchantment, the cool and cybernetic phase following the hot stage of fantasy.

It is thus that for guilt, anguish and death there can be substituted the total joy of the signs of guilt, despair, violence and death. It is the

very euphoria of simulation, that sees itself as the abolition of cause and effect, the beginning and the end, for all of which it substitutes reduplication. In this manner all closed systems protect themselves at the same time from the referential — as well as from all metalanguage that the system forestalls in playing at its own metalanguage; that is to say in duplicating itself in its own critique of itself. In simulation, the metalinguistic illusion duplicates and completes the referential illusion (pathetic hallucination of the sign and pathetic hallucination of the real).

“It’s a circus”, “It’s theatre”, “It’s a movie”, old adages, old naturalistic denunciation. These sayings are now obsolete. The problem now is that of the *satellization of the real*, the putting into orbit of an indefinable reality without common measure to the fantasies that once used to ornament it. This satellization we find further naturalized in the two-rooms-kitchen shower that they have launched into orbit — to the powers of space, you could say — with the last lunar module. The banality of the earthly habitat lifted to the rank of cosmic value, of absolute decor — hypostatized in space — *this is the end of metaphysics, the era of hyperreality that begins.* But the spatial transcendence of the banality of the two-rooms, like its cool and mechanical figuration of hyperrealism, says only one thing: that this module, such as it is, participates in a hyperspace of representation — where each is already technically in possession of the instantaneous reproduction of his own life, where the pilots of the Tupolev that crashed at Bourget could see themselves die live on their own camera. This is nothing else than the short-circuit of the response by the question in the test, instantaneous process of re-conduction whereby reality is immediately contaminated by its simulacrum.

There used to be, before, a specific class of allegorical and slightly diabolical objects: mirrors, images, works of art (concepts?) — simulacra, but transparent and manifest (you didn’t confuse the counterfeit with the original), that had their characteristic style and savoir-faire. And pleasure consisted then rather in discovering the “natural” in what was artificial and counterfeit. Today, when the real and the imaginary are confused in the same operational totality, the esthetic fascination is everywhere. It is a subliminal perception (a sort of sixth sense) of deception, montage, scenaria — of the overexposed reality in the light of the models — no longer a production space, but a reading strip, strip of coding and

decoding, magnetized by the signs — esthetic reality — no longer by the premeditation and the distance of art, but by its elevation to the second level, to the second power, by the anticipation and the immanence of the code. A kind of nonintentional parody hovers over everything, of technical simulation, of indefinable fame to which is attached an esthetic pleasure, that very one of reading and of the rules of the game. Travelling of signs, the media, of fashion and the models, of the blind and brilliant ambiance of the simulacra.

A long time ago art prefigured this turning which is that today of daily life. Very quickly the work turns back on itself as the manipulation of the signs of art: over-signification of art, “academism of the signifier”, as Levi-Strauss would say, who interprets it really as the form-sign. If is then that art enters into its indefinite *reproduction*: all that reduplicates itself, even if it be the everyday and banal reality, falls by the token under the sign of art, and becomes esthetic. It’s the same thing for production, which you could say is entering today this esthetic reduplication, this phase when, expelling all content and finality, it becomes somehow abstract and non-figurative. It expresses then the pure form of production, it takes upon itself, as art, the value of a finality without purpose. Art and industry can then exchange their signs. Art can become a reproducing machine (Andy Warhol), without ceasing to be art, since the machine is only a sign. And production can lose all social finality so as to be verified and exalted finally in the prestigious, hyperbolic signs that are the great industrial combines, the 1/4-mile-high towers or the number mysteries of the GNP.

And so, art is everywhere, since artifice is at the very heart of reality. And so, art is dead, not only because its critical transcendence is gone, but because reality itself, entirely impregnated by an aesthetic which is inseparable from its own structure, has been confused with its own image. Reality no longer has the time to take on the appearance of reality. It no longer even surpasses fiction: it captures every dream even before it takes on the appearance of a dream. Schizophrenic vertigo of these serial signs, for which no counterfeit, no sublimation is possible, immanent in their repetition — who could say what the reality is that these signs simulate? *They no longer even repress anything (which is why, if you will, simulation pushes us close to the sphere of psychosis).*

Even the primary processes are abolished in them. The cool universe of digitality has absorbed the world of metaphor and metonymy. The principle of simulation wins out over the reality principle just as over the principle of pleasure.

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Regarding seminar 4: The Irrational Content of Philosophical Anthropology.

Friedrich Nietzsche
On the Genealogy of Morality

First essay: “Good and Evil”, “Good and Bad”

So, you have to respect the good spirits which preside in these historians of morality! But it is unfortunately a fact that *historical spirit* itself is lacking in them, they have been left in the lurch by all the good spirits of history itself! As is now established philosophical practice, they all think in a way that is *essentially* unhistorical; this can't be doubted. The idiocy of their moral genealogy is revealed at the outset when it is a question of conveying the descent of the concept and judgment of “good”. “Originally” – they decree – “unegoistic acts were praised and called good by their recipients, in other words, by the people to whom they were *useful*; later, everyone *forgot* the origin of the praise and because such acts had always been *habitually* praised as good, people also began to experience them as good – as if they were something good *as such*”. We can see at once: this first deduction contains all the typical traits of idiosyncratic English psychologists, – we have “usefulness”, “forgetting”, “habit” and finally “error”, all as the basis of a respect for values of which the higher man has hitherto been proud, as though it were a sort of general privilege of mankind. This pride *must be* humbled, this valuation devalued: has that been achieved? . . . Now for me, it is obvious that the real breeding-ground for the concept “good” has been sought

and located in the wrong place by this theory: the judgment “good” does *not* emanate from those to whom goodness is shown! Instead, it has been “the good” themselves, *meaning the noble, the mighty, the high-placed and the high-minded, who saw and judged themselves and their actions as good, I mean first-rate, in contrast to everything lowly, low-minded, common and plebeian. It was from this pathos of distance that they first claimed the right to create values and give these values names: usefulness was none of their concern!* The standpoint of usefulness is as alien and inappropriate as it can be to such a heated eruption of the highest rank-ordering and rank – defining value judgments: this is the point where feeling reaches the opposite of the low temperatures needed for any calculation of prudence or reckoning of usefulness, – and not just for once, for one exceptional moment, but permanently. The pathos of nobility and distance, as I said, the continuing and predominant feeling of complete and fundamental superiority of a higher ruling kind in relation to a lower kind, to those “below” – *that is the origin of the antithesis “good” and “bad”.* (*The seigniorial privilege of giving names even allows us to conceive of the origin of language itself as a manifestation of the power of the rulers: they say, “this is so and so”, they set their seal on everything and every occurrence with a sound and thereby take possession of it, as it were*). It is because of this origin that from the outset, the word “good” is absolutely *not* necessarily attached to “unegoistic” actions: as the superstition of these moral genealogists would have it. On the contrary, it is only with a *decline* of aristocratic value judgments that this whole antithesis between “egoistic” and “unegoistic” forces itself more and more on man’s conscience, – it is, to use my language, the *herd instinct* which, with that, finally gets its word in (and makes *words*). And even then, it takes long enough for this instinct to become sufficiently dominant for the valuation of moral values to become enmeshed and embedded in the antithesis (as is the case in contemporary Europe, for example: the prejudice which takes “moral”, “unegoistic” and “*désintéressé*” as equivalent terms already rules with the power of a “fixed idea” and mental illness) ...

5.

With regard to *our* problem, which can justifiably be called a *quiet* problem and fastidiously addresses itself to only a few ears, it is of no little Nietzsche here uses a derivative of the word “*Stand*” (“estate”).

... interest to discover that, in these words and roots which denote “good”, we can often detect the main nuance which made the noble feel they were men of higher rank. True, in most cases they might give themselves names which simply show superiority of power (such as “the mighty”, “the masters”, “the commanders”) or the most visible sign of this superiority, such as “the rich”, “the propertied” (that is the meaning of *arya*; and the equivalent in Iranian and Slavic). But the names also show a *typical char – acter trait*: and this is what concerns us here. For example, they call themselves “the truthful”: led by the Greek aristocracy, whose mouthpiece is the Megarian poet Theognis. The word used specifically for this purpose, εσθλοζ¹¹, means, according to its root, one who is, who has reality, who really exists and is true; then, with a subjective transformation, it becomes the slogan and catch-phrase of the aristocracy and is completely assimilated with the sense of “aristocratic”, in contrast to the *deceitful* common man, as taken and shown by Theognis, – until, finally, with the decline of the aristocracy, the word remains as a term for spiritual *noblesse*, and, as it were, ripens and sweetens. Cowardice is underlined in the word χαχοζ¹², as in δειλοζ¹³ (the plebeian in contrast to the αγαθοζ): perhaps this gives a clue as to where we should look for the etymological derivation of the ambiguous term αγαθοζ¹⁴. In the Latin word *malus*¹⁵ (to which I juxtapose μεγαζ)¹⁶ the common man could be characterized as the dark-skinned and especially the dark-haired man (“*hic niger est –*”)¹⁷, as the pre-Aryan occupant of Italian soil who could most easily be distinguished from the blond race which had become dominant, namely the Aryan conquering race, by its color; at any rate, I have found exactly the same with Gaelic peoples, – *fin* (for example in *Fingal*), the word designating the aristocracy and finally the good, noble, pure, was originally a blond person in contrast to the dark-skinned, dark-haired native inhabitants. By the way, the Celts were a completely blond race; it is wrong to connect those traces of an essentially dark-haired population,

¹¹ This word seems originally to have meant “genuine, real”; it later becomes one of the most commonly used words for “noble”.

¹² (Greek) “weak, ugly, cowardly, worthless”.

¹³ (Greek) “cowardly (and thus despicable)”.

¹⁴ (Greek) “capable, useful, good”.

¹⁵ “bad, evil”.

¹⁶ (Greek) “dark, black”.

¹⁷ “That man is a dangerous character”, literally “He is black” (Horace, *Satires* I. 85).

which can be seen on carefully prepared ethnological maps in Germany, with any Celtic descent and mixing of blood in such a connection, as Virchow does: it is more a case of the *pre-Aryan* population of Germany emerging at these points.

(The same holds good for virtually the whole of Europe: to all intents and purposes the subject race has ended up by regaining the upper hand in skin color, shortness of forehead and perhaps even in intellectual and social instincts: who can give any guarantee that modern democracy, the even more modern anarchism, and indeed that predilection for the “commune”, the most primitive form of social structure which is common to all Europe’s socialists, are not in essence a huge *throw-back* – and that the conquering *master race*, that of the Aryans, is not physiologically being defeated as well? . . .) I think I can interpret the Latin *bonus*¹⁸ as “the “warrior””: providing I am correct in tracing *bonus* back to an older *duonus* (compare *bellum*¹⁹ – *duellum* – *duenum*, which seems to me to contain that *duonus*). Therefore, *bonus* as a man of war, of division (*duo*), as warrior: one can see what made up a man’s “goodness” in ancient Rome. Take our German “*gut*”: does it not mean “the godlike man”, the man “of godlike race”? And is it not identical with the popular (originally noble), name of the Goths? The grounds for this sup – position will not be gone into here. –

6.

If the highest caste is at the same time the *clerical* caste and therefore chooses a title for its overall description which calls its priestly function to mind, this does not yet constitute an exception to the rule that the concept of political superiority always resolves itself into the concept of psychological superiority (although this may be the occasion giving rise to exceptions). This is an example of the first juxtaposition of “pure” and “impure” as signs of different estates; and later “good” and “bad” develop in a direction which no longer refers to social standing. In addition, people should be wary of taking these terms “pure” and “impure” too seriously, too far or even symbolically: all ancient man’s concepts were originally understood – to a degree we can scarcely imagine – as crude, coarse, detached, narrow, direct and in particular *unsymbolic*. From the

¹⁸ “good”

¹⁹ Both “bellum” and “duellum” mean “war” (Latin).

outset the “pure man” was just a man who washed, avoided certain foods which cause skin complaints, did not sleep with the filthy women from the lower orders and had a horror of blood, – nothing more, not much more!

And yet the very nature of an essentially priestly aristocracy shows how contradictory valuations could become dangerously internalized and sharpened, precisely in such an aristocracy at an early stage; and in fact, clefts were finally driven between man and man which even an Achilles of free-thinking would shudder to cross. From the very beginning there has been something *unhealthy* about these priestly aristocracies and in the customs dominant there, which are turned away from action and are partly brooding and partly emotionally explosive, resulting in the almost inevitable bowel complaints and neurasthenia which have plagued the clergy down the ages; but as for the remedy they themselves found for their sickness, – surely one must say that its aftereffects have shown it to be a hundred times more dangerous than the disease it was meant to cure? People are still ill from the after-effects of these priestly quack-cures! For example, think of certain diets (avoidance of meat), of fasting, sexual abstinence, the flight “into the desert” (Weir-Mitchell’s bed-rest, admittedly without the subsequent overfeeding and weight gain that constitute the most effective antidote to all hysteria brought on by the ascetic ideal): think, too, of the whole metaphysics of the clergy, which is antagonistic towards the senses, making men lazy and refined, think, too, of their Fakir-like and Brahmin-like self-hypnotizing – Brahminism as crystal ball and fixed idea – and the final, all-too-comprehensible general disenchantment with its radical cure, *nothingness* (or God: – the yearning for a *unio mystica* with God is the Buddhist yearning for nothingness, Nirvâna – and no more!) Priests make *everything* more dangerous, not just medicaments and healing arts but pride, revenge, acumen, debauchery, love, lust for power, virtue, sickness; – in any case, with some justification one could add that man first became an *interesting animal* on the foundation of this *essentially dangerous* form of human existence, the priest, and that the human soul became *deep* in the higher sense and turned *evil* for the first time – and of course, these are the two basic forms of man’s superiority, hitherto, over other animals! . . .

9.

– “But why do you talk about *nobler* ideals!” Let’s bow to the facts: the people have won – or “the slaves”, the “plebeians”, “the herd”, or what – ever you want to call them – if the Jews made this come about, good for them! No people ever had a more world-historic mission. “The Masters” are deposed; the morality of the common people has triumphed. You might take this victory for blood-poisoning (it did mix the races up) – I do not deny it; but undoubtedly this intoxication has *succeeded*. The “salvation” of the human race (I mean, from “the Masters”) is well on course; everything is being made appreciably Jewish, Christian or plebeian (never mind the words!). The passage of this poison through the whole body of mankind seems unstoppable, even though its tempo and pace, from now on, might tend to be slower, softer, quieter, calmer – there is no hurry . . . With this in view, does the Church still have a *necessary* role, indeed, does it have a right to exist? Or could one do without it? *Quaeritur*²³

It seems that the Church rather slows down and blocks the passage of poison instead of accelerating it? Well, that might be what makes it useful . . . Certainly it is by now something crude and boorish, resistant to a more tender intelligence, to a truly modern taste. Should not the Church at least try to be more refined? . . . Nowadays it alienates, more than it seduces . . . Who amongst us would be a free-thinker if it were not for the Church? We loathe the Church, *not* its poison . . . Apart from the Church, we too love the poison . . . – This is the epilogue by a “free-thinker” to my speech, an honest animal as he clearly shows himself to be, and moreover a democrat; he had listened to me up to that point, and could not stand listening to my silence. As a matter of fact, there is much for me to keep silent about at this point. –

10.

The beginning of the slaves’ revolt in morality occurs when *ressentiment* itself turns creative and gives birth to values: the *ressentiment* of those beings who, denied the proper response of action, compensate for it only with imaginary revenge. Whereas all noble morality grows out of a triumphant saying “yes” to itself, slave morality says “no” on

²³ “That is the question”.

principle to everything that is “outside”, “other”, “non-self”: and *this* “no” is its creative deed. This reversal of the evaluating glance – this *essential* orientation to the outside instead of back onto itself – is a feature of *ressentiment*: in order to come about, slave morality first has to have an opposing, external world, it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all, – its action is basically a reaction. The opposite is the case with the noble method of valuation: this acts and grows spontaneously, seeking out its opposite only so that it can say “yes” to itself even more thankfully and exultantly, – its negative concept “low”, “common”, “bad” is only a pale contrast created after the event compared to its positive basic concept, saturated with life and passion, “we the noble, the good, the beautiful and the happy!” When the noble method of valuation makes a mistake and sins against reality, this happens in relation to the sphere with which it is *not* sufficiently familiar, a true knowledge of which, indeed, it rigidly resists: in some circumstances, it misjudges the sphere it despises, that of the common man, the rabble; on the other hand, we should bear in mind that the distortion which results from the feeling of contempt, disdain and superciliousness, always assuming that the image of the despised person is *distorted*, remains far behind the distortion with which the entrenched hatred and revenge of the powerless man attacks his opponent – in effigy of course. Indeed, contempt has too much negligence, nonchalance, complacency and impatience, even too much personal cheerfulness mixed into it, for it to be in a position to transform its object into a real caricature and monster. Nor should one fail to hear the almost kindly nuances which the Greek nobility, for example, places in all words that it uses to distinguish itself from the rabble; a sort of sympathy, consideration and indulgence incessantly permeates and sugars them, with the result that nearly all words referring to the common man remain as expressions for “unhappy”, “pitiable” (compare δειλοζ, δειαιοζ, πονηροζ, μοχθηροζ the last two actually designating the common man as slave worker and beast of burden) – and on the other hand, “bad”, “low” and “unhappy” have never ceased to reverberate in the Greek ear in a tone in which “unhappy” predominates: this is a legacy of the old, nobler, aristocratic method of valuation that does not deny itself even in contempt...

...The “well-born” *felt* they were “the happy”; they did not need first of all to construct their happiness artificially by looking at their enemies, or in some cases by talking themselves into it, *lying themselves into it* (as all men of *ressentiment* are wont to do); and also, as complete men bursting with strength and therefore *necessarily* active, they knew they must not separate happiness from action, – being active is by necessity counted as part of happiness ... – all very much the opposite of “happiness” at the level of the powerless, the oppressed, and those rankled with poisonous and hostile feelings, for whom it manifests itself as essentially a narcotic, an aesthetic, rest, peace, “sabbath”, relaxation of the mind and stretching of the limbs, in short as something *passive*. While the noble man is confident and frank with himself (γενναῖον, “of noble birth”, underlines the nuance “upright” and probably “naïve” as well), the man of *ressentiment* is neither upright nor naïve, nor honest and straight with himself. His soul *squints*: his mind loves dark corners, secret paths and back-doors, everything secretive appeals to him as being *his* world, *his* security, *his* comfort; he knows all about keeping quiet, not forgetting, waiting, temporarily humbling and abasing himself. A race of such men of *ressentiment* will inevitably end up *cleverer* than any noble race, and will respect cleverness to a quite different degree as well: namely, as a condition of existence of the first rank, whilst the cleverness of noble men can easily have a subtle aftertaste of luxury and refinement about it: – precisely because in this area, it is nowhere near as important as the complete certainty of function of the governing *unconscious* instincts, nor indeed as important as a certain lack of cleverness, such as a daring charge at danger or at the enemy, or those frenzied sudden fits of anger, love, reverence, gratitude and revenge by which noble souls down the ages have recognized one another.

When *ressentiment* does occur in the noble man himself, it is consumed and exhausted in an immediate reaction, and therefore it does not *poison*, on the other hand, it does not occur at all in countless cases where it is unavoidable for all who are weak and power-less. To be unable to take his enemies, his misfortunes and even his *misdeeds* seriously for long – that is the sign of strong, rounded natures with a superabundance of a power which is flexible, formative, healing and can make one forget (a good example from the modern world is Mirabeau, who had no recall for the insults and slights directed at him and who could not forgive,

simply because he – forgot.) A man like this shake from him, with one shrug, many worms which would have burrowed into another man; actual “love of your enemies” is also possible here and here alone – assuming it is a possible at all on earth. How much respect a noble man has for his enemies! – and a respect of that sort is a bridge to love . . . For he insists on having his enemy to himself, as a mark of distinction, indeed he will tolerate as enemies none other than such as have nothing to be despised and a *great deal* to be honored! Against this, imagine “the enemy” as conceived of by the man of *ressentiment* – and here we have his deed, his creation: he has conceived of the “evil enemy”, “*the evil one*” as a basic idea to which he now thinks up a copy and counterpart, the “good one” – himself! . . .

11.

Exactly the opposite is true of the noble one who conceives of the basic idea “good” by himself, in advance and spontaneously, and only then creates a notion of “bad!” This “bad” of noble origin and that “evil” from the cauldron of unassuaged hatred – the first is an afterthought, an aside, a complementary color, whilst the other is the original, the beginning, the actual *deed* in the conception of slave morality – how different are the two words “bad” and “evil”, although both seem to be the opposite for the same concept, “good!” But it is *not* the same concept “good”; on the contrary, one should ask *who* is actually evil in the sense of the morality of *ressentiment*. The stern reply is: *precisely* the “good” person of the other morality, the noble, powerful, dominating one, but re-touched, re-interpreted and reviewed through the poisonous eye of *ressentiment*. Here there is one point we would be the last to deny: anyone who came to know these “good men” as enemies came to know nothing but “*evil enemies*”, and the same people who are so strongly held in check by custom, respect, habit, gratitude and even more through spying on one another and through peer group jealousy, who, on the other hand, behave towards one another by showing such resourcefulness in consideration, self-control, delicacy, loyalty, pride and friendship.

At the center of all these noble races we cannot fail to see the beast of prey, the magnificent *blond beast* avidly prowling round for spoil and victory; this hidden center needs release from time to time,

the beast must out again, must return to the wild: – Roman, Arabian, Germanic, Japanese nobility, Homeric heroes, Scandinavian Vikings – in this requirement they are all alike. It was the noble races which left the concept of “barbarian” in their traces wherever they went; even their highest culture betrays the fact that they were conscious of this and indeed proud of it (for example, when Pericles, in that famous funeral oration, tells his Athenians. This “daring” of the noble races, mad, absurd and sudden in the way it manifests itself, the unpredictability and even the improbability of their undertakings ... their unconcern and scorn for safety, body, life, comfort, their shocking cheerfulness and depth of delight in all destruction, in all the debauches of victory and cruelty – all this, for those who suffered under it, was summed up in the image of the “barbarian”, the “evil enemy”, perhaps the “Goth” or the “Vandal”. Assuming that what is at any rate believed as “truth” were indeed true, that it is the *meaning of all culture* to breed a tame and civilized animal, a *household pet*, out of the beast of prey “man”, then one would undoubtedly have to view all instinctive reaction and instinctive *ressentiment*, by means of which the noble races and their ideals were finally wrecked and overpowered, as the actual *instruments of culture*; which, however, is not to say that the *bearers* of these instincts were themselves representatives of the culture. Instead, the opposite would be not only probable – no! it is *visible* today! These bearers of oppressive, vindictive instincts, the descendants of all European and non-European slavery, in particular of all pre-Aryan population – represent the *decline* of mankind! These “instruments of culture” are a disgrace to man, more a grounds for suspicion of, or an argument against, “culture” in general! We may be quite justified in retaining our fear of the blond beast at the center of every noble race and remain on our guard: but who would not, a hundred times over, prefer to fear if he can admire at the same time, rather than *not* fear, but thereby permanently retain the disgusting spectacle of the failed, the stunted, the wasted away and the poisoned? And is that not our fate?

What constitutes *our* aversion to “man” today? – for we *suffer* from man, no doubt about that. *Not* fear; rather, the fact that we have nothing to fear from man; that “man” is first and foremost a teeming mass of worms; that the “tame man”, who is incurably mediocre and unedifying,

has already learnt to view himself as the aim and pinnacle, the meaning of history, the “higher man”; – yes, the fact that he has a certain right to feel like that in so far as he feels distanced from the superabundance of failed, sickly, tired and exhausted people of whom today’s Europe is beginning to reek, and in so far as he is at least relatively successful, at least still capable of living, at least saying “yes” to life...

12.

...But from time to time grant me – assuming that there are divine benefactresses beyond good and evil – a glimpse, grant me just one glimpse of something perfect, completely finished, happy, powerful, triumphant, that still leaves something to fear! A glimpse of a man who justifies man himself, a stroke of luck, an instance of a man who makes up for and redeems man and enables us to retain our faith in mankind! . . . For the matter stands like so: the stunting and levelling of European man conceals our greatest danger, because the sight of this makes us tired . . . Today we see nothing that wants to expand, we suspect that things will just continue to decline, getting thinner, better-natured, cleverer, more comfortable, more mediocre, more indifferent, more Chinese, more Christian – no doubt about it, man is getting “better” all the time . . . Right here is where the destiny of Europe lies – in losing our fear of man we have also lost our love for him, our respect for him, our hope in him and even our will to be man. The sight of man now makes us tired – what is nihilism today if it is not that? We are tired of man...

Second essay: “Guilt”, “bad conscience” and related matters

3.

His conscience? ... We can presume, in advance, that the concept “conscience”, which we meet here in its highest, almost disconcerting form, already has a long history and metamorphosis behind it... “How do you give a memory to the animal, man? How do you impress something upon this partly dull, partly idiotic, inattentive mind, this personification of forgetfulness, so that it will stick?” . . . This age-old question was not resolved with gentle solutions and methods, as can be imagined; perhaps there is nothing more terrible and strange in man’s prehistory than his

technique of mnemonics. “A thing must be burnt in so that it stays in the memory: only something that continues *to hurt* stays in the memory” – that is a proposition from the oldest (and unfortunately the longest-lived) psychology on earth. You almost want to add that wherever on earth you still find ceremonial, solemnity, mystery, gloomy shades in the lives of men and peoples, something of the dread with which everyone, everywhere, used to make promises, give pledges and commendation, is *still working*: the past, the most prolonged, deepest, hardest past, breathes on us and rises up in us when we become “solemn”. *When man decided he had to make a memory for himself, it never happened without blood, torments and sacrifices: the most horrifying sacrifices and forfeits (the sacrifice of the first-born belongs here), the most disgusting mutilations (for example, castration), the cruelest rituals of all religious cults (and all religions are, at their most fundamental, systems of cruelty) – all this has its origin in that particular instinct which discovered that pain was the most powerful aid to mnemonics. In a certain sense, the whole of asceticism belongs here: a few ideas have to be made ineradicable, ubiquitous, unforgettable, “fixed”, in order to hypnotize the whole nervous and intellectual system through these “fixed ideas” – and ascetic procedures and lifestyles are a method of freeing those ideas from competition with all other ideas, of making them “unforgettable”.*

The worse man’s memory has been, the more dreadful his customs have appeared; in particular, the harshness of the penal law gives a measure of how much trouble it had in conquering forgetfulness, and *preserving* a few primitive requirements of social life *in the minds of these slaves of the mood and desire of the moment*. We Germans certainly do not regard ourselves as a particularly cruel or hard-hearted people, still less as particularly irresponsible and happy-go-lucky; but you only have to look at our old penal code in order to see how difficult it was on this earth to breed a “nation of thinkers” (by which I mean: *the* nation in Europe that still contains the maximum of reliability, solemnity, tastelessness and sobriety, qualities which give it the right to breed all sorts of European mandarin). These Germans made a memory for themselves with dreadful methods, in order to master their basic plebeian instincts and the brutal crudeness of the same: think of old German punishments such as stoning (– even the legend drops the millstone on the guilty person’s head), breaking on the wheel (a unique invention

and specialty of German genius in the field of punishment!), impaling, ripping apart and trampling to death by horses (“quartering”), boiling of the criminal in oil or wine (still in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries), the popular flaying (“cutting strips”), cutting out flesh from the breast; and, of course, coating the wrong-doer with honey and leaving him to the flies in the scorching sun. With the aid of such images and procedures, man was eventually able to retain five or six “I-don’t-want-to’s” in his memory, in connection with which a *promise* had been given, in order to enjoy the advantages of society – and there you are! With the aid of this sort of memory, people finally came to “reason!” – Ah, reason, solemnity, mastering of emotions, this really dismal thing called reflection, all these privileges and splendors man has: what a price had to be paid for them! How much blood and horror lies at the basis of all “good things!” . . .

4.

... Have these genealogists of morality up to now ever remotely dreamt that, for example, the main moral concept “*Schuld*” (“guilt”) descends from the very material concept of “*Schulden*” (“debts”)? That inescapable thought, which is now so cheap and apparently natural, and which has had to serve as an explanation of how the sense of justice came about at all on earth, “the criminal deserves to be punished *because* he could have acted otherwise”, is actually an extremely late and refined form of human judgment and inference; whoever thinks it dates back to the beginning is laying his coarse hands on the psychology of primitive man in the wrong way. Throughout most of human history, punishment has *not* been meted out *because* the miscreant was held responsible for his act, therefore it was *not* assumed that the guilty party alone should be punished: – but rather, as parents still punish their children, it was out of anger over some wrong that had been suffered, directed at the perpetrator, – but this anger was held in check and modified by the idea that every injury has its *equivalent* which can be paid in compensation, if only through the *pain* of the person who injures. And where did this primeval, deeply-rooted and perhaps now ineradicable idea gain its power, *this idea of an equivalence between injury and pain*? I have already let it out: in the contractual relationship between *creditor* and *debtor*, which is as old as the very conception of a “legal subject” and itself refers back to the basic forms of buying, selling, bartering, trade

and traffic precisely here, the person making the promise has to have a memory *made* for him: precisely here, we may suppose, is a repository of hard, cruel, painful things.

The debtor, in order to inspire confidence that the promise of repayment will be honored, in order to give a guarantee of the solemnity and sanctity of his promise, and in order to etch the duty and obligation of repayment into his conscience, pawns something to the creditor by means of the contract in case he does not pay, something that he still “possesses” and controls, for example, his body, or his wife, or his freedom, or his life (or, in certain religious circumstances, even his after-life, the salvation of his soul, finally, even his peace in the grave: as in Egypt, where the corpse of a debtor found no peace from the creditor even in the grave – and this peace meant a lot precisely to the Egyptians). But, in particular, the creditor could inflict all kinds of dishonor and torture on the body of the debtor, for example, cutting as much flesh off as seemed appropriate for the debt: – from this standpoint there were everywhere, early on, estimates which went into horrifyingly minute and fastidious detail, *legally* drawn up estimates for individual limbs and parts of the body. I regard it as definite progress and proof of a freer, more open-handed calculation, of *a more Roman* pricing of justice, when Rome’s code of the Twelve Tables decreed that it did not matter how much or how little a creditor cut off in such a circumstance ⁴⁶.

Let’s be quite clear about the logic of this whole matter of compensation: it is strange enough. The equivalence is provided by the fact that instead of an advantage directly making up for the wrong (so, instead of compensation in money, land or possessions of any kind), a sort of *pleasure* is given to the creditor as repayment and compensation, – the pleasure of having the right to exercise power over the powerless without a thought, the pleasure “*de faire le mal pour le plaisir de le faire*” ⁴⁷, the enjoyment of violating: an enjoyment that is prized all the higher, the lower and baser the position of the creditor in the social scale, and which can easily seem a delicious titbit to him, even a foretaste of higher rank. Through punishment of the debtor, the creditor takes part

⁴⁶ “If they have cut off more or less, let that not be considered a crime”. This is from the Third Table, section 6. Modern editions read a slightly different text here with “se” (– sine) for “ne”: “If they have cut off more or less, let it be honestly done”.

⁴⁷ P. Mérimée, *Lettres à une inconnue* (Paris, 1874), I. 8: “To do evil for the pleasure of doing it”.

in the *rights of the masters*: at last he, too, shares the elevated feeling of being in a position to despise and maltreat someone as an “inferior” – or at least, when the actual power of punishment, of exacting punishment, is already transferred to the “authorities”, of *seeing* the debtor despised and maltreated. So, then, compensation is made up of a warrant for and entitlement to cruelty. –

6.

In *this* sphere of legal obligations, then, the moral conceptual world of “debt”, “conscience”, “duty”, “sacred duty”, has its breeding ground – all began with a thorough and prolonged bloodletting, like the beginning of all great things on earth. And may we not add that this world has really never quite lost a certain odour of blood and torture? (not even with old Kant: the categorical imperative smells of cruelty . . .). In the same way, it was here that the uncanny and perhaps inextricable link-up between the ideas of “debt and suffering” was first crocheted together. I ask again: to what extent can suffering be a compensation for “debts”?

To the degree that *to make* someone suffer is pleasure in its highest form, and to the degree that the injured party received an extraordinary counter-pleasure in exchange for the injury and distress caused by the injury: *to make* someone suffer, – a true *feast*, something that, as I mentioned, rose in price the more it contrasted with the rank and social position of the creditor. I say all this in speculation: because such subterranean things are difficult to fathom out, besides being embarrassing; and anyone who clumsily tries to interject the concept “revenge” has merely obscured and darkened his own insight, rather than clarified it (– revenge itself just leads us back to the same problem: “how can it be gratifying to make someone suffer?”). It seems to me that the delicacy and even more the tartuffery of tame house-pets (meaning modern man, meaning us) revolts against a truly forceful realization of the degree to which *cruelty* is part of the festive joy of the ancients and, indeed, is an ingredient in nearly every pleasure they have; on the other hand, how naive and innocent their need for cruelty appears, and how fundamental is that “disinterested malice” (or, to use Spinoza’s words, the *sympathia malevolens*) they assume is a *normal* human attribute –: making it something to which conscience says a hearty “yes”! A more piercing eye would perhaps be able to detect, even now, plenty of these

most primitive and basic festive joys of man; in *Beyond Good and Evil*, VII, section 229⁴⁸ (earlier in *Daybreak*, I, sections 18, 77, 113)⁴⁹. I pointed a wary finger at the ever-growing intellectualization and “deification” of cruelty, which runs through the whole history of higher culture (and indeed, constitutes it in an important sense). At all events, not so long ago it was unthinkable to hold a royal wedding or full-scale festival for the people without executions, tortures or perhaps an *auto-da-fé*, similarly, no noble household was without creatures on whom people could discharge their malice and cruel taunts with impunity (– remember Don Quixote, for example, at the court of the Duchess: ⁵⁰ today we read the whole of Don Quixote with a bitter taste in the mouth, it is almost an ordeal, which would make us seem very strange and incomprehensible to the author and his contemporaries, – they read it with a clear conscience as the funniest of books, it made them nearly laugh themselves to death). To see suffering does you good, to make suffer, better still – that is a hard proposition, but an ancient, powerful, *human-all-too-human* proposition to which, by the way, even *the apes might subscribe* as people say, in thinking up bizarre cruelties they anticipate and, as it were, act out a “demonstration” of what man will do. No cruelty, no feast: that is what the oldest and longest period in human history teaches us – and punishment, too, has such very strong *festive* aspects!

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⁴⁸ See below, Supplementary material, pp. 153–4.

⁴⁹ See below, Supplementary material, pp. 137–9, pp. 140–1, pp. 143–4.

⁵⁰ Don Quixote, Book II, chapters 31–7.

Erich Fromm
The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness
Malignant Aggression: Premises

Man's Nature
Preliminary Remarks

Biologically adaptive aggression serves life. This is understood in principle, biologically and neurophysiologically, even though much more information is still needed. It is a drive man shares with all other animals, although with certain differences that have been discussed above.

What is unique in man is that he can be driven by impulses to kill and to torture, and that he feels lust in doing so; he is the only animal that can be a killer and destroyer of his own species without any rational gain, either biological or economic. To explore the nature of this biologically nonadaptive, malignant destructiveness is the object of the following pages. Malignant aggression, let us remember, is specifically human and not derived from animal instinct. It does not serve the physiological survival of man, yet it is an important part of his mental functioning. It is one of the passions that are dominant and powerful in some individuals and cultures, although not in others. I shall try to show that destructiveness is one of the possible answers to psychic needs that are rooted in the existence of man, and that its generation results, as was stated earlier, from the interaction of various social conditions with man's existential needs. This hypothesis makes it necessary to build a theoretical basis upon which we can attempt to examine the following questions: What are the specific conditions of human existence? What is man's nature or essence? Although present-day thought, especially in psychology, is not very hospitable to such questions, which are usually considered as belonging to the realm of philosophy and other purely "subjective speculations", I hope to demonstrate in the following discussion that there are indeed areas for empirical examination.

Man's Nature

For most thinkers since the Greek philosophers, it was self-evident that there is something called human nature, something that constitutes the essence of man. There were various views about what constitutes it, but there was agreement that such an essence exists—that is to say, that

there is something by virtue of which man is man. Thus, man was defined as a rational being, as a social animal, an animal that can make tools (*Homo faber*), or a symbol-making animal.

More recently, this traditional view has begun to be questioned. One reason for this change was the increasing emphasis given to the historical approach to man. An examination of the history of humanity suggested that man in our epoch is so different from man in previous times that it seemed unrealistic to assume that men in every age have had in common something that can be called “human nature”. The historical approach was reinforced, particularly in the United States, by studies in the field of cultural anthropology. The study of primitive peoples has discovered such a diversity of customs, values, feelings, and thoughts that many anthropologists arrived at the concept that man is born as a blank sheet of paper on which each culture writes its text. Another factor contributing to the tendency to deny the assumption of a fixed human nature was that the concept has so often been abused as a shield behind which the most inhuman acts are committed. In the name of human nature, for example, Aristotle and most thinkers up to the eighteenth century defended slavery¹. Or in order to prove the rationality and necessity of the capitalist form of society, scholars have tried to make a case for acquisitiveness, competitiveness, and selfishness as innate human traits. Popularly, one refers cynically to “human nature” in accepting the inevitability of such undesirable human behavior as greed, murder, cheating, and lying.

Another reason for skepticism about the concept of human nature probably lies in the influence of evolutionary thinking. Once man came to be seen as developing in the process of evolution, the idea of a substance which is contained in his essence seemed untenable. Yet I believe it is precisely from an evolutionary standpoint that we can expect new insight into the problem of the nature of man. New contributions have been made in this direction by such authors as Karl Marx, R. M. Bucke² Teilhard de Chardin, T. Dobzhansky; a similar approach is proposed also in this chapter.

¹ Exceptions: among the Greeks would be the Stoics, defenders of the equality of all men, and in the Renaissance, such humanists as Erasmus, Thomas More, and Juan Luis Vives.

² Richard M. Bucke was a Canadian psychiatrist, a friend of Emerson, a bold and imaginative mind, and in his time one of the leading figures in North American psychiatry. Although he is completely forgotten by psychiatrists, his book *Cosmic Consciousness* (rev. ed. 1946) has been read for almost a hundred years by nonprofessionals.

The main argument in favor of the assumption of the existence of a human nature is that we can define the essence of Homo sapiens in morphological, anatomical, physiological, and neurological terms. In fact, we give an exact and generally accepted definition of the species man by data referring to posture, formation of the brain, the teeth, diet, and many other factors by which we clearly differentiate him from the most developed nonhuman primates. Surely, we must assume, unless we regress to a view that considers body and mind as separate realms, that the species man must be definable mentally as well as physically.

Darwin himself was very aware of the fact that man qua man was characterized not only by specific physical but also by specific psychical attributes. The most important ones he mentions in *The Descent of Man* are as follows (abbreviated and paraphrased by G. G. Simpson): In proportion with his higher intelligence, man's behavior is more flexible, less reflex or instinctive.

Man shares such complex factors as curiosity, imitation, attention, memory, and imagination with other relatively advanced animals, but has them in higher degree and applies them in more intricate ways. More, at least, than other animals, man reasons and improves the adaptive nature of his behavior in rational ways.

Man regularly both uses and makes tools in great variety.

Man is self-conscious; he reflects on his past, future, life, death, and so forth.

Man makes mental abstractions and develops a related symbolism; the most essential and complexly developed outcome of these capacities is language.

Some men have a sense of beauty. Most men have a religious sense, taking that term broadly to include awe, superstition, belief in the animistic, supernatural, or spiritual.

Normal men have a moral sense; in later terms, man ethicizes.

Man is a cultural and social animal and has developed cultures and societies unique in kind and in complexity. (G. G. Simpson, 1949.)

If one examines Darwin's list of psychic traits, several elements stand out. He mentions a number of disparate single items, some uniquely human, such as self-consciousness, symbol and culture making, an aesthetic, moral, and religious sense. This list of specific human characteristics suffers from the fact that it is purely descriptive and

enumerative, is unsystematic, and makes no attempt to analyze their common conditions. Most importantly, he does not mention in his list passions and emotions like tenderness, love, hate, cruelty, narcissism, sadism, masochism, and so on...

Clearly, our attempt to consider the most important human passions as specifically human, and not as inherited from our animal ancestors, can find no support in Darwin's view. The advance of thought among students of evolution since Darwin is manifest in the views of one of the most eminent contemporary investigators, G. G. Simpson. He insists that man has essential attributes other than those of animals. "It is important to realize", "he writes", that man is an animal, but it is even more important to realize that the essence of his unique nature lies precisely in those characteristics that are not shared with any other animal. His place in nature and its supreme significance are not defined by his animality but by his humanity". (G. G. Simpson, 1949.)

Simpson suggests as the basic definition of *Homo sapiens* the interrelated factors of intelligence, flexibility, individualization, and socialization. Even if his answer is not entirely satisfactory, his attempt to understand man's essential traits as being interrelated and rooted in one basic factor and his recognition of the transformation of quantitative into qualitative change constitute a significant step beyond Darwin. (G. G. Simpson, 1944; 1953.)

From the side of psychology, one of the best-known attempts to describe man's specific needs is that made by Abraham Maslow, who drew up a list of man's "basic needs" – physiological and aesthetic needs, needs for safety, belongingness, love, esteem, self-actualization, knowledge and understanding. (A. Maslow, 1954.) This list is a somewhat unsystematic enumeration, and regrettably, Maslow did not try to analyze the common origin of such needs in the nature of man. The attempt to define the nature of man in terms of the specific conditions-biological and mental-of the species man leads us first to some considerations concerning the birth of man.

It seems simple to know when a human individual comes into existence, but in fact it is not quite as simple as it seems. The answer might be: at the time of conception, when the fetus has assumed definite human form, in the act of birth, at the end of weaning; or one might even claim that most men have not yet been fully born by the time they die. We

would best decline to fix a day or an hour for “the birth” of an individual and speak rather of a process in the course of which a person comes into existence.

If we ask when man as a species was born, the answer is much more difficult. We know much less about the evolutionary process. Here we are dealing with millions of years; our knowledge is based on accidental findings of skeletons and tools whose significance is still much disputed.

Yet in spite of the insufficiency of our knowledge, there are a few data which, even though in need of modification in detail, give us a general picture of the process we may call the birth of man. We could date the conception of man back at the beginning of unicellular life, about one and a half billion years ago, or to the beginning of the existence of primitive mammals, about two hundred million years ago; we might say that human development begins with man’s hominid ancestors who may have lived about fourteen million years ago or possibly earlier. We could date his birth from the appearance of the first man, *Homo erectus*, of whom the various specimens found in Asia cover a time from about one million to about five hundred thousand years ago (Peking Man); or from only about forty thousand years ago when modern man (*Homo sapiens sapiens*) emerged, who was in all essential biological aspects identical to man today³ Indeed, if we look at man’s individual development in terms of historical time, we might say that man proper was born only a few minutes ago. Or we might even think that he is still in the process of birth, that the unbiblical cord has not yet been severed, and that complications have arisen that make it appear doubtful whether man will ever be born or whether he is to be stillborn. Most students of human evolution date the birth of man to one particular event: the making of tools, following Benjamin Franklin’s definition of man as *Homo faber*, man the toolmaker. This definition has been sharply criticized by Marx who considered it “characteristic of Yankeedom”⁴. Among modern writers, Mumford has most convincingly criticized this orientation based on toolmaking. (L. Mumford, 1967.)

One must look for a concept of man’s nature in the process of human evolution rather than in isolated aspects like toolmaking, which bears so clearly the stamp of the contemporary obsession with produc-

³ Cf. the discussion in D. Pilbeam (1970); also M. F. A. Montagu (1967) and G. Smolla (1967).

⁴ Cf., for an understanding of Marx’s concept of human nature, E. Fromm (1961, 1968).

tion. We have to arrive at an understanding of man's nature on the basis of the blend of the two fundamental biological conditions that mark the emergence of man. One was the ever-decreasing determination of behavior by instincts⁵. Even taking into account the many controversial views about the nature of instincts, it is generally accepted that the higher an animal has risen in the stages of evolution, the less is the weight of stereotyped behavior patterns that are strictly determined and phylogenetically programmed in the brain.

The process of ever-decreasing determination of behavior by instincts can be plotted as a continuum, at the zero end of which we will find the lowest forms of animal evolution with the highest degree of instinctive determination; this decreases along with animal evolution and reaches a certain level with the mammals; it decreases further in the development going up to the primates, and even here we find a great gulf between monkeys and apes, as Yerkes and Yerkes have shown in their classic investigation. (R. M. and A. V. Yerkes 1929.) In the species *Homo* instinctive determination has reached its maximum decrease. The other trend to be found in animal evolution is the growth of the brain, and particularly of the neocortex. Here, too, we can plot the evolution as a continuum – at one end, the lowest animals, with the most primitive nervous structure and a relatively small number of neurons: at the other, man, with a larger and more complex brain structure, especially a neocortex three times as large as that of even his hominid ancestors, and a truly fantastic number of intraneuronal connections...

Does the extraordinary development of his brain make up for his instinctive deficit? To some extent it does. Man is guided by his intellect to make right choices. But we know also how weak and unreliable this instrument is. It is easily influenced by man's desires and passions and surrenders to their influence. Man's brain is insufficient not only as a substitute for the weakened instincts, but it complicates the task of living tremendously. By this I do not refer to instrumental intelligence, the use of thought as an instrument for the manipulation of objects in order to satisfy one's needs; after all, man shares this with animals, especially with the primates. I refer to that aspect in which man's thinking has acquired an entirely new quality, that of self-awareness. Man is the only

⁵ The term "instincts" is used here in a loose fashion in order to simplify the discussion. It is not used in the dated sense of "instinct" as excluding learning, but in the sense of "organic drives".

animal who not only knows objects but who knows that he knows. Man is the only animal who has not only instrumental intelligence, but reason, the capacity to use his thinking to understand objectively-i.e., to know the nature of things as they are in themselves, and not only as means for his satisfaction. Gifted with self-awareness and reason, man is aware of himself as a being separate from nature and from others; he is aware of his powerlessness, of his ignorance; he is aware of his end: death.

Self-awareness, reason, and imagination have disrupted the “harmony” that characterizes animal existence. Their emergence has made man into an anomaly, the freak of the universe. He is part of nature, subject to her physical laws and unable to change them, yet he transcends nature. He is set apart while being a part; he is homeless yet chained to the home he shares with all creatures. Cast into this world at an accidental place and time he is forced out of it accidentally and against his will. Being aware of himself, he realizes his powerlessness and the limitations of his existence. He is never free from the dichotomy of his existence: he cannot rid himself of his mind, even if he would want to; he cannot rid himself of his body as long as he is alive-and his body makes him want to be alive. Man’s life cannot be lived by repeating the pattern of his species; he must live. Man is the only animal who does not feel at home in nature, who can feel evicted from paradise, the only animal for whom his own existence is a problem that he has to solve and from which he cannot escape. He cannot go back to the prehuman state of harmony with nature, and he does not know where he will arrive if he goes forward. Man’s existential contradiction results in a state of constant disequilibrium. This disequilibrium distinguishes him from the animal, which lives, as it were, in harmony with nature. This does not mean that the animal necessarily lives a peaceful and happy life, but that it has its specific ecological niche to which its physical and mental qualities have been adapted by the process of evolution. Man’s existential, and hence unavoidable disequilibrium can be relatively stable when he has found, with the support of his culture, a more or less adequate way of coping with his existential problems. But this relative stability does not imply that the dichotomy has disappeared; it is merely dormant and becomes manifest as soon as the conditions for this relative stability change.

Indeed, in the process of man’s self-creation this relative stability is upset again and again. Man, in his history, changes his environment,

and in this process, he changes himself. His knowledge increases, but so does his awareness of his ignorance; he experiences himself as an individual, and not only as a member of his tribe, and with this his sense of separateness and isolation grows. He creates larger and more efficient social units, led by powerful leaders-and he becomes frightened and submissive. He attains a certain amount of freedom-and becomes afraid of this very freedom. His capacity for material production grows, but in the process, he becomes greedy and egotistical, a slave of the things he has created.

Every new state of disequilibrium forces man to seek for new equilibrium. Indeed, what has often been considered man's innate drive for progress is his attempt to find a new and if possible better equilibrium. The new forms of equilibrium by no means constitute a straight line of human improvement. Frequently in history new achievements have led to regressive developments. Many times, when forced to find a new solution, man runs into a blind alley from which he has to extricate himself; and it is indeed remarkable that thus far in history he has been able to do so.

These considerations suggest a hypothesis as to how to define the essence or nature of man. I propose that man's nature cannot be defined in terms of a specific quality, such as love, hate, reason, good or evil, but only in terms of fundamental contradictions that characterize human existence and have their root in the biological dichotomy between missing instincts and self-awareness. Man's existential conflict produces certain psychic needs common to all men. He is forced to overcome the horror of separateness, of powerlessness, and of lostness, and find new forms of relating himself to the world to enable him to feel at home. I have called these psychic needs existential because they are rooted in the very conditions of human existence. They are shared by all men, and their fulfillment is as necessary for man's remaining sane as the fulfillment of organic drives is necessary for his remaining alive. But each of these needs can be satisfied in different ways, which vary according to the differences of his social condition. These different ways of satisfying the existential needs manifest themselves in passions, such as love, tenderness, striving for justice, independence, truth, hate, sadism, masochism, destructiveness, narcissism. I call them character-rooted passions-or simply human passions-because they are integrated in man's character.

While the concept of character will be discussed at length further on, it will suffice here to say that character is the relatively permanent system of all noninstinctual strivings through which man relates himself to the human and natural world. One may understand character as the human substitute for the missing animal instincts; it is man's second nature. What all men have in common are their organic drives (even though highly modifiable by experience) and their existential needs. What they do not have in common are the kinds of passions that are dominant in their respective characters-character-rooted passions. The difference in character is largely due to the difference in social conditions (although genetically given dispositions also influence the formation of the character); for this reason, one can call character-rooted passions a historical category and instincts a natural category. Yet the former are not a purely historical category either, because they are the result of the impact the various historical constellations have on the biologically given conditions of human existence?

We are now ready to discuss man's existential needs and the variety of character – rooted passions that in turn constitute different answers to these existential needs. Before starting this discussion let us look back and raise a question of method. I have suggested a "reconstruction" of man's mind as it may have been at the beginning of prehistory. The obvious objection to this method is that it is a theoretical reconstruction for which there is no evidence whatsoever-or so it would appear. However, evidence is not completely lacking for the formulation of some tentative hypotheses that may be disproven or confirmed by further findings.

This evidence lies essentially in those findings which indicate that man, perhaps as early as half a million years ago (Peking Man) had cults and rituals, manifesting that his concerns went beyond satisfying his material needs. The history of prehistoric religion and art (not separable in those times) is the main source for the study of primitive man's mind. Obviously, I cannot set forth into this vast and as yet controversial territory within the context of this study. What I want to stress is that the presently available data, as well as those still to be found in regard to primitive religions and rituals, will not reveal the nature of prehistoric man's mind unless we have a key with which we can decipher it. This key, I believe, is our own mind. Not our conscious thoughts, but those categories of thought and feeling that are buried in our unconscious and

yet are an experiential core present in all men of all cultures; briefly, it is what I would like to call man's "primary human experience". This primary human experience is in itself rooted in man's existential situation. For this reason, it is common to all men and does not need to be explained as being racially inherited.

The first question, of course, is whether we can find this key; whether we can transcend our normal frame of mind and transpose ourselves into the mind of the "original man". Drama, poetry, art, myth have done this, but not psychology, with the exception of psychoanalysis. The various psychoanalytic schools have done it in different ways; Freud's original man was a historical construct of the member of a patriarchally organized male band, ruled and exploited by a father tyrant against whom the sons rebel, and whose internalization is the basis for the formation of the superego and a new social organization. Freud's aim was to help the contemporary patient to discover his own unconscious by letting him share the experience of what Freud believed to be his earliest ancestors.

Even though this model of original man was fictitious and the corresponding "Oedipus complex" was not the deepest level of human experience, Freud's hypothesis opened up an entirely new possibility: that all men of every period and culture had shared a basic experience with their common ancestors. Thus, Freud added another historical argument to the humanist belief that all men share the common core of humanity.

C. G. Jung made the same attempt in a different and in many respects more sophisticated way than Freud's. He was particularly interested in the variety of myths, rituals, and religions. He used myth ingeniously and brilliantly as a key for the understanding of the unconscious, and thus built a bridge between mythology and psychology more systematically and extensively than any of his predecessors.

What I am suggesting here is the use of our unconscious as a key to the understanding of prehistory. This requires the practice of self-knowledge in the psychoanalytic sense: the removal of a major part of our resistance against the awareness of our unconscious, thus reducing the difficulty of penetrating from our conscious mind to the depth of our core.

Provided we are able to do this, we can understand our fellowmen who live in the same culture as we do, also men of an entirely different

culture, and even a mad man. We can also sense what original man must have experienced, what existential needs he had, and in what ways men (including ourselves) can respond to these needs.

**From: Fromm Erich (1973)
The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness.
Holt Rinehart & Winston, New York., Pp. 218-228**

Regarding seminar 5. Phenomenon of Consciousness from an angle of Philosophical Theory.

**Jean Paul Sartre
*Being and Nothingness***

**CHAPTER THREE
Transcendence**

IN order to arrive at as complete a description as possible of the *for-itself* we chose as a guiding thread the examination of negative attitudes. As we have seen, all questions which we can pose and the replies which can be made to them are conditioned by the permanent possibility of non-being, outside us and within. Our original goal, however, was not only to discover the negative structures of the for-itself. In the Introduction we encountered a problem, and it is this problem which we have wished to resolve: what is the original relation of human reality to the being of phenomena or being-in-itself? In the Introduction indeed we were obliged to reject both the realist solution and the idealist solution. It appeared to us both that transcendent being could not act on consciousness and that consciousness could not “construct” the transcendent by objectivizing elements borrowed from its subjectivity. Consequently, we concluded that the original relation to being could not be an external relation which would unite two substances originally isolated.

“The relation of the regions of being is a primitive upsurge”, we said, “and it forms a part of the very structure of these beings”. *The concrete is revealed to us as the synthetic totality of which consciousness, like the phenomenon, constitutes only the articulations.*

But although in one sense consciousness considered in isolation is an abstraction, and although phenomena—even the phenomenon of being — are similarly abstract in so far as they cannot exist as phenomena with...out appearing to a consciousness, nevertheless the being of phenomena as in an in-itself which is what it is cannot be considered as an abstraction. In order to be, it needs only itself; it refers only to itself.

On the other hand, *our description of the for-itself has shown us how this on the contrary, is removed as far as possible from a substance and from the in-itself; we have seen that it is its own nothingness and that it can exist only in the ontological unity of its ekstases.* Therefore, while the relation of the for-itself to the in-itself is originally constitutive of the very being which is put into the relation, we should not understand that these relations constitutive of the in-itself but rather of the for-itself. It is in the form itself alone that we must look for the key to that relation to being which we call, for example, knowing. *The for-itself is responsible in its being for its relation with the in-itself, or if you prefer, it produces itself originally on the foundation of a relation to the in-itself. This is what we all readily anticipated when we defined consciousness as “a being such that in its being, its being is in question in so far as this being implies a being other than itself”.* But since formulating this definition we have acquired new knowledge. *In particular we have grasped the profound meaning of the for-itself as the foundation of its own nothingness.* Is it not time now to utilize this knowledge to determine and explain that ekstastic relation of the for-itself to the in-itself on the foundation of which *knowing* and acting in general can appear? Are we not in a position now to reply to our original question? In order to be non-thetic self-consciousness, consciousness must be aesthetic consciousness of something, as we have noted. But what we have studied hitherto is the for-itself as the original mode of being of non-thetic self-consciousness. Are we not therefore bound to describe the relations of the for-itself with the in-itself inasmuch as these are constitutive of the very being of the for-itself? Are we not able at present to find the answer to questions of the following type: Since the in-itself is what it is, how and why does the being of the for-itself have to be a knowledge of the in-itself? And what in general is knowledge?

I. KNOWLEDGE AS A TYPE OF RELATION BETWEEN THE FOR-ITSELF AND THE IN-ITSELF

THERE is only intuitive knowledge. Deduction and *discursive argument*, incorrectly called examples of knowing, are only instruments which lead to intuition. When intuition is reached, methods utilized to attain it are effaced before it; in cases where it is not attained, reason and argument remain as indicating signs which point toward an intuition beyond reach; finally if it has been attained but is not a present mode of my consciousness, the precepts which I use remain as the results of operations formerly effected, like what Descartes called the “memories of ideas”. If someone asks for a definition of intuition, Husserl will reply, in agreement with the majority of philosophers, that it is the presence of the thing (Sache) “in person” to consciousness. Knowledge therefore is of the type of being which we described in the preceding chapter under the title of “presence to –”. But we have established that the in-itself can never by itself be a presence. Being-present, in fact, is an ekstastic mode of being of the for-itself. We are then compelled to reverse the terms of our definition: *intuition is the presence of consciousness to the thing. Therefore, we must return now to the problem of nature and the meaning of this presence of the for-itself to being.*

In the Introduction while using the still not elucidated *concept of “consciousness”*, we establish the necessity for consciousness to be *consciousness of something*. In fact, it is by means of that of which it is conscious that consciousness distinguishes itself in its Own eyes and that it can be self-consciousness; a consciousness which would not be consciousness (of) something would be consciousness (of) nothing. *But at present we have elucidated the ontological meaning of consciousness or the for-itself*. We can therefore pose the problem in more precise terms and ask: What do we mean when we say that it is necessary for consciousness to-be-consciousness of something-considered on the ontological level; i.e., in the perspective of being-for-itself?

We know that the for-itself is the foundation of its Own nothingness in the form of the phantom dyad-the reflection-reflecting. The *reflecting* exists only in order to reflect the reflection, and the reflection is a reflection only insofar as it refers to the reflecting. Thus, the two terms outlined in the dyad point to each other, and each engages its being in the being of

the other. But if the reflecting is nothing other than the reflecting of *this* reflection, and if the reflection can be characterized only by its “being-in-order-to-be reflected in *this* reflecting”, then the two terms of the quasi-dyad support their two nothingnesses on each other, conjointly annihilating themselves. It is necessary that the reflecting reflect *something* in order that the ensemble should not dissolve into nothing. But if the reflection, on the other hand, were *something*, independent of its being-in-order-to-be-reflected, then it would necessarily be qualified not as a reflection but as an in-itself. This would be to introduce opacity into the system “the-reflection-reflecting” and, even more, to complete the suggested scissiparity. For in the for-itself the reflection is *also* the reflecting. But if the reflection is qualified, it is separated from the reflecting and its appearance is separated from its reality; the cogito becomes impossible. The reflection can be simultaneously “something to be reflected” and nothing, but only if it makes itself qualified by something other than itself or, if you prefer, if it is reflected as a relation to an outside which it is not.

What defines the reflection for the reflecting is always *that* to *which it is* presence. Even a joy, apprehended on the unreflective level, is only the “reflected” presence to a laughing and open world full of happy perspectives. But the few preceding comments have already informed us *that non-being is an essential structure of presence. Presence encloses a radical negation as presence to that which one is not. What is present to me is what is not me.* We should note furthermore that this “non-being” is implied a priori in every theory of knowledge. It is impossible to construct the notion of an object if we do not have originally a negative relation designating the object as that which is not consciousness. This is what made it quite easy to use the expression “non-ego”, which was the fashion for a time, although one could not detect on the part of those who employed it the slightest concern to found this “not” which originally qualified the external world. Actually neither the connection of representation, nor the necessity of certain subjective ensembles, nor temporal irreversibility, nor an appeal to infinity could serve to constitute the object as such (that is, to serve as foundation for a further negation which would separate out the non-ego and oppose it to me as such) if this negation were not given first and if it were not the a priori foundation of all experience.

The thing, before all comparison, before all construction, is that which is present to consciousness as *not being* consciousness. The original relation of presence as the foundation of knowledge is negative. But as negation comes to the world by means of the for-itself, and as the thing is what *it is* in the absolute indifference of identity, it cannot be the thing which is posited as not being the for-itself. Negation comes from the for-itself. We should not conceive this negation as a type of judgment which would bear on the thing itself and deny concerning *it* that it is the for-itself; this type of negation could be conceived only if the for-itself were a substance already fully formed, and even in that case it could emanate only as a third being establishing from outside a negative relation between two beings. But by the original negation the for-itself constitutes itself as *not being* the thing.

Consequently, the definition of consciousness which we gave earlier can be formulated in the perspective of the for-itself as follows: “The for-itself is a being such that in its being, its being is in question in so far as this being is essentially a certain way of *not being* a being which it posits simultaneously as other than itself”. Knowledge appears then as a mode of being. Knowing is neither a relation established after the event between two beings, nor is it an activity of one of these two beings, nor is it a quality of a property or a virtue. It is the very being of the for-itself in so far as this is presence to – ; that is, in so far as the for-itself has to be its being by making itself not to be a certain being to which it is present. This means that the for-itself can be only in the mode of a reflection (reflet) causing itself to be reflected as not being a certain being. The “something” which must qualify the reflected in order that the dyad “the-reflection-reflecting” may not dissolve in nothingness is pure negation. The reflected causes itself to be qualified *outside* next to a certain being as not *being* that being. This is precisely what we mean by “to be consciousness of something”. But we must define more precisely what we understand by this original negation...

...But if the for-itself is to be the nothingness whereby “there is” being, then being can exist originally only as totality. Thus, knowledge is the world. To use Heidegger’s expression, the world and outside of that *nothing*. *But this “nothing” is not originally that in which human reality emerges. This nothing is human reality itself as the radical negation by means of which the world is revealed.* Of course, the very apprehension

of the world as totality causes the appearance *alongside* the world of a nothingness which sustains and encompasses this totality. In fact, this nothingness as the absolutely nothing which is left outside the totality even determines the totality. This is why totalization adds nothing to being, for it is only the result of the appearance of nothingness as the limit of being. But this nothingness is *not* anything except human reality apprehending itself as excluded from being and perpetually beyond being, in commerce with nothing. It amounts to the same thing whether we say, human reality is that by which being is revealed as totality or, human reality is that which causes *there to be* nothing outside of being. This nothing is the possibility for there to be a beyond-the-world such that (1) this possibility reveals being as a world and (2) human reality has to be this possibility. As such, this nothing constitutes-along with the original presence to being-the circuit of selfness.

But human reality makes itself the unachieved totality of negations only insofar as it reaches beyond a concrete negation which it has to be as actual presence to being. If it were in fact a pure consciousness (of) being a syncretic and undifferentiated negation, it could not determine itself and therefore could not be a concrete totality, although detailed, of its determinations. It is a totality only to the extent that through all its other negations it escapes the concrete negation which it is at present. It's being can be its own totality only to the extent that it is a surpassing toward the whole which it has to be, beyond the partial structure which it is. Otherwise, it would simply be what it is and could in no way be considered as either a totality or a non-totality. In the sense then that a partial negative structure must appear on the ground of the undifferentiated negations which I am-and of which it forms a part-I make known to myself by means of being-in-itself a certain concrete reality which I have too not-be. The "this" is the being which I at present am not, in so far as it appears on the ground of the totality of being. *This is* what I at present am not inasmuch as I have to be nothing of being: it is what is revealed on the undifferentiated ground of being, to make known to me the concrete negation which I have to be on the totalizing ground of my negations...

(2) Furthermore, the Other does not constitute me as an object for myself but for him. In other words, he does not serve as a regulative or constitutive concept for the pieces of knowledge which I may have of

myself. Therefore, the Other's presence does not cause me-as-object to "appear". I apprehend nothing but an escape from myself toward. Even when language has revealed that the Other considers me evil or jealous, I shall never have a concrete intuition of my evil or of my jealousy. These will never be more than fleeting notions whose very nature will be to escape me. I shall not apprehend my evil, but in relation to this or that particular act I shall escape myself, I shall feel my alienation or my flow towards ... a being which I shall only be able to think emptily as evil and which nevertheless I shall *feel* that I am, which I shall live at a distance through shame or fear.

Thus myself-as-object is neither knowledge nor a unity of knowledge but an uneasiness, a lived wrenching away from the ecstatic unity of the for-itself, a limit which I cannot reach and which yet I am. The Other through whom this Me comes to me is neither knowledge nor category but the fact of the presence of a strange freedom. In fact, my wrenching away from myself and the upsurge of the Other's freedom are one; I can feel them and live them only as an ensemble; I cannot even try to conceive of one without the other. The fact of the Other is incontestable and touches me to the heart. I realize him through *uneasiness*; through him I am perpetually in danger in a world which is *this* world and which nevertheless I can only glimpse.

The Other does not appear to me as a being who is constituted first so as to encounter me later; he appears as a being who arises in an original relation of being with me and whose indubitability and factual *necessity* are those of my own consciousness. A number of difficulties remain. In particular there is the fact that through shame we confer on the Other an indubitable presence. Now as we have seen, it is only probable that the Other is looking at me. That farm at the top of the hill seems to be looking at the commandos, and it is certain that the house is occupied by the enemy. But it is not certain that the enemy soldiers are at present watching "through the windows. It is not certain that the man whose footsteps I hear behind me is looking at me; his face could be turned away, his look fixed on the ground or on a book. Finally, in general it is not sure that those" eyes which are fixed on me are eyes; they could be only "artificial ones" resembling real eyes. In short, must we not say that in tum the look becomes *probable* because of the fact that can constantly believe that I am looked-at without actually being so? As a result, does

not our certainty of the Other's existence take on a purely hypothetical character?

The difficulty can be expressed in these terms: On the occasion of certain appearances in the world which seem to me to manifest a look, I apprehend in myself a certain "being-looked-at" with its own structures which refer me to the Other's real existence. But it is possible that I am mistaken; perhaps the objects of the world which I took for eyes were not eyes; perhaps it was only the wind which shook the bush behind me; in short perhaps these concrete objects did not really manifest a look. In this case what becomes of my certainty that I am *looked-at*? My shame was in fact shame before somebody. But nobody is there. Does it not thereby become shame before nobody? Since it has posited somebody where there was nobody, does it not become a false shame?

...Similarly, *shame is only the original feeling of having my being outside, engaged in another being and as such without any defense*, illuminated by the absolute light which emanates from a pure subject. Shame is the consciousness of being irremediably what I always was: "in suspense" that is, in the mode of the "not-yet" or of the "already-no-longer". Pure shame is not a feeling of being this or that guilty object but in general of being an object; that is, of recognizing *myself* in this degraded, fixed, and dependent being which I am for the Other. Shame is the feeling of an *original* fault, not because of the fact that I may have committed this or that particular fault but simply that I have "fallen" into the world in the midst of things and that I need the mediation of the Other in order to be what I am.

Modesty and in particular the fear of being surprised in a state of nakedness are only a symbolic specification of original shame; the body symbol implies here our defenseless state as objects. To put on clothes is to hide one's object-state; it is to claim the right of seeing without being seen; that is, to be a pure subject. This is why the Biblical symbol of the fall after the original sin is the fact that Adam and Eve "know that they are naked". The reaction to shame will consist exactly in apprehending as an object the one who apprehended my own object-state...The-Other-as-Object "has" a subjectivity as this has "an inside". In this way I recover myself, for I can not be an *object* for an *object*. I certainly do not deny that the Other remains connected with me "inside him", but the consciousness which he has of me, since it is consciousness-as-an-object,

appears to me as pure interiority without efficacy. It is just one property among others of that “inside”, something comparable to a sensitized plate in the closed compartment of a camera. In so far as I make there be an Other, I apprehend myself as the free source of the knowledge which the Other has of me, and the Other appears to me as affected in his being by that knowledge which he has of my being inasmuch as I have affected him with the character of Other. This knowledge takes on then a subjective character in the new sense of “relative”; that is, it remains in the subject-as-object as a quality *relative* to the being-other with which I have affected him. It no longer *touches* me; it is an image of me in *him*.

Thus, subjectivity is degraded into interiority, free consciousness into a pure absence of principles, possibilities into properties, and the knowledge by which the Other touches me in my being, into a pure image of me in the Other’s “consciousness”. Shame motivates the reaction which surpasses and overcomes the shame inasmuch as the reaction encloses within it an implicit and non-thematized comprehension of being-able-to-be-an-object on the part of the subject for whom I am an object. This implicit comprehension is nothing other than the consciousness (of) my “being-myself”; that is, of my selfness reinforced. In fact, in the structure which expresses the experience “I am ashamed of myself”, shame supposes a me-as-object for the Other but also a selfness which is ashamed and which is imperfectly expressed by the “I” of the formula. Thus, shame is a unitary apprehension with three dimensions: “I am ashamed of myself before the Other”...

...Shame, fear, and pride are my original reactions; they are only various ways by which I recognize the Other as a subject beyond reach, and they include within them a comprehension of my selfness which can and must serve as my motivation for constituting the Other as an object...

PART THREE.
Being-for-Others

CHAPTER ONE.
The Existence of Others

The Problem

WE have described human reality from the standpoint of negating conduct and from the standpoint of the cogito. Following this lead we have discovered that human reality is-for-itself. Is this all that it is? Without going outside our attitude of reflective description, we can encounter modes of consciousness which seem, even while themselves remaining strictly in for-itself, to point to a radically different type of ontological structure. This ontological structure is mine; it is in relation to myself as subject that I am concerned about myself, and yet this concern (for-my-self) reveals to me a being which is my being without being-for-me. Consider for example shame. Here we are dealing with a mode of consciousness which has a structure identical with all those which we have previously described. It is a non-positional self-consciousness, conscious (of) itself as shame; as such, it is an example of what the Germans call “*Erlebnis*”, and it is accessible to reflection. In addition, its structure is intentional; it is a shameful apprehension of something and this something is me. I am ashamed of what I am. Shame therefore realizes an intimate relation of myself to myself. Through shame I have discovered an aspect of my being. Yet although certain complex forms derived from shame can appear on the reflective plane, shame is not originally a phenomenon of reflection.

In fact, no matter, what results one can obtain in solitude by the religious practice of shame, it is in its primary structure shame before *somebody*. I have just made an awkward or vulgar gesture. This gesture clings to me; I neither judge it nor blame it. I simply live it. I realize it in the mode of for-itself. But now suddenly I raise my head. Somebody was there and has seen me. Suddenly I realize the vulgarity of my gesture, and I am ashamed. *It is certain that my shame is not reflective, for the presence of another in my consciousness, even as a catalyst is incompatible with the reflective attitude;* in the field of my reflection I can never meet with anything but the consciousness which is mine. But

the Other is the indispensable mediator between myself and me. I am ashamed of myself as I appear to the Other. By the mere appearance of the Other, I am put in the position of passing judgment on myself as on an object, for it is as an object that I appear to the Other. Yet this object which has appeared to the Other is not an empty image in the mind of another. Such an image in fact, would be imputable wholly to the Other and so could not “touch” me. I could feel irritation, or anger before it as before a bad portrait of myself which gives to my expression an ugliness or baseness which I do not have, but I could not be touched to the quick. Shame is by nature recognition. I recognize that I am as the Other sees me. There is however no question of a comparison between what I am for myself and what I am for the Other as if I found in myself, in the mode of being of the For-itself, an equivalent of what I am for the Other. In the first place this comparison is not encountered in us as the result of a concrete psychic operation. Shame is an immediate shudder which runs through me from head to foot without any discursive preparation. In addition, the comparison is impossible; I am unable to bring about any relation between what I am in the intimacy of the For-Itself, without distance, without recoil, without perspective, and this unjustifiable being-in-itself which I am for the Other. There is no standard here, no table of correlation. Moreover, the very notion of vulgarity implies an intermonad relation. Nobody can be vulgar all alone.

Thus, the Other has not only revealed to me what I was; he has established me in a new type of being which can support new qualifications. This being was not in me potentially before the appearance of the Other, for it could not have found any place in the For-itself. Even if some power had been pleased to endow me with a body wholly constituted before it should be for-others, still my vulgarity and my awkwardness could not lodge there potentially; for they are meanings and as such they surpass the body and at the same time refer to a witness capable of understanding them and to the totality of my human reality. But this new being which appears for the other does not reside in the Other; I am responsible for it as is shown very well by the education system which consists in making children ashamed of what they are. Thus, shame is shame of oneself before *the* Other; these two structures are inseparable. But at the same time, I need the Other in order to realize fully all the structures of my being. The For-itself refers to the For-others. Therefore, if we wish to

grasp in its totality the relation of man's being to being-in-itself, we cannot be satisfied with the descriptions outlined in the earlier chapters of this work. We must answer two far more formidable questions: first that of the existence of the Other, then that of the relation of my being to the being of the Other.

1. FIRST ATTITUDE TOWARD OTHERS: LOVE, LANGUAGE, MASOCHISM

EVERYTHING which may be said of me in my relations with the Other applies to him as well. While I attempt to free myself from the hold of the Other, the Other is trying to free himself from mine; while I seek to enslave the Other, the Other seeks to enslave me. We are by no means dealing with unilateral relations with an object-in-itself, but with reciprocal and moving relations. The following descriptions of concrete behavior must therefore be envisaged within the perspective of *conflict*. *Conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others.*

If we start with the first revelation of the Other as a *look*, we must recognize that we experience our inapprehensible being-for-others in the form of a *possession*. I am possessed by the Other; the Other's look fashions my body in its nakedness, causes it to be born, sculpts it, produces it as it is, sees it as I shall never see it. *The Other holds a secret the secret of what I am.* He makes me be and thereby he possesses me, and this possession is nothing other than the consciousness of possessing me.

I in the recognition of my object-state have proof that he has this consciousness. By virtue of consciousness the Other is for me simultaneously the one who *has stolen my being from me* and the one who causes "there to be" a being which is my being. Thus, I have a comprehension of this ontological structure: I am responsible for my being-for-others, but I am not the foundation of it. It appears to me therefore in the form of a contingent given for which I am nevertheless responsible; the Other finds my being in so far as this being is in the form of the "there is". But he is not responsible for my being although he found it in complete freedom – in and by means of his free transcendence. Thus, to the extent that *I am revealed to myself* as responsible for my being, I *lay claim* to this being which I am, that is, I wish to recover it, or, more exactly, I am the project of the recovery of my being. I want to stretch out my hand

and grab hold of this being which is presented to me as my *being* but at a distance-like the dinner of Tantalus; I want to find it by my very freedom. For if in one sense my being-as-objects an unbearable contingency and the pure “possession” of myself by another, still in another sense this being stands as the indication of what I should be obliged to recover and found in order to be the foundation of myself. But this is conceivable only if I assimilate the Other’s freedom. Thus my project of recovering myself is fundamentally a project of absorbing the Other.

Nevertheless, this project must leave the Other’s nature intact. Two consequences result: (1) I do not thereby cease to assert the Other – that is, to deny concerning myself that I am the Other. Since the Other is the foundation of my being, he could not be dissolved in me without my being-for-others disappearing. Therefore, if I project the realization of unity with the Other, this means that I project my assimilation of the Other’s Otherness as my own possibility. In fact, the problem for me is to make myself be by acquiring the possibility of taking the Other’s point of view on myself. It is not a matter of acquiring a pure, abstract faculty of knowledge. It is not the pure category of the Other which I project appropriating to myself. This category is not conceived nor even conceivable. But on the occasion of concrete experience with the Other, an experience suffered and realized, it is this concrete Other as an absolute reality whom in his otherness I wish to incorporate into myself. (2) The Other whom I wish to assimilate is by no means the Other-as-object. Or, if you prefer, my project of incorporating the Other in no way corresponds to a recapturing of my for-itself as myself and to a surpassing of the Other’s transcendence toward my own possibilities.

For me it is not a question of obliterating my object-state by making an object of the Other, which would amount to releasing myself from my being-for-others. Quite the contrary, I want to assimilate the Other as the Other-Looking-at-me, and this project of assimilation includes an augmented recognition of my being-looked-at. In short, in order to maintain before me the Other’s freedom, which is looking at me, I identify myself totally with my being looked-at. And since my being-as-object is the only possible relation between me and the Other, it is this being-as-object which alone can serve me as an instrument to effect my assimilation of the other freedom.

Thus, as a reaction to the failure of the third ecstasies, the for-itself wishes to be identified with the Other's freedom as founding its own being-in itself. To be other to oneself-the ideal always aimed concretely in the form of being *this* Other to oneself – is the primary value of my relations with the Other. This means that my being-for-others is haunted by the indication of an absolute-being which would be itself as other and other as itself and which by freely giving to itself its being-itself as other and its being-other as itself, would be the very being of the ontological proof-that is, God. This ideal cannot be realized without my surmounting the original contingency of my relations to the Other; that is, by overcoming the fact that there is no relation of internal negativity between the negation by which the Other is made other than I and the negation by which I am made other than the Other.

We have seen that this contingency is in sunnountable; it is the fact of my relations with the Other, just as my body is the fact of my being-in-the-world. Unity with the Other is therefore *in fact* unrealizable. It is also unrealizable *in theory*, for the assimilation of the for-itself and the Other in a single transcendence would necessarily involve the disappearance of the characteristic of otherness in the Other. Thus, the condition on which I project the identification of myself with the Other is that I persist in denying that I am the Other. Finally, this project of unification is the source of conflict since while I experience myself as an object for the Other and while I project assimilating him in and by means of this experience, the Other apprehends me as an object in the midst of the world and does not project identifying me with himself. It would therefore be necessary-since being for-others includes a double internal negation – to act upon the internal negation by which the Other transcends my transcendence and makes me exist for the Other; that is, to *act upon the* Other's freedom.

This unrealizable ideal which haunts my project of myself in the presence of the Other is not to be identified with love in so far as love is an enterprise; i.e., an organic ensemble of projects toward my own possibilities. But it is the ideal of love, its motivation and its end, its unique value. Love as the primitive relation to the Other is the ensemble of the projects by which I aim at realizing this value. . . .

These projects put me in direct connection with the Other's freedom. It is in this sense that love is, a conflict. We have observed that

the Other's freedom is the foundation of my being. But precisely because I exist by means of the Other's freedom, I have no security; I am in danger of this freedom. It moulds my being and makes me be, it confers values upon me and removes them from me; and my being receives from it a perpetual passive escape from self. Irresponsible and beyond reach, this protean freedom in which I have engaged myself can in turn engage me in a thousand different ways of being. My project of recovering my being can be realized only if I get hold of this freedom and reduce it to being a freedom subject to my freedom.

At the same time, it is the only way in which I can act on the free negation of interiority by which the Other constitutes me as an Other; that is the only way in which I can prepare the way for a future identification of the Other with me. This will be clearer perhaps if we study the problem from a purely psychological aspect. Why does the lover want to be loved? *If Love were in fact a pure desire for physical possession, it could in many cases be easily satisfied.* Proust's hero, for example, who installs his mistress in his home, who can see her and possess her at any hour of the day, who has been able to make her completely dependent on him economically, ought to be free from worry. Yet we know that he is, on the contrary, continually gnawed by anxiety. Through her consciousness Albertine escapes Marcel even when he is at her side, and that is why he knows relief only when he gazes on her while she sleeps. It is certain then that the lover wishes to capture a "consciousness". But why does he wish it? And how?

The notion of "ownership", by which love is so often explained, is not actually primary. Why should I want to appropriate the Other if it were not precisely that the Other makes me be? But this implies precisely a certain mode of appropriation; it is the Other's freedom as such that we want to get hold of. Not because of a desire for power. The tyrant scorns love, he is content with fear. If he seeks to win the love of his subjects, it is for political reasons; and if he finds a more economical way to enslave them, he adopts it immediately.

On the other hand, the man who wants to be loved does not desire the enslavement of the beloved. He is not bent on becoming the object of passion which flows forth mechanically. He does not want to possess an automaton, and if we want to humiliate him, we need only try to persuade him that the beloved's passion is the result of a psychological

determinism. The lover will then feel that both his love and his being are cheapened. If Tristan and Isolde fall madly in love because of a love potion, they are less interesting. The total enslavement of the beloved kills the love of the lover. The end is surpassed; if the beloved is transformed into an automaton, the lover finds himself alone. *Thus the lover does not desire to possess the beloved as one possesses a thing; he demands a special type of appropriation.* He wants to possess freedom as freedom.

On the other hand, the lover can not be satisfied with that superior form of freedom which is a free and voluntary engagement. Who would be content with a love given as pure loyalty to a sworn oath? Tho would be satisfied with the words, "I love you because I have freely engaged myself to love you and because I do not wish to go back on my word". Thus, the lover demands a pledge, yet is irritated by a pledge. He wants to be loved by a freedom but demands that this freedom as freedom should no longer be free. He wishes that the Other's freedom should determine itself to become love – and this not only at the beginning of the affair but at each instant – and at the same time he wants this freedom to be captured by *itself*, to turn back upon itself, as in madness, as in a dream, so as to will its own. This captivity must be a resignation that is both free and yet chained in our hands. In love it is not a determinism of the passions which we desire in the Other nor a freedom beyond reach; it is a freedom which plays the *role* of a determinism of the passions, and which is caught in its own role. For himself the lover does not demand that he be the cause of this radical modification of freedom but that he be the unique and privileged occasion of it. In fact, he could not want to be the cause of it without immediately submerging the beloved in the midst of the world as a tool which can be transcended. That is not the essence of love. On the contrary, in Love the Lover wants to be "the whole World" for the beloved. This means that he puts himself on the side of the world; he is the one who assumes and symbolizes the world; he is a this which includes all other theses. He is and consents to be an *object*... And everywhere he desires the circle of the Other's freedom; that is, at each instant as the Other's freedom accepts this limit to his transcendence, this acceptance is already present as the motivation of the acceptance considered. It is in the capacity of an end already chosen that the lover wishes to be chosen as an end.

This allows us to grasp what basically the lover demands of the beloved; he does not want to act on the Other's freedom but to exist *a priori* as the objective limit of this freedom; that is, to be given at one stroke along with it and in its very upsurge as the limit which the freedom must accept in order to be free. By this very fact, what he demands is a limiting, a gluing down of the Other's freedom by itself; this limit of structure is in fact a given, and the very appearance of the given as the limit of freedom means that the freedom *makes itself exist* within the given by being its own prohibition against surpassing it. This prohibition is envisaged by the lover simultaneously as something lived—that is, something suffered (in a word, as a facticity) and as something freely consented to. It must be freely consented to since it must be effected only with the upsurge of a freedom which chooses itself as freedom. But it must be only what is lived since it must be an impossibility always present, a facticity which surges back to the heart of the Other's freedom. This is expressed psychologically by the demand that the free decision to love me, which the beloved formerly has taken, must slip in as a magically determining motivation *within* his present free engagement.

Now we can grasp the meaning of this demand: the facticity which is to be a factual limit for the Other in my demand to be loved and which is to result in being *his* own facticity—this is my facticity. It is in so far as I am the object which the Other makes come into being that I must be the inherent limit to his very transcendence. Thus, the Other by his upsurge into being makes me be as unsurpassable and absolute, not as a nihilating For-itself but as a being-for-others-in-the-midst-of-the-world. Thus, to want to be loved is to infect the Other with one's own facticity; it is to wish to compel him to recreate you perpetually as the condition of a freedom which submits itself and which is engaged; it is to wish both that freedom found fact and that fact have preeminence over freedom. If this end could be attained, it would result in the first place in my being secure within the Other's consciousness. First because the motive of my uneasiness and my shame is the fact that I apprehend and experience myself in my being-for-others as that which can always be surpassed towards something else, that which is the pure object of a value judgment, a pure means, a pure tool. My uneasiness stems from the fact that I assume necessarily and freely that being which another makes me be in an absolute. freedom. "God knows what I am for him God knows

what he thinks of me!” This means “God knows what he makes me be”. I am haunted by this being which I fear to encounter someday at the turn of a path, this being which is so strange to me and which is yet my *being* and which I know that I shall never encounter in spite of all my efforts to do so. But if the Other loves me then I become the unsurpassable, which means that I must be the absolute end. In this sense I am saved from instrumentality. My existence in the midst of the world becomes the exact correlate of my transcendence-for-myself since my independence is absolutely safe guarded. The object which the Other must make me be is an object transcendence, an absolute center of reference around which all the instrumental things of the world are ordered as pure means. At the same time, as the absolute limit of freedom-i.e., of the absolute source of all values – I am protected against any eventual devaluation. I am the absolute value. To the extent that I assume my being-for-others, I assume myself as value. Thus, to want to be loved is to want to be placed beyond the whole system of values posited by the Other and to be the condition of all valorization and the objective foundation of all values. This demand is the usual theme of lovers’ conversations, whether as in *La Porte Etroite*, the woman who wants to be loved identifies herself with an ascetic morality of self-surpassing and wishes to embody the ideal limit of this sur passing-or as more usually happens, the woman in love demands that the beloved in his acts should sacrifice traditional morality for her and is anxious to know whether the beloved would betray his friends for her, “would steal for her”, “would kill for her”, etc.

From this point of view, my being must escape the *look* of the beloved, or rather it must be the object of a look with another structure. I must no longer be seen on the ground of the world as a “this” among other “thesis”, but the world must be revealed in terms of me. In fact, to the extent that the upsurge of freedom makes a world exist, I must be, as the limiting-condition of this upsurge, the very condition of the upsurge of a world. I must be the one whose function is to make trees and water exist, to make cities and fields and other men exist, in order to give them later to the Other who arranges them into a world, just as the mother in matrilineal communities receives titles and the family name not to keep them herself but to transfer them immediately to her children. In one sense if I am to be loved, I am the object through whose procuration the world will exist for the Other; in another sense I am the world. Instead of being

a “this” detaching itself on the ground of the world, I am the ground-as-object on which the world detaches itself. Thus, I am reassured; the Other’s look no longer paralyzes me with finitude. It no longer fixes my being in what I am. I can no longer be *looked* at as ugly, as small, as cowardly, since these characteristics necessarily represent a factual limitation of my being and an apprehension of my finitude as finitude. To be sure, my possibilities remain transcended possibilities, dead possibilities; but I possess all possibles. I am all the dead-possibilities in the world; hence I cease to be the being who is understood from the standpoint of other beings or of its acts. In the loving intuition which I demand, I am to be given as an absolute totality in terms of which all its peculiar acts and all beings are to be understood. One could say, slightly modifying a famous pronouncement of the Stoics, that “the beloved can fail in three ways” The ideal of the sage and the ideal of the man who wants to be loved actually coincide in this that both want to be an object-as-totality accessible to a global intuition which will apprehend the beloved’s or the sage’s actions in the world as partial structures which are interpreted in terms of the totality. Just as wisdom is proposed as a state to be attained by an absolute metamorphosis, so the Other’s freedom must be absolutely metamorphosed in order to allow me to attain the state of being loved.

Up to this point our description would fall into line with Hegel’s famous description of the Master and Slave relation. What the Hegelian Master is for the Slave, the lover wants to be for the beloved. But the analogy stops here, for with Hegel the master demands the Slave’s freedom only laterally and, so to speak, implicitly, while the lover wants the beloved’s freedom first and foremost. In this sense if I am to be loved by the Other, this means that I am to be freely chosen as beloved. ...And since the Other is the foundation of my being-as-object, I demand of him that the free upsurge of his being should have his choice of me as his unique and absolute end; that is, that Thus my facticity is saved. It is no longer this, unthinkable and insurmountable given which I am fleeing; it is that for which the Other freely makes himself exist; it is as an end which he has given to himself. I have infected him with my facticity, but as it is in the form of freedom that he has been infected with it, he refers it back to me as a facticity taken up and consented to...He is the foundation of it in order that it may be his end. By means of this love I then have a different apprehension of my alienation and of my

own facticity. My facticity-as-for-others-is no longer a fact but a right. My existence is because it is given a name. I am because I give myself away. These beloved veins on my hands exist-beneficently. How good I am to have eyes, hair, eyebrows and to lavish them away tirelessly in an overflow of generosity to this tireless desire which the Other freely makes himself be. Whereas before being loved we were uneasy about that unjustified, unjustifiable protuberance, which was our existence, whereas we felt ourselves “de trop”, we now feel that our existence is taken up and willed even in its tiniest details by an absolute freedom which at the same time our existence conditions and which we ourselves will with our freedom. This is the basis for the joy of love when there is joy: we feel that our existence is justified. By the same token if the beloved can love us, he is wholly ready to be assimilated by our freedom; for this being-loved which we desire is already the ontological proof applied to our being-for-others. Our objective sense implies the existence of the Other, and conversely it is the Other’s freedom which founds our essence. If we could manage to interiorize the whole system, we should be our own foundation.

Such then is the real goal of the lover in so far as his love is an enterprise -i.e., a project of himself. This project is going to provoke a conflict. The beloved in fact apprehends the lover as one Other-as-object among others; that is, he perceives the lover on the ground of the world, transcends him, and utilizes him. The beloved is a look. He cannot therefore employ his transcendence to fix an ultimate limit to his surpassing, nor can he employ his freedom to captivate itself. The beloved cannot will to love. Therefore, the lover must seduce the beloved, and his love can in no way be distinguished from the enterprise of seduction. In seduction I do not try to reveal my subjectivity to the Other. Moreover, I could do so only by looking at the other; but by this look I should cause the Other’s subjectivity to disappear, and it is exactly this which I want to assimilate. To seduce is to risk assuming my object-state completely for the Other; it is to put myself beneath his look and to make him look at me; it is to risk the danger of being-seen in order to affect a new departure and to appropriate the Other in and by means of my object-ness. I refuse to leave the level on which I make proof of my object-ness; it is on this level that I wish to engage in battle by making myself a *fascinating object*...

I become a spectator of the incident, I experience myself non-ethically as engaged in “we”. The earlier rivalries, the slight conflicts have disappeared, and the consciousnesses which furnished the matter of the “we” are precisely those of all the patrons: “we” look at the event, “we” take part. It is this unanimity which Romains wanted to describe in *Vie unanime* or in *Vin blanc de la Villette*. Here we are brought back again to Heidegger’s *Mitsein*. Was it worthwhile then to criticize it earlier?

We shall only remark here that we had no intention of casting doubt on the experience of the “we”. We limited ourselves to showing that this experience could not be the foundation of our consciousness of the Other. It is clear, in fact, that it could not constitute an ontological structure of human-reality; we have proved that the existence of the for-itself in the midst of others was at its origin a metaphysical and contingent fact. In addition, it is clear that the “we” is not an inter-subjective consciousness nor a new being which surpasses and encircles its parts as a synthetic whole in the manner of the collective consciousness of the sociologists. The “we” is experienced by a particular consciousness; it is not necessary that *all* the patrons at the cafe should be conscious of being “we” in order for me to experience myself as being engaged in a “we” with them. Everyone is familiar with this pattern of every-day dialogue: “We are very dissatisfied”. “But no, my dear, speak for yourself”. This implies that there are aberrant consciousnesses of the “we” – which as such are nevertheless perfectly normal consciousnesses. If this is the case, then in order for a consciousness to get the consciousness of being engaged in a “we”, it is necessary that the other consciousnesses which enter into community with it should be first given in some other way; that is, either in the capacity of a transcendence-transcending or as a transcendence-transcended. The “we” is a certain particular experience which is produced in special cases on the foundation of being-for-others in general. The being-for-others precedes and founds the *being-with-others*. Furthermore, the philosopher who wants to study the “we” must take precautions and know of what he speaks. There is not only a We-as-subject; grammar teaches us that there is also a We-as-complement-i.e., a Now from all which has been said up till now it is easy to We-as-object understand that the “we” in “We are looking at them” cannot be on the same ontological plane as the “us” in “They are looking at us”. There is no question here of subjectivities qua subjectivities. In the sentence,

“They are looking at me”, I want to indicate that I experience myself as an object for others, as an alienated Me, as a transcendence-transcended.

If the sentence, “They are looking at us”, is to indicate a real experience, it is necessary that in this experience I make proof of the fact that I am engaged with others in a community of transcendences-transcended, of alienated “Me’s”. The “Us” here refers to an experience of *being-objects* in common. Thus, there are two radically different forms of the experience of the “we”, and the two forms correspond exactly to the being-in-the-act of-looking and the being-looked-at, which constitute the fundamental relations of the For-itself with the Other. It is these two forms of the “we” which must be studied next.

From: Sartre Jean-Paul (2003) *Being and Nothingness*.

The principal text of modern existentialism. –

[Translated by Hazel E. Barnes],

University of Colorado, Pp. 221-364

Elias Norbert

***“Changes in Attitude towards the Relations
between Men and Women” (IX)***

The feeling of shame surrounding human sexual relations has changed and become noticeably stronger in the civilizing process. This manifests itself particularly clearly in the difficulty experienced by adults in the more recent stages of civilization in talking about these relations to children. But today this difficulty appears almost natural. It seems to be explained almost by biological reasons alone that a child knows nothing of the relations of the sexes, and that it is an extremely delicate and difficult task to enlighten the growing girls and boys about themselves and what goes on around them. The extent to which this situation far from being self-evident, is the further result of the civilizing process is only perceived if the behavior of people in the different stages is observed.

Regardless, therefore, of how much the tendencies may crisscross, *advance* and *recede*, relax or tighten in matters of detail and from a short-term perspective, the direction of the main movement – as far as it is visible up to now – has been the same for the expression of all kinds of

drive. The process of civilization of the sex drive, seen on a large scale, has run parallel to those of the other drives, no matter what sociogenetic differences of detail may always be present. Here, too, measured in terms of the standards of the men of successive upper classes, control has grown ever stricter. The drive has been slowly but progressively suppressed from the public life of society. The *reserve* that must be exercised in speaking of it has also increased. And this restraint, like all others, is enforced less and less by direct physical force. *It is cultivated in individuals from an early age as habitual self-restraint by the structure of social life, by the pressure social institutions in general, and by certain executive organs of society (above all, the family) in particular. Correspondingly, the social commands and prohibitions become increasingly a part of the self, a strictly regulated superego.*

Like many other drives, sexuality is confined more and more exclusively, not only for women but for men as well, to a particular enclave, socially legitimized marriage. Social tolerance of other relationships, for both husband and wife, which was by no means lacking earlier, is suppressed increasingly, if with fluctuations. Every violation of these restrictions, and everything conducive to one, is therefore related to the realm of secrecy, of what may not be mentioned without loss of prestige or *social position*.

And just as the nuclear family only very gradually became, so exclusively, the sole legitimate enclave of sexuality and of all intimate functions for men and women, so it was only at a recent stage that it became so decisively the primary organ for cultivating the socially required control over impulses and behaviour in young people. Before this degree of restraint and intimacy was reached, and until the separation of the life of drives from public view was strictly enforced, the task of early conditioning did not fall so heavily on father and mother. All the people with whom the child came into contact – and when intimization was less advanced and the interior of the house less isolated, they were often required numerous – played a part. In addition, the family itself was usually larger and in the upper classes – the servants more numerous in earlier times. People in general spoke more openly about the various aspects of the life of drives and gave way more freely in speech and action to their own impulses. The shame associated with sexuality was less...

It is not without a touch of paradox that the greater the transformation, control, restraint and concealment of drives and impulses that is demanded of individuals by society, and therefore the more difficult the conditioning of young becomes, the more the task of first instilling socially required habits is concentrated within the nuclear family, on the father and mother. The mechanism of conditioning, however, is still scarcely different than in earlier times.

For it does not involve a closer supervision of the task, or more exact planning that takes of the special circumstances of the child but is affected primarily by automatic means and to some extent through reflexes. *The socially patterned constellation of habits and impulses of the parents gives rise to a constellation of habits and impulses in the child*; these may operate either in the same direction or in one entirely different from that desired or expected by the parents on the basis of their own conditioning.

The interweaving of the habits of parents and children, through which the drive economy of the child is slowly molded and given its character is, in other words, only to a slight extent determined by “reason”. Behavior and words associated by the parent with shame and repugnance are very soon associated in the same way by the children, through the parent’s expressions of displeasure, their more and *less gentle pressure*; in this the social standard of shame and repugnance is gradually reproduced in the children. But such a standard form at the same time the basis and framework of the most diverse individual drive formations. How the growing personality is fashioned in particular cases by this incessant social interaction between the parents’ and children’s feelings, habits and reactions is unforeseeable and incalculable to parents.

The trend of the civilizing movement towards the stronger and stronger and more complete “intimization” of all bodily functions towards their enclosure – in particular enclaves, to put them “behind closed doors”, has diverse consequences. One of the most important, which has already been observed in connection with various other forms of drives, is seen particularly clearly in testcase of the development of civilizing restraints on sex-division in human beings which becomes more pronounced the more sharply those aspects of human life that may be publicly displayed are divided from those that may not, and which must remain “intimate” or “secret”. Sexuality, like all the other natural

human functions, is a phenomenon known to everyone and part of each human life. *We have seen how all these functions have gradually become charged with sociogenetic shame and embarrassment*, so that the mere mention on them in public is increasingly restricted by a multitude of controls and prohibitions. More and more, people keep the functions themselves, and reminders of them, concealed from one another.

Where is not possible – as in weddings, for example-shame, embarrassment, fear and all the other emotions, associated with these driving forces of human life are mastered by precisely regulated social ritual the standard of shame...

In conjunction with this growing division of behavior into what is and what is not publicly permitted, the psychic structure of people is also transformed. The prohibitions supported by social sanctions are reproduced in individuals as self-controls. The pressure to restrain impulses and the sociogenetic shame surrounding them – these are turned so completely into habits that we cannot resist them even when alone, in the intimate sphere. Pleasure-promising drives and pleasure-denying taboos and prohibitions, *socially generated feelings* of shame and repugnance, come to battle within the self. This, as has been mentioned, is clearly the state of affairs, which Freud cried to express by concepts such as the “superego” and the “unconscious” or, as it is nor unfruitfully called in everyday speech, the “subconscious”.

But however, it is expressed *the social code of conduct* so imprints itself in one form or another on human beings that it becomes a constituent element of their individual selves. And this element, the superego, like the personality structure as a whole of individual people, necessarily changes constantly with the social code of behavior and the structure of society.

The pronounced division in the “ego” or consciousness characteristic of people in our phase of civilization, which finds expression in such terms as “superego” and “unconscious”, corresponds to the specific split in the behavior which civilized society demands of its members. It marches the degree of regulation and restraint imposed on the expression of drives and impulses. Tendencies in this direction may to be developed in any form of human society, even in those which we call “primitive”. *But the strength attained in societies such as ours by this differentiation and the form in which it appears are reflections of a particular historical development, the results of a civilizing process. This is what is meant*

when we refer here to the continuous correspondence between the social structure and the structure of the personality, of the individual self.

“On changes in Aggressiveness” (X)

The affect-structure of human beings is a whole. We can call particular drives by different names according to their different directions and functions. We may speak of hunger and spit, of sexual drive and of aggressive impulses, but *in life these different impulses are not separable* than heart from the stomach or the blood in the brain from the blood in the genitalia. The complement and in part supersede each other transform themselves within certain limits and compensate for each other; a disturbance here manifests itself there. In short, they form a kind of circuit in the human being, a partial unit within total unity of organism. Their structure is still opaque in many aspects. But their socially imprinted form is of decisive importance for the functioning of a society as of individual within it. The manner in which impulses or emotional expressions are spoken of today sometimes leads one to surmise that we have within us a whole bundle of different drives. A “*death instinct*” or “*need for recognition*” are referred to as if these are different chemical substances. This is not to deny that observation of these different drives in individuals may be fruitful and instructive. ... Accordingly, aggressiveness, which will be the subject of this chapter, is not a separable species of drive. At most, one may speak of the “aggressive impulse” only if one remains aware that it refers to a particular bodily function within the totality of an organism, and that changes in this function indicate changes in the personality structure as a whole.

1. The standard of aggressiveness, its tone and intensity, is not at present exactly uniform among the different nations of the West. But these differences, which from close up often appear quite considerable, disappear if the aggressiveness of the “civilized” nations is compared to that of societies at a different stage of affect control. Compared to the battle fury of the Abyssinian warriors admittedly powerless against the technical apparatus of the civilized army or to the frenzy of the different tribes at the time of the Great Migrations, the aggressiveness of even the most warlike nations of the civilized world appears subdued. Like all other instincts, it is bound, even in directly warlike actions, by the advanced scare of the division of functions, and by the resulting greater dependence of individuals on each other and on the technical apparatus.

It is confined and earned by innumerable rules and prohibitions that have become self-constraints. It is as much transformed, “refined”, “civilized”, as all the other forms of pleasure, and it is only in dreams or isolated outbursts we account for as pathological that something of its immediate and unregulated force appears. In this area of the affects, the theatre of hostile collisions between people; the same historical transformation has taken place as in all others. No matter at what point the Middle Ages stand in this transformation, it will again suffice here take the standard of their secular ruling class, the warriors, as a starting point, illustrate the overall pattern of this development.

The release of the affects battle in the Middle Ages was no longer, perhaps, quite so uninhibited as in early period of the Great Migrations. But it was open and uninhibited enough compared to the standard of modern times. In the latter, *cruelty and joy in the destruction* and torment of others, like the proof of physical superiority, a placed under an increasingly strong social control anchored in the state organization. All these forms of pleasure, hemmed in by threats of displeasure, have gradually come to express themselves only indirectly, in a “refined” form. And only at times of social upheaval or where social control is looser (e.g., in colonial regions) do they *break out* more directly, uninhibitedly, less impeded by shame and repugnance.

Life in medieval society tended in the opposite direction. Rapine, battle, hunting of people and animals – all these were *vital necessities* which, accordance with the structure of society, were visible to all. And thus, for the mighty and strong, they formed part of the pleasures of life. “I tell you”, says a war hymn, attributed to the minstrel Bertram de Born, that neither eating, drinking, nor sleep has as much savor for me as when I hear the cry “Forwards”, from both sides, and horses without riders shying and whinnying, and the cry “Help! Help”, and to see the small and great fall to the grass at the ditches and the dead pierced by the wood of the lances decked with banners... A particular pleasure was taken in mutilating prisoners “By my troth”, said the king in the same *chanson* “I laugh at what you say, I care not a fig for your treats. I shall shame every knight I have taken, cut off his nose and his ears. If he is a sergeant or a merchant he will lose a foot or an arm”. “He spends his life”, we read of a knight, “in plundering, destroying churches, falling upon pilgrims, oppressing widows and orphans. He takes particular pleasure in mutilating the innocent. In a single monastery, that of the black monks

of Sarlat, there are 150 men and women whose hands he has cut off or whose eyes he has put out. And his wife is just as cruel. She helps him with his executions. It gives her pleasure torture the poor women...". Such affective outbursts may still occur as exceptional phenomena, as a "pathological" degeneration in later phases of social development. But here no punitive social power existed... The only threat, the only danger fear was that of being overpowered in battle by a stronger opponent. Leaving, aside a small elite, rapine, pillage and murder were standard practice in the warrior society of this time... What, for example, ought to be with prisoners? There was little money in this society. With regard to prisoners who could pay and who, moreover, were members of one's own class, one exercised some degree of restraint. But the others? To keep them meant to feed them. To return them meant to enhance the wealth and fighting power of the enemy.

For subjects (i.e., working, serving and fighting hands) were a part of the wealth of the ruling class of that time. So, prisoners were killed or sent back so mutilated that they were unfired for war, service and work. The same applied to destroying fields, filling in wells and cutting down trees. In a predominantly agrarian society, in which immobile possessions, represented a major part of property, this too served to weaken the enemy...

From Elias Norbert (2000):

"The Civilizing Process: sociogenetic and psychogenetic investigations"

"Changes in Attitude towards the Relations between Men and Women" (IX);

"On changes in Aggressiveness" (X),

[in "The Civilizing Process: sociogenetic and psychogenetic investigations"],

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"The social constraints towards self-constraints"

What has the organization of society in the form of "states", what have the *monopolization* and *centralization of taxes* and *physical force over a large area*, to do with civilization? ...Clearly, "civilization" is not, any more than rationalization, a product of "ratio" or the result of calculated long-term planning. How could it be conceivable that gradual "rationalization" could be founded on pre-existing "rational" behavior and planning over centuries? Could one really imagine that the civilizing

proceed had been set in motion by people with that long-term perspective, that specific mastery of all short-term affects, considering that this type of long-term perspective and self-mastery already presuppose a long civilizing process?

In fact, nothing in history indicates that this change was brought about “rationally”, through any purposive education of individual people or groups. It happened by and large unplanned; but it did not happen, nevertheless, without a specific type of order. It has been shown in detail above how constraints through others from a variety of angles were converted into self-restraints, how the more animalic human activities were progressively thrust behind the scenes of people’s communal social life and invested with feelings of shame, how the regulation of the whole instinctual and affective life by steady self-control became more and more stable, more even and more all-embracing. What poses itself here with regard to the civilizing process is nothing other than the general problem of historical change. Taken as a whole this change is not “rationally” planned; but neither is it a random coming and going of orderless patterns. How is this possible? How does it happen at all that formations arise in the human world that no single being has intended, and which are yet anything but cloud formations without stability or structure? The preceding study, and particularly those parts of it devoted to the problems of social dynamics, attempts to provide an answer to these questions. It is simple enough: plans and actions, the emotional and rational impulses of individual people, constantly interweave in a friendly or hostile way. *This basic tissue resulting from many single plans and actions of people can give rise to changes and patterns that no individual person has planned or created. From interdependence of people arises an order sui generis, an order more compelling and stronger than the will and reason of the individual people composing it.* It is this order of interweaving human impulses and strivings, this social order, which determines the course of historical change; it underlies the civilizing process.

This order is neither “rational” – if by “rational” we mean that it has resulted intentionally from the purposive deliberation of individual people; nor “irrational” – if by “irrational” we mean that it has arisen in an incomprehensible way. It has occasionally been identified “with the order of Nature”; it interpreted by Hegel and some others as a kind of

supra-individual “Spirit”, his concept of a “cunning of reason” shows how much he too was preoccupied by the fact that all the planning and actions of people give rise to many things that no one actually intended. But the mental habits which tend to bind us to opposites such as “rational” and “irrational”, or “spirit” and “nature”, inadequate here...

It was attempted there to what kind of interweaving, of mutual dependence between people, set in motion, for example, processes of feudalization. It was shown how the compulsion of competitive situations drove a number of feudal lords into conflict, how this circle of competitors was solely narrowed, and how this led to the monopoly of one and finally – in conjunction with other mechanisms of integration such as processes of increasing capital formation and functional differentiation – to the formation of absolutist state.

This whole reorganization of human relationships certainly had direct significance for the change in the human habitus, the provisional result of which is our form of “civilized” conduct and feelings. The connection between these specific changes in the structure of the psychic habitus will be discussed again shortly. But consideration of these mechanisms of integration is also relevant in a more general way to an understanding of the civilizing process. Only if we see the compelling force with which a particular social structure, a particular form of social interweaving, is pushed through its tensions to a specific change and so to other forms of interweaving, can we understand how these changes arise in human mentality, ...in the patterning malleable psychological apparatus which can be observed over and again in human history from earliest times to the present. And only then, therefore, can we understand that the change in habitus characteristic of a civilizing process is subject to a quite specific order and direction, although it was not planned by individual people or by produced “reasonable”, purposive measures. Civilization is not “reasonable”; not “rational”, any more than it is “irrational”.

It is a set-in motion blindly and kept in motion by the autonomies dynamic of a web of relationships, by specific changes in the way people are bound to live together. But it is by no means impossible that we can make out of it something more “reasonable”, something that functions better in terms of our needs and purposes. For it is precisely in conjunction with the civilizing process that the blind dynamics of people intertwining

in their deeds and aims gradually leads towards' greater scope for planned intervention into both the social and individual structures – intervention, based on a growing knowledge of the unplanned dynamics of these structures.

But which specific changes in the way people are bonded to each other mold their personality in a “civilizing” manner? The most general answer to this question too, an answer based on what was said earlier about the changes in western society is very simple. From the earliest period of the history of the Occident to the present, social functions have become more and more differentiated under the pressure of competition. The more differentiated they become, the larger grows the number of functions and thus, of people on whom the individual constantly depends in all his actions, from the simplest and most commonplace to the more complex and uncommon. – As more and more people must attune their conduct to that of others, the web of actions must be organized more and more strictly and accurately, if each individual action is to fulfil its social function. Individuals are compelled to regulate their conduct in an increasingly differentiated, more even and more stable manner. That this involves not only a conscious regulation has already been stressed. Precisely this is characteristic of the psychological changes in the course of civilization: the more complex and stable control of conduct is increasingly instilled in the individual from his or her earliest years as an automatism, a self-compulsion that he or she cannot resist even if he or she consciously wishes to. The web of actions grows so complex and extensive, the effort required to behave “correctly” within it becomes so great, that beside the individual’s conscious self-control and automatic, blindly functioning apparatus of self-control is firmly established... When a monopoly of force is formed, pacified social spaces are created which are normally free from acts of violence. The pressures acting on individual people within them are of a different kind than previously. Forms of non-physical violence that always existed, but hitherto had always been mingled or fused with physical force, are now separated from the latter; they persist in a changed form internally within the more pacified societies... They are most visible so far as the standard thinking of our time is concerned as types of economic violence. In reality, however, there is a whole set of means whose monopolization can enable people as groups or as individuals to enforce their will upon others. The

monopolization of the means of production, of economic means, is only of those which stand out in fuller relief when the means of physical violence become monopolized, when, in other words, in a more pacified scare society the free use of physical force by those who are physically stronger is no longer possible.

...Thus, the form and structure of the more conscious and more unconscious psychological self-steering functions can never be grasped if they are imagined as something as in any sense existing and functioning as isolation from one another. Both are equally fundamental to the existence of a human being, together from a single great functional continuum. *Nor can their structure and changes be understood if observation is confined to individual human beings. They can only be comprehended in connection with the structure of relationships between people, and with the long-term changes in that structure.*

Therefore, in order to understand and explain civilizing processes one needs to investigate – as has been attempted here – the transformation of both the personality structure and the entire social structure. This task demands, within the smaller radius, psychogenetic investigations aimed at grasping the whole field of individual psychological energies, the structure and form of the more drive-impulsive no less than of the more conscious self-steering functions. The exploration of civilizing processes demands sociogenetic investigations of the overall structure, within a long-term perspective, nor only of a single state society but of the social field, formed by a specific group of interdependent societies and the sequential order in which it changes...

But beyond a certain point in the accumulation of material facts, historiography enters the phase when it ought no longer to be satisfied with the collection further particulars and with the description of those already assembled but should be concerned with those problems which facilitate penetration of the underlying regularities by which people in a certain society are bound over and over again to particular patterns of conduct and to very specific functional chains, for example as knights and bondsmen, kings and state officials, bourgeois and nobles, and by which these relationships and institutions change in a very specific direction. In short, beyond a certain point of factual knowledge, a more solid framework, a structural nexus can be perceived in the multitude of particular historical faces. And all further facts that can be discovered

serve – apart from the enrichment of the historical panorama they may offer us – either to revise the insight already gained into these structures, or to extend and deepen it. The statement that every sociogenetic study should be aimed at the *totality* of a social field does not mean that it should be directed at the sum of all particulars, but at its structure within the entirety of its interdependencies. In the last resort the boundaries of such a study are determined by the boundaries of the interdependencies, or at least by the immanent articulation of the interdependencies.

It is in this light that what was said above about rationalization is to be understood. The gradual transition to more “rational” behavior and thought like the transition to a more differentiated, a more comprehensive type of self-control, is usually associated today only with bourgeois functions. We often find firmly lodged in the minds of our contemporaries the idea that the bourgeoisie was the “originator” or “inventor” of more rational thought. Here, for the sake of contrast, certain rationalization processes in the aristocratic camp have been described. But one should not deduce from this that the *court aristocracy* was the social “originator” of this spurt of rationalization. Just as the *court aristocracy* or the bourgeoisie in the age of manufacturing did not have “originators” in any other social class, so this rationalization equally lacked an originator. *The very transformation of the whole social structure*, in the course of which these *figurations* of bourgeois and nobles come into being, is itself, considered from certain aspect, a rationalization.

What becomes more rational is not just the individual produces of men, nor, above all, merely the systems of thought set down in books. *What is rationalized is, primarily, the modes of conduct of certain groups of people. “Rationalization” is nothing other – think, for example, of the courtization of warriors – than an expression of the direction in which the molding of people in specific social figurations is changed during this period.* Changes of this kind, however, do not “originate” in one class or another, but arise in conjunction with the tensions between different functional groups in a social field and between the competing people within them. Under the pressure of tensions of this kind which permeate the whole fabric of society, the latter’s whole structure changes, during a particular phase, in the direction of a centralization of particular dominions and a greater specialization, an integration of the individual people within them. And with this of the whole social field, the structure

of social and psychological is also changed – first in small, then in larger and larger sectors – in direction of rationalization.

The slow de-functionalization of the first estate and the corresponding diminution of its power potential, the pacification of the second estate, and the gradual rise of the third estate – none of these can be understood independently of others any more than, for example, the development of trade in this period is comprehensible independently of the formation of powerful monopolies of physical force and the rise of mighty courts.

All these are levers in the process of increasing differentiation and extension of all chains of which has played such a decisive role in the whole course of Western history. In this process – as has been shown from various angles – the functions nobility was transformed, and with them bourgeois functions and the form of central organs. And hand in hand with this gradual change in the of social functions and intimations, went a transformation of individual self-steering – first in the leading groups of both the nobility and the bourgeoisie – in the direction of greater foresight and a stricter regulation of libidinal impulses.

Leafing through the traditional accounts of the intellectual development of the West, one often has the impression of a vague conception in the minds of their authors that the rationalization of consciousness, the change from magical traditional to rational forms of thinking in the history of the West, had its cause in the emergence of a number of geniuses and outstanding individuals. These enlightened individuals, such accounts appear to suggest, caught Western man how to use his innate reason properly.

Here, a different picture emerges. What the great thinkers of the West have achieved is certainly considerable. They gave comprehensive and exemplary expression to what their contemporaries experienced in their daily actions without being able to grasp it clearly in thought. They tried to articulate the more reality – oriented or, in their own language, more rational forms of thinking which had gradually developed along with the overall changes in the structure of social interdependencies, and with their help tried to clarify the problems of human existence. They gave other people a clearer view of their world and themselves. And so, they also acted as levers within the larger workings of society. They were to a greater or lesser degree, depending on their talent and personal

situation, interpreters and spokesmen of a social chorus. But they were nor on their own the originators of the type of thought prevalent did not create what we call “rational thought”.

This expression itself is, as can be seen, somewhat too static and insufficiently differentiated for what it is intended to express. Too static, because the structure of psychological functions changes as slowly or as rapidly as that of functions. Insufficiency differentiated because the pattern of rationalization, the structure of more rational habits of thinking, was and is very different in different social classes – for instance, in the court nobility or the leading bourgeois strata – in accordance with their different social functions and overall historical situation. And finally, the same is true of rationalization said above of changes of consciousness in general: it represents only one side of a more comprehensive change in the whole social personality. It goes hand in hand with a corresponding transformation of drive structures. It is, in brief, one manifestation of civilization among others.

VI Shame and Repugnance

No less characteristic of a civilizing process than “rationalization” in the peculiar moldings of the drive economy that we call “shame” and or “embarrassment”. Both these, the strong spurt of (rationalization and a rime) no less strong advance of the *threshold of shame* and became more and more perceptible in the *habitus* of Western people speaking from the sixteenth century onwards, are different sides of the transformation of the social personality structure.

The feeling of shame is a specific excitation, a kind of anxiety, which is automatically reproduced in the individual on certain occasions by force of habit. Considered superficially, it is fear of social degradation or, more generally, of other people’s gestures superiority. But it is form of displeasure or fear which arises characteristically on those occasions when a person who fears lapsing into inferiority can evert this danger neither by direct physical means nor by any other form of attack. This defenselessness against of superiority of others, this total exposure to them does not arise directly form a treat from the physical superiority of others actually present, although it doubtless has its origins in physical compulsion, in the body inferiority of the child in face of his parents or

teachers. In adults, however, this defenselessness results from the fact that the people whose superiority one fears are in accord with one's own super-ego, with the agency of self-constraint implanted in the individual by others on whom he was depend, who possessed power and superiority over him. In keeping with this, anxiety that we call "shame" is heavily veiled to the sight of others; however strong it may be, it is never directly expressed in noisy gestures. Shame takes on its particular coloration from the fact that the person feeling it has done. It is about to do something, through which he comes into contradiction with people to whom he is bound in one form or another, and with himself, with the sector of his consciousness, by which he controls himself. The conflict expressed in shame – fear is not merely a conflict of the individual with prevalent social opinion; the individual's behavior has brought him into conflict with the part of himself that represents this social opinion. It is a conflict within his own personality; he himself recognizes himself as inferior. He fears the loss of the love or respect of others, to which he attaches or has attached value. Their attitude has precipitated an attitude within him that he automatically adopts towards himself. This is what makes him so defenseless against gestures of superiority by others which somehow trigger off this automatism within him.

This explains why the fear of transgression of social prohibitions takes on more clearly the character of shame the more completely external constraints have been turned into self-restraints by the structure of society, and the more comprehensive and differentiated the ring of self-restraints has become within which a person's conduct is enclosed. The inner tension, the excitement that is aroused whenever a person feels compelled to break out of this enclosure in any place, or when he has done so, varies in strength according to the gravity of the social prohibition and the degree of self-constraint. In ordinary life we call this excitement shame only in certain contexts and above all when it has a certain degree of strength; but in terms of its structure it is, despite its many nuances and degrees, always the same event. Like self-constraints, it is to be found in a less stable, less uniform and less-embracing form even at simpler levels of social development. Like this constraint, tensions and fears of this kind emerge more clearly with every spurt of the civilizing process, and finally predominate over others – particularly over the physical fear of other. The predominate the more, the larger the areas that are pacified,

and the more people are stamped with the more even constraints that come to the fore in society when the representatives of the monopoly of physical violence normally only exercise their control as it were standing in the wings – the further, in short, the civilization of conduct advances. Just as we can only speak of “reason” in conjunction with advances of rationalization and the formation of functions demanding foresight and restraint, we can only speak of shame in conjunction with its sociogenesis, with spurt in which the shame-threshold advances or at least moves, and in which the structure and pattern of self-constraints are change in a particular direction, reproducing themselves henceforth in the same form over a greater or lesser period.

Both rationalization and the advance of the shame and repugnance thresholds are expressions of a reduction in the direct physical fear of other beings, and of a consolidation of the aromatic inner anxieties, which the individual now exerts on himself. The greater, more differentiated foresight and long-term view, which become necessary in order that larger and larger groups of people may preserve their social existence in an increasing differentiated society, are equally expressed in both processes. It is not difficult explain how these seemingly so different psychological changes are connected: both – the intensification of shame like the increased rationalization – are different are aspects of the growing split in the individual personality that occurs with increasing division of functions; they are different aspects of the differentiation between drives and drive-controls, between “Id” and “Ego”, or “Superego” functions. The further this differentiation of individual self-steering advances, the more clearly that sector of the controlling functions which in a broader sense is called the “ego”, and in a narrower the “super-ego”, takes on a twofold function. On other hand, this sector forms the center from which a person, partly consciously and partly quite automatically and unconsciously, steers and regulates his or her “inner life”, his or her affects and impulses. The layer of psychological functions which, in the course of the social transformation that has been described, is gradually differentiated the drives, the ego or super-ego functions, has, in other words, a twofold task within the personality: *they conduct at the same time is domestic policy and a foreign policy – which, moreover, are not always in harmony, and often are contradictory.*

This explains the fact that in the same socio-historical period in which rationalization made perceptible advances, an advance in the shame and repugnance threshold is also to be observed. It also explains the fact that here, as always – in accordance with the sociogenetic ground rule – a corresponding process is to be observed even today in the life of each individual child: the rationalization of conduct is an expression of the foreign policy of the same *super-ego* formation whose domestic policy is expressed in an advance of the shame threshold...

It was shown earlier by a series of examples how, from the sixteenth century onwards, the frontier of shame and embarrassment gradually began to advance more rapidly. Here, too, the chains of thought begin slowly to join up. This advance coincided with the accelerated courtization of the upper class. It was time when the chains of dependence intersecting in the individual grew denser and longer, when more and more people are being bound more and more closely together and the constraint towards self-control was increasing. Like mutual dependence, like mutual observation of people increased; sensibilities and, correspondently, prohibitions, became more differentiated; and equally more subtle, equally more manifold became the reasons for shame and for embarrassment aroused by the conduct of others.

It was pointed that with the advancing division of functions and the greater integration of people, the major contrasts between different classes and countries diminish, while the nuances, the varieties of their molding within the framework of civilization multiply. Here one encounters a corresponding trend in the development of individual conduct and sentiment. The more the strong contrasts of individual conduct are tempered, the more the *violent fluctuations* of pleasure or displeasure are contained, moderated and changed by self-control, that greater becomes the sensitivity to shades or nuances of conduct, the more finely attuned people grow to minute gestures and forms, and the more complex becomes their experience of themselves and their world at levels which were previously hidden from consciousness through the veil of strong affects.

To clarify this by an obvious example, “primitive” people experience human and natural events within the relativity narrow circle which is vitally important to them – narrow, because their chains of dependence are relatively short – in a manner, which in some respects

far more differentiated than that of civilized people. The differentiation varies, depending on whether we are concerned with farmers or hunters or herdsmen, for example. But however, this may be, it can be stated generally that, insofar as it is of vital importance to a group, the ability of primitive people to distinguish things in forest and field, whether it be a particular from another, or sounds, scents or movements, is more highly developed than in “civilized” people.

But among more primitive people the sphere is still far more a danger zone; it is full of fears which more primitive people no longer know. This is decisive for what is or is not distinguished. The manner in which “nature” is experienced is fundamentally affected, slowly at the end of the Middle Ages and then more quickly from the sixteenth century onwards, by the pacification of larger and larger populated areas. Only now do forests, meadows and mountains gradually cease to be danger “zones of the first order, from which anxiety and fear constantly intrude into individual life”. And now, as the network of roads becomes, like social interdependence in general, denser; as robber-knights and beasts of prey slowly disperse; as forest and field cease to be the scene of unbridled passions, of the: savage pursuit of man and beast, of wild joy and wild fear, and as they are “mounded by intertwining peaceful activities, the production of goods, trade and transport”; now, to pacified people a correspondingly pacified nature becomes visible, and in a new way. It becomes-in keeping with the mounting significance which the eye attains as the mediator of pleasure with the growing moderation of the affects – to a high degree an object of visual pleasure.

In addition, people – more precisely the townspeople for whom forest, and field are no longer their everyday background but a place of relaxation-grow more sensitive and begin to see the open country in a more differentiated way, at a level, which was previously screened off by danger and the play of more unmoderated passions. They take pleasure in the harmony of color and lines, become open to what is called the beauty of nature; their feelings are aroused by the changing shades and shapes of the clouds and the play of light on the leaves of a tree. In the wake of this pacification, the sensitivity of people to social conduct is also changed. Now, inner fears – the fears of one sector of the personality for another – grow in proportion to the decrease of outer ones. As a result of these inner tensions, people begin to experience each other in a more

differentiated way, which was precluded as long as they constantly faced serious and inescapable threats from outside.

Now a major part of the tensions, which earlier discharged directly in conflicts between people, must be resolved as tension in the struggle of the individual with himself. Social life ceases to be danger zone in which feasting, dancing and noisy pleasure frequent suddenly give way to rage, blows and murder, and becomes a different kind of danger zone if individuals cannot sufficiently restrain themselves, if they touch sensitive spots, their own shame-frontier or the embarrassment-threshold of others. In a sense, the danger now passes through the self of every individual. Thus, people become, in this respect too, sensitive to distinction, which previously scarcely entered consciousness. Just as nature now becomes, far more than earlier, a source of pleasure mediated by the eye, people to become a source of visual pleasure or, conversely, of visually aroused displeasure, different degrees of repugnance.

The direct fear inspired in people by people has diminished, and the inner fear mediated through the eye and through the superego is rising proportionately. When the use of weapons in combat is an everyday occurrence, the small gesture of offering someone a knife at table (to recall one of the exams mentioned earlier) has no great importance. As the use of weapons is restricted more and more, as external and internal pressures make the expression of anger by physical attack increasingly difficult, people gradually become more sensitive to anything reminiscent of an attack. The very gesture of attack touches danger zone; it becomes distressing to see a person passing someone else a knife with the point towards him. And from the most highly sensitized small circles of high court society, for whom this sensitivity also represents a prestige value, a means of distinction cultivated for that very reason, this prohibition gradually spreads throughout the whole of civilized society. Thus, aggressive associations infused no doubt with others from the layer of elementary urges, combine with status tensions in arousing anxiety...

...This is one of example among many of particular aspects of the structural transformation of society that we denote by catchword "civilization". Nowhere in human society is there a zero-point of fear of external powers, and nowhere a zero-point of automatic inner anxieties. Although they may be experienced as very different, they are finally inseparable. What takes place in the course of a civilizing process is not

the disappearance of one and the emergence of the other. What changes is merely the proportion between the external and self-activating fears, and their whole structure. People's fears of external power diminish without ever disappearing; the never-absent, latent or actual anxieties arising from the tension between drives and drive-control functions become relatively stronger, more comprehensive and continuous... This, too, shows a pronounced shift towards the internalization of fears. And one thing certainly should not be overlooked in all this: the fact that today, as formerly, all forms of adult inner anxieties are bound up with the child's fears of others, of external powers...

*From Elias Norbert (2000):
"The Civilizing Process: sociogenetic and psychogenetic investigations".
"The social constraints towards self-constraints" Pp. 365-379;
"Shame and Repugnance" (VI);
"Increasing Constraints on the Upper Class" (VII),
[in "The Civilizing Process: sociogenetic and psychogenetic investigations"],
Vol. II., Pp. 421-436,
[Translated by Edmund Jephcott with some notes and corrections by the author],
Blackwell Publish.*

Regarding seminar 6. The Sociocultural Context of Philosophical Thought.

Oswald Spengler
"The Decline of the West"
Perspectives of Word-History

... For me, the "people" is a unit of the soul. The great events of history were not really achieved by peoples; they themselves created the peoples. Every act alters the soul of the doer. Even when the event is preceded by some grouping around or under a famous name, the fact that there is a people and not merely a band behind the prestige of that name is not a condition, but a result of the event. It was the fortunes of the immigration that made the Ostrogoths and the Osmanli what they afterwards were. The "Americans" did not immigrate from Europe; the name of the Florentine geographer Amerigo Vespucci designates to-day not only a continent, but also a people in the true sense of the word,

whose specific character was born in the spiritual upheavals of 1775 and, above all, 1861.

This is the one and only connotation of the word “people”. Neither unity of speech nor physical descent is decisive. That which distinguishes the people from the population, raises it up out of the population, and will one day let it find its level again in the population is always the inwardly lived experience of the “we”. The deeper this feeling is, the stronger is the vis viva of the people. There are energetic and tame, ephemeral, and indestructible, forms of peoples. They can change speech, name, race, and land, but so long as their soul lasts, they can gather to themselves and transform human material of any and every provenance. The Roman name in Hannibal’s day meant a people, in Trajan’s time nothing more than a population.

Of course, it is often quite justifiable to align peoples with races, but “race” in this connection must not be interpreted in the present-day Darwinian sense of the word. It cannot be accepted, surely, that a people were ever held together by the mere unity of physical origin, or, if it were, could maintain that unity even for ten generations. It cannot be too often reiterated that this physiological provenance has no existence except for science — never for folk-consciousness — and that no people was ever yet stirred to enthusiasm for this ideal of blood-purity. *In race there is nothing material, but something cosmic and directional, the felt harmony of a Destiny, the single cadence of the march of historical Being.* It is incoordination of this (wholly metaphysical) beat that produces race-hatred, which is just as strong between Germans and Jews, and it is resonance on this beat that makes the true love – so akin to hate – between man and wife. He who has no trace knows nothing of this perilous love. If apart of the human multitude that now speaks Indo-Germanic languages, cherishes a certain race – ideal, what is evidenced thereby is not the existence of the prototype-people so dear to the scholar, but the metaphysical force and power of the ideal. It is highly significant that this ideal is expressed, never in the whole population but mainly in its warrior-element and pre-eminently in its genuine nobility that is, in men who live entirely in a world of facts, under the spell of historical becoming, destiny-men who will and dare – and he was precisely in the early times (another significant point) that a born alien of quality and dignity could without particular difficulty gain admittance to the ruling

class, and wives in particular were chosen for their “breed” and not their descent. Correspondingly, the impress of race-traits is weakest (as may be observed even to-day) in the true priestly and scholarly natures, even though these often do stand in close blood-relationship to the others. A strong spirit trains up the body in to a product of art. The Romans formed, in the midst of the confused and even heteroclite tribes of Italy, a race of the firmest and strictest inward unity that was neither Etruscan nor Latin nor merely “Classical”, but quite specifically Roman. Now here is the force that cements a people set before us more plainly than in Roman busts of the late Republican period.

III.

With this are laid, at last, the foundations for *a morphology of peoples* directly its essence is seen, we see also an inward order in the historical stream of the peoples. They are neither linguistic nor political nor zoological, but spiritual, units. And this leads at once to the further distinction between peoples before, within, and after a Culture. It is a fact that has been profoundly felt in all ages that Culture-peoples are more distinct in character than the rest... Their predecessors I will call primitive peoples. These are the fugitive and heterogeneous associations that form and dissolve without ascertainable rule, till at last, in the presentiment of a still unborn Culture (as, for example, in the pre-Homeric, the pre-Christian, and the Germanic periods), phase by phase, becoming ever more definite in type, they assemble the human material of a population into groups, though all the time little or no alteration has been occurring in the stamp of man. Such a superposition of phases leads from the Cimbri and Teutones through the Marcomanni and Goths to the Franks, Lombards and Saxons. Instances of primitive peoples are the Jews and Persians of the Seleucid age, the “Sea-peoples”, the Egyptian Nomeas of Menes’s time. And that which follows a Culture we may call — from its best-known example, Egyptians of post-Roman times — *fellah-peoples*.

In the tenth century of our era the Faustian soul suddenly evoke and manifested itself in innumerable shapes. Amongst these, side by side with the architecture and the ornament, there appears a distinctly characterized form of “people”. Out of the people-shapes of the Carolingian Empire — “the Saxons, Swabians, Franks, Visigoths, Lombards — arise suddenly the Germen, the French, the Spaniards, the Italians”. Hitherto (consciously

and deliberately or not) historical research has uniformly regarded these Culture-peoples as something in being, as primaries, and have treated the Culture itself as secondary, as their product. The creative units of history, accordingly, were simply the Indians, the Greeks, the Romans, the Germans, and soon. As the Greek culture was the work of the Hellenes, they must have been in existence as such far earlier; therefore, they must have been immigrants. Any other idea of creator and creation seemed inconceivable.

I regard it, therefore, as a discovery of decisive importance that the facts here set forth lead to their verse conclusion. It will be established in all rigor that the great Cultures are entities, primary or original, that arise out of the deepest foundations of spirituality, and that the peoples under the spell of a Culture are, alike in their inward form and in their whole manifestation, its products and not its authors. These shapes in which humanity is seized and molded possess style and style-history no less than kinds of art and modes of thought. The people of Athens are a symbol not less than the Doric temple, the Englishman not less than modern physics. *There are peoples of Apollonian, Magian, Faustian cast.* The Arabian Culture was not created by “the Arabs” contrary; for the Magian Culture begins in the time the Arabian people represents its last great creation of that kind, a community bonded by Islam as the Jewish and Persian communities before it had been bonded by their religions. World-history is the history of the great Cultures, and peoples are but the symbolic forms and vessels in which the men of these Cultures *fulfil their Destinies*. In each of these Cultures, Mexican and Chinese, Indian and Egyptian, there quite the of Christ, and whether our science is aware of it or not style, which arises at the beginning of the springtime, forming states and carrying history, and throughout the course of its evolution bears its fundamental form onward to the goal. They are in the highest degree unlike amongst powering feeling of spiritual relationship, and the notion of the barbarian meaning the man who inwardly does not belong to the Culture — is as clear-cut in the peoples of the Egyptian settlements and the Chinese world of states as it is in the Classical. The energy of the for mis so high that it grasps and recasts neighboring peoples, witness the Carthaginians of Roman times with their half-Classical style, and the Russians who have figured as a people of Western style from Catherine

the Great to the fall of Petrine Tsardom. Is a group of great peoples of identical possible to conceive of a sharper contrast than that – themselves between Athenians and Spartans, Germans and Frenchmen, Tsin and Tsu and all military history shows national hatred as the loftiest method of inducing historic decisions. But the moment that a people alien to the Culture makes an appearance in the field of history...

Peoples in the style of their Culture we will call Nations, the word itself distinguishing them from the forms that precede and that follow them. It is not merely a strong feeling of "we" that forges the inward unity of its most significant of all major associations; underlying the nation there is an Idea. This stream of a collective being possesses a very deep relation to Destiny, to Time, and to History, a relation that is different in each instance and one, too, that determines the relation of the human material to race, language, land, state, and religion. As the styles of the Old Chinese and the Classical peoples differ, so also the styles of their histories. Life as experienced by primitive and by *fellaheen peoples* is just the zoological up-and-down, a planless happening without goal or cadenced march in time, where in occurrences are many, but, in the last analysis, devoid of significance. *The only historical peoples, the peoples whose existence is world-history are the nations.* Let us be perfectly clear as to what is meant by this. The Ostrogoths suffered a great destiny, and therefore, inwardly, they have no history. Their battles and settlements were not necessary and therefore were episodic; their end was insignificant. In 1500 B.C. that which lived about Mycenae and Tiryns was not as yet a nation, and that which lived in Minoan Crete was no longer a nation...

Further, nations are the true city-building peoples. In the strongholds they arose, with the cities they ripen to the full height of their world-consciousness, and in the world-cities they dissolve. Every town-formation that has character has also national character. The village, which is wholly a thing of race, does not yet possess it; the megalopolis possesses it no longer. Of this essential, which so characteristically colours the nation's public life that its slightest manifestation identifies it, we cannot exaggerate — we can scarcely imagine the force, the self-sufficingness, and the loneliness. If between the souls of two Cultures the screen is impenetrable, if no Western may ever hope completely to understand the Indian or the Chinese, this is equally so, even more so, as

between well-developed nations. Nations understand one another as little as individuals do so. Each understands merely a self-created picture of the other, and individuals with the insight to penetrate deeper are few and far between. *Vis-a-vis* the Egyptians, all the Classical peoples necessarily felt themselves as relatives in one whole, but as between themselves they never understood each other. What sharper contrast is there than that between the Athenian and the Spartan spirit?... German and French piety, English and Spanish social ethics, German and English habits of life, stand so far apart that for the average man, and, therefore, for the public opinion of his community, the real inwardness of every foreign nation remains a deep secret and a source of continual and pregnant error. In the Roman Empire men began generally to understand one another, but this was precisely because there had ceased to be anything worth understanding in the Classical city. With the advent of mutual comprehension this particular humanity ceased to live in nations, and *ipso facto* ceased to be historic.

Owing to the very depth of these experiences, it is not possible for a whole people to be uniformly and throughout a Culture-people, a nation. Amongst primitives each individual man has the same feeling of group-obligations, but the awakening of a nation into self-consciousness invariably takes place in gradations – that is, pre-eminently in the particular class that is strongest of soul and holds the others spellbound by a power derived from what it has experienced. *Every nation is represented in history by a minority.* At the beginning of the spring time it is the nobility, which in that period of its first appearance is the fine flowering of the people, the vessel in which the national character unconscious, but felt all the more strongly in its cosmic pulse – receives its destined Style. The “we” is the knightly class, in the Egyptian feudal period of 2700 not less than in the Indian and the Chinese of 1200. The Homeric heroes are the Danai; the Norman barons are England. Centuries later, Saint-Simon – the embodiment, it is true, of an older France used to say that “all France” was assembled in the King’s anteroom, and there was a time in which Rome and the Senate were actually identical...

The people-form of this Culture is founded, like its Gothic architecture and its Infinitesimal Calculus upon a tendency to the Infinite, in the spatial as well as the temporal sense. The nation-feeling comprises, to begin with, a geographical horizon that, considering the period and its

means of communication, can only be called vast, and is not paralleled in any other Culture. The fatherland as extent, as a region whose boundaries the individual has scarcely, if ever, seen and which nevertheless he will defend and die for, is something that in its symbolic depth and force men of other Cultures can never comprehend. The Magian nation does not as such possess an earthly home; the Classical possesses it only as a point-focus. The actuality that, evening Gothic times, united men from the banks of the Adige with men in the Order-castles of Lithuania in an association of feeling would have been inconceivable even in ancient China and ancient Egypt and stands in the sharpest opposition to the actuality of Rome and Athens, where every member of the Demos had the rest constantly in sight...

Still stronger is the sensitivity to distance in time. Before the fatherland idea (which is a consequence of the existence of the nation) emerged at all, this passion evolved another idea to which the Faustian nations owe that existence – the dynastic idea. *Faustian peoples* are historical peoples, communities that feel themselves bound together not by place or consensus, but by history; and the eminent symbol and vessel of the common Destiny is the ruling “house”. For Egyptian and for Chinese mankind the dynasty is a symbol of quite other meaning. Here what it signifies, as a will and an activity, is Time.

All that we have been, all that we would be, is manifested in the being of the one generation; and our sense of this is much too profound to be upset by the worthlessness of agent. *What matters is not the person, but the idea, and it is for the sake of the idea that thousands have so often marched to their deaths with conviction in age neological quarrel.* Classical history was for Classical eyes only a chain of incidents leading from moment to moment; Magian history was for its members the progressive actualization in and through mankind of a world-plan laid down by God and accomplished between a creation and a cataclysm; but Faustian history is in our eyes a single grand willing of conscious logic, in the accomplishment of which nations are led and represented by their rulers. It is a trait of race Rational foundations it has not and cannot have it has simply been felt so, and because it has been felt so, the companion-trust of the Germanic migration-time developed on into the feudal troth of the Gothic, the loyalty of the Baroque, and the merely seemingly undynastic patriotism of the nineteenth century... *“Lever doodt als Sklav*

(better dead than slave)” is an old Frisian peasant-saying. There verse has been the choice of every Late Civilization, and every Late Civilization has had to experience how much that choice costs it...

From: Spengler Oswald (1928)
“The Decline of the West” Perspectives of Word-History. –
[Translation with notes by Charles Francis Atkinson],
LONDON Georg Allen&Unwin LTD.
Ruskin House, Vol.II., Pp. 165 -186.

Max Weber
The Protestant Ethics and The Spirit of Capitalism

A PRODUCT of modern European civilization, studying any problem of universal history, is bound to ask himself to what combination of circumstances the fact should be attributed that in Western civilization, and in Western civilization only, cultural phenomena have appeared which (as we like to think) lie in a line of development having universal significance and value.

Only in the West does science exist at a stage of development which we recognize to-day as valid. Empirical knowledge, reflection on problems of the cosmos and of life, philosophical and theological wisdom of the most profound sort, are not confined to it, though the case of the last the full development of a systematic theology must be credited to Christianity under the influence of Hellenism, since there were only fragments in Islam and in a few Indian sects. In short, knowledge and observation of great refinement have existed elsewhere, above all in India, China, Babylonia, Egypt. But in Babylonia and elsewhere astronomy lacked – which makes its development all the more astounding – the mathematical foundation which it first received from the Greeks. The Indian geometry had no rational proof; that was another product of the Greek intellect, also the creator of mechanics and physics. The Indian natural sciences, though well developed in observation, lacked the method of experiment, which was, apart from beginnings in antiquity, essentially a product of the Renaissance, as was the modern laboratory. Hence medicine, especially in India, though highly developed in

empirical technique, lacked a biological and particularly a biochemical foundation. A rational chemistry has been absent from all areas of culture except the West.

The highly developed historical scholarship of China did not have the method of Thucydides. Machiavelli, it is true, had predecessors in India; but all Indian political thought was lacking in a systematic method comparable to that of Aristotle, and, indeed, in the possession of rational concepts. Not all the anticipations in India (School of Mimamsa), nor the extensive codification especially in the Near East, nor all the Indian and other books of law, had the strictly systematic forms of thought, so essential to a rational jurisprudence, of the Roman law and of the Western law under its influence. A structure like the canon law is known only to the West. A similar statement is true of art. The musical ear of other peoples has probably been even more sensitively developed than our own, certainly not less so. Polyphonic music of various kinds has been widely distributed over the earth. The co-operation of a number of instruments and also the singing of parts have existed elsewhere. All our rational tone intervals have been known and calculated. But rational harmonious music, both counterpoint and harmony, formation of the tone material on the basis of three triads with the harmonic third; our chromatics and enharmonic, not interpreted in terms of space, but, since the Renaissance, of harmony; our orchestra, with its string quartet as a nucleus, and the organization of ensembles of wind instruments; our system of notation, which has made possible the composition and production of modern musical works, and thus their very survival; our sonatas, symphonies, operas; and finally, as means to all these, our fundamental instruments, the organ, piano, violin, etc.; all these things are known only in the Occident, although programmed music, tone poetry, alteration of tones and chromatics, have existed in various musical traditions as means of expression... Even more are parliaments of periodically elected representatives, with government by demagogues and party leaders as ministers responsible to the parliaments, peculiar to us, although there have, of course, been parties, in the sense of organizations for exerting influence and gaining control of political power, all over the world. In fact, the State itself, in the sense of a political association with a rational, written constitution, rationally ordained law, and an administration bound to rational rules or laws, administered by trained officials, is known, in this combination of characteristics, only in the Occident, despite all other approaches to it.

And the same is true of the most fateful force in our modern life, capitalism. The impulse to acquisition pursuit of gain, of money, of the greatest possible amount of money has in itself nothing to do with capitalism. This impulse exists and has existed among waiters, physicians, coachmen, artists, prostitutes, dishonest officials, soldiers, nobles, crusaders, gamblers, and beggars. One may say that it has been common to all sorts and conditions of men at all times and all countries of the earth, wherever objective possibilities of it is or has been given. It should be taught in the kindergarten of cultural history that this naive idea of capitalism must be given up once and for all unlimited greed for gain is not in the least identical with capitalism and is still less with its spirit. Capitalism may even be identical to the restraint, or at least a rational tempering, of this irrational impulse. But capitalism is identical with the pursuit of profit, and forever renewed profit, by means of continuous, rational, capitalistic enterprise. For it must be so: in a wholly capitalistic order of society, an individual capitalistic enterprise which did not take advantage of its opportunities for profit-making would be doomed to extinction.

Let us now define our terms somewhat more carefully than is generally done. *We will define a capitalistic economic action, which rest on expectation on profit by the utilization of opportunities for exchange, that is on (formally) peaceful chances of profit. Acquisition by force (formally and actually) follows its particular laws, and it is not expedient, however little one can forbid this, to place it in the same category with action which is, in the last analysis, oriented to profits from exchange.*

Where capitalistic acquisition is rationally pursued, the corresponding action is adjusted to calculations in terms of capital. This means that the action is adapted to a systematic utilization of goods or personal services as means of acquisition in such a way that, at the close of a business period, the balance of the enterprise in money assets (or, in the case of a continuous enterprise, the periodically estimated money value of assets) exceeds the capital, i.e. the estimated value of the material means of production used for acquisition in exchange. It makes no difference whether it involves a quantity of goods entrusted in natura to a travelling merchant, the proceeds of which may consist in other goods in natura acquired by trade, or whether it involves a manufacturing enterprise, the assets of which consist of buildings, machinery, cash, raw

materials, partly and wholly manufactured goods, which are balanced against liabilities. *The important fact is always that a calculation of capital in terms of money is made, whether by modern book-keeping methods or in any other way, however primitive and crude.* Everything is done in terms of balances: at the beginning of the enterprise an initial balance, before every individual decision a calculation to ascertain its probable profitability, and at the end a final balance to ascertain how much profit has been made...

For the purpose of this conception all that matters is that an actual adaptation of economic action to a comparison of money income with money expenses takes place, no matter how primitive the form. Now in this sense capitalism and capitalistic enterprises, even with a considerable rationalization of capitalistic calculation, have existed in all civilized countries of the earth, so far as economic documents permit us to judge. In China, India, Babylon, Egypt, Mediterranean antiquity, and the Middle Ages, as well as in modern times. These were not merely isolated ventures, but economic enterprises which were entirely dependent on the continual renewal of capitalistic undertakings, and even continuous operations. However, trade especially was for a long time not continuous like our own but consisted essentially in a series of individual undertakings. Only gradually did the activities of even the large merchants acquire an inner cohesion (with branch organizations, etc.). In any case, the capitalistic enterprise and the capitalistic entrepreneur, not only as occasional but as regular entrepreneurs, are very old and were very widespread.

Now, however, the Occident has developed capitalism both to a quantitative extent, and (carrying this quantitative development) in types, forms, and directions which have never existed elsewhere. All over the world there have been merchants, wholesale and retail, local and engaged in foreign trade... Whenever money finances of public bodies have existed, moneylenders have appeared, as in Babylon, Hellas, India, China, Rome. They have financed wars and piracy, contracts and building operations of all sorts. In overseas policy they have functioned as colonial entrepreneurs, as planters with slaves, or directly or indirectly forced labor, and have farmed domains, offices, and, above all, taxes. They have financed party leaders in elections and condottieri in civil wars. And, finally, they have been speculators in chances for pecuniary gain of all kinds. This kind of entrepreneur, the capitalistic adventurer,

has existed everywhere. With the exception of trade and credit and banking transactions, their activities were predominantly of an irrational and speculative character, or directed to acquisition by force, above all the acquisition of booty, whether directly in war or in the form of continuous fiscal booty by exploitation of subjects.

The capitalism of promoters, large-scale speculators, concession hunters, and much modern financial capitalism even in peace time, but, above all, the capitalism especially concerned with exploiting wars, bears this stamp even in modern Western countries, and some, but only some, parts of large-scale international trade are closely related to it, today as always... Rational industrial organization, attuned to a regular market and neither to political nor irrationally speculative opportunities for profit, is not, however, the only peculiarity of Western capitalism. The modern rational organization of the capitalistic enterprise would not have been possible without two other important factors in its development: the separation of business from the household, which completely dominates modern economic life, and closely connected with it, rational book-keeping. A spatial separation of places of work from those of residence exists elsewhere, as in the Oriental bazaar and in the *ergasteria* of other cultures. The development of capitalistic associations with their own accounts is also found in the Far East, the Near East, and in antiquity. But compared to the modern independence of business enterprises, those are only small beginnings. The reason for this was particularly that the indispensable requisites for this independence, our rational business book-keeping and our legal separation of corporate from personal property, were entirely lacking, or had only begun to develop.

The tendency everywhere else was for acquisitive enterprises to arise as parts of a royal or manorial household (of the *oikos*), which is, as Rodbertus has perceived, with all its superficial similarity, a fundamentally different, even opposite, development.

However, all these peculiarities of Western capitalism have derived their significance in the last analysis only from their association with the capitalistic organization of labour. Even what is generally called commercialization, the development of negotiable securities and the rationalization of speculation, the exchanges, etc., is connected with it. *For without the rational capitalistic organization of labour, all this, so far as it was possible at all, would have nothing like the same significance,*

above all for the social structure and all the specific problems of the modern Occident connected with it. Exact calculation — the basis of everything else — is only possible on a basis of free labour.

And just as, or rather because, the world has known no rational organization of labour outside the modern Occident, it has known no rational socialism. Of course, there has been civic economy, a civic food-supply policy, mercantilism and welfare policies of princes, rationing, regulation of economic life, protectionism, and laissez-faire theories (as in China). The world has also known socialistic and communistic experiments of various sorts: family, religious, or military communism, State socialism (in Egypt), monopolistic cartels, and consumers' organizations. But although there have everywhere been civic market privileges, companies, guilds, and all sorts of legal differences between town and country, the concept of the citizen has not existed outside the Occident, and that of the bourgeoisie outside the modern Occident. Similarly, the proletariat as a class could not exist, because there was no rational organization of free labour under regular discipline. Class struggles between creditor and debtor classes; landowners and the landless, serfs, or tenants; trading interests and consumers or landlords, have existed everywhere in various combinations. But even the Western mediaeval struggles between putters-out and their workers exist elsewhere only in beginnings. The modern conflict of the large-scale industrial entrepreneur and free-wage labourers was entirely lacking. And thus, there could be no such problems as those of socialism...

For in all the above cases it is a question of the specific and peculiar rationalism of Western culture. Now by this term very different things may be understood, as the following discussion will repeatedly show. There is, for example, rationalization' of mystical contemplation, that is of an attitude which, viewed from other departments of life, is specifically irrational, just as much as there are rationalizations of economic life, of technique, of scientific research, of military training, of law and administration. Furthermore, each one of these fields may be rationalized in terms of very different ultimate values and ends, and what is rational from one point of view may well be irrational from another. Hence rationalizations of the most varied character have existed in various departments of life and in all areas of culture. To characterize their differences from the view-point of cultural history it is necessary to know what departments are rationalized, and in what direction.

It is hence our first concern to work out and to explain genetically the special peculiarity of Occidental rationalism, and within this field that of the modern Occidental form. Every such attempt at explanation must, recognizing the fundamental importance of the economic factor, above all take account of the economic conditions. But at the same time the opposite correlation must not be left out of consideration. For though the development of economic rationalism is partly dependent on rational technique and law, it is at the same time determined by the ability and disposition of men to adopt certain types of practical rational conduct. When these types have been obstructed by spiritual obstacles, the development of rational economic conduct has also met serious inner resistance. The magical and religious forces, and the ethical ideas of duty based upon them, have in the past always been among the most important formative influences on conduct. In the studies collected here we shall be concerned with these forces.

Two older essays have been placed at the beginning which attempt, at one important point, to approach the from side of the problem which is generally most difficult to grasp: the influence of certain religious ideas on the development of an economic spirit, or *the ethos of economic system*. In this case *we are dealing with the connection of the spirit of modern economic life with the rational ethics of ascetic Protestantism*. Thus, we treat here only one side of the causal chain. *The later studies on the Economic Ethics of the World Religions attempt, in the form of a survey of the relations of the most important religions to economic life and to the social stratification of their environment, to follow out both causal relationships, so far as it is necessary in order to find points of comparison with the Occidental development.*

For only in this way is it possible to attempt a causal evaluation of those elements of the *economic ethics of the Western religions* which differentiate them from others, with a hope of attaining even a tolerable degree of approximation. *Hence these studies do not claim to be complete analyses of cultures, however brief*. On the contrary, in every culture they quite deliberately emphasize the elements in which it differs from Western civilization. They are, hence, definitely oriented to the problems which seem important for the understanding of Western culture from this view-point. With our object in view, any other procedure did not seem possible. But to avoid misunderstanding we must here lay special emphasis on the limitation of our purpose...

CHAPTER II. THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM

In the title of this study is used the somewhat pretension phrase, the spirit of capitalism. What that is to be understood by it? The attempt to give anything like a definition of it brings out certain difficulties which are in the very nature of this type of investigation.

If any object can be found to which this term can be applied with any understandable meaning, it can only be an historical individual, i.e. a complex of elements associated in historical reality which we unite into a conceptual whole from the standpoint of their cultural significance... We must, in other words, work out in the course of the discussion, as its most important results, the best conceptual formulation of what we here understand by the spirit of capitalism, that is the best from the point of view which interests us here. This point of view (the one of which we shall speak later) is, further, by no means the only possible one from which the historical phenomena we are investigating can be analyzed. Other standpoints would, for this as for every historical phenomenon, yield other characteristics as the essential ones. The result is that it is by no means necessary to understand by the spirit of capitalism only what it will come to mean to us for the purposes of our analysis. This is a necessary result of the nature of historical concepts which attempt for their methodological purposes not to grasp historical reality in abstract general formulae, but in concrete genetic sets of relations which are inevitably of a specifically unique and individual character.

Thus, if we try to determine the object, the analysis and historical explanation of which we are attempting, it cannot be in the form of a conceptual definition, but at least in the beginning only provisional description of what is here meant by the spirit of capitalism. Such a description is, however, indispensable in order clearly to understand the object of the investigation. For this purpose we turn to a document of that spirit which contains what we are looking for in almost classical purity, and at the time has the advantage of being free from all direct relationship to religion, being thus, for our purposes, free of preconception.

“Remember, that time is money. He that can earn ten shillings a day by his labour, and goes abroad, or sits idle, one half of that day, though he

spends but sixpence during his diversion or idleness, ought not to reckon that the only expense; he has really spent, or rather thrown away, five shillings besides”.

“Remember, that credit is money. If a man lets his money lie in my hands after it is due, he gives me the interest, or so much as I can make of it during that time. This amounts to a considerable sum where a man has good and large credit and makes good use of it”.

“Remember, that money is of the prolific, generating nature. Money can beget money, and its offspring can beget more, and so on. Five shillings turned is six, turned again it is seven and three pence, and so on, till it becomes a hundred pounds. The more there is of it, the more it produces every turning, so that the profits rise quicker and quicker. He that kills a breeding-sow, destroys all her offspring to the thousandth generation. He that murders a crown, destroys all that it might/ have produced, even scores of pounds”.

“Remember this saying. The good paymaster is lord of another man’s purse. He that is known to pay punctually and exactly to the time he promises, may at any time, and on any occasion, raise all the money his friends can spare. This is sometimes of great use. After industry and frugality, nothing contributes more to the raising of a young man in the world than punctuality and justice in all his dealings; therefore, never keep borrowed money an hour beyond the time you promised, lest a disappointment shut up your friend’s purse forever”.

“The most trifling actions that affect a man’s credit are to be regarded. The sound of your hammer at five in the morning, or eight at night, heard by a creditor, makes him easy six months longer; but if he sees you at a billiard-table, or hears your voice at a tavern, when you should be at work, he sends for his money the next day; demands it, before he can receive it, in a lump”.

“It shows, besides, that you are mindful of what you owe; it makes you appear a careful as well as an honest man, and that still increases your credit”. “Beware of thinking all your own that you possess, and of living accordingly. It is a mistake that many people who have credit fall into. To prevent this, keep an exact account for some time both of your expenses and your income. If you take the pains at first to mention particulars,

it will have this good effect: you will discover how wonderfully small, trifling expenses mount up to large sums, and will discern what might have been, and may for the future be saved, without occasioning any great inconvenience”.

“For six pounds a year you may have the use of one hundred pounds, provided you are a man of known prudence and honesty”. He that spends a groat a day idly, spends idly above six pounds a year, which is the price for the use of one hundred pounds. “He that wastes idly a groat’s worth of his time per day, one day with another, wastes the privilege of using one hundred pounds each day”. “He that idly loses five shillings, not only loses worse of time, loses five shillings, and might it prudently throw five shillings into the sea”. “He that loses five, not loses the sum, but all the advantage that might be made by turning it in dealing, which by the time that a young man becomes old, will amount to a considerable sum of money”.

It is Benjamin Ferdinand who preaches to us in these sentences, the same which Ferdinand Kürnberger satirizes in his clever and malicious “Picture of American Culture” as the supposed confession of faith of the Yankee. That it is the spirit of capitalism which here speaks in characteristic fashion, no one will doubt, however little we may wish to claim that everything which could be understood as pertaining to that spirit is contained in it. Let us pause a moment to consider this passage, the philosophy of which Kürnberger sums up in the words, “They make tallow out of cattle and money out of men”. The peculiarity of this philosophy of avarice appears to be the ideal of the honest man of recognized credit, and above all the idea of a duty of the individual toward the increase of his capital, which is assumed as an end in itself. *Truly what is here preached is not simply a means of making one’s way in the world, but a peculiar ethic.* The infraction of its rules is treated not as foolishness but as forgetfulness of duty. That is the essence of the matter. It is not mere business astuteness, that sort of thing is common enough, it is an *ethos*. This is the quality which interests us...

...Now, all Franklin’s moral attitudes are colored with utilitarianism. Honesty is useful, because it assures credit; so are punctuality, industry, frugality, and that is the reason they are virtues. A logical deduction from this would be that where, for instance, the appearance of honesty serves

the same purpose, that would suffice, and an unnecessary surplus of this virtue would evidently appear to Franklin's eyes as unproductive waste. And as a matter of fact, the story in his autobiography of his conversion to those virtues', or the discussion of the value of a strict maintenance of the appearance of modesty, the assiduous belittlement of one's own deserts in order to gain general recognition later, confirms this impression. According to Franklin, those virtues, like all others, are only in so far virtues as they are actually useful to the individual, and the surrogate of mere appearance is always sufficient when it accomplishes the end in view. It is a conclusion which is inevitable for strict utilitarianism. The impression of many Germans that the virtues professed by Americanism are pure hypocrisy seems to have been confirmed by this striking case. But in fact, the matter is not by any means so simple. Benjamin Franklin's own character, as it appears in the really unusual candidness of his autobiography, belies that suspicion...

...In fact, the *summum bonum* of this ethic, the earning of more and more money, combined with the strict avoidance of all spontaneous enjoyment of life, is above all completely devoid of any eudemonistic, not to say hedonistic, admixture. It is thought of so purely as an end in itself, that from the point of view of the happiness of, or utility to, the single individual, it appears entirely transcendental and absolutely irrational. Man is dominated by the making of money, by acquisition as the ultimate *purpose of his life*. Economic acquisition is no longer subordinated to man as the means for the satisfaction of his material needs. *This reversal of what we should call the natural relationship, so irrational from a naive point of view, is evidently as definitely a leading principle of capitalism as it is foreign to all peoples not under capitalistic influence.* At the same time, it expresses a type of feeling which is closely connected with certain religious ideas. If we thus ask, why should "money be made out of men", Benjamin Franklin himself, although he was a colourless deist, answers in his autobiography with a quotation from the Bible, which his strict Calvinistic father drummed into him again and again in his "youth Seest thou a man diligent in his business". "He shall stand before kings" (Prov. xxii. 29). [The earning of money within the modern economic order is, so long as it is done legally, the result and the expression of virtue and proficiency in a calling; and this virtue and proficiency are, as it is now not difficult to see, the real Alpha and Omega

of Franklin's ethic, as expressed in the passages we have quoted, as well as in all his works without exception.

And in truth this peculiar idea, so familiar to us to-day, but in reality, so little a matter of course, of one's duty in a calling, is what is most characteristic of the *social ethic of capitalistic culture* and is in a sense the fundamental basis of it. It is an obligation which the individual is supposed to feel and does feel towards the content of his professional activity, no matter in what it consists, in particular no matter whether it appears on the surface as a utilization of his personal powers, or only of his material possessions (as capital). The capitalistic economy of the present day is an immense cosmos into which the individual is born, and which presents itself to him, at least as an individual, as an unalterable order of things in which he must live. It forces the individual, in so far as he is involved in the system of market relationships, to conform to capitalistic rules of action. The manufacturer who in the long run acts counter to these norms, will just as inevitably be eliminated from the economic scene as the worker who cannot or will not adapt himself to them will be thrown into the streets without a job.

Thus, the capitalism of to-day, which has come to dominate economic life, educates and selects the economic subjects which it needs through a process of economic survival of the fittest. But here one can easily see the limits of the concept of selection as a means of historical explanation. In order that a manner of life so well adapted to the peculiarities of capitalism could be selected at all, i.e. should come to dominate others, it had to originate somewhere, and not in isolated individuals alone, but as a way of life common to whole groups of men.

This origin is what really needs explanation. Concerning the doctrine of the more naive historical materialism, that such ideas originate as a reflection or super structure of economic situations, we shall speak more in detail below. At this point it will suffice for our purpose to call attention to the fact that without doubt, in the country of Benjamin Franklin's birth (Massachusetts), the spirit of capitalism (in the sense we have attached to it) was present before the capitalistic order. There were complaints of a peculiarly calculating sort of profit-seeking in New England, as distinguished from other parts of America, as early as 1632. It is further undoubted that capitalism remained far less developed in some of the neighboring colonies, the later Southern States

of the United States of America, in spite of the fact that, these latter were founded by large capitalists for business motives, while the New England colonies were founded by preachers. and seminary graduates with the help of small bourgeois, craftsmen and yeomen, for religious reasons... The opportunity of earning more was less attractive than that of working less. He did not ask: how much can I earn in a day if I do as much work as possible but: "how much must I work in order to earn the wage, marks, which. I earned before and which takes care of my traditional needs? This is an example of what is here meant by traditionalism. A man does not by nature" wish to earn more and more money, but simply to live as he is accustomed to live and to earn as much as is necessary for that purpose. Wherever modern capitalism has begun its work of increasing the productivity of human labour by increasing its intensity, it has encountered the immensely stubborn resistance of this leading trait of pre-capitalistic labour. And to-day it encounters it the more, the more backward (from a capitalistic point of view) the labouring forces are with which it has to deal... *Labour must, on the contrary be performed as if it were an absolute end in itself, a calling...* To-day, capitalism, once in the saddle, can recruit its labouring force in all industrial countries with comparative ease. In the past this was in every case an extremely difficult problem. And even to-day it could probably not get along without the support of a powerful ally along the way, which, as we shall see below, was at hand at the time of its development...

*From: Weber Max (1950)
"The Protestant Ethics and The Spirit of Capitalism". –*

[Translated by Talcott Parsons],
Harvard University NEW YORK:
Charles Scribner's Sons, LONDON:
Georg Allen&Unwin LTD, Pp. 13-78.

Regarding seminar 7. The System Approach in Philosophical Theory of Society.

ALFRED REGINALD RADCLIFFE-BROWN

The Structure and Function in Primitive Society

It has been suggested to me by some of my friends that I should use this occasion to offer some remarks about my own point of view in social anthropology ; and since in my teaching, beginning at Cambridge and at the London School of Economics thirty years ago, I have consistently emphasized the importance of the study of social structure, the suggestion made to me was that I should say something on that subject.

I hope you will pardon me if I begin with a note of personal explanation. I have been described on more than one occasion as belonging to something called the “Functional School of Social Anthropology” and even as being its leader, or one of its leaders. This Functional School does not really exist; it is a myth invented by Professor Malinowski. He has explained how, to quote his own words, “the magnificent title of the Functional School of Anthropology has been bestowed by myself, in a way on myself, and to a large extent out of my own sense of irresponsibility”. Professor Malinowski’s irresponsibility has had unfortunate results, since it has spread over anthropology a dense fog of discussion about “functionalism”. Professor Lowie has announced that the leading, though not the only, exponent of functionalism in the nineteenth century was Professor Franz Boas. I do not think that there is any special sense, other than the purely chronological one, in which I can be said to be either the follower of Professor Boas or the predecessor of Professor Malinowski. The statement that I am a “functionalist”, or equally the statement that I am not, would seem to me to convey no definite meaning.

There is no place in natural science for “schools” in this sense, and I regard social anthropology as a branch of natural science. Each scientist starts from the work of his predecessors, finds problems which he believes to be significant, and by observation and reasoning endeavors to make some contribution to a growing body of theory. Co-operation amongst scientists results from the fact that they are working on the same or related problems. Such co-operation does not result in the formation

of schools, in the sense in which there are schools of philosophy or of painting. There is no place for orthodoxies and heterodoxies in science. Nothing is more pernicious in science than attempts to establish adherence to doctrines. All that a teacher can do is to assist the student in learning to understand and use the scientific method. It is not his business to make disciples.

I conceive of social anthropology as the theoretical natural science of human society, that is, the investigation of social phenomena by methods essentially similar to those used in the physical and biological sciences. I am quite willing to call the subject “comparative sociology”, if any one so wishes. It is the subject itself, and not the name, that is important. As you know, there are some ethnologists or anthropologists who hold that it is not possible, or at least not profitable, to apply to social phenomena the theoretical methods of natural science. For these persons social anthropology, as I have defined it, is something that does not, and never will, exist. For them, of course, my remarks will have no meaning, or at least not the meaning I intend them to have.

While I have defined social anthropology as the study of human society, there are some who define it as the study of culture. It might perhaps be thought that this difference of definition is of minor importance. Actually it leads to two different kinds of study, between which it is hardly possible to obtain agreement in the formulation of problems.

For a preliminary definition of social phenomena it seems sufficiently clear that what we have to deal with are relations of association between individual organisms. In a hive of bees there are the relations of association of the queen, the workers and the drones. There is the association of animals in a herd, of a mother-cat and her kittens. These are social phenomena; I do not suppose that any one will call them cultural phenomena. In anthropology, of course, we are only concerned with human beings, and in social anthropology, as I define it, what we have to investigate are the forms of association to be found amongst human beings.

Let us consider what are the concrete, observable facts with which the social anthropologist is concerned. If we set out to study, for example, the aboriginal inhabitants of a part of Australia, we find a certain number of individual human beings in a certain natural environment. We can

observe the acts of behaviour of these individuals, including, of course, their acts of speech, and the material products of past actions. We do not observe a “culture”, since that word denotes, not any concrete reality, but an abstraction, and as it is commonly used a vague abstraction. But direct observation does reveal to us that these human beings are connected by a complex network of social relations. I use the term “social structure” to denote this network of actually existing relations. It is this that I regard it as my business to study if I am working, not as an ethnologist or psychologist, but as a social anthropologist. I do not mean that the study of social structure is the whole of social anthropology, but I do regard it as being in a very important sense the most fundamental part of the science.

My view of natural science is that it is the systematic investigation of the structure of the universe as it is revealed to us through our senses. There are certain important separate branches of science, each of which deals with a certain class or kind of structures, the aim being to discover the characteristics of all structures of that kind. So atomic physics deals with the structure of atoms, chemistry with the structure of molecules, crystallography and colloidal chemistry with the structure of crystals and colloids, and anatomy and physiology with the structures of organisms. There is, therefore, I suggest, place for a branch of natural science which will have for its task the discovery of the general characteristics of those social structures of which the component units are human beings.

Social phenomena constitute a distinct class of natural phenomena. They are all, in one way or another, connected with the existence of social structures, either being implied in or resulting from them. Social structures are just as real as are individual organisms. A complex organism is a collection of living cells and interstitial fluids arranged in a certain structure; and a living cell is similarly a structural arrangement of complex molecules. The physiological and psychological phenomena that we observe in the lives of organisms are not simply the result of the nature of the constituent molecules or atoms of which the organism is built up, but are the result of the structure in which they are united. So also the social phenomena which we observe in any human society are not the immediate result of the nature of individual human beings, but are the result of the social structure by which they are united.

It should be noted that to say we are studying social structures is not exactly the same thing as saying that we study social relations, which is how some sociologists define their subject. A particular social relation between two persons (unless they be Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden) exists only as part of a wide network of social relations, involving many other persons, and it is this network which I regard as the object of our investigations.

I am aware, of course, that the term "social structure" is used in a number of different senses, some of them very vague. This is unfortunately true of many other terms commonly used by anthropologists. The choice of terms and their definitions is a matter of scientific convenience, but one of the characteristics of a science as soon as it has passed the first formative period is the existence of technical terms which are used in the same precise meaning by all the students of that science. By this test, I regret to say, social anthropology reveals itself as not yet a formed science. One has therefore to select for oneself, for certain terms, definitions which seem to be the most convenient for the purposes of scientific analysis.

There are some anthropologists who use the term social structure to refer only to persistent social groups, such as nations, tribes and clans, which retain their continuity, their identity as individual groups, in spite of changes in their membership. Dr. Evans-Pritchard, in his recent admirable book on the Nuer, prefers to use the term social structure in this sense. Certainly, the existence of such persistent social groups is an exceedingly important aspect of structure.

But I find it more useful to include under the term social structure a good deal more than this. In the first place, I regard as a part of the social structure all social relations of person to person. For example, the kinship structure of any society consists of a number of such *dyadic relations*, as between a father and son, or a mother's brother and his sister's son. In an Australian tribe the whole social structure is based on a network of such relations of person to person, established through genealogical connections.

Secondly, I include under social structure the differentiation of individuals and of classes by their social role. The differential social positions of men and women, of chiefs and commoners, of employers and employees, are just as much determinants of *social relations* as belonging to different clans or different nations.

In the study of social structure, the concrete reality with which we are concerned is the set of actually existing relations, at a given moment of time, which link together certain human beings. It is on this that we can make direct observations. But it is not this that we attempt to describe in its particularity. Science (as distinguished from history or biography) is not concerned with the particular, the unique, but only with the general, with kinds, with events which recur. The actual relations of Tom, Dick and Harry or the behaviour of Jack and Jill may go down in our field note-books and may provide illustrations for a general description. But what we need for scientific purposes is an account of the form of the structure. For example, if in an Australian tribe I observe in a number of instances the behaviour towards one another of persons who stand in the relation of mother's brother and sister's son, it is in order that I may be able to record as precisely as possible the general or normal form of this relationship, abstracted from the variations of particular instances, though taking account of those variations.

This important distinction, between structure as an actually existing concrete reality, to be directly observed, and structural form, as what the field-worker describes, may be made clearer perhaps by a consideration of the continuity of social structure through time, a continuity which is not static like that of a building, but a dynamic continuity, like that of the organic structure of a living body. Throughout the life of an organism its structure is being constantly renewed; and similarly, the social life constantly renews the social structure. Thus, the actual relations of persons and groups of persons change from year to year, or even from day to day. New members come into a community by birth or immigration; others go out of it by death or emigration. There are marriages and divorces. Friends may become enemies, or enemies may make peace and become friends. But while the actual structure changes in this way, the general structural form may remain relatively constant over a longer or shorter period of time. Thus, if I visit a relatively stable community and revisit it after an interval of ten years, I shall find that many of its members have died and others have been born; the members who still survive are now ten years older and their relations to one another may have changed in many ways. Yet I may find that the kinds of relations that I can observe are very little different from those observed ten years before. The structural form has changed little.

But, on the other hand, the structural form may change, sometimes gradually, sometimes with relative suddenness, as in revolutions and military conquests. But even in the most revolutionary changes some continuity of structure is maintained. I must say a few words about the spatial aspect of social structure. It is rarely that we find a community that is absolutely isolated, having no outside contact. At the present moment of history, the network of social relations spreads over the whole world, without any absolute solution of continuity anywhere. This gives rise to a difficulty which I do not think that sociologists have really faced, the difficulty of defining what is meant by the term "a society". They do commonly talk of societies as if they were distinguishable, discrete entities, as, for example, when we are told that a society is an organism. Is the British Empire a society, or a collection of societies? Is a Chinese village a society, or is it merely a fragment of the Republic of China?

If we say that our subject is the study and comparison of human societies, we ought to be able to say what are the unit entities with which we are concerned. If we take any convenient locality of a suitable size, we can study the structural system as it appears in and from that region, i.e., the network of relations connecting the inhabitants amongst themselves and with the people of other regions. We can thus observe, describe, and compare the systems of social structure of as many localities as we wish. To illustrate what I mean, I may refer to two recent studies from the University of Chicago, one of a Japanese village, Suye Mura, by Dr. John Embree, and the other of a French Canadian community, St. Denis, by Dr. Horace Miner.

Closely connected with this conception of social structure is the conception of "social personality" as the position occupied by a human being in a social structure, the complex formed by all his social relations with others. Every human being living in society is two things: he is an individual and also a person. As an individual, he is a biological organism, a collection of a vast number of molecules organized in a complex structure, within which, as long as it persists, there occur physiological and psychological actions and reactions, processes and changes. Human beings as individuals are objects of study for physiologists and psychologists.

The human being as a person is a complex of social relationships. He is a citizen of England, a husband and a father, a brick-layer, a

member of a particular Methodist congregation, a voter in a certain constituency, a member of his trade union, an adherent of the Labour Party, and so on. *Note that each of these descriptions refers to a social relationship, or to a place in a social structure. Note also that a social personality is something that changes during the course of the life of the person. As a person, the human being is the object of study for the social anthropologist. We cannot study persons except in terms of social structure, nor can we study social structure except in terms of the persons who are the units of which it is composed.*

If you tell me that an individual and a person are after all really the same thing, I would remind you of the Christian creed. God is three persons, but to say that He is three individuals is to be guilty of a heresy for which men have been put to death. Yet the failure to distinguish individual and person is not merely a heresy in religion, it is worse than that, it is a source of confusion in science. I have now sufficiently defined, I hope, the subject matter of what I regard as an extremely important branch of social anthropology. The method to be adopted follows immediately from this definition. It must combine with the intensive study of single societies (i.e., of the structural systems observable in particular communities) the systematic comparison of many societies (or structural systems of different types). The use of comparison is indispensable. The study of a single society may provide materials for comparative study, or it may afford occasion for hypotheses, which then need to be tested by reference to other societies; it cannot give demonstrated results.

Our first task, of course, is to learn as much as we can about the varieties, or diversities, of structural systems. This requires field research. Many writers of ethnographical descriptions do not attempt to give us any systematic account of the social structure. But a few social anthropologists, here and in America, do recognize the importance of such data and their work is providing us with a steadily growing body of material for our study. Moreover, their researches are no longer confined to what are called "primitive" societies, but extend to communities in such regions as Sicily, Ireland, Japan, Canada and the United States.

If we are to have a real comparative morphology of societies, however, we must aim at building up some sort of classification of types of structural systems. That is a complex and difficult task, to which I have myself devoted attention for thirty years. It is the kind of task that

needs the co-operation of a number of students and I think I can number on my fingers those who are actively interested in it at the present time. Nevertheless, I believe some progress is being made. Such work, however, does not produce spectacular results and a book on the subject would certainly not be an anthropological best-seller.

We should remember that chemistry and biology did not become fully formed sciences until considerable progress had been made with the systematic classification of the things they were dealing with, substances in the one instance and plants and animals in the other. Besides this morphological study, consisting in the definition, comparison and classification of diverse structural systems, there is a physiological study. *The problem here is: how do social systems persist?*

In what I am thus calling social physiology, we are concerned not only with social structure, but with every kind of social phenomenon. Morals, law: etiquette, religion, government, and education are all parts of the complex mechanism by which a social structure exists and persists. If we take up the structural point of view, we study these things, not in abstraction or isolation, but in their direct and indirect relations to social structure, i.e., with reference to the way in which they depend upon, or affect, the social relations between persons and groups of persons. I cannot do more here than offer a few brief illustrations of what this means.

Let us first consider the study of language. A language is a connected set of speech usages observed within a defined speech-community. The existence of speech-communities and their sizes are features of social structure. There is, therefore, a certain very general relation between social structure and language. But if we consider the special characteristics of a particular language-its phonology, its morphology, and even to a great extent its vocabulary – there is no direct connection of either one-sided or mutual determination between these and the special characteristics of the social structure of the community within which the language is spoken. We can easily conceive that two societies might have very similar forms of social structure and very different kinds of language, or vice versa. The coincidence of a particular form of social structure and a particular language in a given community is always the result of historical accident.

There may, of course, be certain indirect, remote interactions between social structure and language, but these would seem to be of

minor importance. Thus, the general comparative study of languages can be profitably carried out as a relatively independent branch of science, in which the language is considered in abstraction from the social structure of the community in which it is spoken. But, on the other hand, there are certain features of linguistic history which are specifically connected with social structure. As structural phenomena may be instanced the process by – which Latin, from being the language of the small region of Latium, became the language of a considerable part of Europe, displacing the other Italic languages, Etruscan, and “many Celtic languages”; and the subsequent reverse process by which Latin split up into a number of diverse local forms of speech, which ultimately became the various Romance languages of to-day.

Thus, the spread of language, the unification of a number of separate communities into a single speech-community, and the reverse process of subdivision into different speech-communities, are phenomena of social structure. So also, are those instances in which, in societies having a class structure, there are differences of speech *usage* in different classes.

I have considered language first, because linguistics is, I think, the branch of social anthropology which can be most profitably studied without reference to social structure. There is a reason for this. The set of speech *usages* which constitute a language does form a system and systems of this kind can’ be compared in order to discover their common general, or abstract, characters, the determination of which can give us laws, which will be specifically laws of linguistics.

Let us consider very briefly certain other branches of social anthropology and their relation to the study of social structure. If we take the social life of a local community over a period, let us say a year, we can observe a certain sum total of total activities carried out by the persons who compose it. We can also observe a certain *apportionment* of these activities, one person doing certain things, another doing others. This apportionment of activities, equivalent to what is sometimes called the social *division of labour*, is an important feature of the social structure. Now activities are carried out because they provide some sort of, “gratification”, as I propose to call it, and the characteristic feature of social life is that activities of certain persons provide gratifications for other persons. In a simple instance, when an Australian blackfellow goes hunting, he provides meat, not only for himself, but for his wife and

children and also for other relatives to whom it is his duty to give meat when he has it. Thus, in any society there is not only an apportionment of activities, but also an apportionment of the gratifications resulting therefrom, and some sort of social machinery, relatively: simple or, sometimes, highly complex, by which the system works.

It is this machinery, or certain aspects of it, that constitutes the special subject-matter studied by the economists. They concern themselves with what kinds and quantities of goods are produced, how they are distributed (i.e., their flow from person to person, or region to region), and the way in which they are disposed of. Thus, what are called economic institutions are extensively studied in more or less complete abstraction from the rest of the social system. This method does undoubtedly provide useful results, particularly in the study of complex modern societies. Its weaknesses become apparent as soon as we attempt to apply it to the exchange of goods in what are called primitive societies.

The economic machinery of a society appears in quite a new light if it is studied in relation to the social structure. The exchange of goods and services is dependent upon, is the result of, and at the same time is a means of maintaining a certain structure, a network of relations between persons and collections of persons. For the economists and politicians of Canada the potlatch of the Indians of the north-west of America was simply wasteful foolishness and it was therefore forbidden. For the anthropologist it was the machinery for maintaining a social structure of lineages, clans and moieties, with which was combined an arrangement of rank defined by privileges. Any full understanding of the economic institutions of human societies requires that they should be studied from two angles. From one of these the economic system is viewed as the mechanism by which goods of various kinds and in various quantities are produced, transported and transferred, and utilized. From the other the economic system is a set of relations between persons and groups which maintains, and is maintained by, this exchange or circulation of goods and services. From the latter point of view, the study of the economic life of societies takes its place as part of the general study of social structure.

Social relations are only observed, and can only be described, by reference to the reciprocal behaviour of the persons related. The form of a social structure has therefore to be described by the patterns of behaviour to which individuals and groups conform in their dealings with

one another. These patterns are partially formulated in rules which, in our own society, we distinguish as rules of etiquette, of morals and of law. Rules, of course, only exist in their recognition by the members of the society; either in their verbal recognition, when they are stated as rules, or in their observance in behaviour. These two modes of recognition, as every field-worker knows, are not the same thing and both have to be taken into account.

If I say that in any society the rules of etiquette, morals and law are part of the mechanism by which a certain set of social relations is maintained in existence, this statement will, I suppose, be greeted as a truism. But it is one of those truisms which many writers on human society verbally accept and yet ignore in theoretical discussions, or in their descriptive analyses. The point is not that rules exist in every society, but that what we need to know for a scientific understanding is just how these things work in general and in particular instances.

Let us consider, for example, the study of law. If you examine the literature on jurisprudence you will find that legal institutions are studied for the most part in more or less complete abstraction from the rest of the social system of which they are a part. This is doubtless the most convenient method for lawyers in their professional studies. But for any scientific investigation of the nature of law it is insufficient. The data with which a scientist must deal are events which occur and can be observed. In the field of law, the events which the social scientist can observe and thus take as his data are the proceedings that take place in courts of justice. These are the reality, and for the social anthropologist they are the mechanism or process by which certain definable social relations between persons and groups are restored, maintained or modified. *Law is a part of the machinery by which a certain social structure is maintained. The system of laws of a particular society can only be fully understood if it is studied in relation to the social structure, and inversely the understanding of the social structure requires, amongst other things, a systematic study of the legal institutions.*

I have talked about social relations, but I have not so far offered you a precise definition. A social relation exists between two or more individual organisms when there is some adjustment of their respective interests, by convergence of interest, or by limitation of conflicts that might arise from divergence of interests. I use the term "interest" here

in the widest possible sense, to refer to all behaviour that we regard as purposive. To speak of an interest implies a subject and an object and a relation between them. Whenever we say that a subject has a certain interest in an object we can state the same thing by saying that the object has a certain value for the subject. Interest and value are correlative terms, which refer to the two sides of an asymmetrical relation.

Thus, the study of social structure leads immediately to the study of interests or values as the determinants of social relations. *A social relation does not result from similarity of interests, but rests either on the mutual interest of persons in one another, or on one or more common interests, or on a combination of both.* The simplest form of social solidarity is where two persons are both interested in bringing about a certain result and cooperate to that end. When two or more persons have a *common interest* in an object, that object can be said to have a *social value* for the persons thus associated. If then, practically all the members of a society have an interest in the observance of the laws, we can say that the law has a social value. The study of social values in this sense is therefore a part of the study of social structure.

It was from this point of view that in an early work I approached the study of what can conveniently be called ritual values, i.e., the values expressed in rites and myths. It is perhaps again a truism to say that religion is the cement which holds society together. But for a scientific understanding we need to know just how it does this, and that is a subject for lengthy investigations in many different forms of society...

From the point of view that I have attempted briefly to describe, social institutions, in the sense of standardized modes of behaviour, constitute the machinery by which a social structure, a network of social relations, maintains its existence and its continuity. I hesitate to use the term "function", which in recent years has been so much used and misused in a multitude of meanings, many of them very vague. Instead of being used, as scientific terms ought to be, to assist in making distinctions, it is now used to confuse things that ought to be distinguished. For it is often employed in place of the more ordinary words "use", "purpose" and "meaning". It seems to be more convenient and sensible, as well as more scholarly, to speak of the use or uses of an axe or digging stick, the meaning of a word or symbol, the purpose of an act of legislation, rather than to use the word function for these various things.

“Function” has been a very useful technical term in physiology and by analogy with its use in that science it would be a very convenient means of expressing an important concept in social science. As I have been accustomed to use the word, following Durkheim and others, I would define the social function of a socially standardized mode of activity, or mode of thought, as its relation to the social structure to the existence and continuity of which it makes some contribution. Analogously, in a living organism, the physiological function of the beating of the heart, or the secretion of gastric juices, is its relation to the organic structure to the existence or continuity of which it makes its contribution. It is in this sense that I am interested in such things as the social function of the punishment of crime, or the social function of the totemic rites of Australian tribes, or of the funeral rites of the Andaman Islanders. But this is not what either Professor Malinowski or Professor Lowie mean by functional anthropology. Besides these two divisions of the study of social structure, which I have called social morphology and social physiology, there is a third, the investigation of the processes by which social structures change, of how new forms of structures come into existence. Of this important branch of study I have time for only one illustration, from the field of colonial sociology.

Let us suppose that we wish to study and understand what is happening in a British or French colony or dependency in Africa, at the present time. Formerly the region was inhabited by Africans having their own social structure. Now a new and more complex social structure has been brought into existence. The population now includes a certain number of Europeans – government officials, traders, missionaries and, in some instances, settlers. The new political structure is one in which the Europeans have a large measure of control, and they generally play an important part in the new economic structure. The outstanding characteristic of this kind of social structure is that Europeans and Africans constitute different classes, with different languages, different customs and modes of life, and different sets of values and ideas. It is an extreme example of a society compounded of heterogeneous elements. As such it has a certain instability, due to the lack of adjustment of divergent interests.

In order to understand the social changes that are taking place in a society of this kind, it seems to me essential to study the whole

set of relations amongst the persons involved. This kind of study was undertaken by some of us in South Africa twenty years ago and is still being continued, profitably, I think. A few years ago, as a result perhaps of re-defining social anthropology as the study, not of society, but of culture, we were assured to abandon this kind of investigation in favor of what is now called the study of "culture contact".

In place of the study of the formation of new composite societies, we are supposed to regard what is happening in Africa as a process in which an entity called African culture comes into contact with an entity called European or Western culture, and a third new entity is produced, or is to be produced, which is to be described as Westernized African culture. To me this seems a fantastic reification of abstractions. European culture is an abstraction and so is the culture of an African tribe. I find it fantastic to imagine these two abstractions coming into contact and by an act of generation producing a third abstraction. There is contact, but it is between human beings, European and African, and it takes place within a definite structural arrangement.

You are aware that in certain anthropological circles the term "evolutionary anthropologist" is almost a term of abuse. It is applied, however, without much discrimination. Thus, Lewis Morgan is called an evolutionist, although he rejected the theory of organic evolution and in relation to society believed, not in evolution, but in progress, which he conceived as the steady material and moral improvement of mankind from crude stone implements and sexual promiscuity to the steam engines and monogamous marriage of Rochester, N.Y. But even such anti-evolutionists as Boas believe in progress.

It is convenient, I think, to use the term "*progress*" for the process by which human beings attain to greater control over the physical environment through the increase of knowledge and improvement of technique by inventions and discoveries. The way in which we are now able to destroy considerable portions of cities from the air is one of the latest striking results of progress. Progress is not the same thing as social evolution, but it is, I believe, very closely connected with it.

Evolution, as I understand the term, refers specifically to a process of emergence of new forms of structure. Organic evolution has two important features: (1) in the course of it a small number of kinds of organisms have given rise to a very much larger number of kinds; (2)

more complex forms of organic structure have come into existence by development out of simpler forms. While I am unable to attach any definite meaning to such phrases as the evolution of culture or the evolution of language, I think that social evolution is a reality which the social anthropologist should recognize and study. Like organic evolution, it can be defined by two features. There has been a process by which, from a small number of forms of social structure, many different forms have arisen in the course of history; that is, there has been a process of differentiation. Secondly, throughout this process more complex forms of social structures have developed out of, or replaced, simpler forms.

Just how structural systems are to be classified with reference to their greater or less complexity is a problem requiring investigation. But there is evidence of a close correlation between complexity and another feature of structural systems, namely, the extent of the field of social relations. In a structural system with a narrow total social field, an average or typical person is brought into direct and indirect social relations with only a small number of other persons. In systems of this type, we may find that the linguistic community the body of persons who speak one language-numbers from 250 to 500, while the political community is even smaller, and economic relations by the exchange of goods and services extend only over a very narrow range. Apart from the differentiation by sex and age, there is very little differentiation of social role between persons or classes. We can contrast with this the systems of social structure that we observe today in England or the United States. Thus, the process of human history to which I think the term social evolution may be appropriately applied might be defined as the process by which wide-range systems of social structure have grown out of, or replaced, narrow-range systems. Whether this view is acceptable or not, I suggest that the concept of social evolution is one which requires to be defined in terms of social structure.

There is no time on this occasion to discuss the relation of the study of social structure to the study of culture. For an interesting attempt to bring the two kinds of study together I would refer you to Mr. Gregory Bateson's book *Naven*. I have made no attempt to deal with social anthropology as a whole and with all its various branches and divisions. I have endeavored only to give you a very general idea of the kind of study to which I have found it scientifically profitable to devote a considerable

and steadily increasing proportion of my time and energy. The only reward that I have sought I think I have in some measure found-something of the kind of insight into the nature of the world of which we are part that only the patient pursuit of the method of natural science can afford.

From: *Radcliffe-Brown, A. (1952)*
The Structure and Function in Primitive Society –
THE FREE PRESS GLENCOE, ILLINOIS. – Pp. 226-240.

TALCOTT PARSONS
The social system.

§ THE INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRATION OF ACTION ELEMENTS

A CONCRETE action system is an integrated structure of action elements in relation to a situation. This means essentially integration of motivational and cultural or symbolic elements, brought together in a certain kind of ordered system.

The analysis of the general features of action in the previous chapter, combined with the immediately preceding analysis of the functional prerequisites of social systems, yield certain specifications which can guide us to strategic features of this ordered structure.

It is inherent in an action system that action is, to use one phrase, “normatively oriented” ...Expectations then, in combination with the “double contingency” of the process of interaction as it has been called, create a crucially imperative problem of order. Two aspects of this problem of order may in turn be distinguished, order in the symbolic systems which make communication possible, and order in the mutuality of motivational orientation to the normative aspect of expectations, the “Hobbesian” problem of order.

The problem of order, and thus of the nature of the integration of stable systems of social interaction, that is, of social structure, thus focuses on the integration of the motivation of actors with the normative cultural standards which integrate the action system, in our context interpersonally. These standards are, in the terms used in the preceding

chapter, patterns of value-orientation, and as such are a particularly crucial part of the cultural tradition of the social system. The orientation of one actor to the contingent action of another inherently involves evaluative orientation, because the element of contingency implies the relevance of a system of alternatives. Stability of interaction in turn depends on the condition that the particular acts of evaluation on both sides should be oriented to common standards since only in terms of such standards is “order” in either the communication or the motivational contexts possible.

There is a range of possible modes of orientation in the motivational sense to a value- standard. Perhaps the most important distinction is between the attitude of “expediency” at one pole, where conformity or non-conformity is a function of the instrumental interests of the actor, and at the other pole the “introjection” or internalization of the standard so that to act in conformity with it becomes a need-disposition in the actor’s own personality structure, relatively independently of any instrumentally significant consequences of that conformity. The latter is to be treated as the basic type of integration of motivation with a *normative pattern-structure of values*.

In order to justify this last proposition it is necessary to go somewhat further into the nature of the interaction process. In the case of a given actor, ego, there is soon built up a system of expectations relative to a given other, alter. With respect to alter’s action – this implies for ego hopes and anxieties, that is, some of alter’s possible reactions will be favorable from ego’s point of view and others unfavorable...

Generally, in so far as the normative standards in terms of which ego and alter are interacting are shared and clear, favorable reactions on the part of alter will tend to be deviating from them (and vice versa of course). The result of this circumstance is the tendency for the conformity-deviation dimension and the favorable-unfavorable or the gratification-deprivation dimension to coincide. In other words, the basic condition on which an interaction system can be stabilized is for the interests of the actors to be bound to conformity with a shared system of value-orientation standards.

There is in turn a two-fold structure of this “binding in”. In the first place, by virtue of internalization of the standard, conformity with it tends to be of personal, expressive and/or instrumental significance to

ego. In the second place, the structuring of the reactions of alter to ego's action as sanctions is a function of his conformity with the standard. Therefore, conformity as a direct mode of the fulfillment of his own need-dispositions tends to coincide with conformity as a condition of eliciting the favorable and avoiding the unfavorable reactions of others. In so far as, relative to the actions of a plurality of actors, conformity with a value-orientation standard meets both these criteria, that is from the point of view of any given actor in the system, it is both a mode of the fulfillment of his own need-dispositions and a condition of "optimizing" the reactions of other significant actors, that standard will be said to be "institutionalized".

A value pattern in this sense is always institutionalized in an interaction context. Therefore, there is always a double aspect of the expectation system which is integrated in relation to it. On the one hand there are the expectations which concern and in part set standards for the behavior of the actor, ego, who is taken as the point of reference; these are his "role-expectations". On the other hand, from his point of view there is a set of expectations relative to the contingently probable reactions of others (alters) — these will be called "sanctions", which in turn may be subdivided into positive and negative according to whether they are felt by ego to be gratification-promoting or depriving. The relation between role-expectations and sanctions then is clearly reciprocal. What are sanctions to ego are role-expectations to alter and vice versa.

A role then is a sector of the total orientation system of an individual actor which is organized about expectations in relation to a particular interaction context, that is integrated with a particular set of value-standards which govern interaction with one or more alters in the appropriate complementary roles. These alters need not be a defined group of individuals but can involve any alter if and when he comes into a particular complementary interaction relationship with ego which involves a reciprocity of expectations with reference to common standards of value-orientation.

The institutionalization of a set of role-expectations and of the corresponding sanctions is clearly a matter of degree. This degree is a function of two sets of variables; on the one hand those affecting the actual sharedness of the value-orientation patterns, on the other those determining the motivational orientation or commitment to the

fulfillment of the relevant expectations. As we shall see a variety of factors can influence this degree of institutionalization through each of these channels. The polar antithesis of full institutionalization is, however, *anomie*, the absence of structured complementarity of the interaction process or, what is the same thing, the complete breakdown of normative order in both senses. This is, however, a limiting concept which is never descriptive of a concrete social system. Just as there are degrees of institutionalization so are there also degrees of *anomie*. The one is the obverse of the other.

An *institution* will be said to be a complex of institutionalized role integrates which is of strategic structural significance in the social system in question. The institution should be considered to be a higher order unit of social structure than the role, and indeed it is made up of a plurality of interdependent role-patterns or components of them. Thus, when we speak of the “institution of property” in a social system we bring together those aspects of the roles of the component actors which have to do with the integration of action-expectations with the value-patterns governing the definition of rights in “possessions” and obligations relative to them. An institution in this sense should be clearly distinguished from a collectivity. A collectivity is a system of concretely interactive specific roles. An institution on the other hand is a complex of patterned elements in role-expectations which may apply to an indefinite number of collectivities. Conversely, a collectivity may be the focus of a whole series of institutions. Thus, the institutions of marriage and of parenthood are both constitutive of a particular family as a collectivity.

It is now necessary to go back to certain aspects of the integration of action elements in institutionalized roles. The starting point is the crucial significance of interaction and the corresponding complementarity of expectations. *What are expectations to ego are sanctions to alter and vice versa*, for among the expectations of any role, indeed the central part of them, are definitions of how its incumbent should act toward others, and these definitions are structured along the conformity-deviance dimension. The question of how far sanctions are *intended* by the actor who imposes them to influence the behavior of the other, or to “reward” his conformity and to “punish” his deviance, may remain an open question for the moment. The important point is that such intention is *not a criterion* of the concept of sanctions as here used. The criterion is merely that they are meaningful reactions of alter to what ego does.

Certain empirical generalizations seem to be established which can carry us somewhat farther in interpreting the dynamic significance of this reciprocal integration of role-expectations. The first derives from what was above called the “sensitivity” of the human personality to the attitudes of others. From this it follows that only in limiting cases will the significance of sanctions be purely instrumental, that is, will the probability of a given reaction be significant only as a set of expected conditions of the situation which influence the probability of successful attainment of a particular goal or the probable cost of its attainment. Conformity with role-expectations will always to a greater or less degree involve motivational elements of the character referred to in psychological discussions as composing the “ego-ideal” or the superego, elements of “self-respect”, adequacy or “security” in the psychological sense. Such elements are not of course necessarily central for every concrete actor in every concrete situation which is connected with a set of institutionalized role-expectations. A particular individual or class of them may well become involved in an interaction situation in which their own “sentiments” are only very peripherally involved.

But in a general sense in social situations, the circumstances of socialization and other factors preclude that this should be the predominant situation in permanent social systems which involve the major motivational interests of the participant actors. The focal case is that where the actor “cares” how others react to him in much more than a purely instrumental sense.

Considering that we are talking about the conditions of relatively stable interaction in social systems, it follows from this that the value-standards which define institutionalized role-expectations assume to a greater or less degree a moral significance. Conformity with them becomes, that is, to some degree a matter of the fulfillment of obligations which ego carries relative to the interests of the larger action system in which he is involved, that is a social system. The sharing of such common value patterns, entailing a sense of responsibility for the fulfillment of obligations, then creates a solidarity among those mutually oriented to the common values. The actors concerned will be said to constitute, within the area of relevance of these values, a *collectivity*.

For some classes of participants, the significance of collectivity membership may be predominantly its usefulness in an instrumental context to their “private” goals. But such an orientation cannot be constitutive of the collectivity itself, and so far as it predominates, tends to disrupt the solidarity of the collectivity. This is *most emphatically not* to say that participation in a solidary collectivity tends in general to interfere with the attainment of the individual’s private goals, but that without the attachment to the constitutive common values the collectivity tends to dissolve. If this attachment is given, there is room for much fulfillment of private interests.

Attachment to common values means, motivationally considered, that the actors have common “sentiments” in support of the value patterns, which may be defined as meaning that conformity with the relevant expectations is treated as a “good thing” relatively independently of any specific instrumental “advantage” to be gained from such conformity, e.g., in the avoidance of negative sanctions. Furthermore, this attachment to common values, while it may fit the immediate gratificational needs of the actor, always has also a “moral” aspect in that to some degree this conformity defines the “responsibilities” of the actor in the wider, that is, social action system in which he participates. Obviously, the specific focus of responsibility is the collectivity which is constituted by a particular common value-orientation.

Finally, it is quite clear that the “sentiments” which support such common values are not ordinarily in their specific structure the manifestation of constitutionally given propensities of the organism. They are in general learned or acquired. Furthermore, the part they play in the orientation of action is not predominantly that of cultural objects which are cognized and “adapted to” but the culture patterns have come to be internalized; they constitute part of the structure of the personality system of the actor itself. Such sentiments or “value-attitudes” as they may be called, are therefore genuine need-dispositions of the personality. It is only by virtue of internalization or institutionalized values that a genuine motivational integration of behavior in the social structure takes place, that the “deeper” layers of motivation become harnessed to the fulfillment of role-expectations. It is only when this has taken place to a high degree that it is possible to say that a social system is highly integrated, and that the interests of the approach coincide.

This integration of a set of common value patterns with the internalized need – disposition structure of the constituent personalities is the core phenomenon of the dynamics of social systems. That the stability of any social system except the most evanescent interaction process is dependent on a degree of such integration may be said to be the fundamental dynamic theorem of sociology. It is the major point of reference for all analysis which may claim to be a dynamic analysis of social process.

It is the significance of institutional integration in this sense which lies at the basis of the place of specifically sociological theory in the sciences of action and the reasons why economic theory and other versions of the conceptual schemes which give predominance to rational instrumental goal-orientation cannot provide an adequate model for the dynamic analysis of the social system in general terms.

It has been repeatedly shown that reduction of motivational dynamics to rational instrumental terms leads straight to the Hobbesian thesis, which is a reduction ad absurdum of the concept of a social system. This reduction was carried out in classic form by Durkheim in his *Division of Labor*. But Durkheim's excellent functional analysis has since been enormously reinforced by the implications of modern psychological knowledge with reference to the conditions of socialization and the bases of psychological security and the stability of personality, as well as much further empirical and theoretical analysis of social systems as such.

The theory of institutional behavior, which is essentially sociological theory, is precisely of the highest significance in social science because by setting the problems of social dynamics in a context of institutional structure and drawing the implications of the theorem of institutional integration which has just been stated, this theory is enabled to exploit and extend the knowledge of modern psychology about the non and irrational aspects of motivation in order to analyze social processes. It follows also that any conceptual scheme which utilizes only the motivational elements of rational instrumental goal-orientation can be an adequate theory only of certain relatively specialized processes *within* the framework of an institutionally structured social system.

The basic theorem of institutional integration like all such basic theorems, explains very little in detail. It provides rather a point of reference in relation to which it is possible in an orderly fashion to

introduce successively the more detailed distinctions which are necessary before an adequate analysis of complex behavioral processes can be approached. The present exposition has chosen the deductive approach. Hence it should be clearly understood that empirical applications of the conceptual scheme will be possible only after a much more advanced stage of elaboration has been reached.

There are above all two main directions in which this further elaboration must be carried out. In the first place institutionalized role behavior has been defined as behavior oriented to a value-orientation pattern or system of them. But there are many different kinds of such patterns and many different ways in which role-expectations may be structured relative to them. Exact coincidence should be regarded as a limiting case like the famous frictionless machine. Though complete integration of a social system of motivation with a fully consistent set of cultural patterns is empirically unknown, the conception of such an integrated social system is of high theoretical significance.

In place of this extremely general formula then it is necessary to put a differentiated account of at least some of the most important of these differentiated possibilities. Secondly, the oversimplified "ideal case" depicts complete motivational integration with a given value-pattern in the sense that this pattern as internalized is conceived to produce a need-disposition for conformity with it which insures adequate motivation for conforming behavior. This is obviously a highly simplified model. Before approaching realistic levels, it is essential to analyze the complications involved in the possibilities of alienative as well as conformational need-dispositions, of conflicts and ambivalence and the like. An introduction to the elaboration of the cultural aspects of this problem will constitute the remainder of the present chapter.

Before embarking on these considerations, however, a brief discussion is in order of the implications of this theorem of institutional integration for the articulation of social role structure with personality structure. The starting point is that stated above that the role expectation is structured around a specific interaction context. To whatever extent adequate motivation for the fulfillment of such expectations is achieved, where a set of expectations for those playing the "same" role is uniform there is every reason why in personality terms the motivational significance of this uniform behavior cannot be the same for all the personalities concerned. Three crucial reasons for this may be cited.

First, the role in question is only one of several in which each individual is involved. Though the expectations for each may be identical with respect to *this* role, the total role systems would only in a limiting case be identical. In each case then the particular role must fit into a different total system of role expectations. Since all the different roles in which an individual is involved are interdependent in his motivational system, the combination of motivational elements which produces the uniform behavior will be different for different personalities.

Secondly, role-involvements do not exhaust the orientation or interest system of any personality. He has internal or “narcissistic” and individually creative foci of interest, and orientations to nonsocial aspects of his situation. Again, for two different personalities only in a limiting case would these non-social aspects of the total orientation system be identical. Since this non-social sector of his personality is interdependent with the social sector, differences in this realm would have repercussions in the field of social motivation. Finally, third, there is every reason to believe that it is strictly impossible for the distribution of constitutional differences in the population of a complex social system to correspond directly with the distribution of roles. Therefore, the *relation* between the constitutional basis of role-behavior and the overt behavior will be different with different individuals in the same role. Fulfillment of a given set of expectations will impose a greater “strain” on one actor than on another.

For all these reasons and possibly others, it is not possible to infer directly back and forth from personality structure to role behavior. The uniformities of role behavior as well as their differentiations are problematical even *given* the personality constitutions of the participants in the social system. Analysis of the motivational dynamics of role behavior therefore implies the formulation of mechanisms specific to the *sociological* problem level. It is not possible simply to “extrapolate” from the personality mechanisms of the one to those of the many as participants in the social system. This circumstance introduces frightful complications into the task of the sociologist, but unfortunately its implications cannot be evaded.

These considerations should not, however, give the impression that what are ordinarily called “psychological” concepts have no relevance to sociological theory. Just what the scope of the term psychological should be is a question discussion of which may be deferred to the final

chapter. But it is of the greatest importance that *motivational* categories should play a central role in sociological theory. Essentially the dynamic elements of personalities and of social systems are made up of the same “stuff”. This material must, however, conceptually be differently organized for the purposes of analysis of the two types of system.

V.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE SOCIAL SYSTEM: EMPIRICAL DIFFERENTIATION AND VARIATION IN THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIETIES

THE classification presented in the last section of the foregoing chapter brings us a long step nearer to the possibility of treating systematically the concrete structure of societies in terms of the internal differentiations in the structure of any particular society and the ranges of variability between societies. At this point, however, we encounter a serious difficulty. From a certain abstract theoretical point of view a systematic treatment of these problems could only be attained by methodically spelling out all the logically possible permutations and combinations of all the elements which have been distinguished in the outline of points of reference, or which could be derived by further subdivision of the categories.

Certainly, far more work along these lines should be carefully and systematically undertaken than has so far been the case. Such an undertaking is, however, far beyond the possible scope of the present work. Many particular phases of it will prove to be of great importance in connection with the solution of problems in more specialized fields of sociology. We do not, however, propose to attempt to carry such structural morphology farther here. Before leaving the treatment of social structure as such it will, however, prove useful and illuminating to attempt to short-cut this process by mobilizing available empirical and theoretical knowledge to give some indications of the main lines of internal differentiation and comparative variability of types of social structure.

There are two devices by which we can attempt to take such a short cut. The first is by applying the broad classificatory scheme we have developed to the assessment of the significance of certain empirical uniformities which are fairly well established in sociology. The essential point is that in certain crucial areas of social structure we do not find that

empirically observable structures cover anything like the whole range or theoretically possible variability; possible, that is, according to purely logical permutations and combinations of structural components. Actual structures are, rather, concentrated in empirical “clusterings”. In the first section of this chapter we will review certain highlights of evidence for the special importance of four such clusterings, those 1) of kinship, control of sex relations and socialization, 2) of the organization of instrumental achievement roles and stratification, 3) of the relation between power, force and territoriality, and 4) of the relation of the paramount integration of value-orientations to cognitive orientations and certain problems of personality adjustment in “religion”.

If the existence of such clusterings can be validated, even only in a rather rough way, this validation serves a two-fold purpose for the sociologist. On the one hand it justifies his short-cutting investigation of the *whole* range of structural possibilities and concentrating on a fraction of them; thus it enormously simplifies arriving at least at a first approximation of a systematic classification of empirically significant ranges of differentiation and structural variation of societies. On the other hand, it can serve as a highly important lead into the formulation, and hence testing, of fundamental dynamic generalizations, of laws of social process, since the explanation of *why* the logically possible range of variability is empirically restricted can be found only in terms of such laws.

The second short cut involves making use of certain of the positive theoretical results of the foregoing analysis. The whole nature of the theory of action in general, and hence of the theory of social systems, as here developed, is such that precisely with respect to variability of structure, patterns of value-orientation as the focus of institutionalization, *must* play a crucial role...

§ SOME EMPIRICAL CLUSTERINGS OF THE STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS.

1. *Kinship Systems*

FROM a purely taxonomic point of view any considerable prominence of kinship in social structures generally would seem highly problematical. Elaborate as the classification under the first heading in the scheme presented in the last chapter, Categorization of Objects, was,

it got only so far as to *name* the principal ascriptive foci of a kinship system, namely sex, age and biological relatedness, without developing a classification under each or showing how they were combined, to say nothing of developing a classification of types of kinship structure themselves.

In other words, kinship in terms of the possible combinations of the general structural elements of social systems has a high degree of specificity. *The fact that kinship looms large in every known society* means that a great many other logically possible permutations of the structural elements have either been eliminated or relegated to secondary positions in the social structure. This calls for explanation.

But not only do kinship systems, that is, prominent groupings in a population constituted on the basis of biological relatedness, exist but certain further general facts are highly significant. The first of these is that membership in a kinship unit and status within it is universally the primary mode of initial status ascription of the new-born infant in all known societies. Following this, a highly significant part of the socialization process almost always occurs within the kinship unit, with kinship personalities serving as strategically important socializing agents. Thus, just as initial status is ascribed by birth in a kinship unit and relations to the rest of the social structure are initially mediated only through relation of that unit as a unit to the outside society, so child-care is a function every-where ascribed to kinship units, and to various statuses within them. Details vary, especially the incidence of other agencies such as organs of "formal education" and various others such as health care, out the central fact remains.

Third, *there is a universal relation between kinship structures and the regulation of erotic relations between the sexes. It is universally true that there is a taboo on incest, namely that sexual relations as well as intermarriage are, for at least the vast majority of the population, except for spouses forbidden within the conjugal family*, and often within larger kinship units. It is unusual for the legitimacy of sexual relations to be confined to the marriage relationship, but there is *never* lack of discrimination with regard to sexual access to married persons; their spouses always have defined sexual privileges, and post marital sexual relations outside are most generally rather narrowly restricted both by eligibility of partners and by occasion.

Finally, kinship units themselves, in spite of their many variations, fall within a narrow sector of the total range of structural variability of types of collectivities. In pattern variable terms, roles within them are always functionally diffuse and collectivity-oriented. Their constitution on the basis of biological relatedness precludes the primacy of universalistic orientations, and narrowly limits the relevance of achievement patterns, at least as criteria of membership, to the marriage selection process...

The most fundamental considerations probably have to do with the consequences of the plasticity, sensitivity and dependency of the human infant and with certain closely associated features of the place of "sex" in the need-structure of the human personality. Presumably there is continuity from sub-human origins in one critical respect, namely the centering of the earliest child-care on the mother. This fact, plus the disabilities of pregnancy and the fact that only recently has other than breast-feeding become widely feasible, lie at the basis of the differentiation of sex roles.

It seems, then, that the *personality of the human infant has always developed in the context of certain crucially important early attachments, that to the mother looming by far the largest*. Whatever the importance of these facts for the general possibilities of personality development, it seems that they are crucial for the perpetuation of kinship as a central focus of social structure.

The most essential point is that the child grows up with a deeply rooted need for adult attachments which can serve as substitutes for his infantile attachments. Furthermore, this attachment system comes to be structured along the axis of sex discrimination. Surely, in spite of the apparently very great institutional plasticity of erotic need-structures, the great regularity with which homosexuality is tabooed, or at most permitted within very narrow limits, is a further fact which deserves to be ranked with those of initial status ascription, that of childcare and the regulation of heterosexual relations as a central social uniformity. One essential point, then, is above all that the child has his erotic development channeled in the direction of normal heterosexuality and that this includes not only needs for erotic gratification in a specific sense, but for the placing at least of *some* erotic gratifications in the context of a diffuse heterosexual attachment. A stable attachment of a man to a woman with inclusion of sexual relations taken for granted, almost automatically

results in a family. If this happens, the forces tending to integrate the child into the same unit are very powerful indeed.

It is a highly open question how far the human family has an “instinctive” basis. However, that may be, there is a powerful complex of forces on the action level which, once the family is given, tends to perpetuate it. The essential point is that the conditions of socialization within a kinship unit predispose the child to assume both marital and parental roles at the relevant stage of his own life cycle. It is by no means out of the question that this basic complex of social structures and motivational forces should sometime be broken. Our knowledge is not yet sufficient to be able to say in much detail what the conditions necessary to break out of it would be, nor what would be its effects on personality and social structure. But, in spite of the enormous and nightly significant variability of kinship structure itself, the persistence of the kinship complex throughout the range of variability of social structures in other respects is indicative of a powerful combination of forces.

The most recent large-scale demonstration of its power is the case of Soviet Russia. There is nothing in Marxist ideology in favor of preservation of the family; indeed, the balance is strongly the other way. In the early days of the revolution, it was taken for granted that the family was mainly a “bourgeois prejudice” and was in process of immediately “withering away”. Then came a very powerful reaction so that in legislative terms a far stricter level of official enforcement of family obligation than in most Western countries emerged. A possible set of forces operating to bring this about may be suggested, along with whatever may have seemed “good policy” to the top leadership.

The basic need-disposition structure on which motivation for the familial roles of adults is built up is developed in the context of childhood attachments. Ambivalence relative to these attachments is, of course, the rule though varying in intensity. The revolutionary situation may well have given opportunity for expression of the negative side of the ambivalence. But it is well known that in situations of acute psychological insecurity there is a strong tendency to regression. A revolutionary period certainly creates a great deal of insecurity. It may well be, therefore, that the resurgence of a demand for, or at least a toleration of, strict family morality, involved a widespread regression to attachment needs with high security values. This interpretation, if correct, would illustrate the

difficulty of “abolishing” such a deep-rooted complex of role-orientations as those underlying the place of kinship structures in societies.

2. *Instrumental Achievement Structures and Stratification*

A second principal clustering, which limits the variation of structures which might otherwise be formally possible, is that of the relation of instrumental complexes to stratification. The essential fact here seems to be that there are rather sharp limits to the independent variability of the instrumental structure and the distribution of facilities, on the one hand, the distribution of *rewards* on the other. The actual variability, that is, occurs within a “band” which is considerably narrower than the range of logically possible permutations and combinations.

The more “strung out” dimension of this band is the degree to which instrumental orientations are segregated out from fusions with expressive orientations and are differentiated. On this continuum, *the modern Western type of occupational role structure stands near the pole of maximum segregation, while the situation characteristic of so many non-literate societies, where the over-whelming proportion of instrumental functions is carried out in kinship roles, stands close to the opposite pole.* This is, to be sure, a highly significant range of variability in social structures and the differences along it are fundamental in a whole series of respects. But the “band” is relatively narrow. This is a way of saying in figurative terms that there is not very much variability along another dimension. *This dimension is the matter of the degree of independence of instrumental role allocation and hence distribution of facilities from prestige distribution, or allocation of rewards. Whatever the type of structure with regard to fusions and segregations, and the degree of functional differentiation of roles, these two tend to go hand in hand, to be closely integrated with each other.*

There are two primary aspects of this integration. The first concerns problems internal to a universalistic, functionally specific, and *affectively neutral sub-system of instrumental orientations.* Here the *relational* reward system consists primarily of approval and esteem and their obverses disapproval and disesteem, and the distribution of non-social reward-objects in accordance with their symbolic relations to an approval-esteem scale. The second concerns the response and love aspects of the reward system and its relation to the instrumental

complex. The significance of kinship in this latter context is, because of the considerations just outlined, so great that it is above all a question of the relations between the instrumental complex and the family.

First, within the instrumental complex itself. With the elaboration of *the division of labor* there is an inherent tendency to differentiate along two axes both of which have inferiority-superiority implications. *In the first place, achievement values cannot mean anything at all if there is no discrimination between doing things "well" and doing them "badly".* The capacity to do things *relativity* "well" (which is always at least implicitly a comparative judgment, relative to other actors) may be called "competence" or "skill". With any at all elaborate system of the division of labor there will inevitably be a considerable range of differentiation of levels of competence, especially when a system of different technical roles and not just one such role is considered.

Secondly, beyond rather elementary levels, instrumental role-differentiation requires organization. Organization in turn differentiates roles along the axis of "responsibility" for the affairs of the collectivity. It seems to be one of the best attested empirical generalizations of social science that every continuous organization which involves at all complex cooperative processes, is significantly differentiated along this axis, informally if not formally.

It goes almost without saying that the imperatives of effectiveness demand that with differentials of competence and of responsibility there should go differentials in facilities. It would clearly not be efficient to place the best tools in the hands of the least efficient workers in order to compensate them for their lower efficiency status, still less perhaps to entrust the most important facilities to those carrying the least responsibility. The latter is indeed strictly impossible because of the relational component in facilities themselves. Thus the "connections" necessary to adjust an organization to its social situation, can only serve this function if they are accessible to those exercising responsibility. *There is, therefore, an inherent tendency to allocate greater facilities to those on the higher levels of competence and responsibility.*

This tendency is *both* a functional imperative of effectiveness and efficiency of instrumental structures, and an inherent implication of the valuation of instrumental achievement. But the valuation of instrumental achievement itself means that achieving higher levels of competence

and/or responsibility and having larger facilities at one's command are in themselves rewards, and rewards which are inherently differential. It is literally impossible to have an instrumental system sanctioned by the valuation of achievement without the internal differentiation of the role and facility structure coming also to be a differentiation of rewards, an internal stratification. This conclusion follows directly from the fundamental theorem of institutional integration or motivation presented in Chapter II.

The only way to avoid this would be to suppress the valuation of the differences of competence or responsibility, including denial of their functional relevance. Here again the history of Soviet Russia is instructive. Marxist ideology, including Lenin's own statements, did radically deny that any competence above that of the ordinary "worker" was a legitimate basis of differential valuation. But what has happened in fact is that, with the developing industrialization of the Soviet Union, both facilities and rewards have become markedly differentiated, including monetary reward. The fact that the Soviet industrial manager belongs to the "intelligentsia" while his American counterpart is called by Marxists a "capitalist" does not alter the essential structural situation. Both receive rewards greatly in excess of those going to ordinary workers. Whether in this respect the equalitarian ideal of communism will be realized in the future remains to be seen. Perhaps a sociologist is at least entitled to be skeptical.

This, of course, does not in the least mean that there is no room for variability in the relations between instrumental complexes and reward systems. There is very considerable room, but the fact remains that the "band" is far narrower than the permutations and combinations of the structural elements of such systems would by themselves lead us to believe had to be the case.

But this is not all. The same individual actor who is the incumbent of instrumentally oriented, e.g., occupational roles, also has certain expressive needs which are not gratified in that role. He is above all incorporated into other role systems where immediate gratifications and diffuse attachments and loyalties to individuals loom large. The relative exclusion of such orientations from an occupational role system is itself a prerequisite of the latter developing to a high degree of elaboration.

This is the essential basis for the segregation of kinship and occupational roles in “industrial” societies. But no such society so far known has shown strong signs of eliminating the kinship unit entirely or for a long period — as we illustrated by the case of Soviet Russia. In view of these facts, it is not conceivable that, so long as there is a kinship structure, it should be totally unintegrated with the occupational structure. This interaction above all concerns its relation to the reward system. The solidarity of the kinship unit is of such a character that if certain facilities and rewards are available to one member, they will have to be “shared” with the other members. It is strictly inconceivable that most of the men highly placed in the occupational sphere, should fail to share what their incomes can buy, with their families if they have them, and perhaps still more fundamental, that they should not share their prestige. So long, that is, as there is a solidary kinship unit, it is impossible for the wives and children of those high and low in the occupational system to be equally treated, *regardless of their personal achievements*.

In other words, these two basic components of the reward system of the society, occupational approval or esteem and the symbolic accoutrements thereof, and “emotional security”, love and response in the kinship unit, must go together in some way. The consequence of this is that the combination of an occupationally differentiated industrial system and a significantly solidary kinship system must be a system of stratification in which the children of the more highly placed come to have differential advantages, by virtue of their ascribed kinship status, not shared by those lower down. Again, this generalization is amply confirmed by the history of Soviet Russia. It is conceivable that this empirical generalization will someday be invalidated for instance by elimination of the kinship unit. But in the light of the historical persistence of this clustering, the question of *how* this would be possible is sharply posed.

If what has just been said is true of “industrial” societies, how much more so in the cases closer to the “fusion” end of the continuum referred to above. Indeed, it can safely be said that in such societies, anything even closely approaching “equality of opportunity” to the degree to which that is characteristic of modern industrial societies, is out of the question. But unless the need for kinship solidarities can be radically reduced below, for instance, the present American level, there is an inherent limit to the development, not only of egalitarian societies, but even of complete equality of opportunity.

3. Territoriality, Force and the Integration of the Power System

A third very central empirical clustering in social systems concerns the power system. We have already shown the way in which instrumental orientations, through the relational focus of facilities, tend to focus on power as a proximate goal and how, since *facilities and rewards* are so intimately connected, and the power of one actor is *always* relative to that of another, power *can readily become the focus of disruptive conflicts*. Finally, it was also shown that *force in one primary context, namely that of the prevention of undesired action, is an ultimately effective means, and force is inherently linked to territorial location because it is a physical means*.

This complex of facts is of such critical functional significance to social systems that it is safe to say that no paramount integrative structure of a society could perform that function effectively unless it were intimately tied in with the control of power relations in general and force in particular. No society can subsist unless there is a basis for “counting on” some control of the use of force, and unless disruptive conflicts which inevitably become “struggles for power” tending by progression along the gradient of resort to increasingly drastic means to eventuate in resort to force, are kept within bounds. If it is a partial social system which is in question an essential part of the problem of its relation to the society is that of its place in the power system.

Certain types of integrative structure are, of course, very directly organized about these foci. The ideal type of case is what we refer to as the state, which is the equivalent for this area of the social structure of the kinship system and the system of stratification for the other two. There is a very wide range of variability with respect to the extent to which such a differentiated structure emerges. Among other things it is a function of the level of organization of the use of force, and of course its technology. This in turn is connected with the level of technology and organization in general — if there is a highly developed occupational system it is always possible that the organizational patterns which characterize it can be applied to organization of the use of force. We may say that the higher the level of organization the more potentially disruptive violent conflict can become, and therefore the greater the functional need for its control. But in any case, force must be territorially organized. It is not possible

to have a variety of different jurisdictions commanding force within the same territory without definition of their limits.

One concrete illustration of the importance of these considerations may be given. There seem to be certain elements of inherent instability in societies where the overwhelming bulk of the population is organized on the basis of peasant village communities. One of the reasons for this is the fact that the village community as the primary focus of solidarity can only within very narrow limits be an effective unit for the organization of the use of force. It is, in the face of any more extensive organization, not a defensible unit. Hence there must always be a “superstructure” over a peasant society, which, among other things, organizes and stabilizes the use of force. The question is how far such a superstructure is, as it were, “organically” integrated with the self-contained village communities and often the level of integration is not high. This circumstance is of great significance for the history of China, and, for example, of Eastern Europe. Among many other things it has much to do with the striking fact that the Communist movement has had so much more success in peasant societies than in industrialized societies, which have a much firmer structure between the lowest level community unit and the paramount integration of the power system.

We may conclude, then, that societies where there is almost unrestricted freedom to resort to force, and above all where several agencies with independent control of organized force operate within the same territorial area, are as rare as societies where children are socialized without any reference to kinship relations or where the reward system is in inverse relation to the gradations of competence and responsibility in the principal areas of valued achievement.

4. *Religion and Value-Integration*

A fourth empirical clustering may be briefly delineated. In the first place there are certain types of situation of human life in any society which, though varying in specific structure, incidence and intensity in different societies have certain universal features. There is the limitation of the human life span and the universal experience of death, especially of premature death, not only as an expectation for the person who knows he is going to the, *but as posing a problem of emotional adjustment to the survivors. The crucial significance of attachments to human individuals is such that death cannot be treated with indifference.*

Secondly, whatever the value system institutionalized in a society, the realization of the expectations which it defines is necessarily to some degree both uncertain and uneven. In part this results from the exposure of men to an external nature which is capricious and in some respects “unfriendly” in relation to human interests — the vagaries of the weather constitute one prominent example. But more fundamentally it results from the empirical impossibility of complete integration of any value-system with the realistic conditions of action. Every social run is in some degree malintegrated, which means that there is as a problem of the discrepancy between institutionally legitimized expectations and the actual outcome of events. There is always a problem of what attitude should be taken to what in terms of the current value system is undeserved suffering, and to the actual existence of unpunished behavior in contravention of the moral norms of the society, the “problem of evil”. *The moral economy of a human society never has perfectly balanced books.*

From what we know of the psychology of expectations and the consequences of frustration, it is clear that there are difficult problems of adjustment in these areas. Just as it is not possible to be indifferent to the death of an object of intense attachment, so it is not possible simply to take the frustration of one’s fundamental expectations with respect to values, as to what, for example, is fair, “*in one’s stride*” as it were, saying, “*what the hell*”. It is therefore imperative that there be some sort of socially structured orientation to these problems of discrepancy precisely between events and *institutionalized* expectations...

...That such situations should continually arise is indicated by evidence which will be presented later that there are strong forces in all social systems making for commitment to “utopian” patterns of value-orientation, that is, patterns which are incompatible with the known conditions of effective long-run institutionalization. Thus, it seems fair to say that in contemporary society advocacy of complete abolition of the family, of absolute egalitarianism or of absolute repudiation of coercion, can be placed in this category.

**From: Parsons, Talcott. (1961)
“An outline of the Social System”**

from Talcott Parsons, Edward A. Shils, Kaspar D. Naegle, and Jesse R. Pitts (eds.),
Theories of Society. – New York: Simon Schuster, The Free Press.,
Pp. 22-29; 105-115; 421-440).

Regarding seminar 8: Social Knowledge and Established Philosophical Criticism.

Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari
Anti-Oedipus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia.

3. SAVAGES, BARBARIANS, CIVILIZED MEN

Translated by Robert Hurley and Mark Seem.

I. The Inscribing Socius

If the universal comes at the end — the body without organs and desiring-production — under the conditions determined by an apparently victorious capitalism, where do we find enough innocence for generating universal history? *Desiring-production also exists from the beginning: there is desiring-production from the moment there is social production and reproduction.* But in a very precise sense it is true that precapitalist social machines are inherent in desire: they code it, they code the flows of desire. *To code desire — and the fear, the anguish of decoded flows — is the business of the socius.* As we shall see, capitalism is the only social machine that is constructed on the basis of decoded flows, substituting for intrinsic codes an axiomatic of abstract quantities in the form of money. Capitalism therefore liberates the flows of desire, but under the social conditions that define its limit and the possibility of its own dissolution, so that it is constantly opposing with all its exasperated strength the movement that drives it toward this limit. At capitalism's limit the deterritorialized socius gives way to the body without organs, and the decoded flows throw themselves into desiring-production. *Hence it is correct to retrospectively understand all history in the light of capitalism,* provided that the rules formulated by Marx are followed exactly.

First of all, universal history is the history of contingencies, and not the history of necessity. Ruptures and limits, and not continuity. For great accidents were necessary, and amazing encounters that could have happened elsewhere, or before, or might never have happened, in order for the flows to escape coding and, escaping, to nonetheless fashion a new machine bearing the determinations of the capitalist socius. Thus, the encounter between private property and commodity production, which presents itself, however, as two quite distinct forms of decoding,

by privatization and by abstraction. Or, from the viewpoint of private property itself, the encounter between flows of convertible wealth owned by capitalists and a flow of workers possessing nothing more than their labor capacity* (here again, two distinct forms of deterritorialization). In a sense, capitalism has haunted all forms of society, but it haunts them as their terrifying nightmare, it is the dread they feel of a flow that would elude their codes. Then again, if we say that capitalism determines the conditions and the possibility of a universal history, this is true only insofar as capitalism has to deal essentially with its own limit, its own destruction — as Marx says, insofar as it is capable of self-criticism (at least to a certain point: the point where the limit appears, in the very movement that counteracts the tendency).* In a word, universal history is not only retrospective, it is also contingent, singular, ironic, and critical.

The earth is the primitive, savage unity of desire and production. For the earth is not merely the multiple and divided object of labor, it is also the unique, indivisible entity, the full body that falls back on the forces of production and appropriates them for its own as the natural or divine precondition. While the ground can be the productive element and the result of appropriation, the Earth is the great ungendered stasis, the element superior to production that conditions the common appropriation and utilization of the ground. It is the surface on which the whole process of production is inscribed, on which the forces and means of labor are recorded, and the agents and the products distributed. It appears here as the quasi cause of production and the object of desire (it is on the earth that desire becomes bound to its own repression).

The *territorial machine* is therefore the first form of socius, the machine of primitive inscription, the “megamachine” that covers a social

* *force de travail*. Here we have followed Martin Nicolaus’s translation of Marx’s *Grundrisse* in translating this Marxian term as “labor capacity” instead of “labor power”. (*Translators’ note*.)

* Marx, *Grundrisse* (see reference note 63), pp. 104-108. Maurice Godelier comments: “The West’s line of development, far from being universal because it will recur everywhere, appears universal because it recurs nowhere else. ... It is typical therefore because, in its singular progress, it has obtained a universal result. It has furnished a practical base (industrial economy) and a theoretical conception (socialism) that permit it to leave behind, and to cause all other societies to leave behind, the most ancient and the most recent forms of exploitation of man by man. . . The authentic universality of the West’s line of development lies therefore in its singularity, in its difference, not in its resemblance to the other lines of evolution”. (Godelier [see reference note 47], pp. 92-96).

field. It is not to be confused with technical machines. In its simplest, so-called manual forms, the technical machine already implies an acting, a transmitting, or even a driving element that is nonhuman, and that extends man's strength and allows for a certain disengagement from it. The social machine, in contrast, has men for its parts, even if we view them *with* their machines, and integrate them, internalize them in an institutional model at every stage of action, transmission, and motricity. *Hence the social machine fashions a memory without which there would be no synergy of man and his (technical) machines.* The latter do not in fact contain the conditions for the reproduction of their process; they point to the social machines that condition and organize them, but also limit and inhibit their development. It will be necessary to await capitalism to find a semiautonomous organization of technical production that tends to appropriate memory and reproduction, and thereby modifies the forms of the exploitation of man; but as a matter of fact, this organization presupposes a dismantling of the great social machines that preceded it.

The same machine can be both technical and social, but only when viewed from different perspectives: *for example, the clock as a technical machine for measuring uniform time, and as a social machine for reproducing canonic hours and for assuring order in the city.* When Lewis Mumford coins the word "megamachine" to designate the social machine as a collective entity, he is literally correct (although he limits its application to the barbarian despotic institution): "If, more or less in agreement with Reuleaux's classic definition, one can consider the machine to be the combination of solid elements, each having its specialized function and operating under human control in order to transmit a movement and perform a task, then the human machine was indeed a true machine". The social machine is literally a machine, irrespective of any metaphor, inasmuch as it exhibits an immobile motor and undertakes a variety of interventions: flows are set apart, elements are detached from a chain, and portions of the tasks to be performed are distributed. Coding the flows implies all these operations.

This is the social machine's supreme task, inasmuch as the apportioning of production corresponds to extractions from the chain, resulting in a residual share for each member, in a global system of desire and destiny that organizes the productions of production, the productions of recording, and the productions of consumption. Flows of women

and children, flows of herds and of seed, sperm flows, flows of shit, menstrual flows: nothing must escape coding. The primitive territorial machine, with its immobile motor, the earth, is already a social machine, a megamachine, that codes the (flows of production, the flows of means of production, of producers and consumers: the full body of the goddess Earth gathers to itself the cultivable species, the agricultural implements, and the human organs)...

The primitive territorial machine codes flows, invests organs, and marks bodies. To such a degree that circulating — exchanging — is a secondary activity in comparison with the task that sums up all the others: marking bodies, which are the earth's products. The essence of the recording, inscribing socius, insofar as it lays claim to the productive forces and distributes the agents of production, resides in these operations: tattooing, excising, incising, carving, scarifying, mutilating, encircling, and initiating. Nietzsche thus defined the “*morality of mores* – the labor performed by man upon himself during the greater part of the existence of the human race, his entire *prehistoric* labor”, a system of evaluations possessing the force of law concerning the various members and parts of the body. Not only is the criminal deprived of organs according to a regime (*order*) of collective investments; not only is the one who has to be eaten, eaten according to social rules as exact as those followed in carving up and apportioning a steer; but the man who enjoys the full exercise of his rights and duties has his whole body marked under a regime that consigns his organs and their exercise to the collectivity (the privatization of the organs will only begin with “the shame felt by man *at the sight of man*”). For it is a founding act — that the organs be hewn into the socius, and that the flows run over its surface — through which man ceases to be a biological organism and becomes a full body, an earth, to which his organs become attached, where they are attracted, repelled, miraculated, following the requirements of a socius. Nietzsche says: it is a matter of creating a memory for man; and man, who was constituted by means of an active faculty of forgetting (*oublie*), by means of a repression of biological memory, must create *another* memory, one that is collective, a memory of words (*paroles*) and no longer a memory of things, a memory of signs and no longer of effects. This organization, which traces its signs directly on the body, constitutes a system of cruelty, a terrible alphabet. “Perhaps indeed there was nothing more fearful and

uncanny in the whole prehistory of man than his *mnemotechnics* (...) Man could never do without blood, torture, and sacrifices when he felt the need to create a memory for himself; the most dreadful sacrifices and pledges (...), the most repulsive mutilations (...), the cruelest rites of all the religious cults . . . one has only to look at our former codes of punishments to understand what effort it costs on this earth to breed a “nation of thinkers”!”

Cruelty has nothing to do with some ill-defined or natural violent, that might be commissioned to explain the history of mankind; *cruelty is the movement of culture that is realized in bodies and inscribed on them, belaboring them*. That is what cruelty means. This culture is not the movement of ideology, on the contrary, *it forcibly injects production into desire, and conversely, it forcibly inserts desire into social production and reproduction. For even death, punishment, and torture are desired, and are instances of production (compare the history of fatalism)*. It makes men or their organs into the parts and wheels of the social machine. The sign is a position of desire; but the first signs are the territorial signs that plant their flags in bodies. And if one wants to call *this inscription in naked flesh* “writing”, then it must be said that speech in fact presupposes writing, and that it is this cruel system of inscribed signs that renders man capable of language and gives him a memory of the spoken word.

II. Oedipus at Last

In the territorial or even the despotic machine, social economic reproduction is never independent of human reproduction, of the social form of this reproduction. The family is therefore an open praxis, a strategy that is coextensive with the social field; the relations of filiation and alliance are determinant, or rather “determined as dominant”. As a matter of fact, what is marked or inscribed on the socius — directly — is the producers (or nonproducers) according to the standing of their family or their standing inside the family. The reproduction process is not directly economic but passes by way of the noneconomic factors of kinship. This is true not only with respect to the territorial machine, and to local groups that determine the place of each member in social economic reproduction, according to one’s status from the standpoint of the alliances and the filiations, but also with respect to the despotic machine, which adds the relations of the new alliance and direct filiation

to the old alliance and filiations (whence the role of the sovereign's family in despotic overcoding, and that of the "dynasty" — whatever its mutations, its indecisions — which are inscribed under the same category of new alliance).

The process by no means remains the same in the capitalist system. Representations no longer relates to distinct object, but to productive activity itself. The socius as full body has become directly economic as capital-money; it does not tolerate any other preconditions. What is inscribed or marked is no longer the producers or nonproducers, but the forces and means of production as abstract quantities that become effectively concrete in their becoming related or their conjunction: labor capacity or capital, constant capital or variable capital, capital of filiation or capital of alliance. Capital has taken upon itself the relations of alliance and filiation. There ensues a privatization of the family according to which the family ceases to give its social form to economic reproduction: it is as though disinvested, placed outside the field; in the language of Aristotle, the family is now simply the form of human matter or material that finds itself subordinated to the autonomous social form of economic reproduction, and that comes to take the place assigned it by the latter. That is to say that the elements of production and anti-production are not reproduced in the same way as humans themselves but find in them a simple material that the form of economic reproduction reorganizes in a mode that is entirely distinct from the form this material has as human reproduction. Precisely because it is privatized, placed outside the field, the form of the material or the form of human reproduction begets people whom one can readily assume to be all equal in relation to one another; but inside the field itself, the form of social economic reproduction has already preformed the form of the material so as to engender, there where they are needed, *the* capitalist as a function derived from capital, and *the* worker as a function derived from labor capacity, etc., in such a way that the family finds itself countersected by the order of classes. (In this sense, indeed, segregation is the only origin of equality).

This placing of the family outside the social field is also its greatest social fortune. For it is the condition under which the entire social field can be *applied* to the family. Individual persons are social persons first of all, i.e., functions derived from the abstract quantities; they become concrete in the becoming-related or the axiomatic of these

quantities, in their conjunction. They are nothing more nor less than configurations or images produced by the points-signs, the breaks-flows, the pure “figures” of capitalism; the capitalist as personified capital — i.e., as a function derived from the flow of capital; and the worker as personified labor capacity — i.e., a function derived from the flow of labor. In this way capitalism fills its field of immanence with images: even destitution, despair, revolt — and on the other side, the violence and the oppression of capital — become images of destitution, despair, revolt, violence, or oppression. But starting from nonfigurative figures or from the breaks-flows that produce them, these images will themselves be capable of figuring and reproducing only by shaping a human material whose specific form of reproduction falls outside the social field that nonetheless determines this form. Private persons are therefore images of the second order, images of images — that is, *simulacra* that are thus endowed with an aptitude for representing the first-order images of social persons. These private persons are formally delimited in the locus of the restricted family as father, mother, child. But instead of being a strategy that, through the action of alliances and filiations, opens onto the entire social field, is coextensive with it, and countersects its co-ordinates, it would appear that the family is now merely a simple tactic around which the social field recloses, to which it applies its autonomous requirements of reproduction, and that it counteracts with all its dimensions. The alliances and filiations no longer pass-through people but through money; so the family becomes a microcosm, suited to expressing what it no longer dominates. In a certain sense the situation has not changed; for what is invested through the family is still the economic, political, and cultural social field, its breaks and flows. Private persons are an illusion, images of images or derivatives of derivatives. But in another sense, everything has changed, because the family, instead of constituting and developing the dominant factors of social reproduction, is content to apply and envelop these factors in its own mode of reproduction. Father, mother, and child thus become the simulacrum of the images of capital (“Mister Capital, Madame Earth”, and their child the Worker), with the result that these images are no longer recognized at all in the desire that is determined to invest only their simulacrum. The familial determinations become the application of the social axiomatic.

The family becomes the sub-aggregate to which the whole of the social field is applied. Since *each person* has his own private father and mother, it is a distributive sub-aggregate that simulates for each person the collective whole of social persons and that closes off his domain and scrambles his images. Everything is reduced to the father-mother-child triangle, which reverberates the answer “daddy-mommy” every time it is stimulated by the images of capital. In short, Oedipus arrives: it is born in the capitalist system of the application of first-order social images to the private familial images of the second order. It is the aggregate of destination that corresponds to an aggregate of departure that is socially determined. It is our intimate colonial formation that corresponds to the form of social sovereignty. We are all little colonies, and it is Oedipus that colonizes us. When the family ceases to be a unit of production and of reproduction, when the conjunction again finds in the family the meaning of a simple unit of consumption, it is father-mother that we consume. In the aggregate of departure there is the boss, the foreman, the priest, the tax collector, the cop, the soldier, the worker, all the machines and territorialities, all the social images of our society; but in the aggregate of destination, in the end, there is no longer anyone but daddy, mommy, and me, the despotic sign inherited by daddy, the residual territoriality assumed by mommy, and the divided, split, castrated ego. Isn't this operation of flattening, folding, or application what leads Lacan to say, willingly betraying the secret of psycho-analysis as an applied axiomatic: what appears to “come most freely into play in what is called the analytic dialogue, in fact depends on a sub-foundation that is perfectly reducible to a few essential and formalizable articulations”. Everything is pre-formed, arranged in advance. The social field, where everyone acts and is acted upon (*patit*) as a collective agent of enunciation, an agent of production and anti-production, is reduced to Oedipus, where everyone now finds himself cornered and cut along the line that divides him into an individual subject of the statement and an individual subject of enunciation. The subject of the statement is the social person, and the subject of enunciation, the private person. “So” it's your father, so it's your mother, so it's you: the familial conjunction results from the capitalist conjunctions, insofar as they are applied to private persons. Daddy-mommy-me — one is sure to re-encounter them everywhere, since everything has been applied to them. The reign of images is the

new way in which capitalism utilizes the schizzes and diverts the flows: composite images, images flattened onto other images, so that when this operation reaches its outcome the little ego of each person, related to its father-mother, is truly the center of the world. Much more underhanded than the subterranean reign of the fetishes of the earth, or the celestial reign of the despot's idols, is the advent of the Oedipal-narcissistic machine: "No more glyphs and hieroglyphs, we'll have the real objective reality . . . our Kodak-vision. ... To every man, to every woman, the universe is just a setting to the absolute little picture of himself, herself. ... A picture! A Kodak snap, in a universal film of snaps". Each person as a little triangulated microcosm — the narcissistic ego is identical with the Oedipal subject.

Oedipus at last: in the end it is a very simple operation, one that indeed readily lends itself to formalization, although it involves universal history. We have seen in what sense schizophrenia was the *absolute limit* of every society, inasmuch as it sets in motion decoded and deterritorialized flows that it restores to desiring-production, "at the bounds" of all social production. And capitalism, the *relative limit* of every society, inasmuch as it axiomatizes the decoded flows and reterritorializes the deterritorialized flows. We have also seen that capitalism finds in schizophrenia its own *exterior limit*, which it is continually repelling and exorcising, while capitalism itself produces its *immanent limits*, which it never ceases to displace and enlarge. But capitalism still needs a displaced *interior limit* in another way: precisely in order to neutralize or repel the absolute exterior limit, the schizophrenic limit; it needs to internalize this limit, this time by restricting it, by causing it to pass no longer between social production and the desiring-production that breaks away from social reproduction, but inside social production, between the form of social reproduction and the form of a familial reproduction to which social production is reduced, between the social aggregate and the private sub-aggregate to which the social aggregate is applied.

Oedipus is this displaced or internalized limit where desire lets itself be caught. The Oedipal triangle is the personal and private territoriality that corresponds to all of capitalism's efforts at social reterritorialization. Oedipus was always the displaced limit for every social formation, since it is the displaced represented of desire. But in the primitive formations this limit remains vacant, precisely insofar as the flows are coded and

as the interplay of alliances and filiations keeps families extended according to the scale of the determinations of the social field, preventing any secondary reduction of the latter to the former. In the despotic formations the Oedipal limit is occupied, symbolically occupied but not lived or inhabited, inasmuch as the imperial incest effects an overcoding that in turn surveys the entire social field from above (the repressing representation): the formal operations of flattening, extrapolation, and so on, that later belong to Oedipus, are already sketched out, but within a symbolic space where the object from on high is formed. It is only in the capitalist formation that the Oedipal limit finds itself not only occupied, but inhabited and lived, in the sense in which the social images produced by the decoded flows actually fall back on restricted familial images invested by desire. It is at this point in the Imaginary that Oedipus is constituted, at the same time as it *completes its migration* in the in-depth elements of representation: *the displaced represented has become, as such, the representation of desire*. Hence it goes without saying that this becoming or this constitution does not develop under the categories imagined in the earlier social formation, since the imaginary Oedipus results from such a becoming and not the inverse. It is not via a flow of shit or a wave of incest that Oedipus arrives, but via the decoded flows of capital-money. The waves of incest and shit are only secondary derivatives of the latter, insofar as they transport the private persons to which the flows of capital are reduced or applied. (Which explains the complex origin of the relation that is completely distorted in the psychoanalytic equation, shit — money; in reality, it is a question of encounters or conjunctions, of derivatives and resultants between decoded flows.)

In Oedipus there is a recapitulation of the three states, or the three machines. For Oedipus makes ready in the territorial machine, as an empty unoccupied limit. It takes form in the despotic machine as a symbolically occupied limit. But it is filled and carried to completion only by becoming the imaginary Oedipus of the capitalist machine. The despotic machine preserved the primitive territorialities, and the capitalist machine resuscitates the Urstaat as one of the poles of its axiomatic, it makes the despot into one of its images. That is why Oedipus gathers up everything, everything is found again in Oedipus, which is indeed the result of universal history, but in the singular sense in which capital is already this result. *Fetishes, idols, images, and simulacra* — here we

have the whole series: territorial fetishes, despotic idols or symbols, then everything is recapitulated in the images of capitalism, which shapes and reduces them to the Oedipal simulacrum. The representative of the local group with Laius, the territoriality with Jocasta, the despot with Oedipus himself: “a motley painting of everything that has ever been believed”. It comes as no surprise that Freud looks to Sophocles for the central image of Oedipus-the-despot, the myth become tragedy, in order to make the image radiate in two contrary directions: the ritual primitive direction of *Totem and Taboo*, and the private direction of modern man the dreamer. (Oedipus can be a myth, a tragedy, or a dream: it always expresses the displacement of the limit).

Oedipus would be nothing if the symbolic position of an object from on high, in the despotic machine, did not first make possible the folding and flattening operations that will constitute Oedipus in the modern social field: the triangulation's *cause*.... Whence the two aspects of the signifier: a barred transcendent signifier taken in a maximum that distributes lack, and an immanent system of relations between minimal elements that come to fill the uncovered field (somewhat similar, in traditional terms, to the way one goes from the Parmenidean Being to the atoms of Democritus). A transcendent object that is more and more spiritualized, for a field of forces that is more and more immanent, more and more internalized: this describes the evolution of the infinite debt — through Catholicism, then the Reformation. The extreme spiritualization of the despotic State, and the extreme internalization of the capitalist field, define bad conscience. The latter is not cynicism's contrary; it is, in private persons, the correlate of the cynicism of social persons. All the cynical tactics of bad conscience, just as Nietzsche and then Lawrence and Miller analyzed them to arrive at a definition of civilized European man: the hypnosis and the reign of images, the torpor they spread; the hatred of life and of all that is free, of all that passes and flows; the universal effusion of the death instinct; depression and guilt used as a means of contagion, the kiss of the Vampire: aren't you ashamed to be happy? follow my example, I won't let go before you say, “*It's my fault*”, *O ignoble contagion of the depressives, neurosis as the only illness consisting in making others ill; the permissive structure: let me deceive, rob, slaughter, kill! but in the name of the social order, and so daddy-mommy will be proud of me; the double direction given to resentment,*

the turning back against oneself, and the projection against the Other: the father is dead, it's my fault, who killed him? It's your fault, it's the Jews, the Arabs, the Chinese, all the resources of racism and segregation; the abject desire to be loved, the whimpering at not being loved enough, at not being “understood”, concurrent with the reduction of sexuality to the “dirty little secret”, this whole *priest's psychology* — there is not a single one of these tactics that does not find in Oedipus its land of milk and honey, its good provider. Nor is there a single one of these tactics that does not serve and develop in psycho-analysis, with the latter as the new avatar of the “ascetic ideal”.

Once again, psychoanalysis does not invent Oedipus; it merely provides the latter a last territoriality, the couch, and a last Law, the analyst as despot and money collector. But the mother as the simulacrum of territoriality, and the father as the simulacrum of the despotic Law, with the slashed, split, castrated ego, are the products of capitalism insofar as it engineers an operation that has no equivalent in the other social formations. Everywhere else the familial position is merely a stimulus to the investment of the social field by desire: the familial images function only by opening onto social images to which they become coupled or which they confront in the course of struggles and compromises; so that what is invested through the breaks and segments of families is the economic, political, and cultural breaks of the field into which they are plunged (cf. Ndembu schizophrenia). This is the case even in the peripheral zones of capitalism, where the colonizer's efforts at oedipalizing the indigenous population — African Oedipus — find themselves contradicted by the breakup of the family along the lines of social exploitation and oppression. But it is at the soft center of capitalism, in the temperate zones of the bourgeoisie, that the colony becomes intimate and private, interior to each person: it is there that the flow of the investment of desire, which travels from the familial stimulus to the social organization (or disorganization), is as it were *covered over by a reflux* that flattens the social investment onto the familial investment serving as a pseudo-organizer. The family has become the locus of retention and resonance of all the social determinations. It falls to the reactionary investment of the capitalist field to apply all the social images to the simulacra of the restricted family, with the result that,

wherever one turns, one no longer finds anything but father-mother — this Oedipal filth that sticks to our skin... For the family must appear in two forms: one where doubtless it is guilty, but only in the manner in which the child lives it intensely, internally, and where it is confounded with the child's own guilt; the other where it is a tribunal of responsibility, before which one stands as a guilty child, and in relation to which one becomes a responsible adult (Oedipus as sickness *and* sanity, the family as an alienating factor *and* as an agent of dealienation, if only through the way in which it is reconstituted in the transference). This is what Foucault has shown in his very fine analysis: the familialism inherent in psychoanalysis doesn't so much destroy classical psychiatry as shine forth as the latter's crowning achievement. After the madman of the earth and the madman of the despot comes the madman of the family; what nineteenth-century psychiatry had wanted to organize in the asylum — “the imperative fiction of the family”, Reason-the-father and madness-the-child or minor, the parents who are ill only from their own childhood — all this finds its fulfillment outside the asylum, in psychoanalysis and in the consulting room of the analyst. Freud is the Luther and the Adam Smith of psychiatry. He mobilizes all the resources of myth, of tragedy, of dreams, in order to re-enslave desire, this time from within: *an intimate theater*. Yes, Oedipus is nevertheless the universal of desire, the product of universal history — but on one condition, which is not met by Freud: that Oedipus be capable, at least to a certain point, of conducting its autocritique. Universal history is nothing more than a theology if it does not seize control of the conditions of its contingent, singular existence, its irony, and its own critique. And what are these conditions, this point where the autocritique is possible and necessary? To discover beneath the familial reduction the nature of the social investments of the unconscious. To discover beneath the individual fantasy the nature of group fantasies. Or, what amounts to the same thing, to push the simulacrum to the point where it ceases to be the image of an image, so as to discover the abstract figures, the schizzes-flows that it harbors and conceals...

**From: Deleuze G. and Guattari F. (2009).
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USA, Pp. 139-271.**

Regarding seminar 9: The Issue of Mass Society and Current Cultural Crisis.

Samuel Huntington

The Clash of Civilizations And the remaking of World Order

INTRODUCTION: FLAGS AND CULTURAL IDENTITY

On January 3, 1992 a meeting of Russian and American scholars took place in the auditorium of a government building in Moscow. Two weeks earlier the Soviet Union had ceased to exist and the Russian Federation had become an independent country. As a result, the statue of Lenin which previously graced the stage of the auditorium had disappeared and instead the flag of the Russian Federation was now displayed on the front wall. The only problem, one American observed, was that the flag had been hung upside down. After this was pointed out to the Russian hosts, they quickly and quietly corrected the error during the first intermission.

The years after the Cold War witnessed the beginnings of dramatic changes in peoples' identities and the symbols of those identities. Global politics began to be reconfigured along cultural lines. Upside-down flags were a sign of the transition, but more and more the flags are flying high and true, and Russians and other people are mobilizing and marching behind these and other symbols of their new cultural identities.

On April 18, 1994 two thousand people rallied in Sarajevo waving the flags of Saudi Arabia and Turkey. By flying those banners, instead of U.N. NATO, or American flags, these Sarajevans identified themselves with their fellow Muslims and told the world who were their real and not-so-real friends.

On October 16, 1994 in Los Angeles 70,000 people marched beneath "a sea of Mexican flags" protesting Proposition 187, a referendum measure which would deny many state benefits to illegal immigrants and their children. Why are they "walking down the street with a Mexican flag and demanding that this country give them a tree education?" observers asked — why should be waving, the American flag. "Two weeks later more protestors did march down the street": carrying an American flag-upside down. These flag displays ensured victory for Proposition 187, which was approved by 59 percent of California voters.

In the post-Cold War world flags count and so do other symbols of cultural identity, including crosses, crescents, and even head coverings, because culture counts, and cultural identity is what is most meaningful to most people. People are discovering new but often old identities and marching under new but often old flags which lead to wars with new but often old enemies.

One grim Weltanschauung for this new era was well expressed by the Venetian nationalist demagogue in Michael Oibdin's novel, *Dead Lagoon*: "There can be no true friends without true enemies. Unless we hate what we are not, we cannot love what we are. These are the old truths we are painfully rediscovering after a century and more of sentimental cant. Those who deny them deny their family, their heritage, their culture, their birthright, their very selves!

They will not lightly be forgiven". The unfortunate truth in these old truths cannot be ignored by statesmen and scholars. For peoples seeking identity and reinventing ethnicity, enemies are essential, and the potentially most dangerous enmities occur across the fault lines between the world's major civilizations.

The central theme of this book is that culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world. The five parts of this book elaborate corollaries to this main proposition. Part I: For the first time in history global politics is both multipolar and multicivilizational; modernization is distinct from Westernization and is producing neither a universal civilization in any meaningful sense nor the Westernization of non-Western societies.

Part II: The balance of power among civilizations is shifting: the West is declining in relative influence; Asian civilizations are expanding their economic, military, and political strength; Islam is exploding demographically with destabilizing consequences for Muslim countries and their neighbors; and non-Western civilizations generally are reaffirming the value of their own cultures.

Part III: A civilization-based world order is emerging: societies sharing cultural affinities cooperate with each other; efforts to shift societies from one civilization to another are unsuccessful; and countries group themselves around the lead or core states of their civilization.

Part IV: The West's universalist pretensions increasingly bring it into conflict with other civilizations, most seriously with Islam and China; at the local level fault line wars, largely between Muslims and non-Muslims, generate "kin-country rallying", the threat of broader escalation, and hence efforts by core states to halt these wars.

Part V: *The survival of the West depends on Americans reaffirming their Western identity and Westerners accepting their civilization as unique The New Era in World Politics universal and uniting to renew and preserve it against challenges from non-Western societies. Avoidance of a global war of civilizations depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the multicivilizational character of global politics.*

A MULTIPOLAR, MULTICIVILIZATIONAL WORLD

In the post-Cold War world, for the first time in history, global politics has become multipolar and multicivilizational. During most of human existence, contacts between civilizations were intermittent or nonexistent. Then, with the beginning of the modern era, about A.D. 1500, global politics assumed two dimensions. For over four hundred years, the nation states of the West—Britain, France, Spain, Austria, Prussia, Germany, the United States, and others—constituted a multipolar international system within Western civilization and interacted, competed, and fought wars with each other. At the same time, Western nations also expanded, conquered, colonized, or decisively influenced every other civilization (Map 1.1). During the Cold War global politics became bipolar and the world was divided into three parts. A group of mostly wealthy and democratic societies, led by the United States, was engaged in a pervasive, ideological, political, economic, and, at times, military competition with a group of somewhat poorer communist societies associated with and led by the Soviet Union. Much of this conflict occurred in the Third World outside these, two camps, composed of countries which often were poor, lacked political stability, were recently independent, and claimed to be nonaligned (Map 1.2).

In the late 1980s the communist world collapsed, and the Cold War international system became history. In the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political,

or economic. They are cultural. Peoples and nations are attempting to answer the most basic question humans can face: Who are we? And they are answering that question in the traditional way human beings have answered it, by reference to the things that mean most to them. People define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs, and institutions. They identify with cultural groups: tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations, and, at the broadest level, civilizations. People use politics not just to advance their interests but also to define their identity. We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against.

Nation states remain the principal actors in world affairs. Their behavior is shaped as in the past by the pursuit of power and wealth, but it is also shaped by cultural preferences, commonalities, and differences. The most important groupings of states are no longer the three blocs of the Cold War but rather the world's seven or eight major civilizations (Map 1.3). Non-Western societies, particularly in East Asia, are developing their economic wealth and creating the basis for enhanced military power and political influence. As their power and self-confidence increase, non-Western societies increasingly assert their own cultural values and reject those "imposed" on them by the West. The "international system of the twenty-first century", Henry Kissinger has noted, "...will contain at least six major powers-the United States, Europe, China, Japan, Russia, and probably India-as well as a multiplicity of medium-sized and smaller countries".

Kissinger's six major powers belong to five very different civilizations, and in addition there are important Islamic states whose strategic locations, large populations, and/or oil resources make them influential in world affairs. In this new world, local politics is the politics of ethnicity; global politics is the politics of civilizations. The rivalry of the superpowers is replaced by the clash of civilizations.

In this new world the most pervasive, important, and dangerous conflicts will not be between social classes, rich and poor, or other economically defined groups, but between peoples belonging to different cultural entities. Tribal wars and ethnic conflicts will occur within civilizations. Violence between states and groups from different civilizations, however, carries with it the potential for escalation as other states and groups from these civilizations rally to the support of

their “kin countries”. The bloody clash of clans in Somalia poses no threat of broader conflict. The bloody clash of tribes in Rwanda has consequences for Uganda, Zaire, and Burundi but not much further. The bloody clashes of civilizations in Bosnia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, or Kashmir could become bigger wars. In the Yugoslav conflicts, Russia provided diplomatic support to the Serbs, and Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, and Libya provided funds and arms to the Bosnians, not for reasons of ideology or power politics or economic interest but because of cultural kinship. “Cultural conflicts”, Vaclav Havel has observed, “are increasing and are more dangerous today than at any time in history”, and Jacques Oelors agreed that “future conflicts will be sparked by cultural factors rather than economics or ideology”. And the most dangerous cultural conflicts are those along the fault lines between civilizations.

In the post-Cold War world, culture is both a divisive and a unifying force. People separated by ideology but united by culture come together, as the two Germanys did and as the two Koreas and the several Chinas are beginning to. Societies united by ideology or historical circumstance but divided by civilization either come apart, as did the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Bosnia, or are subjected to intense strain, as is the case with Ukraine, Nigeria, Sudan, India, Sri Lanka, and many others. Countries with cultural affinities cooperate economically and politically. International organizations based on states with cultural commonality, such as the European Union, are far more successful than those that attempt to transcend cultures. For forty-five years the Iron Curtain was the central dividing line in Europe. That line has moved several hundred miles east. It is now the line separating the peoples of Western Christianity, on the one hand, from Muslim and Orthodox peoples on the other.

The philosophical assumptions, underlying values, social relations, customs, and overall outlooks on life differ significantly among civilizations. The revitalization of religion throughout much of the world is reinforcing these cultural differences. Cultures can change, and the nature of their impact on politics and economics can vary from one period to another. Yet the major differences in political and economic development among civilizations are clearly rooted in their different cultures. East Asian economic success has its source in East Asian culture, as do the difficulties East Asian societies have had in achieving

stable democratic political systems. Islamic culture explains in large part the failure of democracy to emerge in much of the Muslim world. Developments in the postcommunist societies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are shaped by their civilizational identities. Those with Western Christian heritages are making progress toward economic development and democratic politics; the prospects for economic and political development in the Orthodox countries are uncertain; the prospects in the Muslim republics are bleak.

The West is and will remain for years to come the most powerful civilization. Yet its power relative to that of other civilizations is declining. As the West attempts to assert its values and to protect its interests, non-Western societies confront a choice. Some attempt to emulate the West and to join or to “band-wagon” with the West. Other Confucian and Islamic societies attempt to expand their own economic and military power to resist and to “balance” against the West. A central axis of post-Cold War world politics is thus the interaction of Western power and culture with the power and culture of non-Western civilizations.

In sum, the post-Cold War world is a world of seven or eight major civilizations. Cultural commonalities and differences shape the interests, antagonisms, and associations of states. The most important countries in the world come overwhelmingly from different civilizations. The local conflicts most likely to escalate into broader wars are those between groups and states from different civilizations. The predominant patterns of political and economic development differ from civilization to civilization. The key issues on the international agenda involve differences among civilizations. Power is shifting from the long predominant West to non-Western civilizations. Global politics has become multipolar and multicivilizational.

OTHERWORLDS?

Maps and Paradigms, this picture of post-Cold War world politics shaped by cultural factors and involving interactions among states and groups from different civilizations is highly simplified. It omits many things, distorts some things, and obscures others. Yet if we are to think seriously about the world, and act effectively in it, some sort of simplified map of reality, some theory, concept, model, paradigm, is necessary. Without such intellectual constructs, there is, as William

James said, only “a bloomin “buzzin” confusion”. Intellectual and scientific advance, Thomas Kuhn showed in his classic *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, consists of the displacement of one paradigm, which has become increasingly incapable of explaining new or newly discovered facts, by a new paradigm, which does account for those facts in a more satisfactory fashion. “To be accepted as a paradigm”, Kuhn wrote, “a theory must seem better than its competitors, but it need not, and in fact never does, explain all the facts with which it can be confronted”. “Finding one’s way through unfamiliar terrain”, John Lewis Caddis also wisely observed, “generally requires a map of some sort. Cartography, like cognition itself, is a necessary simplification that allows us to see where we are, and where we may be going”. The Cold War image of superpower competition was, as he points out, such a model, articulated first by Harry Truman, as “an exercise in geopolitical cartography that depicted the international landscape in terms everyone could understand, and so doing prepared the way for the sophisticated strategy of containment that was soon to follow”. World views and causal theories are indispensable guides to international politics.

For forty years students and practitioners of international relations thought and acted in terms of the highly simplified but very useful Cold War paradigm of world affairs. This paradigm could not account for everything that went on in world politics. There were many anomalies, to use Kuhn’s term, and at times the paradigm blinded scholars and statesmen to major developments, such as the Sino-Soviet split. Yet as a simple model of global politics, it accounted for more important phenomena than any of its rivals, it was an essential starting point for thinking about international affairs, it came to be almost universally accepted, and it shaped thinking about world politics for two generations.

Simplified paradigms or maps are indispensable for human thought and action. On the one hand, we may explicitly formulate theories or models and consciously use them to guide our behavior. Alternatively, we may deny the need for such guides and assume that we will act only in terms of specific “objective” facts, dealing with each case “on its merits”. If we assume this, however, we delude ourselves. For in the back of our minds are hidden assumptions, biases, and prejudices that determine how we perceive reality, what facts, we look at, and how we judge their importance and merits. We need explicit, or implicit models so as to be able to:

- 1. order and generalize about reality;*
- 2. understand causal relationships among phenomena;*
- 3. anticipate and, if we are lucky, predict future developments;*
- 4. distinguish what is important from what is unimportant;*
- 5. show us what paths we should take to achieve our goals.*

Every model or map is an abstraction and will be more useful for some purposes than for others. A road map shows us how to drive from A to B but will not be very useful if we are piloting a plane, in which case we will want a map highlighting airfields, radio beacons, flight paths, and topography. With no map, however, we will be lost. The more detailed a map is the more fully it will reflect reality. An extremely detailed map, however, will not be useful for many purposes. If we wish to get from one big city to another on a major expressway, we do not need and may find confusing a map which includes much information unrelated to automotive transportation and in which the major highways are lost in a complex mass of secondary roads. A map, on the other hand, which had only one expressway on it would eliminate much reality and limit our ability to find alternative routes if the expressway were blocked by a major accident. In short, we need a map that both portrays reality and simplifies reality in away that best serves our purposes. Several maps or paradigms of world politics were advanced at the end of the Cold War.

One World: Euphoria and Harmony. One widely articulated paradigm was based on the assumption that the end of the Cold War meant the end of significant conflict in global politics and the emergence of one relatively harmonious world. The most widely discussed formulation of this model was the “end of history” thesis advanced by Francis Fukuyama. “We may be witnessing”, Fukuyama argued, “...the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government”. To be sure, he said, some conflicts may happen in places in the Third World, but the global conflict is over, and not just in Europe. “It is precisely in the non-European world” that the big changes have occurred, particularly in China and the Soviet Union. The war of ideas is at an end. Believers in Marxist-Leninism may still exist “in places like Managua, Pyongyang, and Cambridge, Massachusetts”, but overall liberal democracy has triumphed. The future will be devoted not

to great exhilarating struggles over ideas but rather to resolving mundane economic and technical problems. And, he concluded rather sadly, it will all be rather boring.

The expectation of harmony was widely shared. Political and intellectual leaders elaborated similar views. The Berlin wall had come down, communist regimes had collapsed, the United Nations was to assume anew importance, the former Cold War rivals would engage in “partnership” and a “grand bargain”, peacekeeping and peacemaking would be the order of the day. The President of the world’s leading country proclaimed the “new world order”; the president of, arguably, the world’s leading university vetoed appointment of a professor of security studies because the need had disappeared: “Hallelujah! We study war no more because war is no more”.

The moment of euphoria at the end of the Cold War generated an illusion of harmony, which was soon revealed to be exactly that. The world became different in the early 1990s, but not necessarily more peaceful. Change was inevitable; progress was not. Similar illusions of harmony flourished, briefly, at the end of each of the twentieth century’s other major conflicts. World War I was the “war to end wars” and to make the world safe for democracy. World War II, as Franklin Roosevelt put it, would “end the system of unilateral action, the exclusive alliances, the balances of power, and all the other expedients that have been tried for centuries – and have always failed”. Instead we will have “a universal organization” of “peace-loving Nations” and the beginnings of a “permanent structure of peace”. World War I, however, generated communism, fascism, and the reversal of a century-old trend toward democracy. World War II produced a Cold War that was truly global. The illusion of harmony at the end of that Cold War was soon dissipated by the multiplication of ethnic conflicts and “ethnic cleansing”, the breakdown of law and order, the emergence of new patterns of alliance and conflict among states, the resurgence of neo-communist and neo-fascist movements, intensification of religious fundamentalism, the end of the “diplomacy of smiles” and “policy of yes” in Russia’s relations with the West, the inability of the United Nations and the United States to suppress bloody local conflicts, and the increasing assertiveness of a rising China. In the five years after the Berlin wall came down, the word “genocide” was heard far more often than in any five years of the Cold War.

The one harmonious world paradigm is clearly far too divorced from reality to be a useful guide to the post-Cold War world. Two Worlds: Us and Them. While one-world expectations appear at the end of major conflicts, the tendency to think in terms of two worlds recurs through-out human history. People are always tempted to divide people into us and them, the in-group and the other, our civilization and those barbarians. Scholars have analyzed the world in terms of the Orient and the Occident, North and South, center and periphery. Muslims have traditionally divided the world into Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb, the abode of peace and the abode of war.

This distinction was reflected, and in a sense reversed, at the end of the Cold War by American scholars who divided the world into “zones of peace” and “zones of turmoil”. The former included the West and Japan with about 15 percent of the world’s population, the latter everyone else. Depending upon how the parts are defined, a two-part world picture may in; some measure correspond with reality. The most common division, which appears under various names, is between rich (modern, developed) countries and poor (traditional, undeveloped or developing) countries. Historically correlating with this economic division is the cultural division between West and East, where the emphasis is less on differences in economic well-being and more on differences in underlying philosophy, values, and way of life. Each of these images reflects some elements of reality yet also suffers limitations. Rich modern countries share characteristics which differentiate them from poor traditional countries, which also share characteristics. Differences in wealth may lead to conflicts between societies, but the evidence suggests that this happens primarily when rich and more powerful societies attempt to conquer and colonize poor and more traditional societies. The West did this for four hundred years, and then some of the colonies rebelled and waged wars of liberation against the colonial powers, who may well have lost the will to empire. In the current world, decolonization has occurred, and colonial wars of liberation have been replaced by conflicts among the liberated peoples. At a more general level, conflicts between rich and poor are unlikely because, except in special circumstances, the poor countries lack the political unity, economic power, and military capability to challenge the rich countries. Economic development in Asia and Latin America is blurring the simple dichotomy of haves and have-

nots. Rich states may fight trade wars with each other; poor states may fight violent wars with each other; but an international class war between the poor South and the wealthy North is almost as far from reality as one happy harmonious world. The cultural bifurcation of the world division is still less useful. At some level, the West is an entity. What, however, do non-Western societies have in common other than the fact that they are non-Western? Japanese, Chinese, Hindu, Muslim, and American civilizations share little in terms of religion, social structure, institutions, and prevailing values.

The unity of the non-West and the East-West dichotomy are myths created by the West. These myths suffer the defects of the Orientalism which Edward Said appropriately criticized for promoting “the difference between the familiar (Europe, the West, “us”) and the strange (the Orient, the East, “them”)” and for assuming the inherent superiority of the former to the latter. During the Cold War the world was, in considerable measure, polarized along an ideological spectrum. There is, however, no single cultural spectrum. The polarization of “East” and “West” culturally is in part another consequence of the universal but unfortunate practice of calling European civilization Western civilization. Instead of “East and West”, it is more appropriate to speak of “the West and the rest”, which at least implies the existence of many non-Wests. The world is too complex to be usefully envisioned for most purposes as simply divided economically between North and South or culturally between East and West. 184 States, More or Less. A third map of the post-Cold War world derives from what is often called the “realist” theory of international relations. According to this theory states are the primary, indeed, the only important factors in world affairs, the relation among states is one of anarchy, and hence to ensure their survival and security, states invariably attempt to maximize their power. If one state sees another state increasing its power and thereby becoming a potential threat, it attempts to protect its own security by strengthening its, power and/or by allying itself with other states. The interests and actions of the; more or less 184 states of the post-Cold War world can be predicted from these assumptions. This “realist” picture of the world is a highly useful starting point for analyzing international affairs and explains much state behavior. States are and will remain the dominant entities in world affairs. They maintain armies, conduct diplomacy, negotiate

treaties, fight wars, control international organizations, influence and in considerable measure shape production and commerce. The governments of states give priority to ensuring the external security of their states (although they often may give higher priority to insuring their security as a government against internal threats). Overall, this statist paradigm does provide a more realistic picture of and guide to global politics than the one- or two-world paradigms. It also, however, suffers severe limitations. It assumes all states perceive their interests in the same way and act in the same way. Its simple assumption that power is all is a starting point for understanding state behavior but does not get one very far. States define their interests in terms of power but also in terms of much else besides. States often, of course, attempt to balance power, but if that is all they did, Western European countries would have coalesced with the Soviet Union against the United States in the late 1940s. States respond primarily to perceived threats, and the Western European states then saw a political, ideological, and military threat from the East.

They saw their interests in a way which would not have been predicted by classic realist theory. Values, culture, and institutions pervasively influence how states define their interests. The interests of states are also shaped not only by their domestic values and institutions but by international norms and institutions. Above and beyond their primal concern with security, different types of states define their interests in different ways. States with similar cultures and institutions will see common interest. Democratic states have commonalities with other democratic states and hence do not fight each other. Canada does not have to ally with another power to deter invasion by the United States. At a basic level the assumptions of the statist paradigm have been true throughout history. They thus do not help us to understand how global politics after the Cold War will differ from global politics during and before the Cold War. Yet clearly there are differences, and states pursue their interests differently from one historical period to another. In the post-Cold War world, states increasingly define their interests in civilizational terms. They cooperate with and ally themselves with states with similar or common culture and are more often in conflict with countries of different culture. States define threats in terms of the intentions of other states, and those intentions and how they are perceived are powerfully shaped by cultural considerations. Publics and statesmen are less likely

to see threats emerging from people they feel they understand and can trust because of shared language, religion, values, institutions, and culture. They are much more likely to see threats coming from states whose societies have different cultures and hence which they do not understand and feel they cannot trust. Now that a Marxist-Leninist Soviet Union no longer poses a threat to the Free World and the United States no longer poses a countering threat to the communist world, countries in both worlds increasingly see threats coming from societies which are culturally different. While states remain the primary actors in world affairs, they also are suffering losses in sovereignty, functions, and power. International institutions now assert the right to judge and to constrain what states do in their own territory. In some cases, most notably in Europe, international institutions have assumed important functions previously performed by states, and powerful international bureaucracies have been created which operate directly on individual citizens. Globally there has been a trend for state governments to lose power also through devolution to substate, regional, provincial, and local political entities. In many states, including those in the developed world, regional movements exist promoting substantial autonomy or secession. State governments have in considerable measure lost the ability to control the flow of money in and out of their country and are having increasing difficulty controlling the flows of ideas, technology, goods, and people. State borders, in short, have become increasingly permeable. All these developments have led many to see the gradual end of the hard, "billiard ball" state, which purportedly has been the norm since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, and the emergence of a varied, complex, multilayered international order more closely resembling that of medieval times. Sheer Chaos. The weakening of states and the appearance of "failed states" contribute to a fourth image of a world in anarchy. This paradigm stresses: the breakdown of governmental authority; the breakup of states; the intensification of tribal, ethnic, and religious conflict; the emergence of international criminal mafias; refugees multiplying into the tens of millions; the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction; the spread of terrorism; the prevalence of massacres and ethnic cleansing. This picture of a world in chaos was convincingly set forth and summed up in the titles of two penetrating works published in 1993: *Out of Control* by Zbigniew Brzezinski and *Pandaemonium* by Daniel Patrick Moynihan.

Like the states paradigm, the chaos paradigm is close to reality. It provides a graphic and accurate picture of much of what is going on in the world, and unlike the states paradigm, it highlights the significant changes in world politics that have occurred with the end of the Cold War. As of early 1993, for instance, an estimated 48 ethnic wars were occurring throughout the world, and 164 “territorial-ethnic claims and conflicts concerning borders” existed in the former Soviet Union, of which 30 had involved some form of armed conflict.¹⁴ Yet it suffers even more than the states paradigm in being too close to reality. The world may be chaos, but it is not totally without order. An image of universal and undifferentiated anarchy provides few clues for understanding the world, for ordering events and evaluating their importance, for predicting trends in the anarchy, for distinguishing among types of chaos and their possibly different causes and consequences, and for developing guidelines for governmental policy makers.

COMPARING WORLDS: REALISM, PARSIMONY, AND PREDICTIONS

Each of these four paradigms offers a somewhat different combination of realism and parsimony. Each also has its deficiencies and limitations. Conceivably these could be countered by combining paradigms, and positing, for instance, that the world is engaged in simultaneous processes of fragmentation and integration. Both trends indeed exist, and a more complex model will more closely approximate reality than a simpler one. Yet this sacrifices parsimony for realism and, if pursued very far, leads to the rejection of all paradigms or theories. In addition, by embracing two simultaneous opposing trends, the fragmentation-integration model fails to set forth under what circumstances one trend will prevail and under what circumstances the other will. The challenge is to develop a paradigm that accounts for more crucial events and provides a better understanding of trends than other paradigms at a similar level of intellectual abstraction.

These four paradigms are also incompatible with each other. The world cannot be both one and fundamentally divided between East and West or North and South. Nor can the nation state be the base rock of international affairs if it is fragmenting and torn by proliferating civil strife. The world is either one, or two, or 184 states, or potentially an almost infinite number of tribes, ethnic groups, and nationalities.

Viewing the world in terms of seven or eight civilizations avoids many of these difficulties. It does not sacrifice reality to parsimony as do the one- and two-world paradigms; yet it also does not sacrifice parsimony to reality as the statist and chaos paradigms do. It provides an easily grasped and intelligible framework for understanding the world, distinguishing what is important from what is unimportant among the multiplying conflicts, predicting future developments, and providing guidelines for policy makers. It also builds on and incorporates elements of the other paradigms. It is more compatible with them than they are with each other. A civilizational approach, for instance, holds that:

- The forces of integration in the world are real and are precisely what are generating counterforces of cultural assertion and civilizational consciousness.

- The world is in some sense two, but the central distinction is between the West as the hitherto dominant civilization and all the others, which, however, have little if anything in common among them. The world, in short, is divided between a Western one and a non-Western many.

- Nation states are and will remain the most important actors in world affairs, but their interests, associations, and conflicts are increasingly shaped by cultural and civilizational factors.

- The world is indeed anarchical, rife with tribal and nationality conflicts, but the conflicts that pose the greatest dangers for stability are those between states or groups from different civilizations.

A civilizational paradigm thus sets forth a relatively simple BUt not tOO simple map for understanding what is going on in the world as the twentieth century ends. No paradigm, however, is good forever. The Cold War model of world politics was useful and relevant for forty years but became obsolete in the late 1980s, and at some point, the civilizational paradigm will suffer a similar fate. For the contemporary period, however, it provides a useful guide for distinguishing what is more important from what is less important. Slightly less than half of the forty-eight ethnic conflicts in the world in early 1993, for example, were between groups from different civilizations. The civilizational perspective would lead the U.N. Secretary-General and the U.S. Secretary of State to concentrate their peacemaking efforts on these conflicts which have much greater potential than others to escalate into broader wars.

Paradigms also generate predictions, and a crucial test of a paradigm's validity and usefulness is the extent to which the predictions derived from it turn out to be more accurate than those from alternative paradigms. A statist paradigm, for instance, leads John Mearsheimer to predict that "the situation between Ukraine and Russia is ripe for the outbreak of security competition between them". Great powers that share along and unprotected common border, like that between Russia and Ukraine, often lapse into competition driven by security fears. Russia and Ukraine might overcome this dynamic and learn to live together in harmony, but it would be unusual if they do.

"A civilizational approach", on the other hand, emphasizes the close cultural, personal, and historical links between Russia and Ukraine and the intermingling of Russians and Ukrainians in both countries, and focuses instead on the civilizational fault line that divides Orthodox eastern Ukraine from Uniate western Ukraine, a central historical fact of long standing which, in keeping with the "realistic" concept of states as unified and self-identified entities, Mearsheimer totally ignores. While a statist approach highlights the possibility of a Russian-Ukrainian war, a civilizational approach minimizes that and instead highlights the possibility of Ukraine splitting in half, a separation which cultural factors would lead one to predict might be more violent than that of Czechoslovakia i but far less bloody than that of Yugoslavia. These different predictions, in turn, give rise to different policy priorities. Mearsheimer's statist prediction of possible war and Russian conquest of Ukraine leads him to support Ukraine's having "nuclear weapons". A civilizational approach would encourage cooperation between Russia and Ukraine, urge Ukraine to give up its nuclear weapons, promote substantial economic assistance and other measures to help maintain Ukrainian unity and independence, and sponsor contingency planning for the possible breakup of Ukraine...

Chapter 12. The West, Civilizations, and Civilization

THE RENEWAL OF THE WEST?

... The West has, in short, become a mature society entering into what future generations, in the recurring pattern of civilizations, will look back to as a “golden age”, a period of peace resulting, in Quigley’s terms, from “the absence of any competing units within the area of the civilization itself, and from the remoteness or even absence of struggles with other societies outside”. It is also a period of prosperity which arises from “the ending of internal belligerent destruction, the reduction of internal trade barriers, the establishment of a common system of weights, measures, and coinage, and from the extensive system of government spending associated with the establishment of a universal empire”.

In previous civilizations this phase of blissful golden age with its visions of immortality has ended either dramatically and quickly with the victory of an external society or slowly and equally painfully by internal disintegration. What happens within a civilization is as crucial to its ability to resist destruction from external sources as it is to holding off decay from within. Civilizations grow, Quigley argued in 1961, because they have an “instrument of expansion”, that is, a military, religious, political, or economic organization that accumulates surplus and invests it in productive innovations. Civilizations decline when they stop the “application of surplus to new ways of doing things. In modern terms we say that the rate of investment decreases”. This happens because the social groups controlling the surplus have a vested interest in using it for “nonproductive but ego-satisfying purposes. ..which distribute the surpluses to consumption but do not provide more effective methods of production”. People live off their capital and the civilization move from the stage of the universal state to the stage of decay. This is a period of acute economic depression, declining standards of living, civil wars between the various vested interests, and growing illiteracy. The society grows weaker and weaker. Vain efforts are made to stop the wastage by legislation. But the decline continues. The religious, intellectual, social, and political levels of the society began to lose the allegiance of the masses of the people on a large scale. New religious movements begin to sweep over the society. There is a growing reluctance to fight for the society or even to support it by paying taxes.

Decay then leads to the stage of invasion “when the civilization, no longer able to defend itself because it is no longer willing to defend itself, lies wide open to “barbarian invaders”, who often come from “another, younger, more powerful civilization””.

The overriding lesson of the history of civilizations, however, is that many things are probable but nothing is inevitable. Civilizations can and have reformed and renewed themselves. The central issue for the West is whether, quite apart from any external challenges, it is capable of stopping and reversing the internal processes of decay. Can the West renew itself or will sustained internal rot simply accelerate its end and/or subordination to other economically and demographically more dynamic civilizations?

In the mid-1990s the West had many characteristics Quigley identified as those of a mature civilization on the brink of decay. Economically the West was far richer than any other civilization, but it also had low economic growth rates, saving rates, and investment rates, particularly as compared with the societies of East Asia. Individual and collective consumption had priority over the creation of the capabilities for future economic and military power. Natural population growth was low, particularly compared with that of Islamic countries. Neither of these problems, however, would inevitably have catastrophic consequences. Western economies were still growing; by and large Western peoples were becoming better off; and the West was still the leader in scientific research and technological innovation. Low birth rates were unlikely to be cured by governments (whose efforts to do so are generally even less successful than their efforts to reduce population growth). Immigration, however, was a potential source of new vigor and human capital provided two conditions were met: first, if priority were given to able, qualified, energetic people with the talents and expertise needed by the host country; second, if the new migrants and their children were assimilated into the cultures of the country and the West. The United States was likely to have problems meeting the first condition and European countries problems meeting the second. Yet setting policies governing the levels, sources, characteristics, and assimilation of immigrants is well within the experience and competence of Western governments.

Far more significant than economics and demography are problems of moral decline, cultural suicide, and political disunity in the West. Oft-pointed-to manifestations of moral decline include:

1. Increases in antisocial behavior, such as crime, drug use, and violence generally;
2. Family decay, including increased rates of divorce, illegitimacy, teen-age pregnancy, and single-parent families;
3. At least in the United States, a decline in “social capital”, that is, membership in voluntary associations and the interpersonal trust associated with such membership;
4. General weakening of the “work ethic” and rise of a cult of personal indulgence;
5. Decreasing commitment to learning and intellectual activity, manifested in the United States in lower levels of scholastic achievement.

The future health of the West and its influence on other societies depends in considerable measure on its success in coping with those trends, which, of course, give rise to the assertions of moral superiority by Muslims and Asians.

Western culture is challenged by groups within Western societies. One such challenge comes from immigrants from other civilizations who reject assimilation and continue to adhere to and to propagate the values, customs, and cultures of their home societies. This phenomenon is most notable among Muslims in Europe, who are, however, a small minority. It is also manifest, in lesser degree, among Hispanics in the United States, who are a large minority.

If assimilation fails in this case, the United States will become a cleft country, with all the potentials for internal strife and disunion that entails. In Europe, Western civilization could also be undermined by the weakening of its central component, Christianity. Declining proportions of Europeans profess religious beliefs, observe religious practices, and participate in religious activities. This trend reflects not so much hostility to religion as indifference to it.

Christian concepts, values, and practices nonetheless pervade European civilization. “Swedes are probably the most unreligious people in Europe”, one of them commented, “but you cannot understand this country at all unless you realize that our institutions, social practices,

families, politics, and way of life are fundamentally shaped by our Lutheran heritage”. Americans, in contrast to Europeans, overwhelmingly believe in God, think themselves to be religious people, and attend church in large numbers. While evidence of a resurgence of religion in America was lacking as of the mid-1980s the following decade seemed to witness intensified religious activity. The erosion of Christianity among Westerners is likely to be at worst only a very long term threat to the health of Western civilization.

A more immediate and dangerous challenge exists in the United States. Historically American national identity has been defined culturally by the heritage of Western civilization and politically by the principles of the American Creed on which Americans overwhelmingly agree: liberty, democracy, individualism, equality before the law, constitutionalism, private property. In the late twentieth century both components of American identity have come under concentrated and sustained onslaught from a small but influential number of intellectuals and publicists. In the name of multiculturalism they have attacked the identification of the United States with Western civilization, denied the existence of a common American culture, and promoted racial, ethnic, and other subnational cultural identities and groupings. They have denounced, in the words of one of their reports, the “systematic bias toward European culture and its derivatives” in education and “the dominance of the European-American monocultural perspective”. The multiculturalists are, as Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., said, “very often ethnocentric separatists who see little in the Western heritage other than Western crimes”. Their “mood is one of divesting Americans of the sinful European inheritance and seeking redemptive infusions from non-Western cultures”.

The multicultural trend was also manifested in a variety of legislation that followed the civil rights acts of the 1960s, and in the 1990s the Clinton administration made the encouragement of diversity one of its major goals. The contrast with the past is striking. The Founding Fathers saw diversity as a reality and as a problem: hence the national motto, *e pluribus unum*, chosen by a committee of the Continental Congress consisting of Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and John Adams. Later political leaders who also were fearful of the dangers of racial, sectional, ethnic, economic, and cultural diversity (which, indeed, produced the largest war of the century between 1815 and 1914),

responded to the call of “bring us together” , “and made the promotion of national unity their central responsibility”. “The one absolutely certain way of bringing this nation to ruin, of preventing all possibility of its continuing as a nation at all”, warned Theodore Roosevelt, “would be to permit it to become a tangle of squabbling nationalities”. In the 1990s, however, the leaders of the United States have not only permitted that but assiduously promoted the diversity rather than the unity of the people they govern.

The leaders of other countries have, as we have seen, at times attempted to disavow their cultural heritage and shift the identity of their country from one civilization to another. In no case to date have they succeeded, and they have instead created schizophrenic torn countries. The American multiculturalists similarly reject their country’s cultural heritage. Instead of attempting to identify the United States with another civilization, however, they wish to create a country of many civilizations, which is to say a country not belonging to any civilization and lacking a cultural core. History shows that no country so constituted can long endure as a coherent society. A multicivilizational United States will not be the United States; it will be the United Nations.

The multiculturalists also challenged a central element of the American Creed, by substituting for the rights of individuals the rights of groups, defined largely in terms of race, ethnicity, sex, and sexual preference. The Creed, Gunnar Myrdal said in the 1940s, reinforcing the comments of foreign observers dating from Hector St. John de Crevecoeur and Alexis de Tocqueville, has been “the cement in the structure of this great and disparate nation”. “It has been our fate as a nation”, Richard Hofstadter agreed, “not to have ideologies but to be one”. What happens then to the United States if that ideology is disavowed by a significant portion of its citizens? The fate of the Soviet Union, the other major country whose unity, even more than that of the United States, was defined in ideological terms is a sobering example for Americans. “[T]he total failure of Marxism and the dramatic breakup of the Soviet Union”, the Japanese philosopher Takeshi Umehara has suggested, “are only the precursors to the collapse of Western liberalism, the main current of modernity. Far from being the alternative to Marxism and the reigning ideology at the end of history, liberalism will be the next domino to fall”.

In an era in which peoples everywhere define themselves in cultural terms what place is there for a society without a cultural core and defined only by a political creed? Political principles are a fickle base on which to build a lasting community. In a multicivilizational world where culture counts, the United States could be simply the last anomalous holdover from a fading Western world where ideology counted. Rejection of the Creed and of Western civilization means the end of the United States of America as we have known it. It also means effectively the end of Western civilization. If the United States is de-Westernized, the West is reduced to Europe and a few lightly populated overseas European settler countries. Without the United States the West becomes a minuscule and declining part of the world's population on a small and inconsequential peninsula at the extremity of the Eurasian land mass.

The clash between the multiculturalists and the defenders of Western civilization and the American Creed is, in James Kurth's phrase, "the Teal clash" within the American segment of Western civilization. Americans cannot avoid the issue: Are we a Western people or are we something else? The futures of the United States and of the West depend upon Americans reaffirming their commitment to Western civilization. Domestically this means rejecting the divisive siren calls of multiculturalism. Internationally it means rejecting the elusive and illusory calls to identify the United States with Asia. Whatever economic connections may exist between them, the fundamental cultural gap between Asian and American societies precludes their joining together in a common home. Americans are culturally part of the Western family; multiculturalists may damage and even destroy that relationship but they cannot replace it. When Americans look for their cultural roots, they find them in Europe.

In the mid-1990s new discussion occurred of the nature and future of the West, a renewed recognition arose that such a reality had existed, and heightened concern about what would insure its continued existence. This in part germinated from the perceived need to expand the premier Western institution, NATO, to include the Western countries to the east and from the serious divisions that arose within the West over how to respond to the breakup of Yugoslavia. It also more broadly reflected anxiety about the future unity of the West in the absence of a Soviet threat and particularly what this meant for the United States commitment

to Europe. As Western countries increasingly interact with increasingly powerful non-Western societies, they become more and more aware of their common Western cultural core that binds them together... Whether the West comes together politically and economically, however, depends overwhelmingly on whether the United States reaffirms its identity as a Western nation and defines its global role as the leader of Western civilization.

Huntington, Samuel P.
The Clash of Civilizations and
The Remaking of World Order
2011

<https://www.stetson.edu › artsci › media › clash>

SUGGESTED READING

Basic:

1. Blackburn, Simon. (2007) *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*. – Oxford University Press, USA, 407 p.
2. Baudrillard, Jean. (1983) *Simulations* [Translated by Paul Foss, Paul Patton and Philip Beitchman] Foreign Agents Series, Columbia University New York City, New York <http://www.naturalthinker.net/trl/texts/Baudrillard,Jean/simulations.html>
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Web resources

1. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy – <http://www.iep.utm.edu>
2. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online – <https://www.rep.routledge.com>
3. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy – <http://plato.stanford.edu>
4. Meta-Encyclopedia of Philosophy – <http://www.ditext.com/encyc/frame.html>
5. The Proceedings of the Friesian School – <http://www.friesian.com>
6. Philosophy Pages – <http://philosophypages.com>

EXAM QUESTIONS

1. What is the subject matter of philosophical discourse?
2. The main functions of philosophy.
3. What is the major issue of pre-modern philosophy?
4. The main branches of philosophy.
5. The concept of dialectics and its historical types.
6. What does the term of negative dialectics mean?
7. Specifics of ancient dialectics.
8. Point out the main principles of dialectical argumentation.
9. Give examples of the main dialectical tensions of classical philosophy.
10. The issue of freedom in philosophical tradition.
11. Determinism and voluntarism as the worldview attitudes in philosophy.
12. The divergence of philosophical approaches.
13. Relationship between philosophical categories “essence” and “substance”.
14. What does the concept of metaphysics mean?
15. What does the term of existence mean from the standpoint of existentialists?
16. Existential clarification of metaphysics.
17. What is hermeneutics?
18. What is eclecticism?
19. Describe the general features of “mythical thought”.
20. What are the main characteristics of religious worldview?
21. The issue of correlation between mythological and religious worldviews.
22. The essence of religious faith on the part of existentialism.
23. The notion of science and forms of scientific knowledge.
24. The correlation between religion, philosophy and science.
25. The notion of paradigm in its correlation with the notion of “image of the world”.

26. The main trends of ancient philosophy.
27. Describe the movements and specifics of medieval philosophy.
28. Representatives of German classical philosophy and related fundamental issues.
29. The main approaches within the framework of modern philosophy.
30. What approaches of postmodern philosophy do you know?
31. The main stages of historical development of ontology.
32. The characteristics of classical ontology.
33. What do you know about existential ontology?
34. Fundamental notions of existentialism.
35. Whom does belong to the category of “Limit situation” and what exactly does it mean?
36. Define the main meanings of the category of “simulacrum”.
37. Simulacra in the economic life of society.
38. The notion and structure of consciousness.
39. Transcendental approach to consciousness.
40. “Practical Reason” as a leading narrative in modern anthropology.
41. What is the phenomenology of consciousness?
42. “Phenomenological ontology” and the issue of consciousness.
43. Anthropology and philosophical anthropology.
44. Fundamental notions of psychoanalysis.
45. The main issue of philosophical anthropology.
46. The phenomenon of rationalistic anthropology.
47. Unconscious as the basis for development of psychoanalytic anthropology.
48. Define the concept of “anthropological type”.
49. The idea and structure of the so-called collective unconscious.
50. Destructiveness as a central issue of psychoanalytic anthropology.
51. The phenomenon of “malignant aggression”.
52. The idea of sublimation as an attempt to explain culture.
53. The postmodern criticism of psychoanalysis.
54. What is a system approach in social theory?

55. The phenomenon of transgression as the subject matter of philosophical studies.
56. What is structuralism?
57. Psychoanalytic origins of structuralism.
58. The main issue of social philosophy.
59. The issue of conceptualization and classification of society.
60. The notion of socio-economic formation, basis and superstructure.
61. The idea of social stratification and whom does it belong to?
62. The notion of social structure.
63. The correlation between social structure and culture.
64. Institutional basis of social system.
65. Institutional transformation of so-called “advanced society”.
66. The concept of “discourses of power”.
67. Postmodern social criticism.
68. Ethical focus of civilizational paradigm.
69. The concept and classification of civilizations.
70. Tension between “civilizations” as a matter of global crisis.
71. Socio-economic expediency of family institutions.
72. Theory of mental sociogenesis of personality.
73. The notion and issue of social technologies of influence.
74. The evolution of social technologies (sanctions) as a philosophical issue.
75. Development of critical social theory, and its representatives.
76. The concept of postindustrial society.
77. Theory of a “mass society”.
78. The notion of popular (mass) culture.
79. Civilization paradigm in philosophy of history.
80. Culture and civilization in terms of their correlation.
81. The process of Globalization and “the clash of civilizations”.

*The Department of
Philosophy of Humanities*

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